Comparative Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion

Anne Wetzel, Jan Orbie, Fabienne Bossuyt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781317295389
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the substance of European Union (EU) democracy promotion by comparing it with norms of governance that other international actors promote, among them the United Nations, the United States, the Central and East European EU member states, Russia, China and non-governmental organizations. It aims is to gain a better understanding of the EU's democracy promotion agenda and to learn more about the (in)distinctiveness of the norms diffused by the EU. Building on a common conceptual chapter, the contributions follow different theoretical approaches and research designs, and focus on a diversity of case studies. The book concludes that in comparison with other international actors, the EU's conceptual approach to democracy promotion is diffuse, which in turn makes the EU a particularly flexible but also 'technical' democracy promoter when it comes to implementation. At the same time, there are limits to flexibility at the level of concepts and frames. This indicates a distinct character of the substance of EU democracy promotion, which can be linked to the nature of the EU polity.

This book was published as a special issue of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs.

INTRODUCTION

One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion

Anne Wetzel

University of Mannheim

Jan Orbie

Ghent University

Fabienne Bossuyt

Ghent University

If democracy promotion is a ‘fashionable international art’ (Burnell 2000, 339), then there are many artists involved in it. It is impressive to observe, for instance, how the voices that offered assistance in the course of the Arab Spring appeared to sing from the same hymn sheet:

The EU [European Union] stands ready to assist the countries of the Arab spring to achieve deep democracy and the rule of law based on full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, but also economic development and social justice. (Council of the EU 2011a)

First, it will be the policy of the United States [US] to promote reform across the region, and to support transitions to democracy. (Obama 2011)

Once again, let me say: we are at an historic moment. Democracy is on the march across the Arab world. It is in the interest of the international community and the United Nations [UN] to help you on your way. (Ban Ki-moon 2011)

However, rather than singing from the same hymn sheet, international democracy promoters are soloists. While apparently singing the same melody, they sing it with different lyrics and intonation. The international stage is home to a wide group of actors engaged in democracy promotion, each pursuing their own democratization agenda (Burnell 2008, 416; Merkel 2010, 154–159).

What these democratization agendas exactly consist of, and how similar they are, is seldom studied in detail and hardly ever explained. This special section advances a new research agenda by examining the contents of international democracy promotion, and, specifically, comparing the substance of EU democracy promotion with other norm promoters’.

The special section aims to provide a theoretical and empirical contribution to the existing literature, which so far has focused primarily on the strategies, instruments and impact of democracy promotion (see for example Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Jüemann and Knodt 2007; Zielonka and Pravda 2001; Magen et al 2009). Beyond the relative consensus that most Western actors involved in democracy promotion advocate some form of ‘liberal democracy’ (Kurki 2010, 365; Ayers 2008, 3; Carothers 1997; Risse 2009, 249), comparative analysis of the democratic substance promoted is lacking.¹

Following Stewart, we define ‘democracy promotion’ as ‘activities engaged in by external actors to encourage the development of democracy within a given country’ (2009, 647). We focus on deliberate activities by external actors and do not include undirected processes, such as contagion. These external actors can be states, state-funded agencies or organizations, privately funded non-governmental organizations or even individuals. Though the difference between external and internal actors is subtle (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010, 9–10), we focus solely on actors whose activities are (financially) supported from outside the country that they are targeting, regardless of the actors’ physical location.

The existing literature on strategies of democracy promotion provides some reference points to help us examine the substantive dimension in more detail. In an article on political strategies of external support for democratization, Burnell distinguishes ‘several distinct but related issues’ that arise, ‘including the who?, what?, why?, and how?’ (2005, 361), with substance as the ‘what’. Similarly, Merkel (2010) assembles several issues of strategy, namely questions of ‘who’, ‘whom’, ‘when’, ‘how’, and ‘effect’, where substance is part of the ‘how’. In addition to concrete ‘desired endpoints’ of democracy promotion in the electoral arena, governmental institutions and civil society, Carothers includes the issue of underlying models in the broader question of democracy promotion strategy (1997, 111).

From these works, we single out the question of ‘what’ from external actors’ broader democracy promotion strategies. We go further than these works in that we systematically distinguish three (interconnected) dimensions of substance:² (a) conceptual—underlying models informing democracy promotion activities; (b) discursive—frames used by democracy promoters; and (c) implementation—emphasis of priorities pursued by actors. Accordingly, the special section defines the substance of international democracy promotion as: the substantive content of activities engaged in by external actors to encourage the development of democracy within a third country. This content may relate to underlying concepts of democracy held, frames constructed and/or implementation priorities pursued by the external actor.

The EU has become one of the most significant international democracy promoters in terms of both verbal commitment and financial support (see below). However, it does not have a codified internal definition of democracy that it can project onto other countries. Attempts to draw up a ‘European consensus on democracy’ have failed so far and concepts such as ‘deep democracy’ (European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011b, 2–3) remain vague. What the content of EU international democracy promotion is and how distinctive this is from other actors’ are open questions.

Comparing the EU with other international democracy promoters serves both a descriptive and an analytical goal. First, we gain a better understanding of the EU’s democracy promotion agenda, and whether the EU is distinctive in the norms it promotes. Second, we can explain similarities and differences between the democratic substance promoted by international actors, and across target countries and regions. In short, we not only describe the substance of international democracy promotion but also seek to explain it.

Why substance matters

The issue of substance has always occupied an important part of the discussion about democratization and democracy promotion. However, after decades of research and practice it is still not entirely clear what is conducive to democratization and, as a consequence, what should be promoted. As an example, in the 1980s, the US democracy promotion community adopted ‘an analytic model of democratic transition’ (Carothers 2002, 6), which assumed that democratization would not be dependent on preconditions. Structural developments, such as socio-economic development, were not attributed a decisive role (Carothers 2002, 8). Such an understanding follows elite-oriented or agency approaches (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), in opposition to the arguments of modernization theory (Lipset 1959), which counsels that democracy promoters focus on socio-economic development. Recent studies (Przeworski et al 2000; Ingelhart and Welzel 2009; Epstein et al 2006) do not point to a definite conclusion.

The same question also divides practitioners. In the 1980s, there was a separation between the emergent international democracy assistance community and the established domain of development aid (Carothers 2010, 13). While today there are bridge-building attempts, ‘[f]or many democracy aid providers, socioeconomic development remains terra incognita’ (Carothers 2010, 19). At the same time, the governance agenda has brought politics into the development policy domain (Carothers 2010, 20–21). There are similar debates on the role of elections and state-building (see Carothers 2002).

Paradoxically, the increasing emphasis on democracy promotion by the ‘Western world’, including the EU, is meeting an increasing scepticism about the suitability of the ‘Western model’ of democracy. Democracy promotion is a growing objective for the foreign policy of Western states (Carothers 1997, 110; Youngs 2008) and Schraeder suggests we are witnessing the ‘emergence of an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behaviour’ (2002, 1). This is reflected, for instance, in the EU’s commitment ‘to putting human rights and democracy at the centre of its external action, as a “silver thread” running through all that it does’ (European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011a, 10) or the establishment of the UN Democracy Fund in 2005. Accordingly, Western donors’ budgets for democracy promotion (including the EU’s budget, see below) have significantly increased.

At the same time, Western democracy is far from undisputed. Declining political trust and a shift towards non-institutionalized forms of political participation (Levi and Stoker 2000, 482; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995) have given rise to calls for a grand debate about democracy, its foundations and prerequisites, possibilities and limits (Kühnhardt 2000, 241). There is an ongoing debate about the EU’s democratic credentials and deficits (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Moravcsik 2002), which begs ‘the question of standards’ (Majone 1998) of democracy that are appropriate for judgement. Thus, the model of liberal democracy, usually assumed in international democracy promotion, may not be secure.

Other voices reject the strong reliance on a ‘democracy template’ that includes institutions such as free and fair elections, functional legislative bodies, political parties, independent judiciaries, etc, and instead emphasize ‘the need for democracy assistance programming that is sensitive to the presence in many developmental settings of rich internal traditions of communal deliberation and democratic life’ (Mandaville and Mandaville 2007, 8). With regard to Africa, for instance, Bradley points to the relevance of non-Western forms of democracy and demands that democracy promotion policies should be multifaceted and adopted to the unique nature of the continent (2005, 426). Similarly, Rutazibwa argues that only an ‘ethical retreat’ from promoting ‘western style multi-party electoral liberal democracy’ (even with the best intentions) will allow ‘African-style democracy’ to emerge (2013, 95).

Finally, new actors are promoting alternative substances: witness the rise of ‘autocracy promotion’ from countries such as China, Russia, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela over the last ten years. China and Russia profess to offer ‘model political regime[s] that other countries could and should adopt’ (Burnell 2010, 7). Jackson contends that Russia in particular ‘has encouraged, and sometimes promoted through indirect and direct means, its own form of political governance, which in many ways is at odds with the Western liberal democratic model’ (2010, 114). This has often entailed a limitation of Western democratization efforts (Burnell 2010). Altogether, these points show that the substance of democracy promotion cannot simply be taken for granted and requires critical reflection.

Focusing on the EU

This Special Section pays particular attention to the EU’s external democracy promotion activities. Over the past twenty years, amidst a general growth in international democracy promotion, the EU has been increasingly active in this area (for a detailed overview see Smith 2008, 142–168; Börzel and Risse 2004; 2009). The Lomé IV agreement (signed 1989) with EU member states’ former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP group) was ‘the first multilateral development agreement to include political conditionality’ (Börzel and Risse 2009, 34). In November 1991, the Council issued a resolution on human rights, democracy and development. Early 1992, the European leaders signed the Maastricht Treaty, which contained clear commitments to democracy promotion in the articles on development cooperation (Article 130u) and on Common Foreign and Security Policy (Article J1). Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War and the fall of communism spurred democracy promotion policies towards the former Soviet bloc, most importantly in relation to the Central and Eastern European countries aspiring to EU membership. The Europe Agreements with these countries, signed between 1991 and 1996, all contained provisions on democracy. The 1993 Copenhagen Declaration by the European Council spelled out ‘democracy’ as one of the eligibility criteria for EU membership. Democracy also came to occupy a more important position in the EU’s relations with other parts of the world. For example, the mid-term review of Lomé IV (1995) and the Cotonou Agreement (2000) with the ACP further strengthened political conditionality. Since 1995, all EU agreements concluded with third countries have included an ‘essential elements clause’ on democracy and human rights. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) launched in 2004 explicitly envisages the promotion of democracy (European Commission 2004, 12–13). In 1994, the European Initiative (currently ‘Instrument’) for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) was established. Democracy-related support also comes from geographic instruments such as the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, now European Neighbourhood Instrument [ENI]).

A detailed overview of EU spending on democracy promotion is hard to track down (European Parliament Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy [OPPD] 2010, 65–66), as are comparative figures from other democracy promoters, but we can sketch a general picture, which indicates that the EU is an important democracy promoter in budgetary terms. Del Biondo’s estimates (see contribution in this special section) show that, in the mid-2000s, the EU spent about €1.5 billion of its annual aid on democracy-related support, which was roughly equivalent to the US figures. The EIDHR’s budget grew by 44 per cent between 1999 and 2009 (Herrero 2009, 12–13), and it provided about €1.1 billion over the period 2007–2013 (European Parliament and Council of the EU 2006, Article 19). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) aid statistics on EU support for the ‘government and civil society’ sector, which represents a broad interpretation of democracy promotion policies (Barry 2012, 308–310)³, show that the EU institutions committed on average about US$2 billion to ‘government and civil society’ between 2004 and 2012, second only to the US, and with other donors—such as the World Bank, Germany, Sweden and Australia—far behind at around US$1 billion each.

Since the Arab Spring, democracy promotion has gained precedence in EU foreign policy. The European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy launched the concept of ‘deep democracy’ (2011b, 2–3) making democracy promotion a top EU priority in its neighbourhood. The latest European strategy document for development, ‘Agenda for Change’, includes democracy and human rights as major objectives (European Commission 2011b, 5–6). Inte...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1 Introduction: One of what kind? Comparative perspectives on the substance of EU democracy promotion
• 2 Constructing new environments versus attitude adjustment: contrasting the substance of democracy in UN and EU democracy promotion discourses
• 3 Cosmetic agreements and the cracks beneath: ideological convergences and divergences in US and EU democracy promotion in civil society
• 4 Competing perspectives on democracy and democratization: assessing alternative models of democracy promoted in Central Asian states
• 5 Promoting democracy or the external context? Comparing the substance of EU and US democracy assistance in Ethiopia
• 6 Democracy promotion in Kosovo: mapping the substance of donor assistance and a comparative analysis of strategies
• 7 International, national or local? Explaining the substance of democracy promotion: the case of Eastern European democracy promotion
• Index