False Belief and the Meno Paradox

Elly Pirocacos

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429862373
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Epistemology in Philosophy

Published in 1998, the philosophical concern of this book is epistemological in kind. It involves understanding the Socratic elentic method and how its structure introduces an important epistemological problem which is first raised in the "Meno" dialogue as a paradox. This paradox, named the Meno paradox, raises the problem of falsehood. Specifically the impossibility of falsehood. The "Theaetetus" dialogue is then analyzed in terms of how falsehood is there set up as a clearly epistemological problem. The "Sophist" dialogue is in turn discussed as offering a response to the problem of falsehood by revising it as a problem for semantics.

1 The Meno

Introduction

The Meno is commonly believed to be a transitional dialogue which means that the ideas presented in the Meno move beyond what can reasonably be supposed to represent Socratic, as opposed to Platonic philosophy. Whether there is any legitimate historical content in Plato’s dialogues, and whether he can at any time be counted on to present any ideas other than his own is still a controversial issue which may find no resolution.¹ What can be said about the transitional nature of this dialogue however is that it sets up, and attempts to resolve a fundamental question which each of the dialogues which preceded it inadvertently raised. Specifically, the unique nature of the Meno is that it (i) locates a serious logico-methodological problem for the so-called Socratic elenctic method; (ii) that this problem finds expression in the so-called Meno Paradox, (iii) that (ii) raises serious epistemological questions where the topic of false belief will be central; that (iv) a sample elenchus (the slave boy) is presented to illustrate the proposed solution; and that (v) the proposed solution is the Theory of Recollection.

The most immediately compelling aspect of the early Socratic dialogue is the non-constructivist and provocative force of its aporetic end. All encounters with Socrates end when one of his interlocutor’s beliefs are shown to be inconsistent with the conjunct of a number of his other beliefs. A minimum conception of the elenchus thus reveals that at least one of these beliefs must be rejected in order to maintain consistency. But the perplexity lodged in the belief-set of the interlocutor does not make the location of the faulty belief an accessible task, since the only epistemic requirement of the elenchus is that the participants sincerely express their beliefs, namely that they believe that they are true. If the participants believe all their beliefs true, a revealed inconsistency demonstrates that at least one of their beliefs must be false, without indicating which one. It is this end that has generated feelings of animosity amongst elenctic participants,² as well as misgivings regarding the pedagogico-epistemological merit of the method it is most remembered for. Not until the Meno however does Plato discuss the logical form of the elenchus explicitly and ask whether it can achieve the purpose for which it has been exercised given its form, namely a search for truth. Since this is the catalytic question which prompted Plato to embark on this philosophic expedition, the formulation of it will provide a key to all subsequent sections in this chapter.

This introduces an engaging problem which does not find Socrates and Plato in complete agreement. For Socrates the moralist, elenctic inquiry begins with existing beliefs and at the end makes the status of these available to his interlocutors for scrutiny. This already implies the opinion that belief is short of knowledge, and that belief can be converted into knowledge. I will argue that Meno’s version of the paradox corresponds to the elenctic method as practised by Socrates, and is therefore consistent with the implications mentioned above. I will also argue that Socrates’ reformulation of the paradox which is marked by the insertion of the all-or-nothing assumption reflects deeper concerns that may be attributed to Plato. Specifically, I will argue that two things are going on. Firstly, the 3-stage paradox as developed by Meno starts off with the ability to get inquiry started and therefore also with the distinction between belief and knowledge. Secondly, the all-or-nothing assumption gets inserted by Plato through Socrates, and this is an assumption about thinking or the required ability to identify an object to then go on to think about. Meno’s formulation of the paradox is incongruous with what the all-or-nothing assumption would have us accept since it would stump inquiry from the beginning. That this does not occur, I have already said, is consistent with the elenchus. The problem commonly raised for the elenchus even by Plato in his dialogues is that it is similar to the sophistic method. On the grounds that indeed it can get started, and the antilogic that both methods use, we could easily confuse the elenchus with sophism. Hence, the description of the elenchus as contentious; a word normally used to describe sophistry. This suggests that fault is usually found with the elenctic method not because it can not get underway, but because it can not convert belief into knowledge.

So two things are going on here. There is what Plato is confused about genuinely, namely how the mind ever grabs hold of something to think without knowing that thing completely, hence the all-or-nothing assumption. This is a genuine concern for Plato, but presumably the reason for inquiry is that he believes that it must be somehow mistaken. The other thing is the similarity of the elenchus and the sophistic method which is a related but separate problem about knowledge. Specifically it is about the problem of converting belief into knowledge. The remainder of the Meno following the Meno Paradox is reserved for answering the problem of knowledge acquisition, and the assumption which Socrates inserts is saved for a discussion first in the Theaetetus and later in the Sophist which will introduce the puzzles on the impossibility of falsehood.³ Plato does therefore recognise the self-defeatingness of the elenchus and accepts the commonplace notion that belief short of knowledge is possible as well as that inquiry is possible. However, Plato remains perplexed by the all-or-nothing assumption and he will work out epistemological and semantic puzzles from the underlying thrust of this assumption. By the end of the Sophist, which is the dialogue in which Plato presumably makes concrete headway, we should expect Plato to be able to show us, not that inquiry is possible but rather how inquiry thoughtfully proceeds and how truth and knowledge may be gained thereby. The proposed solution takes Plato into deep semantic waters since the challenge that Plato here sets himself requires that he can explain what ‘thought and speech’ involve and how beliefs may be meaningful and still short of truth or knowledge. I argue that the all-or-nothing assumption is a problem for thought and that it is because Plato is concerned with the objects of thought and how it is that the mind can grab hold of these that the puzzles for both inquiry and falsehood follow. In turn, I also argue that once Plato takes on board the view that belief is short of knowledge and that thinking is meaningful irrespective, that he will be required to rethink his assumption about how and what the mind thinks. This would require that thought is not understood to merely involve strings of identified objects somehow, but some manner in which reflection can take place. Finally, I would like to point out that if it were the case that Plato was really convinced that ‘something is either known completely or not at all’ surely Meno’s paradox and Socrates’ so-called reformulation of it would be different in no way whatsoever; in which case, Plato would also have to accept that inquiry is indeed impossible. We would expect him therefore to either embrace sophism or abandon the pursuit for truth. As it is, Plato was an ardent defender of the elenchus and though perplexed by this assumption which has strong roots in what has been coined the Parmenidean Challenge, he was not committed to its truth. In fact, his mission is to overthrow this epistemological and semantic challenge. It must be possible to have belief short of knowledge and beliefs must be meaningful even when false.

In light of what has already been argued in the Introduction regarding the sophistic method, the Meno and the Meno Paradox are important to the philosophical framework of the topic of false thinking. That is, the elenctic method in opposition to the eristic method stands to gain a great deal from the debate since the possibility of false thinking will by implication undermine the relativism of sophistry. More than this, the problem divulged by the Meno Paradox for the elenchus will be shown to overlap with the epistemological puzzle leading up to the paradox of false thinking. The job here is to show that the epistemological puzzle raised by the Meno Paradox does not deviate from the central problem of false thinking explicitly discussed in the Theaetetus and Sophist. The Meno Paradox hinges on a misplaced understanding of what thinking involves, so that the ability to think of something or the ability to identify something for thought—for want of making a mockery of thought and speech altogether—presumes complete or exhaustive knowledge of that thing. Again, the infallibility of thought follows as a consequent, but here it flies in the face of the elenchus since unlike the sophistic eristic method, it is inconsistent with its epistemological basis, and consequently the end of Socratic inquiry, namely knowledge. This chapter has, therefore, a twofold task: (i) to set out the elenctic method in full; and (ii) to exhibit the paradoxical epistemological starting point of the elenchus, and how this obstructs its own pursued end, which will be shown to overlap in philosophical interest with the topic of false thinking.

Elenctic Form

Agreement regarding the structural form of the elenchus⁴ is unanimous; however, the intention and rules of its exercise are not wholly unified in interpretation. Does Socrates intend to establish the falsehood of his interlocutor’s thesis, or is he content to deflate their unjustified conceit of knowledge by revealing the inconsistency of their belief set? Must the counter-argument itself be a sound argument, or will it suffice that its exposition is based on those beliefs sincerely held by the interlocutor? Is it imperative that the interlocutor himself also comprehend the logical necessity of his self-contradictory conclusion, or is it intended as an exercise for the reader of the dialogue? Is the Socratic disavowal of knowledge sincere, or is it an eristic trick?

Elenchus has consequently been variously defined; sometimes as examination, cross-examination, censure, but more often as refutation. But the word elenchein, Vlastos argues, is used by Plato to describe, rather than baptise, what he does,⁵ so that, though all elenctic arguments are shown to refute, at least in a limited sense, the refutand, this is a consequence of the method, not necessarily its intention; and this may say more about the status of our beliefs, rather than the method itself.

The Formal Structure

(1) The interlocutor asserts a thesis, say p, in response to a typical Socratic ‘What is x?’question.⁶

(2) To a series of secondary questions Socrates manages to get the interlocutor to agree to a number of further premises, say q and r.

(3) Socrates argues and the interlocutor agrees that q and r entail not-p.

(4) Socrates argues and the interlocutor agrees that p and not-p can not both be true at the same time; and therefore, at least one of his beliefs must be false.

Further elaboration of this method requires that we first specify the objective of the elenchus (O); and the rules (R) by which the method is meant to proceed in order to secure (O). As defined by (O) and (R) these constraining conditions will be shown to suggest that the elenctic method is logically limited to exposing the inconsistency of the belief-set of the interlocutor, rather than prove the falsehood of the refutand; and that the problems raised for the elenchus by the Meno Paradox logically follow from this interpretation.

With respect to (O) the distinctive nature of Socratic, as opposed to sophistic argument, is telling. Though the use of antilogic is common to both, it was argued in the Introduction, that unlike the sophist who sought to persuade his audience to adopt a particular belief by whatever means, Socrates was committed to two distinguishing principles.

Two pertinent conditions apply for (O):

(O1) that assent to belief be restricted to those beliefs that can be proved true.

(O2) that the elenchus should reveal to the interlocutor that his conceit of knowledge is unjustified.

In turn, three further conditions can be inferred for the Rules by which inquiry can proceed:

(O1) introduces (R1) which is an epistemic constraint, which provides that the concluding belief is accepted only if the argument in support of it is both valid and sound.

(O2) introduces (R2) or the availability constraint which provides that the interlocutor must be in a position to follow the argumentative method which reveals the inconsistency of his beliefs.

and finally (R3) or the doxastic constraint⁷ provides that all the beliefs sincerely belong to the interlocutor (i.e. that he believes them).⁸

In summary then, the success of the method is achieved when the interlocutor (R2) deduces the falsehood of his original belief, from a number of other beliefs that he also believes are true (R3), and when his reasoning has been both valid and sound (R1).⁹ In other words, the conclusion of the counter-argument must be both valid and sound, and the interlocutor must comprehend the logical necessity of its conclusion.

The incompatibility of the epistemic condition at (R1) on the one hand, and the psychological condition at (R3) on the other hand, generates a paradox which logically restricts the elenctic method to its traditionally accepted non-constructivist aporetic interpretation. It is because the beliefs being used to test the truth of the original thesis are also beliefs that are simply accepted as true by the interlocutor, and are not already known to be true, that at the end of the elenchus it is unclear which of all those beliefs is false. The interlocutor expresses the belief that p is true; and to a number of further questions he expresses that q, and r, are also true. The interlocutor is equally committed to the truth of each one of these beliefs; and in case we are worried that he is just repeating popular opinion, he is asked specifically by Socrates to boldly express only those beliefs that he accepts as true. By way of deductive argument, Socrates then demonstrates to the interlocutor for his understanding, that the conjunct of these beliefs {p,q,r} is self-contradictory, in which case at least one of these beliefs must be false. But which one? Unless each of these beliefs in turn is submitted to the elenchus the truth-value of each will remain unknown. And yet, given (R3), this would again introduce a number of other beliefs that the interlocutor has that may or may not be consistent with his other beliefs. The interlocutor is at a loss, and since he is unable to think himself out of this logical entanglement, the dialogue unsurprisingly ends. In other words, unable to render judgement regarding the soundness of the counter-argument the dialogue ends with the only logically inferable conclusion, inconsistency.

Vlastos On the Socratic Elenchus¹⁰

Convinced that Socrates is not over-stating when he says in the Gorgias, ‘has it not been proved that what was asserted [by myself] is true?’ (479e), Vlastos attempted to provide a novel reading of the elenchus that would justify this bold claim, i.e. that the refutand is proved false. This demonstration hinges on the acceptance that (1) (R3) is incomplete because the interlocutor’s beliefs must not only be his own but Socrates must also accept or believe them to be true; and (2) that Socrates has elenctic knowledge¹¹ which verifies to him that his belief-set is consistent, and therefore, true. This view is obviously inconsistent with the above and it will be shown to be unacceptable; yet, Vlastos raises a significant point at (2) that deserves elaboration.

That textual support is restricted to a single quote from the Gorgias is already reason enough to doubt that Socrates at all aims at proving anything more than inconsistency. However, whether textual evidence can, in fact, support this view is a secondary issue; what is more interesting is if, given its structure and rules of exposition, it can logically prove that the refutand is false.

Already Vlastos’ concession (1) is troubling. If Socrates is going to accept and use in the elenctic process only those doxastic beliefs (R3) that he accepts are true (presumably he asks leading questions which he is already convinced will render the ‘right’ belief), then in retrospect both Socrates’ pedagogic and knowledge disclaimer is an eristic trick used to manipulate his respondents into answering his questions with the intention to shame them. In turn his use of antilogic would become indistinguishable from the sophistic use that Plato seems so determined to keep clearly apart.

Regarding (2) Vlastos introduces an adventurous assumption A which he says Socrates could justifiably have inferred as a meta-elenctic statement, and from which two further assumptions are derived B and C.

A Anyone who ever has a false moral belief will always have at the same time true beliefs entailing the negation of that false belief.

B The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is consistent.

C The set of moral beliefs held by Socrates at any given time is true.

The truth of A is inductively inferred from the outcome of numerous elenctic arguments which show that ‘every time he [Socrates] tangles with people who defend a thesis he considers false and he looks for true premises among their own beliefs from which he can deduce its negation the needed premises are in place; they are always where they should be if A is true. So he has this purely inductive evidence for A’.¹² it follows that a consistent belief-set must be sound, for given A, any belief-set that contains at least one false belief must also contain true beliefs entailing its negation, in which case it would be an inconsisten...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The Meno
• 2 The Theaetetus and False Belief
• 3 False Belief in the Theaetetus
• 4 False Belief in the Sophist
• 5 Resolving Falsehood
• Conclusion
• Bibliography