Italian Youth in International Context

Belonging, Constraints and Opportunities

Valentina Cuzzocrea, Barbara Giovanna Bello, Yuri Kazepov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781351039925
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Italy is not a country for young people. Why? This book provides a unique and in-depth collection of empirical and theoretical material providing multiple answers to this question whilst investigating the living conditions of young people in Italy today.

By bringing together a variety of approaches and methods, the authors of this collection analyze Italian youth through the lenses of three dimensions: 'Activism, participation and citizenship', 'Work, Employment and Careers' and 'Moves, Transitions and Representations'. These dimensions are the analytical building blocks for challenging stereotypes and unveiling misinterpretations and taken-for-granted assumptions that portray young people in Italy as selfish, 'choosy', and unwilling to make sacrifices, commit and manage an independent life. These prejudices often underplay the role of constraints they are facing in the transition to adulthood.

Studying Italian youth, therefore, not only allows us to capture their peculiar characteristics but also to reflect more broadly on the conceptual toolbox we need in order to understand contemporary youth more generally. By doing so, the volume aims to contribute to international discussion on the youth condition in Europe.

The Introduction of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF at http://www.taylorfrancis.com under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND) 4.0 license.

Part I

Activism, participation and citizenship

Chapter 1

Young people and politics in Italy in times of populism

Elisa Lello

1.1 Introduction

In the last 20 years, research about young people’s relationship with politics has largely concerned their growing disengagement. Researchers have shown young Italians’ change in values, and in particular their shift from universalist priorities (such as solidarity, social equality, freedom and democracy) towards more intimate and familiar relations (Cavalli and de Lillo, 1988, 1993; Buzzi et al., 1997, 2002, 2007) and a move towards values and interests more closely aligned to one’s immediate surroundings, such as family, work, friendship, love, career and self-realization (de Lillo, 2002, 2007).

Many scholars have underlined young people’s tendency to abandon institutionalized forms of participation and their traditional channels, such as political parties and unions (Norris, 2004; Gauthier, 2003; Cavalli et al., 2008; Genova, 2010). However, according to some, young Italians should not be considered an individualistic or apathetic generation, given that they simply prefer to engage in civic and social activism along with voluntary work within civil society organizations (Diamanti, 1999; Ceccarini, 1999; Marta and Scabini, 2003; Dalton, 2008). Other scholars hold that younger generations are crucial actors in the redefinition of the meaning and nature of political participation, characterized by innovative and unconventional forms, marked by occasional and time-fragmented activism, the use of new technologies and the interpenetration between public engagement and youth-specific lifestyle (Ward and de Vreese, 2011; Stolle et al., 2010). This kind of activism mainly takes the form of fluid, loosely structured collectivities, such as social movements, single-issue campaigns and online activism. It can also take the form of individualized collective action, as in the multiple behaviours associated with political (or critical) consumerism (Stolle et al., 2005; de Moor, 2017). This shift towards innovative forms of creative engagement is marked by the increasing individual responsibility and by the search for creative ways to compound social and collective goals with personal objectives of self-fulfilment. Such activism tends to flank with more traditional ways of civic engagement (Micheletti and McFarland, 2010; Ceccarini, 2015).

However, looking at an international scenario challenges this kind of interpretation. While confirming young people’s declining rates of institutionalized political engagement, recent studies suggest that if in the 1970s young people were effectively more engaged than adults in non-conventional participation, in the first years of the new millennium this gap has closed. Non-conventional participation has increased over time more among mature individuals than among youth (Goerres, 2009; Garcia-Albacete, 2014). Young people are no longer more active than adults in the field of protest and unconventional participation, neither are they more informed, interested in politics or supportive of the basic principles of democracy, which is why Goerres (2009) suggests a ‘greying’ of Western democracies.

Yet, another interesting contribution comes from those studies that question the meaning of young people’s disengagement from institutionalized channels, contending that it should not be read, in an oversimplified way, as apathy. These studies underline the necessity of problematizing the concept of ‘apathy’ and of developing extensive qualitative research in order to more deeply grasp young people’s images and expectations about politics. They also suggest that young people’s disengagement may reflect their perception that traditional parties and political actors do not have anything to offer them. From this perspective, rather than tuning out, young people may feel left out (O’Toole et al., 2003; Henn et al., 2005).

I argue that this perspective represents a promising interpretative line for the understanding of young people’s political behaviours and choices, both inside and outside of Italy. More so, given the most recent developments involving Western democracies. Namely, I refer to the growing importance of new, or recently redefined, anti-establishment political subjects who openly challenge mainstream parties (i.e. centre-left and centre-right). These anti-establishment parties have quite different political identities, but they share an explicit opposition to traditional political elites whom they accuse of having pursued particularistic interests instead of those of the people, who have been hit by impoverishment and social degradation (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Diamanti and Lazar, 2018). With different inclinations, these parties claim to represent people who are, or who perceive of themselves, as excluded from the benefits brought about by globalization, against the privileged minority. In some countries, and with more evidence in Southern European ones, this dividing line overlaps with criticism towards the European Union and particularly towards austerity policies that dismantled welfare systems and increased social polarization (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017).

If we consider the recent general worsening of young people’s economic and social situation (Furlong and Cartmel, 2007; European Commission, 2017), it does not appear coincidental that in many countries the anti-establishment divide tends to overlap with the generational one. This can be observed more distinctly in Southern Europe, where younger generations more precisely coincide with the excluded, from the redistribution of income, from welfare provisions and from protective legislation on work contracts. Whereas, more mature cohorts keep remarkable guarantees and a more favourable distribution of income (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017).

For instance, in Spain, the Podemos Party has gained wide support from young voters, as shown by surveys carried out by CIS (Centre of Sociological Research). Similar processes take place with the Italian Five Stars Movement (5SM) (Itanes, 2013), but also with the French National Front. The same could be observed in Greece with Syriza, at least until it lost its credibility in effectively contrasting the Troika’s diktats. The political elites from these parties also evoke a generational cleavage thus far latent, at least within south European countries. In 2013, 56% of the 5SM elected in the Chamber of Deputies belonged to the age cohort ranging from 25 to 34 years, and 44% from 35 to 44 years. The same distribution pattern holds for Podemos. Moreover, in both cases we find a high degree of education, with high percentages of elected representatives who have graduated or hold a postgraduate qualification (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017; Montesanti and Tarditi, 2016).

In other cases, the affirmation of innovative leadership within more consolidated parties has produced a similar effect of attracting young voters and members. The case of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK appears emblematic because he is an ‘old’ politician, both in age and for his explicit references to ideals and ideologies of the past, in sharp contrast to the modernizing trend of previous Labour leaders, like Tony Blair. Notwithstanding this – and maybe for this very reason – Corbyn has explicitly addressed youth concerns, stimulating a meaningful rejuvenation both among Labour’s membership and electorate (as reported by YouGov and Ipsos Mori surveys in June 2017). Interestingly, and as in this case, one can also point to the success of Bernie Sanders amongst American youth in the 2016 Democratic primary elections. A further parallel can be traced to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the aged leader of La France Insoumise, who evokes ideals and identities thought to be overcome by history, and whose support is clearly marked in a generational key¹ (Diamanti and Lazar, 2018).

These examples underline the growing importance of the generational factor in explaining political dynamics, and they make Italy an interesting laboratory for observing the relationship between young people and politics. Goerres (2009) notes that in those countries where the young are disadvantaged in comparison to adults and older people, and where policy outcomes tend to privilege more mature cohorts’ interests, the young tend to be more engaged in order to redress the balance. In Italy, public expenditure has traditionally privileged old-age pensions rather than other sectors that would interest young people (such as education, family and children, housing and unemployment).² During the last ten years (2007–2016) the incidence of poverty has multiplied four times for younger cohorts, while decreasing among people aged 65 and over.³ In broader terms, together with the other Southern European countries, Italy is a country where the crisis has more dramatically hit younger generations (European Commission, 2017).

It is no coincidence then that in more recent years, strong anti-austerity movements have been taking place in Euro-Mediterranean countries, including Portugal, Spain and Greece. Such movements hold a social base marked by the presence of young people, highly educated individuals, unemployed or underemployed, and precarious workers (della Porta, 2015). Conversely, in Italy there has yet to be a movement that effectively represents the anti-austerity protest, and/or the younger generations’ grievances and claims. After the season of the altermondialist movements at the turn of the millennium,⁴ the landscape of social movements looks fragmented into several locally focused campaigns against the construction of infrastructures thought to be dangerous for the environment and for public health (della Porta and Mosca, 2015), or in defence of the employment in some specific cases (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017).

In Italy, the anti-austerity protest seems to have taken a different path, immediately becoming institutionalized into a party (5SM), without passing through the stage of social movement (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017). Indeed, this party has attracted support from a remarkable proportion of youth, contributing to shaping their images and expectations about politics. In order to fully comprehend young Italians’ dynamics of participation (and their choices of not being engaged), it is worth further investigating their views about politics. I will focus on these issues through on both quantitative and qualitative data. However, first we need to seriously consider how dramatic social and economic changes have impacted upon the personality formation of young Italians.

1.2 The young and the in-between cohort

Most research about young people, both in the Italian case and at an international level, focuses on the cohort who were young during the first years of the new millennium. However, in the meantime, meaningful societal changes have occurred giving rise to a generation with remarkably different traits and features than those of more than 15 years ago. Consequently, it is necessary to bring some order to the data by clearly identifying our cohort time boundaries. To this purpose, a crucial point regards the idea of an ‘open future’, which has been undermined by the economic crisis. The concept of an ‘open’ future, that is a future not tied to the predestination of the past anymore but supported by the optimistic idea of ‘progress’, has indeed been the key pillar of modernity (Benasayag and Schmit, 2004; Jedlowski, 2012, see also chapter 9 in this volume). That very idea, and the optimistic attitude that accompanied it, constituted the indispensable su...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Italian youth in context – an analysis through multiple dimensions
• PART I Activism, participation and citizenship
• PART II Work, employment and careers
• PART III Moves, transitions and representations
• Afterword
• Index