EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans

Florian Bieber

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781135739959
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume examines how European institutions, the European Union in particular through its policy of conditionality, have shaped the post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans. From state-building to democratization and environmental policies, this book explores whether and in what ways the EU has been successful in consolidating states and democracy in the Balkans. In addition to requiring countries to be ready to join the European Union, the EU has also set new conditions in an effort to become the prime international organization involved in stabilizing the Western Balkans after the wars of the 1990s. Its record has been mixed: the conditions of the EU have often been haphazard and were frequently not followed through. In addition, enlargement towards the Western Balkans has been slow and marred by open questions over the stability of some countries in the region.

This volume assesses the EU's struggle to transform the societies through conditionality and whether the offer of EU membership is enough to build stable democracies.

This book was published as a special issue of Europe-Asia Studies.

Introduction

FLORIAN BIEBER

SINCE THE EARLY 2000S THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS become the prime political actor in the Western Balkans. After its failed involvement in the early 1990s, the establishment of the Stability Pact in the context of the Kosovo War in 1999, and the launch of the Stabilisation and Association process, the EU moved from being the paymaster of the region to a more substantial engagement. From providing police officers, judges and prosecutors in Kosovo to managing peacekeeping in Bosnia & Hercegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH), and from overseeing political reform in Macedonia to pushing governments of the region to cooperate with the International criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IcTY), no other external actor has had a comparable impact on political life in the region. Yet, much of this engagement is often invisible and not embraced by grand symbolic gestures. While two main streets in Prishtina are named after recent US presidents—Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—the only monument to the EU is an ironic monument in Sarajevo in the shape of a tin can labelled ‘canned beef, recalling the food aid of the EU during the Bosnian war when military intervention was needed.

Despite widespread support for EU membership in most countries of the Western Balkans, there are also strong opponents. While support for membership of the EU is strong overall in the region, especially considering that reaching this goal is still far away, in 2010 87.4% of Kosovo’s citizens considered EU membership a good thing; in Croatia, at the other end of the spectrum from Kosovo, sceptics outnumber supporters of EU accession, despite or perhaps because EU accession has become tangible since accession talks were concluded in June 2011.¹ During anti-government protests in early 2011, EU flags were set ablaze and demonstrators regularly carried anti-EU banners and slogans. Similar anti-EU voices can be heard in protests and among nationalist and populist groups in the Western Balkans. In Kosovo, the nationalist movement and party Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination), rejects the EU rule of law mission (EULEX) through slogans such as ‘EULEX. Made in Serbia’. In Serbia, nationalist groups such as 1389 and Obraz protested against the arrest of Ratko Mladić in May 2011 by setting EU flags on fire. Despite nationalist and populist EU sceptics in the Western Balkans, few significant political parties in the region have openly challenged the regional consensus on EU membership. The strong political consensus for accession and popular scepticism in parts of the former Yugoslavia is largely a consequence of the multiple roles the EU has been playing there.

The EU has been engaged both in assisting post-conflict reconstruction and in building future EU member states. While these two policies are enshrined, at least nominally, in the Stabilisation and Association process, there has not been a single policy by the EU towards the region but rather a number of different policies carried out by a host of different institutions and ad hoc bodies of the EU. Especially in post-conflict state-building in BiH and Kosovo, the EU has been present through a plethora of different institutions, often forming a cacophony of voices. In BiH, for example, the EU comes in four different shapes: it is present through the peacekeeping operation EUFOR (Operation Althea), the EU Police Mission (EUPM), the EU Special Representative (linked with the Office of the High Representative until 2011) and the Delegation of the Commission (since 2011 the EU Delegation in the framework of the External Action Service).

Despite the difficulties in forging a single policy out of these different institutions and policies, there has been a key underpinning assumption of the EU’s efforts in the Western Balkans: the transformation of the countries into stable democracies with a functioning rule of law, and an ability to become EU member states is built on the premise that the EU can successfully induce change through conditionality. This process is largely understood to be twofold: first, transforming institutions and adopting EU-compatible legislation, and second, socialising elites through EU conditionality. These conditions extend from transforming state structures in Macedonia, Kosovo and BiH to undoing the effects of mass violence in the post-war regions, including in Croatia and Serbia, to transforming governance throughout the region. The central significance of conditionality in the Western Balkans rests on the offer of full EU membership, first clearly articulated by the EU when it opened the Stabilisation and Association process to the countries of the Western Balkans in 2000. Unlike during the previous enlargements, however, the states of the Western Balkans for the most part have lacked consolidated state structures and continue to face ‘statenesses’ problems. Some countries lack a broad consensus among their citizens over the structure of the government or even the country’s existence. In addition, the legacy of the wars has not only had a long term impact on the economy and social structure, but continues to burden interethnic and interstate relations.

The effectiveness of EU conditionality remains contested. Schimmelfennig (2007) has argued that only a credible promise of membership allows for conditionality to be effective; however, conditionality has often set ambitious targets at a stage when EU membership was either not yet credible or just a remote prospect. Moreover, the EU policy of conditionality has been ever expanding from enlargement to enlargement. While before 2004 conditions focused on the ability of the country to become an effective member state and to implement EU rules, democracy, market economy and democratic governance have become central criteria, enshrined in the 1993 Copenhagen criteria. Their implementation has led to new normative requirements, such as the protection of minority rights, which is not even shared by all EU member states (Sasse & Hughes 2003, pp. 1–38). In the case of Cyprus, the EU attempted for the first time, albeit unsuccessfully, to become the midwife of a state-building project (Tocci 2004). Overall, the expansion of conditionality during the 2004 and 2007 enlargements remained limited to core competences of the European Union and the EU acquis (with the two aforementioned exceptions). In the case of the Western Balkans, the EU has pursued a much broader agenda of conditionality. Conditionality was not only applied earlier, during the Stabilisation and Association process, and prior to granting countries candidate status, but also had a broader scope. These new conditions were drawn from the international obligations the countries had undertaken, such as the peace agreements (the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Ohrid Framework Agreement) and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and additional requirements in the field of peace-building and state-building (Anastasakis 2008). While scholars have been sceptical of the EU’s ability to project its normative power into the region (Noucheva 2009), there is limited understanding of the effects of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans. Conditionality has been extensively studied in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005), but the Western Balkans have received less attention from scholars working on EU enlargement. EU conditionality in the Western Balkans is not, however, a mere extension of previous policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Both the conditions and their impact on the countries have differed significantly from previous enlargements. Thus, the existing literature on EU conditionality cannot be readily transferred to the Western Balkans, and there is a need to understand the particular effects caused by the interplay of additional conditions and contested states and political systems.

It is in this light that this collection both explores the mechanisms through which the EU has expanded conditionality in the Western Balkans from previous enlargements, and assesses its performance.² While the contributions express a considerable degree of scepticism towards the ability of the EU to initiate profound political changes through conditionality, the collection by no means seeks to dismiss conditionality outright. Instead, contributions highlight the causes of the weakness and why some conditions have been met while others remain elusive.

The first study by Bieber explores the tensions between the EU in state building and preparing the countries of the Western Balkans for future membership in the Union. In Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and BiH, the EU either inherited or designed state-building projects. The minimalist states which sprang from these efforts were initially designed to contain and manage conflict, not to join the EU. This stands in contrast, however, to the prospect of EU integration, offered by the EU to the countries of the region. In fact, EU integration as a transformative process is not only the single most important shared political project across the region and the ethnic divides, it is also widely seen as the best mechanism to prevent the resumption of conflict and address the legacies of the most recent wars.³ The gap between minimalist states which are ineffective and display significant structural weaknesses in terms of legitimacy and ability to strengthen their own institutional structures, and the requirements of the EU of its future member states, lies at the centre of the text. The EU has sought to overcome these tensions through conditionality, but has struggled amidst the contested nature of these states. The inability of the EU to formulate consistent conditions as to what kind of state structures are required for EU membership and the tensions between different EU actors (such as EC delegations in the past and EU special representatives) has not only weakened the EU’s ability for state building, but also undermined EU conditionality.

A similarly sceptical view of EU conditionality is taken by Vedran Džihić and Angela Wieser. Their text identifies the inability of EU conditions to substantially advance democratisation in BiH. Even though the EU has developed clear conditions in this sphere, unlike in regard to state building, since the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria its conditionality has been based on the premise that standards are transposed by political elites committed to democratic governance and EU integration. Alternatively, populations support EU enlargement in order to restrain and control their own political elites, which they distrust. In BiH, Džihić and Wieser argue, neither dynamic is successful. The ethnonationalist cartel in power remains formally committed to EU integration and democratic governance, but in practice it often prioritises nationalist and populist policies. Although populations are sceptical towards these elites—expressed in low voter turnout and low levels of trust in institutions, irrespective of ethnic composition—the dynamics of the political system prevent clear lines of responsibility that would put pressure on decision makers from either above (the EU) or below (citizens). As a consequence, BiH remains trapped, not just in a weak state, but also with a weak democratic system of government where EU conditionality has only limited traction.

A third direction, along which EU conditionality significantly expanded beyond the scope of conditions required of future member states during the most recent rounds of enlargement, was the requirement to cooperate with the ICTY. After some US conditionality linking ICTY cooperation to US funding—as in the case of the arrest and extradition of Slobodan Milošević in 2001—the EU became the prime institution penalising countries for non-cooperation by delaying the accession process. Marlene Spoerri argues that this form of conditionality has been successful if measured in terms of the arrest and surrender of indictees to the ICTY. There is little doubt that few of those on trial would have been arrested without EU conditionality; however, this success has been a source of weakness at the same time. As Spoerri explores in the case of Serbia, the strong link between cooperation and financial and symbolic rewards has shifted the debate on the ICTY from responsibility for war crimes to rewards and punishments. The intended effect, that conditionality would not only lead to the fulfilment of particular requirements but also to a socialisation and learning effect where particular practices are challenged, has largely failed. This was demonstrated once more following the arrest of Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in Serbia in May and July 2011, respectively, where the arrests were widely portrayed, not as coming to terms with the past, but rather as opening the door to EU accession.⁴

Whereas the deliberate efforts of the EU to advance the creation of state structures and democratic governance, or to encourage societies to deal with the past, have met with considerable difficulties, the indirect transformative effect of the EU has been more significant. As Andrew Konitzer highlights in his study of the transformation of the Croatian and Serbian party systems, the prospect of EU accession has led to a reconfiguration of party systems. Until the early 2000s, key parties in both countries rejected EU integration, either formally, such as the Serb Radical Party (Srpska radikalna stranka, SRS) in Serbia, or de facto, such as the Croat Democratic Community (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ). The emphasis on national interests and state sovereignty subordinated not only EU integration, but also democracy, to this larger goal. Konitzer tells the story of how the HDZ first moved towards the centre and endorsed both EU integration and basic democratic rules. Even though the key actor of this transformation process, Ivo Sanader, was arrested in Austria on a Croatian arrest warrant for alleged corruption and abuse of office in 2010, the shift is no longer in doubt. In Serbia, the shift took place through the break-away of the more moderate Serb Progressive Party (Srpska napredna stranka, SNS) from the SRS. The SNS, under the leadership of Tomislav Nikolić, has emerged not only as the most popular party in Serbia together with the Democratic Party (Demokratska stranka, DS), but has also endorsed EU integration as a strategic goal and has abandoned radical nationalism as its primary political project. This transformation highlights the effects of the EU beyond progress reports and formal instruments. As an uncontested political goal, the EU has been able to transform the political party systems to lead to a marginalisation of nationalist, EU-sceptic parties.

The effectiveness of conditionality can also be ascertained at the micro-level. Adam Fagan, in his study of the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment for the construction of key roads in BiH around Sarajevo and Mostar, and a highway from Banja Luka to Gradiška, shows that the weakness of EU conditionality at the state level need not be replicated at the local level. Even if the process through which road-building projects need to be discussed with local communities and environmental organisations does not constitute a ‘hard’ condition of the EU, and non-compliance would have been possible, the authorities did engage in consultative processes and Fagan detects a learning process over time. As a result, one can argue that the effectiveness of conditionality does not only hinge on the degree to which these are enforced by external actors, but on the degree to which they change processes in a manner that does not fundamentally threaten existing institutions or elites. In addition, the nexus between conditionality and the ‘Europeanisation’ of the particular project appears to be essential: the roads built formed part of European networks and funding was provided by international financial institutions.

A similar emphasis on technical expertise and external assistance, not just conditionality is placed, in the study by Aybet and Bieber of EU and NATO conditionality, in the sphere of police and defence reform in BiH. Here, the contrast between the largely successful integration and professionalisation of the Bosnian army under NATO auspices stands in sharp contrast to the agonisingly long and eventually unsuccessful efforts of the EU to reform and centralise the police forces. NATO, with clear conditions and a convincing logic underpinning conditionality, and acting as a professional interlocutor with high-ranking soldiers, was able to first abolish entity ministries of defence, and eventually oversee the merger of the armed forces and their drastic reduction in numbers. Police reform, on the other hand, failed despite the fact that EU integration is more widely accepted as a political goal than NATO membership...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans
• 3. Incentives for Democratisation? Effects of EU Conditionality on Democracy in Bosnia & Hercegovina
• 4. Justice Imposed: How Policies of Conditionality Effect Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia
• 5. Speaking European: Conditionality, Public Attitudes and Pro-European Party Rhetoric in the Western Balkans
• 6. EU Conditionality and Governance in Bosnia & Hercegovina: Environmental Regulation of the Trans-European Road Network
• 7. From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU and NATO Conditionality on State Building in Bosnia & Hercegovina
• 8. The Constraints on European Institutions’ Conditionality in the Western Balkans
• Index