The Foundation of Hume's Philosophy

Paul A. Mwaipaya

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429798863
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1999, this volume endeavours to determine the coherence of David Hume's philosophical system. That is, to show that Hume' philosophy is founded upon nothing but his doctrine of belief, from which the entirety of Hume's philosophy may ultimately be derived. Paul A. Mwaipaya demonstrates the coherence of Hume's thoughts in order to show where it has been misunderstood and to dissolve confusing interpretations of Hume's philosophy. This ultimate commonality is derived through examinations of Hume's general theory of perception, Hume's theory of knowledge and probability and Hume's theory of passions and morality.

1 The Foundation of Hume's Philosophy

Section 1.0 Thesis

This study proposes that the entire philosophy of David Hume is based on his doctrine of belief; that belief is the most fundamental principle in Hume's philosophy; and that upon it Hume depends for an explanation of the constituents of human nature, and indeed upon which all his basic principles rely. In other words, the thesis of this study is that belief is the heart of the science of Man, the balancing factor for all the demands for human survival; and that it is the determining principle in Hume's experimental study of human nature (Hume: 1739,I, IV, 7, 273).

In Hume's judgement, the science of Man, human behaviour and conduct, or the science of human nature consists of two principal elements, namely: the understanding (thinking and reasoning) and affections (passions, sentiments, feelings, desires and emotions). These two principal elements are considered by Hume to be of the utmost importance and, indeed, to be the absolutely necessary basis of all human actions (Hume: 1739, III, Π, 2,493). Inasmuch as belief is the foundation of every principle in Hume's philosophy, this means that the doctrine of belief is the foundation of the understanding and affections: thinking, reasoning, passions, desires and emotions (and, of course, of our sense of morality, which Hume believes is supposedly founded on the passions).

Before attempting to explain what precisely belief is for Hume, we must however first of all pinpoint the peculiar meanings he attaches to this notion in his philosophy.

When we talk in ordinary language about belief, we usually have in mind our opinions, convictions, probable certainties or probable certitudes, elements we are not readily prepared to give up. Furthermore, we also use "belief" in connection with our religious convictions. Certainly, we do not conceive belief to be a certain kind of vivid feeling of ideas in our minds, as Hume takes it to be.

Though the applicability of Hume's conception of "belief" is not different from that which we ordinary people and which even his fellow philosophers have, yet, as a peculiar philosopher, he finds it appropriate to define belief in an equally peculiar and very different manner from what we normally take it to be.

In his view, belief is a very strong feeling which projects reality characteristics on our conceptions, such that we are prepared to act upon them. That is, for Hume, belief is a lively idea associated with a present sense impression; that it is an idea which feels very strongly in the mind. As he phrases it, belief is none other than a lively, forceful or solid idea (Hume: 1739, 624), which has almost the same impact in our minds as sense impressions usually have, namely, that of projecting reality upon whatever conception we have before the mind.

Let us now explain how an idea in the mind becomes lively, or how an idea becomes a believed idea, according to Hume.

Hume tells us that an idea or a conception in the mind becomes lively when a communication of force and vividness takes place from a present perceived object or from an impression to the idea itself (Hume: 1739, I,III, 98). This communication of force and vividness, from a present perceived object or from a present sense impression, enables an idea in the mind to acquire that forcefulness, that vividness, or that liveliness which turns it into a believed idea. A believed idea, says Hume, is more lively, more forceful, or more vivid than any fictitious idea or than the mere reveries of the imagination.

According to Hume, it is this peculiar feature of a believed idea which distinguishes it from a mere loose conception of the mind: i.e., it is by means of its forcefulness and vividness that a believed idea is differentiated from anon-believed one, from a faint and languid idea. Vivid ideas are very effective, whenever they make their presence felt in the mind, and, as a result, their vividness forces us to act and react in a variety of ways. In short, Hume maintains that the communication of force and vividness is possible, principally because there is a "casual" relationship or a connection between an idea in the mind and a present sense impression.

When, for instance, a present sense impression is considered as a single perception, limited to the present moment, it is incapable of communicating force and vividness to any idea in the mind. It is only after the "casual" relationship has been established, between an idea in the mind and a present sense impression, that force and vividness is communicated to an idea, and thus makes it lively. In its first appearance in the mind, and, indeed, taken on its own, an impression of sensation is said to be utterly incapable to lead the mind into the formation of belief (Hume: 1739, I,III,8, 102). On the contrary, it is only after a good number of experiences, in which a connection is established between certain objects, that the relationship or connection of the idea and a present sense impression can become operative, eventually enabling that communication of force and vividness to emerge. "We must in every case have found it to be constantly conjoined with some other impression", that a present sense impression can bestow vivacity on a connected idea (Hume: 1739, I,III,8, 102).

In view of this, Hume proclaims that, "when any impression becomes present to us, it does not only transport the mind to such ideas as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a share of its force and vivacity" (Hume: 1739, I,III,8, 98). That is, as soon as a present sense impression is found to be related to an idea, either by some degree of resemblance but more so by other relations such as causation, that the communication of force and vividness takes place. This kind of transfer of force and vividness is said to be responsible for causing an idea in the mind to become more lively than a fictitious one, to be more vivid than a mere loose conception in the mind.

In other words, it is the communication of force and vividness from a present sense impression, which ultimately transforms an idea in the mind from a mere simple or ordinary idea to a believed one, or to belief itself. This is why Hume maintains that belief is nothing else than a vivid conviction or a vivid opinion which the mind may not give up so easily, especially when it is related to its correspondent present experience.

The communication of force and vividness between an idea in the mind and a present sense impression is natural, and therefore not the product of conscious deliberation or of conscious thinking, as one usually thinks. This communication of force and vividness can in fact be considered as an almost mechanical process. In this way, Hume differs radically from the ordinary conception of the origin of our beliefs. Little wonder, he is often misunderstood.

As pointed out already, Hume thinks that belief is nothing more than a lively idea associated with a present impression, and that therefore it does not consist in the addition of a new idea to one or other conception in the mind. He in fact rejects the general assumption, that belief initially consists in the addition of a new idea to one or other conception in the mind, on the basis that if belief consisted in the addition of a new idea to the original conception, then the new idea could only be that of existence. But existence is not an idea, Hume insists (Hume: 1739,1, II, 6, 66). Secondly, Hume rejects the assumption that belief consists in the addition of a new idea to one or other conception in the mind, on the ground that if belief consisted in the addition of a new idea to the original conception, it could then be within the powers of an individual perceiver to add this new idea to any idea whenever he pleases (Hume: 1739, 623-624). For Hume, such liberty does not exist; and that we indeed have no access to such liberty. And this is why the newly formed idea is unable to freely enter into a believed idea.

The new idea which (together with the original conception) supposedly forms belief is usually thought of as the idea of existence. But as Hume repeatedly tells us, no such idea of existence enters into belief in the sense in which there is, for example, an idea for "red", which could be added to some conception (Hume: 1739, 1,1,1, 3). Against this background, Hume simply declares that, "The idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and that when after the simple conception of anything we would conceive it as existent, we really make no addition to or alteration on our first idea" (Hume: 1739, I,III,7, 94).

To prove this point beyond doubt, Hume gives the example of the idea of God, in which he claims that: "When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither increases nor diminishes" (Hume: 1739,I,III,7, 94). That is, Hume thinks that belief is not the conception of a thing plus the idea of existence, hence his conviction that our beliefs in something real can only come from the way an idea "feels", from the way an idea "impresses" us. Phrased differently, Hume maintains that there is absolutely nothing which is connected with belief, apart from these three essential elements, namely: a present sense impression, a lively idea, and a relation or connection in the fancy between the impression and its correlated idea (Hume: 1739,I,III,8, 101).

From here, Hume then tries to answer the following question: Wherein consists the difference betwixt incredulity and belief? (Hume: 1739, I,III, 7, 95). In his judgement, "This operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy: though no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it" (Hume: 1739, 628).

His answer to this question (concerning the peculiarity of belief) is that the difference between a believed idea and a non-believed one lies principally in the manner of our conception of these two different kinds of ideas. That is, the difference between belief and a mere loose conception of the mind lies in the vividness, the steadiness, or in the solidity of a believed idea (Hume: 1740, 1920).

We hope that this explanation of Hume's notions of belief is clear. If not, it may perhaps become more intelligible by pointing out that even Hume himself finds it very difficult to offer a precise definition of belief, either in the English language or any other language. For this reason, he suggests that his readers should turn into themselves, in order to understand that peculiar feeling which constitutes belief. Only by experimenting with themselves, says Hume, can the readers really understand the nature of a lively, vivid, solid, or steady idea, which he insists sustains belief.

Although all this seems to be very clear to him, the question which however strikes us is: Why does Hume go to such length trying to explain what, as he maintains, everyone understands? In our view, it would seem that Hume realizes the peculiarity of his conception of belief, and that therefore he wishes to make his position abundantly clear. But since it is absolutely "impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception" (Hume: 1739, 629), he can only finally opt to refer to what everyone knows sufficiently, in terms of how it feels when one believes something really or when one is actuated by a lively idea. For the sake of clarity, Hume cannot but repeatedly emphasize that even when we try to "make use of words, that express something near it ... its true and proper name is BELIEF, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life" (Hume: 1739, 629).

Naturally, Hume must insist that belief manifests itself in the vividness of a lively idea, got from the communication of force and vividness of a present sense impression to an idea. In fact, for him, what makes belief (or a lively idea) into what it is, lies in the liveliness or vividness of an idea in the mind. But this liveliness or vividness is also and, more perfectly, present in every sense impression, given that all impressions are lively or very vivid, by definition. This is to say that "the BELIEF or ASSENT, which always attends the memory and sense, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present [to the mind]; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination". To believe, in his case, is to "feel an immediate impression of the sense, or a repetition of that impression in the memory. 'Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgement, and lays the foundation of that reasoning, which we build upon it, when we trace the relation of cause and effect" (Hume: 1739, I,III,5, 86).

If this be true, then the above quotation justifies our assumption (and that of Hume) about belief in the broad sense, as including not only lively ideas but also impressions of sensation as well as ideas of the memory, which are by their very nature essentially lively and vivid. So, it is, after all, liveliness which constitutes certain mental presentations as presentations of reality, such that these presentations can and do, in turn, form the basis of passions and actions. More importantly, this must also mean that whatever enables us to see a presentation as a real presentation (as reality), and not as a fictitious one, is undoubtedly of critical importance to human nature, human existence, as well as to human behaviour, human conduct and human existence as a whole. Little surprise, belief (in Humean terms) speaks for itself.

To phrase the whole discussion about Hume's notions of belief in a few words, while at the same time bringing about further clarification as well, we must state that there are two senses in which Hume's conception of belief ought to be understood, if we are to avoid offering confusion and conceptual errors. In the first place, there is BELIEF in the narrow sense which is, correctly speaking, simply a lively idea. As such, the activities of belief in the narrow sense can simply be felt, and not understood in terms of thinking. In the second instance, there is BELIEF in the broad sense which includes all lively ideas, as well as all impressions of sensation and impressions of the memory. United together, these seemingly different notions of belief constitute Hume's peculiar conception of belief with its most important element vivacity explaining the reality-character attached to whatever we believe to be the case or not to be the case, to whatever we regard to be real or not real. This peculiar conception of belief is, for Hume, the cornerstone of human common life, the anchor of human survival, and, most importantly, the balancing element and base upon which all that he has to say about human behaviour and conduct depends completely. In fact, a misunderstanding of this peculiar conception of belief inevitably leads into confusion and superficial exposition of Hume's entire philosophy.

Having established this new and, certainly, strange notion of belief (namely: that belief is a lively idea which derives its vividness from the liveliness of impressions), Hume is persistently adamant, hence his argument that belief is the most essential element which enables us to meet the daily demands of life and to balance social relations. Hume’s emphatic point is that belief is the most essential factor in the constitution of our reality, in the production of our passions, the development of our sense of morality, as well as in the production of our actions. For Hume, belief is undoubtedly the most essential factor in the organization of our lives and in the political arrangement of society as a whole, including choices of economic policies and our actions.¹

The most important effect of belief, therefore, is the assurance which we immediately acquire about some reality, as soon as belief or as soon as an impression or a lively idea (which is related to or connected with a present impression) becomes established in the mind (Hume: 1739, I,III,10, 119).

When we are in doubt about the reality of an object, scepticism occupies the mind immediately. But as soon as belief arises and establishes a given reality, scepticism disappears mysteriously. So, by dissolving doubt, belief reassures us that what we claim to know as such and such is really nothing more than what it appears to be. In this way, belief stabilizes and reconciles our clashing mental activities. Most importantly, once uncertainties are removed from the mind, contentment and peace of mind take their respective positions, making life not only meaningful but also developing new mental vistas. Freed from mental aberrations, we begin to enjoy life peacefully and also open up to humane social interactions.

That is, when we are no longer in doubt about the reality of whatever issue, we naturally respond to the demands of life with some comfortable degree of certitude, with a relaxed mind, and respond to the external world positively. No wonder, Hume thinks that all our actions are ultimately motivated either by pain or pleasure (Hume: 1739, I,III,10, 118), by those items classified as being essentially perceptions, which present themselves in the mind either through impressions or through their correspondent ideas.

A perception of either pain or pleasure, says Hume, may present itself in the mind in two ways: (i) it may appear in a correspondent sense impression, or (ii) it may appear as an idea, representing a sense impression. When a perception of either pain or pleasure appears in the mind in an impression, it has an immediate effect of exciting and activating actions. That is, when a perception of pain or pleasure appears in the mind in an idea of evil or good, it only requires an idea to increase its degree of force and vivaciousness, to be of any effect on our behaviour and conduct or to activate actions. What is more, to raise up its degree of force and vividness, the perception of either evil or good needs, most of all, vividness, which is best accomplished only by belief in the broad sense. So, the effect of belief in the broad sense is the raising "up a simple idea to an equality with our impression, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions" (Hume: 1739, I,III,10, 119).

Since the passions arise in the mind in great measure from lively ideas, they must and indeed necessarily do depend (in the same measure) on a lively idea or on belief in the broad sense for their realisation, as our actions do. This means that the perceptions of pain or pleasure, which appear in the mind in or as ideas, can affect our behaviour and conduct only when ideas are raised up in their degree of vividness, in which case they approach their correspondent impressions in their degree of force and vivacity (Hume: 1739, I,III,10, 119).

In view of all this, Hume cannot but suggest that if we wish to understand what really actuates human actions, we must therefore carefully study how impressions and their correspondent ideas actually operate in the mind. Hume thinks that such study will inevitably enable us to understand what precisely makes people "tick", or what makes them act the way they do. And this is why Hume argues that, if we really wish to understand what makes people "tick", then by all means let us try to come to terms with the nature and impact of the vividness of impressions and their correspondent lively ideas on the mind. Only after these elements are firmly grasped, Hume stresses, can ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• About the Author
• Preface
• 1 The Foundation of Hume's Philosophy
• 2 Hume's General Theory of Perception
• 3 Hume's Theory of Knowledge and Probability
• 4 Hume's Theory of Passions and Morality
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index