The Moscow Uprising of December, 1905

A Background Study

Joseph L. Sanders

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781315395883
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia rusa

This book, originally published in 1987, focuses on the factors which contributed to the Moscow uprising of December 1905, by comprehensively surveying a vast field of both Russian and English language literature on the subject. In order to explain why the uprising occurred in Moscow when it did, the author discusses the contributions of the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, the Soviet-Revolutionaries and the government, concluding that the uprising happened at that time because the parties were committed to it and agitated for it and the local government in Moscow was not in control of the situation.

Chapter I

Armed Insurrection: Theoretical Views of Parties

In discussing the theoretical views of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SR’s regarding armed insurrection, one might just as well begin with the points of agreement then take up the differences. Before delving into either, a few general remarks relative to certain overall features of these views should be made.

The formulations of the Bolsheviks are more cohesive, more consistent, more detailed, less marked by loose ends, and perhaps more authoritative than those of either the Mensheviks or SR’s. Aside from any influence differences in approach and emphases may have had, the main reasons for this lie in just who set forth the views of each respective party or group and in what these same people dealt with in-their writings. The views of the Bolsheviks were primarily the work of one man, Lenin. He gave most of his attention to the broader theoretical concepts relative to the place of armed insurrection in the revolution, but he also discussed some of the more mundane aspects of the problem such as the formation and use of armed detachments of workers. A variety of individuals contributed to the views of both the Mensheviks and SR’s, among them Martov, A. S. Martynov, Plekhanov, F. I. Dan, and Axelrod for the former and Chernov and E. S. Breshkovskaia for the latter. All of these people said a great deal about broader theoretical problems and the relation of armed insurrection to them, but with the exception of Breshkovskaia, they touched very lightly on concrete, practical matters. Consideration of the latter, when it occurred, was left to lesser lights whose views did not carry the weight among their fellow Mensheviks or SR’s that Lenin’s did among the Bolsheviks.

Also, much of the party literature on which any analysis of the views of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SR’s must be based is highly polemical. This was particularly the case with the Social Democrats. The factional dispute and personal quarrels which surfaced at the Social Democrats’ second congress in 1903 were going full tilt at the beginning of 1905. “Bloody Sunday” and what followed brought no abatement. If anything, the dispute broadened. Instead of focusing just on organizational questions and the control of the party, the Social Democrats, or at least their leaders, could, and did, dispute over a concrete revolutionary situation, over what to make of it, and over tactical matters. At the same time, the Social Democrats did not confine their polemics to one another. The SR’s came in for their share and answered in kind. As a result, one has to be constantly parsing away the rhetoric and distortions of polemics in order to arrive at just what the actual views were of a particular spokesman for one or the other of the parties or of the Social Democratic factions.

Points of Agreement

One by-product of the polemics was the obscuring of the many points of agreement or convergence in the views of the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SR’s. These (the points of agreement) began with the general and extended to several more specific matters. Although their assessments may have been expressed differently, the two Social Democratic factions and the SR’s came to virtually the same general conclusions regarding the significance of “Bloody Sunday”. It marked the beginning of the revolution. The next step would be an armed uprising, and each party or group, in its own way and time, committed itself to this. The views of the parties also coincided as to the immediate goals of the insurrection--the overthrow of the autocracy, the summoning of a constituent assembly, and the establishment of a democractic republic.¹

As for the points of agreement on more specific matters, one of these relates to the arming of the people and the latter’s acquisition of some sort of combat experience. The general idea was to form the peasants and workers into combat squads which could be used for self-defense and which could also be employed in partisan activities, in attacks on military patrols, on arsenals and arms stores, on policemen, on transportation-communication facilities, and on government institutions. The experience acquired by participating in such activities was a necessary step in preparing the peasants and workers for a successful assault on the government.²

Actually, at least some SR’s urged just such an approach well before 1905. For Breshkovskaia, for instance, it did not make sense to expect the people to be able to fight at the appropriate moment if they were constantly restrained from clashes with the enemy.³ This was a line Breshkovskaia proclaimed in 1903 in complaint against her own party. From about mid-1904 onward, and certainly after “Bloody Sunday,” it appears that formation of combat squads and their engagement in partisan activities had become the general party line; the complaint about restraint of the people became one the SR’s made against other revolutionary groups. As one SR writer put it in remarks aimed at the Social Democrats, it would be strange or metaphysical

to think the people, who up to the very last moment, who during all the time before the uprising have been restrained from all direct struggle, suddenly would prove capable of conducting a victorious uprising. As an individual acquires strength only by exercising his muscles and not leaving them to inactivity, so a party only in the process, in the practice of struggle forms and accumulates those actual fighting forces which can successfully carry out the strategic task of a victorious uprising.⁴

After “Bloody Sunday,” one SR commentator noted that one rule should be remembered:

The moment of battle preparation and the moment of direct struggle are inseparable; only in the process of struggle itself are produced, are tempered, are selected the fighting forces; only struggle creates fighters.⁵

Hence, according to this same commentator, the military preparations of the people for the insurrection “should consist of the practice of tireless and direct struggle” with the enemy.⁶

By at least February-March, 1905, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were also urging the arming of workers and the formation of combat squads.⁷ This matter received considerable attention from the Bolsheviks at the third congress Among other things, in a resolution on armed insurrection adopted there, it was held that energetic steps shouldbe taken to arm the proletariat.⁸ Combat squads were to be formed from those with arms, and debate on the floor indicated that the intent was to use these squads in local actions so that they could gain some combat experience.⁹ According to the editors of the proceedings of the third congress, two draft resolutions regarding armed insurrection, both authoried by Lenin, were actually brought to the congress.¹⁰ The first, the amended version of which was adopted by the delegates, has already been summarized. The second was merely circulated among the delegates for their private consideration.”¹¹ It is worth quoting in full, for it gives a fair idea of at least Lenin’s thinking and intent in regard to combat squads. The second resolution read:

The Congress holds, on the basis of the experience of the practical workers and the mood of the working masses, that by preparations for an uprising should be understood not only the preparing of weapons and the formation of groups, etc., [sic. ] but also the accumulation of experience by means of practical attempts at separate armed actions such as attacks by armed detachments on the police and soldiers when opportunities arise at various open, mass meetings or attacks of armed detachments on prisons, government institutions, etc., [sic.]. While fully expecting the local centers of the party and the Central Committee to determine the limits of such actions and the most opportune occasions for them, while fully relying on the discretion of the comrades as being capable of preventing useless expenditures of strength in individual and petty terrorist acts, the Congress calls the attention of all party organizations to the necessity to take into consideration the above-cited point of experience.¹²

Subsequent to the third congress, Lenin and the Bolsheviks continued to stress the necessity of combat squads being formed and committed to actual operations against the enemy.¹³

After “Bloody Sunday,” there also appeared in Iskra articles urging the formation of combat squads and outlining how they could be used to carry out attacks on military patrols, arsenals, arms stores, and government institutions.¹⁴ In addition, there was drawn up for the Mensheviks’ general conference of April, 1905, a draft resolution on arming which affords some further indication of Menshevik thinking. In this draft resolution, cognizance was taken of the fact that only a significant mass of armed people could give regular troops a decisive repulse. In view of this, it was proposed that all attention be concentrated on propagandizing the idea of self-arming by the people. At least part of the means which came the party’s way was to be used for arming combat squads of workers which would be used for both self-defense and for partisan activities.¹⁵ This draft resolution was never formally considered or discussed at the Menshevik conference.¹⁶ Oddly enough, the Mensheviks did adopt a resolution committing the party to agitate for the arming of the peasants so they could protect themselves from government forces.¹⁷

Another specific matter on which there was general agreement has to do with the necessity of carrying on revolutionary work in the tsarist armed forces. To judge from commentaries on the matter which appeared in various party newspapers, the Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SR’s intended to push their efforts among both the rank and file and among the officers. In regard to the former, heavy emphasis was to be placed on the everyday or professional grievances of the soldiers and sailors, and these grievances were to be the basis for agitational, propaganda, and organizational work in the armed f...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• List of Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Chapter I: Armed Insurrection: Theoretical Views of Parties
• Chapter II: General Development of the Parties
• Chapter III: The Parties in Moscow: Political Activities
• Chapter IV: Military-Technical Preparations and Activities
• Chapter V: The Police in Moscow
• Chapter VI: The Moscow Garrison
• Chapter VII: The Decision
• Chapter VIII: General Conclusions
• Bibliography
• Appendix 1: Factory Armed Detachments
• Appendix 2: Strikes in Moscow