1 A not so âstationary stateâ
John Stuart Millâs sustainable imagination
John Parham
Major cultural histories of environmentalism or ecology have overlooked âsustainability,â seeming to regard it as a concept of contemporary application only. Yet two more recent analyses have historicised sustainability while also placing nineteenth-century philosophical, scientific, literary and political contexts at the centre of that history. Chapter 8 of Ulrich Groberâs Sustainability: A Cultural History (2010), âThe Birth of Ecology,â looks predominantly at Northern European traditions. In the UK, Simon Dresnerâs The Principles of Sustainability (2008) locates the evolution of the concept largely in nineteenth-century natural and political philosophyâMalthus, Marx and Engels, and John Stuart Mill.
Millâs short chapter âOf the Stationary Stateâ in his Principles of Political Economy (first published 1848) has long been regarded as a key text in the Western historical development of ecology (see Goodin 1992; Dobson 2007; Parham 2007; Dresner 2008). Yet it was written relatively early on in his career. This essay will examine the subsequent development of the concept of the âStationary Stateâ in published work, correspondence and practical activism. I will consider how Mill refined his ideas of it, how that thinking coincides with a trajectory set out by Grober and, consequently, how Millâs reflections and elaborations on the âStationary Stateâ speak to, as I will first describe, a growing preoccupation with sustainability in the environmental humanities, social sciences and literary studies.1
A sustainable discourse
Recent critical discussions about sustainability have critiqued its dubious co-option into a âbusiness-as-usualâ framework and explored the rhetorical possibilities of the term. Stacey Alaimo, for example, regards sustainability as a conservative discourse, a âplastic but potent signifierâ which justifies continuing economic development âdespite the economic and environmental crisesâ (2012: 559). For Vin Nardizzi, this concept, generated by capitalism âto sustain its own development and to safeguard its own hegemony,â might actually trigger âecological catastropheâ (2013: 148; see also LeMenager and Foote 2012: 572; Bloomfield 2015: 22â3). The primary reason for sustainabilityâs ideological co-option, as Mandy Bloomfield has articulated, is that âcomplacent,â ecologically erroneous assumptions of a âfairly stable ecological stateâ suggest the idea that ânatureâs balanceâ could be maintained merely by acting more responsibly and by âcareful management or ethical adjustmentsâ (2015: 23). And yet, as Dresner argues, since no one now could really admit to acting âunsustainably,â the term is âmuch more powerful rhetoricallyâ than (say) âenvironmentally friendlyâ and, so, can function as a foundation or point of reference for ecological living (see 2008: 1). Moreover, precisely because itâs a âcontestable conceptâ (Dresner 2008: 7), âsustainabilityâ offers a valuable and richly discursive starting point for this consideration of what ecological living really means.
We can illustrate these productive possibilities by considering how the so-called âthree pillarsâ of sustainability have been contested and reconfigured. At the UN General Assemblyâs 2005 World Summit, sustainability was formulated as three âinterdependent and mutually reinforcing pillarsâ: economic development, social development and environmental protection (2005: 12). Such equity between the three âpillarsâ has bestowed, however, the ideological conservatism of which sustainability is often accused. Nevertheless, in arguing that âeconomics can only flourish within a functioning social system with effective institutions and governance structuresâ and, furthermore, that âSocieties cannot exist without a functioning life-support systemâ (2007: 622), Fischer et al. have reconceptualised the three âpillarsâ hierarchically, with ecological sustainability enveloping the other categories. Akin to Margrit Eichlerâs earlier graphical conception of sustainability as a âseries of smaller overlapping circles (the human sub-systems) within a larger circle (the biosphere)â (1999: 201), further researchers, led by Dave Griggs, have conceptualised this paradigm both poetically, as a ânested conceptâ (Griggs 2013: 306), and pragmatically, in suggesting that the primacy of ecological over social leads us towards six overarching goals determined by ecological principles: thriving lives and livelihoods; sustainable food security; sustainable water security; universal clean energy; healthy and productive ecosystems; and the governance of sustainable societies.
Even reconfigured ecologically, sustainability has its blind spots. For instance, the habitual focus on human survival, wellbeing, even (in more visionary conceptualisations) flourishing, often overlooks the survival (or flourishing) of other species with which we share this planet (Alaimo 2012: 562â4). Yet, understood as a puzzle of contested priorities operating, nevertheless, in the larger circle of the biosphere, sustainabilityâwhether basic human subsistence or the more expansive vision of human and non-human well-being and flourishing (see Rigby 2017)âcan be seen as an ongoing project demanding constant vigilance, reflection and (sometimes) radical adjustment to ensure that we can subsist within natureâs parameters. That complexity is why literary critics have also been attracted to the term. Stephanie LeMenager and Stephanie Foote argue that we should explore the intersection of âliterary forms and social affiliationâ because literature can âprompt us to imagine, as communities, a world otherwiseâ (2012: 575). Likewise, for Lynn Keller narrative and poetic language can facilitate âserious imaginative exploration of what constitutes a desirable futureâ (2012: 581â2), a âliterature not of but pointing toward sustainabilityâ (2012: 582).
In his study of sustainability, Dresner suggests that âMany of the themes that are debated today around the issue of the environment would be recognizable to a Victorian intellectualâ (2008: 19). He laments, however, both that we donât share the Victoriansâ optimism about building a future (2008: 19) and that, in
an irony of history, the rhetoric of sustainability was adopted onto the political agenda in the 1990s at precisely the same time that the classical political philosophies that could most readily support its concerns (democratic socialism and social democracy) were being abandoned.
(2008: 4)
Mill was a central figure in advancing those âclassical political philosophies.â He was not an especially literary writer, but his critical examination of philosophy, economics, politics and ânatureâ was, famously, coloured by the influence of nineteenth-century Romanticism. Consequently, he too explored the complex interconnections arising from the dual recognition that humans are ânestedâ in the natural economy, and that that dependence on natural resources has fundamental ramifications for social structures and political economics. Such complex puzzles generated an ongoing intellectual project. As richly diverse as any literary equivalent, Mill engaged in a âserious imaginative explorationâ of what sustainability might look like, founded, initially, on his conception of the âStationary State.â
âOn the stationary stateâ
Three concerns underlay Millâs formulation of âThe Stationary Stateâ: Malthusâ comprehension of natural limits to growth; social justice and equity; and human âquality of life.â Mindful of Malthusâ warning about exponential population growth outstripping natural resources, this materialist imperative in Mill was augmented by a more qualitative preoccupation (influenced by Jeremy Benthamâs Utilitarian philosophy) with maximising human happiness. Accordingly, while Mill seemed to anticipate that the threat to resources could be mitigated by technological improvements to production, his enthusiasm for stationary-state economics nevertheless rested upon an encouragement to consume less. This would preserve resources but also reduce labour to manageable dimensions allowing people, in turn, âsufficient leisure [âŚ] to cultivate freely the graces of lifeâ (1998: 128). Mill questioned why it should be a âmatter of congratulation that persons who are already richer than any one needs to be, should have doubled their means of consuming things which give little or no pleasure except as representative of wealth?â (127). The social justice emanated from the suggestion that âabridging labourâ would allow âa much larger body of persons than at presentâ to be freed from the âcoarser toilsâ and from âthe trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each otherâs heels, which form the existing type of social lifeâ (126).
There is little of nature per se in âThe Stationary Stateâ chapter until Mill introduces a poetic flourish near the end, where, notionally, his âstationaryâ economics gradually reaches beyond the human alone:
A population may be too crowded, though all be amply supplied with food and raiment. It is not good for man to be kept perforce at all times in the presence of his species. A world from which solitude is extirpated, is a very poor ideal. Solitude, in the sense of being often alone, is essential to any depth of meditation or of character; and solitude in the presence of natural beauty and grandeur, is the cradle of thoughts and aspirations which are not only good for the individual, but which society could ill do without. Nor is there much satisfaction in contemplating the world with nothing left to the spontaneous activity of nature; with every rood of land brought into cultivation, which is capable of growing food for human beings; every flowery waste or natural pasture ploughed up, all quadrupeds or birds which are not domesticated for manâs use exterminated as his rivals for food, every hedgerow or superfluous tree rooted out, and scarcely a place left where a wild shrub or flower could grow without being eradicated as a weed in the name of improved agriculture. If the earth must lose that great portion of its pleasantness which it owes to things that the unlimited increase of wealth and population would extirpate from it, for the mere purpose of enabling it to support a larger or a happier population, I sincerely hope, for the sake of posterity, that they will be content to be stationary, long before necessity compels them to it.
(128â9)
The value Mill attaches to unspoiled nature remains largely couched in terms of its benefit to humans. In the final lines of the chapter, he conjectures that âthe conquests made from the powers of nature by the intellect and energy of scientific discoverers, [can] become the common property of the species, and the means of improving and elevating the universal lotâ (130). Yet any apparent grandiloquence in this claim is qualified by Millâs intimations towards Romanticism. As Nadia Urbinati argues, the âStationary Stateâ chapter âis methodologically very courageous, innovative, and radical because it questions not simply the notion of economic progress but also the role of political economy as a scienceâ (2011: 242). This is not âbusiness-as-usualâ and Mill is not simply celebrating industry or commerce. Indeed, the claim itself is balanced both elsewhere, when Mill himself protests (as we shall see) against the âconquestâ of nature being the sole end of humankind, and here, by the warning immediately above that we must leave room for âthe spontaneous activity of natureâ and encourage the âStationary Stateâ before ânecessity compels [âŚ] it.â As I have suggested elsewhere (Parham 2007), these competing prioritiesâhuman improvement and a spontaneous natureâwere delicately held in poise in his essay, âNatureâ (published 1874, but probably written in the 1850s), where Mill developed the notion of âintelligent action.â This posited that human modifications to an ecosystem, made in our own interests, must be balanced against an understanding that âPhenomena produced by human agency, no less than those which as far as we are concerned are spontaneous, depend upon the properties of the elementary forces, or of the elementary substances and their compoundsâ (CW, X: 375).2 This led to the profound understanding that âby every choice which we make [âŚ] we place ourselves to a greater or less extent under one set of laws of nature instead of anotherâ (CW, X: 379â80), not least of which is an imperative to consume resources sustainably before we are compelled to. We are at the mercy, that is, of the spontaneous force of âNature.â
As implied by the insights from the essay on âNature,â we can appreciate the âStationary Stateâ chapter even better by looking at other later sources in Mill. Given that fact, I agree with Frederick Rosenâs statement that, for Mill, conceptualising the âstationary stateâ was ânot an end but [âŚ] a beginningâ in that it offered merely âa starting point for major improvement in existing conditionsâ (2013 [Mill: Founders of Modern Political and Social Thought]: 169). That beginning, for a radical imagining of sustainable societies, was forged in much the same historical trajectory as Grober traces.
Mill and the nineteenth-century context
Grober suggests that the idea of sustainability emerged out of changing conceptions of ânatureâ and âenvironmentâ in nineteenth-century European intellectual culture. In particular, he traces a line of influence through Linnaeus, Goethe, Herder and von Humboldt, key scientific and philosophical thinkers, most of whom Mill was familiar with. Groberâs argument that âThe Birth of Ecologyâ arose in this context can be reduced down to three key points (see Parham 2017). Firstly, that sustainability was initiated by a philosophical paradigm that, contrary to the Enlightenment narrative of a âdeath of natureâ (see also Dresner 2008: 4â5), emphasised the energy, vitality, complexity and autonomy (from humans) of nature. Secondly, that sustainability also derived from a subsequent deliberation as to how human activityâland use, industry, development, social structures, politicsâshould answer to this independent and unceasingly dynamic nature. Finally, that the idea of sustainability germinated in the exploration of practical and emancipatory solutions to the problem of how humans could sustain themselves as the project of modernity continued on its relentless way.
British equivalents to Groberâs trajectory exist in what Eric Wilson (2000) has called the âturbulentâ Romanticism of Wordsworth and Coleridge (see Mill, CW, X: 141) and in subsequent attempts by (for example) Carlyle and Ruskin to apply a more complex, dialectical romanticism to social, economic or environmental ends. The existence of crosscurrents between these European and British traditions was encapsulated when the word âenvironmentâ first appeared in English in a translation of Goethe by Carlyle (Grober: 109). Mill corresponded extensively with Carlyle in the 1830s, and thereafter intermittently, not least about Goethe. Significantly, the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill (1873) details an alteration in Millâs world view that questioned and qualified the rigid Utilitarianism he had inherited from his father, James Mill, and from Bentham (Parham 2007: 41). This altered perspective came from reading Wordsworth, Coleridge, Goethe and Carlyle.
Also citing Herder and Coleridge, Mill affirmed that he had derived from âthe Goethian period of German literatureâ a new âfabric of thoughtâ (CW, I, 161; and see CW, X: 141). Central to this, as is clear from Millâs Autobiography, was a new historicist and dialectical foundation to his thinking. Meeting Wordsworth, what impressed Mill was nothing poetic but, rather, the complexity and âmanysidednessâ of Wordsworthâs opinions (20/10/31, CW, XII, 80â1). The latter term was also applied to Goethe (CW, I: 170). From this, there emerged a view that society and âpolitical institutionsâ evolve and adapt to the circumstances of the historical moment: prevailing philosophies; the pressures exerted by peopleâs opinions and material needs or demands; and the physical environment (CW, I: 169). Fashioning, Frederick Rosen writes, what was in fact a âhalf-way houseâ (Rosen 2013: 110) between historicism and empiricism, Mill proposed that a recognition of the dialectical and contingent nature of reality ought, nevertheless, to be balanced by âconvictions as to what is right and wrong,â convictions âfirmly grounded in reason and in the true exigencies of lifeâ (CW, I: 173). In our context, this âhalf-way houseâ meant that, as Mill slowly formed ideas that reinforced his advocacy of âStationary Stateâ economics, he anticipated a profoundly dialectical notion of âsustainabilityâ that embraced both the fundamental truth that we are ânestedâ in nature and a more radical realisation that living within natureâin ways that might sustain resources and wildness and human quality of lifeâdemands an agile, reflexive ability to respond to ever-changing circumstances and ever-deve...