Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace

The Origins of War in the Ancient Middle East

Jason M. Schlude

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781351135696
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

This volume offers an informed survey of the problematic relationship between the ancient empires of Rome and Parthia from c. 96/95 BCE to 224 CE. Schlude explores the rhythms of this relationship and invites its readers to reconsider the past and our relationship with it.

Some have looked to this confrontation to help explain the roots of the long-lived conflict between the West and the Middle East. It is a reading symptomatic of most scholarship on the subject, which emphasizes fundamental incompatibility and bellicosity in Roman–Parthian relations. Rather than focusing on the relationship as a series of conflicts, Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace responds to this common misconception by highlighting instead the more cooperative elements in the relationship and shows how a reconciliation of these two perspectives is possible. There was, in fact, a cyclical pattern in the Roman–Parthian interaction, where a reality of peace and collaboration became overshadowed by images of aggressive posturing projected by powerful Roman statesmen and emperors for a domestic population conditioned to expect conflict. The result was the eventual realization of these images by later Roman opportunists who, unsatisfied with imagined war, sought active conflict with Parthia.

Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace is a fascinating new study of these two superpowers that will be of interest not only to students of Rome and the Near East but also to anyone with an interest in diplomatic relations and conflict in the ancient world and today.

1 Rome and Parthia meet

From Sulla to Lucullus

Introduction

The earliest episodes of Roman–Parthian interaction are the most frustrating for researchers. While the evidence for their relations is never as full as we would like, no matter what the period, it is particularly fragmentary for their inception. As often, we are mostly working from a small group of relatively late Greco-Roman authors who comment on the Parthians only in passing. As a result, we must be extremely cautious in reaching any conclusions from such a small corpus. The texts can only bear so much. Even so, there is enough to see a fundamental dynamic at play: aim for peace, but project power.

At the dawn of the 1st century BCE, the Mediterranean Sea was not yet a complete Roman lake. Roman interests and influence in the lands east of the Italian peninsula had grown over the previous century, evidenced by the new Roman provinces of Macedonia, Asia, and Cilicia. Independent kings, on the other hand, still reigned in Asia Minor, Syria, Judaea, and Egypt. But Rome was already in the process of playing an ever more active role in these regions late in the 2nd and at the start of the 1st centuries BCE.

It was under these circumstances that Roman statesmen first encountered Parthian officials. Initially, the political landscape of Asia Minor was Rome’s primary concern. Early in the 90s BCE, Mithridates VI of Pontus (r. 120–63 BCE), the famed king who fortified himself against the poison of would-be assassins with a regular regime of drugs, and Nicomedes III of Bithynia (r. c. 127–94 BCE) were jockeying for control of the region of Cappadocia. The representatives of each eventually arrived at Rome, whose power was already significant in the area, to advocate for the installation of their preferred candidates on the Cappadocian throne. In the end, the senate decided in favor of an entirely different claimant for the throne: Ariobarzanes.¹ To install him and settle the affairs of Cappadocia, they sent Lucius Cornelius Sulla as proconsul of Cilicia. It was in this capacity that Sulla became the first of a series of Roman aristocrats to engage in diplomacy with a Parthian king, in this case Mithridates II (r. 124/123–88/87 BCE). After discharging these duties, Sulla would return to Italy for several years before once again returning to the East to deal with Mithridates of Pontus, no longer tolerant of Roman Empire and making a bid for hegemony in Asia Minor, the Aegean, and even mainland Greece. This war, the First Mithridatic War, was in 89–85 BCE and would be followed by two more in 83–81 and 74/73–63 BCE. It was in the context of the Third Mithridatic War that the next Roman to engage with the Parthians, Lucius Licinius Lucullus, arrived on the scene. Consequently, any proper study of the history of Roman–Parthian relations must begin with Sulla and Lucullus and their respective commissions in the eastern Roman Empire.

Roman–Parthian contact before the 90s BCE?

A preliminary word about the 2nd century BCE should be included here. Plutarch is explicit that Roman–Parthian relations commenced with Sulla. He notes, “Sulla seems to have enjoyed great fortune: he was the first of the Romans to whom the Parthians [under direction of Mithridates II] came in their requests for alliance and friendship.”² We will discuss the context of this quote in full below, but here we notice he pinpoints Sulla as the start. The author of 1 Maccabees, however, differs. This late 2nd century BCE Jew records a letter purportedly sent by the Romans in the time of Simon the High Priest (r. 142–135 BCE), one of the Maccabean brothers who lead the “Maccabean Revolt”—the Jewish fight for independence against the Seleucids, beginning in 167 BCE. The letter admonished its recipients not to take action harmful to the Jewish people (15.15–21). Among them, the author lists an “Arsaces” (Ἀρσάκῃ) (15.22), certainly a reference to the Parthian king. Considering the time period indicated, Mithridates I (171–139/138 BCE) or Phraates II (139/138–c. 128 BCE) would be candidates. Yet the likelihood that the Romans actually sent this letter to an Arsacid is low. In addition to a “King Ptolemy” named as the addressee in the letter, the author provides a lengthy list of other recipients that includes not only Arsaces, but also an impressive number of other kings, cities, regions, and islands (15.22–24). The total number is no less than twenty-five destinations spread across the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. One has the feeling the author is prone to exaggeration. The hyperbolic mention that the Romans sent the letter “to all the countries” (εἰς πάσας τὰς χώρας) (15.23) only strengthens our suspicion: no Arsacid likely received it.

The intriguing reference, however, still retains value for us. The degree of Parthian ignorance of Rome and Roman ignorance of Parthia before the 90s BCE is an interesting and important question. Certainly, Mithridates II knew enough about the Romans and was sufficiently impressed with them to send an embassy in the first place.³ But had he only recently heard of them? Were his predecessors also aware of this developing western power? And on the other hand, how much did the Romans know about the Parthians? Sadly, we have no certain information in which to anchor safely an attempted answer. The evidence of 1 Maccabees is less than compelling when it suggests the Romans were involved diplomatically with the Parthians during the time of Simon. Still, that this is plausible to the author at all—or that he expects his audience to think it plausible—in the late 2nd century BCE should caution us from postulating mutual ignorance before the 90s BCE, even if formal contact began only then.

Sulla and Mithridates c. 96/95 BCE

The first secure diplomatic exchange followed on the heels of Sulla’s departure from Rome for service in the East after 97 BCE, the year that he held the office of praetor. As mentioned above, he was to use his position as proconsul of Cilicia to install Ariobarzanes as king of Cappadocia—an act that somehow would check the ambitious king Mithridates of Pontus, in the opinion of the author Plutarch.⁴ According to Plutarch, while engaged in this task along the Euphrates river, the Roman magistrate found himself approached by Orobazus, an envoy of Mithridates II of Parthia c. 96/95 BCE. Plutarch describes the exchange as follows:

And while he [Sulla] was passing time beside the Euphrates, a Parthian by the name of Orobazus, an ambassador of king Arsaces [Mithridates II], met with him, although not yet before had the peoples had relations with one another. (But even in this respect does Sulla seem to have enjoyed great fortune: he was the first of the Romans to whom the Parthians came in their requests for alliance and friendship.) When also he is said to have put out three chairs, one for Ariobarzanes, one for Orobazus, and one for himself, sitting down in the middle he is said to have carried out negotiations with them both. For this reason, the king of the Parthians later killed Orobazus, and while some approved of Sulla’s mockery of the barbarians, others censured him for being crass and fond of honor at an inopportune moment.⁵

Such are the principal details. Mithridates, via Orobazus, requested the “alliance and friendship” (συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας) of the Romans. Sulla gave a public audience, sitting between Orobazus and Ariobarzanes. Mithridates subsequently killed Orobazus. And the Roman response was diverse, some approving Sulla’s mockery, others denouncing his haughtiness. While seemingly sparse, Plutarch’s account requires substantial discussion.

Most scholars have concluded that this is was an ominous start for Roman and Parthian intercourse. Sulla insensitively and insultingly placed himself among the easterners in the primary position of public prominence. From this angle, it is no surprise that the Parthian king took offense at Sulla’s act and so did away with the ambassador who subjected himself to it while representing Parthian interests. With that, the king signaled his repugnance for the whole affair. He would seek Roman alliance and friendship no more, but take instead a determined stand of opposition against Rome. There is little that is positive here.⁶

The most productive way to assess this episode, when it comes to the Roman–Parthian relationship, is through the lens of image and reality. Both sides here wished to underscore publicly their relative status. On the one hand, Sulla took center stage as the powerbroker of the Near East. He no doubt did this for the Roman people and himself, though it is notable that his Roman contemporaries mainly saw it as a personal stunt show. (As often, we must remember the role of individual personality and motivation in ancient history.) In this role, he decided to equate the state representatives of Cappadocia and the Parthian Empire.⁷ In terms of the Parthians, Mithridates was revolted at the equation; two-bit Cappadocia was no Parthia, Ariobarzanes no Mithridates. As has been pointed out in previous scholarship, Mithridates was an ambitious king, responsible for adding northern Mesopotamia to the Parthian Empire, with aggressions that extended west of the Euphrates at least once before 96/95 BCE when he took control of Dura-Europos in the late 2nd century BCE.⁸ Indeed, this was the new “King of Kings,” who signaled the magnitude of his power through assumption of this Achaemenid title (documented on coins; Figure 3). Mithridates was the successor of the Achaemenid Empire. Sulla’s behavior was difficult for such a king to swallow. Yes, Mithridates was not there in person, only his envoy, but even the insinuation was too dangerous for the Arsacid. His own man was to blame; he should have been more careful to not participate in the public audience in such a way. With word out on Orobazus’s controversial action, it made sense for Mithridates to take a hard line, indicating to the prominent of Parthian society that he tolerated no question of his primary authority.⁹ All of this, on both sides, was for image. One needed to look strong, in control, aggressive.

The reality though was different. The other features of the exchange suggest that sheer antagonism was not the goal or outcome. We must remember that Mithridates of Parthia wanted “alliance and friendship” (συμμαχία καὶ φιλία).¹⁰ Some knowledge of Rome’s previous ventures in Asia Minor likely informed this desire; he wished to avoid a serious confrontation with Rome. Though they had not directly clashed at any previous point, their movements creeped toward a potential conflict of interest. Evidence would suggest that Mithridates got what he wanted. Plutarch, to be sure, fails to comment explicitly on Roman acceptance or rejection of the proposed alliance and friendship. But however controversial the public meeting proved after the fact, particularly in the Parthian Empire, they surely orchestrated it as a demonstration of solidarity—a suitable symbol of the accord reached between the representatives of Rome and Parthia for all to see. Other sources confirm this picture. Lucius Annaeus Florus, writing in the 2nd century CE, mentions a “treaty” (foedus) concluded between the Romans and the Parthians under Sulla when he recounts the campaign of Crassus in the 50s BCE.¹¹ An objection would seem to arise from Orosius, a Christian writer of the 5th century CE, who fails to mention a “treaty” of Sulla in his version of the same campaign of Crassus.¹² Such an omission, however, is hardly definitive. The positive evidence of Florus is far stronger. It is safe to conclude that a treaty of alliance and friendship was established at the time of Sulla.¹³

This does not, however, illuminate the full nature of the accord. If it was a treaty of alliance and friendship, then a mutual defense pact at lea...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of maps and figures
• Acknowledgments
• Maps
• Introduction
• 1 Rome and Parthia meet: from Sulla to Lucullus
• 2 Empires with a boundary: Pompey and Phraates III
• 3 An opportunist strikes: Crassus and the battle of Carrhae
• 4 Parthian–Roman fallout: Orodes II and Mark Antony in the Near East
• 5 A diplomatic restart: Augustus, Phraates IV, and Phraates V
• 6 Instability at home and abroad: diplomacy and war under the Julio-Claudians
• 7 Legions on the Euphrates: the Parthian policy of the Flavians
• 8 The model of Trajan: the final stage for Rome and Parthia
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index