Globalization, the Third World State and Poverty-Alleviation in the Twenty-First Century

B. Ikubolajeh Logan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351742542
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

This title was first published in 2002.Bringing together an inspiring mix of US and African contributors, this book explores the dynamics of the unfolding globalized economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems. Featuring incisive international commentary on the causes and consequences of poverty in the Third World it presents a powerful study of the strategies by which Third World governments and civil society can overcome poverty by insinuating themselves more creatively into the global order. The result is one of the defining works so far produced on the tensions between globalization and development.

Chapter 1

Introduction: Globalization and Third World Development in the Twenty-First Century

B. Ikubolajeh Logan

Introduction

Globalization is a process that continues to elude clear definition and, for this reason, possesses different meanings for different groups having a variety of agendas. Its lack of clarity imbues the process with a certain strident contentiousness when it is directed at Third World development, because it takes on shades of earlier discourses (for example, north-south, dependency, world structures, post-colonial). Much of the critical energy expended on the current debate on globalization centers on the nature of the process, whether it is merely another stage in the inexorable march of capitalism, or whether it is a distinct and nouvelle experience which locates capitalist expansion within a broader political, environmental, social and cultural super-structure more so than earlier global excursions of capital.

Strong globalizationists, those who argue that the current globalization is a distinctly new phenomenon, make the point that previous periods of capitalist expansion into the Third World lacked the speed, technological sophistication, economic integration and ideological universalism which are the hallmarks of globalization in the twenty-first century (c.f. Ohmae, 1990; 1995; Bryan and Farrell, 1996; Mathews, 1997). Strong globalizationists also adhere to the efficacy of the market over the state and take the neoliberal position that globalization has universally benign economic effects.

Soft or weak globalizationists, on the other hand, describe current global processes simply as another stage in capitalist expansion (see, for example, Sassen, 1998; Kennedy, 1993; Sjolander, 1996). They insist that technology merely makes the process more efficient, not different from earlier phases, in fundamental characteristic and objectives. Weak globalizationists contend further that the current globalization is merely a hiccup in Western hegemony or, at best, a remodification of the structures that underpin that hegemony. The phenomenon is not new, it has merely been recast in the scintillating hues of high tech. The internet may have replaced ocean vessels, but the basic operations of accumulating resources at the core remain essential to the process. While the global political economy of the immediate post-second World War era may have required the formalization of strategies at Bretton Woods, the new order is more flexible. It continues to use the agency of the Bretton Woods institutions, but is particularized by the speed of communication and information technology whose versatility allows global forces easy access to Third World economies (c.f. Hirst and Thompson, 1996; Kapstein, 1991/92).

The scholarly exercise of differentiating between weak versus strong globalization may not be so relevant for the Third World where the major concern is with the effects of the process on the poor. Whether weak or strong, as in earlier historical episodes, the encounter between Western capital and the Third World has not been a meeting of minds. To the contrary, the process has always been a specific drama orchestrated by strong hegemonic forces to solidify the interests of global capital. Towards this end, new rules of admission and engagement are constantly being formulated with the express purpose of excising ineffective/inefficient regions and peoples. In the process, Third World economies become fragmented, selected sectors and classes become co-opted into the global system and the majority of the region’s peoples become increasingly marginalized.

The chapters in this book revolve around a number of themes, three of which are particularly relevant for understanding the effects of globalization on Third World poverty during the first few decades of the twenty-first century; state-market relationships; civil society and the emergence of new regional configurations (new regionalisms); and environment, resource exploitation and economic polarization. The chapters attempt to comment on the mechanisms through which globalization is unfolding in the Third World, with the objective of assessing the degree to which these same mechanisms provide opportunities for economic development and political stability in the region. In the next section, I preface the discussion of the three themes above with a few comments on globalization.

Considering Globalization

Perhaps, at the heart of the present conundrum over what globalization might imply for Third World development is the fact that the term attempts to appropriate for itself a precedence in meaning on the basis of a number of supposedly unique signatures. Among them is the current neoliberal position that the dissolution of the state-market wedlock is an unproblematic requirement for the political and economic survival of the Third World (c.f. Brodhead, 1996; Bryant and Farrell, 1996). Unfortunately, this position does not make clear how widespread privatization of education, health, electricity, water supply and other basic services will improve standards of living in the Third World. Similarly, current attempts to meld democratic reform with economic reform have ambiguous implications. What mechanisms exist for Third World countries to achieve ‘a free market in a free democracy’? What are the commonalities and mutualities between these ‘freedoms’ and how is the freedom to ‘consume’ political participation and to ‘consume’ economic products likely to coexist in poor economies? What happens when/if the state abrogates all its responsibilities to its people in favor of establishing an enabling environment for the market? A number of the chapters in this book attempt to address these fundamental questions.

The current globalization is characterized also by its insistence on human rights as a necessary condition for political and economic change (this is certainly a new engagement since dehumanization of ‘natives’ characterized earlier global extensions of capital into the Third World). There is no doubt that many present Third World regimes violate the human rights of their citizens in ways that are even more uncharitable than in the colonial period. Yet, it has become difficult to promote universal human rights because the same forces, which champion human rights, ignore such rights when their economic and political interests are at stake. For example, the West, in general ‘boycotted’ the 2001 Durban Conference on Racism, not because they do not believe racism to be a humanitarian issue, but precisely because the conference threatened to focus on issues that were against the political interest of Western allies. Actions of this nature by the West, indicate to the Third World that human rights, like democracy, is selectively expendable in the globalization agenda (support of tyrannical regimes like that of former Rawlings of Ghana and undemocratic regimes like that of Kuwait also make this point).

The role of human rights in socioeconomic change in the Third World requires some serious contemplation since advocacy for humanitarian benevolence comes amid advise for the state to abdicate its welfare obligations. The expectation that the private sector will fill any vacuum created by state withdrawal from these functions does not seem to have much merit. It is neither clear why the market will wish to provide some services (which?) out of goodwill, nor how the poor will afford privatized welfare without state assistance. One could argue that the same economic and political pragmatism that encourages Western governments to protect the interests of their large middle class should currently direct Third World governments to provide basic services, at almost any cost, for the poor.

Another interesting aspect of the current globalization is the role of the international financial institutions (IFIs), multinational organizations like the United Nations and a host of multilateral and bilateral organizations and international and local NGOs (Mathews, 1997). These are all key players in the formulation and implementation of national policy at various geographic and social scales. Their activities have often forced the Third World state to relinquish some of its sovereignty (this is especially significant with the structural adjustment agenda of the IFIs over the past two to three decades). In many instances, the objectives of these globalization agents are quite inimical to the welfare of local populations as evidenced by the number of public protests associated with structural adjustment programs in several countries around the Third World (Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.).

The present wave of globalization is also characterized by a mixed array of issues – the environment, gender rights, debt relief, AIDS, the rights of children/child soldiers in civil conflicts, the role of minerals in financing civil unrest, the international transfer of arms and military expertise in the form of mercenaries, nuclear terrorism, immigration etc. Each of these is a priority for one international group or another. Yet, their various agendas do not always converge and actually contribute to the complexity of the globalization process and what it may portend for the Third World poor.

Despite claims to the contrary, all of these signatures do not quite differentiate globalization from, say colonialism. The particular strategies may be different because the specific targets are different, but the overall agendas and objectives have remained intimidatingly consistent. Additionally, the current globalization does shares several attributes with its antecedents, among them, institutionalized resource expropriation and the perpetuation of a dysfunctional socioeconomic order manifested in anomalies like dualism and informality.

Similarly, globalization in the twenty-first century shares a number of paradoxes (simultaneous polarizing processes) with its earlier counterparts.

1. Integration and marginalization, which is marked by the exclusion of large sections of the Third World from the cutting edge of research, technology, management and communications (see, for example, Connor, 1994). Even as some obviously significant world village dynamics are occurring, Third World economies are being systematically relegated to oceans of poverty which are attached to the capitalist mainstream largely through the activities of a few capital cities, export processing zones and miscellaneous mining and agricultural projects.

2. Globalization and regional specialization, is marked by the increasing relegation of Third World labor to unskilled activities (see, for example, Bergsten, 1996). Export processing zones, which use cheap, unskilled labor, are often localized, islands of economic isolation within their countries.

3. Globalization of culture and cultural isolation, is a paradoxical process by which sociocultural convergence (for example, through CNN, Microsoft, the London Times, electronic mail) seems to spawn a simultaneous process of cultural alienation (Barnett and Cavanaugh, 1994; Huntington, 1996). Global cultural homogenization has succeeded in integrating a small segment of Third world societies into the global family, while effectively disconnecting them socially and culturally from their counterparts in their own countries. As a consequence, Third World societies are being increasingly dichotomized in standards of living, quality of life and lifestyles.

A key attribute of the current globalization (elements of which it shares with earlier rounds) is manifested in what may be termed post Cold War one-worldism and political polarization. This process is reflected in the elevation of liberal democracy to a global dogma (Epsing-Andersen and van Kersbergen, 1992; Gill, 1996). Yet, this political philosophy has proved of limited utility in many Third World arenas. Far from bringing relief from ethnic, religious, military and others types of insidious duress, the one-person-one-vote franchise has often been exploited by the Third World political elite to sustain and legitimize their authority (several military dictators have been quite successful at this). At the more global level, the same forces that champion global democracy, dismiss these principles at their own selective behest, a splendid example being the voting structure within the United Nations.

The standards underlying the geopolitics of twenty-first century global, liberal democracy are reflected also in the policies of ombudsmen like the G8, United Nations and a host of international NGOs which demonstrate that Rwanda, Burundi and Sierra Leone are not Bosnia, Macedonia or Yugoslavia; and that the Third World is not part of continental Europe. As Rugumamu demonstrates in chapter 3, through mechanisms like the Lome Conventions, the 1992 Maastricht and WTO treaties, global forces use their unrivaled supremacy both to perpetuate their political and economic domination and to undermine Third World empowerment. For example, the West is systematically discarding earlier provisions of Lome as it shifts from a policy of multilateralism to a post-cold war bilateralism that is reminiscent of the British colonial divide and rule policy. The consensual partnership of the early Lome Convention period is being rapidly restructured on the basis of a shift from mutuality and respect between equals to one of mandates from the metropolitan countries. These philosophical shifts are being accompanied by a distinct shift in regional focus from the Africa-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP-countries) to the Baltic and East Europe in which the same forces that seek to integrate parts of ACP economies (South Africa, Brazil, Jamaica…) into the global system, seek also to make the system more streamlined by reneging on former commitments to the Third World.

Globalization and State-Market Relations

Proponents of globalization have transformed market freedom to a type of comparative advantage in the drive towards market liberalization and privatization in the Third World. The definition of market freedom in these neoliberal terms, covers a wide array of issues, including, market decontrol, labor decontrol and a catch-all of imperatives aimed at removing all forms of government limitations on private sector operations. To put it more vividly but less subtly, market freedom has come to mean that free-wheeling, free-dealing and fast-moving capital must have the freedom to control state policies (Bryan and Farrell, 1996; Schmidt, 1995; Horseman and Marshall, 1994; Rinehart, 1995). States that do not conform to this dogma run the risk of being blacklisted as international economic and political pariahs.

As noted in the previous section, as the state reacts to these new rules of economic engagement, it has been encouraged/coerced to withdraw from many of its traditional roles in promoting employment and social welfare. State withdrawal from these traditional purviews has led to claims that the Third World state is an extinct or nearly extinct behemoth, which cannot cope with the onslaught of globalization (c.f. Ohmae, 1990; Kennedy, 1993; Horseman and Marshall, 1994; Guehenno, 1995; Rosecrans, 1996; Cable, 1995). Suggestions that global economic activities now occur in a ‘stateless’ arena arise from the presumption that control over and dispensation of resources is a zero-sum game. As such, increased market freedom can comc only at the expense of decreased state control in the new era of market triumphalism (c.f. Zartman, 1995).

There are those who take the contrary position that the Third World state is alive and well (Dunn, 1994; Kapstein, 1991/92) and claim that its strength is reflected in its ability to reconfigure itself in response to reconfigured capital. The viable state in the twenty-first century, is one that effectively reconfigures to meet the challenges and demands of capital by accomplishing three, highly interconnected, goals: significant withdrawal from resource allocation, market liberalization and political liberalization (democracy and human rights). In these terms, state retrenchment from economic activities, far from being a sign of weakness, is a sign of its adaptability and strength, as it grapples with its new tripartite role. Only a flexible and strong state can maneuver through the non-coincident requirements of global capital and the welfare needs of the poor. Some of the chapters recommend strategies for the state to manifest its strengths and not suffocate the market and some others describe case studies where the states has tried to achieve this objective.

Globalization and the Grand Poverty-Alleviation Project

The implications of unfolding state-market relations for poverty alleviation in the Third World are discussed in several chapters, but especially in chapter 2 by Yapa. He argues that the more positive aspects of globalization (for example, technology, information) beget a seamier side, which is globalized poverty. Globalized poverty, is integral to global political and economic success and manifests itself in a series of technical, social, cultural and political arenas over which neither the market nor the state has complete authority. This sovereignty vacuum leads Yapa to call for a theory of non-sovereign power to deal with the globalization of poverty. In this context, the exigencies of globalization can be tackled at multiple points simultaneously since no single agency (state or market) is equipped to accomplish the task by itself in a comprehensive way. These ‘sites of opportunity’ present themselves in a number of areas, including, academia, the media, labor movements, local NGOs and environmental movements.

The success of the grand poverty-alleviation project would hinge, therefore, on a state-market relationship that can accomplish the difficult task of marshalling all these different forces to ensure that the twin goals of mass participation and poverty alleviation are made inseparable.

The State, the Market and the Grand Poverty-Alleviation Project

A fundamental task in the grand poverty-alleviation projec...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• 1 Introduction: Globalization and Third World Development in the Twenty-First Century
• 2 Gobalization and Poverty: From a Poststructural Perspective
• 3 Globalization and Marginalization in Euro-Africa Relations in the Twenty-First Century
• 4 The Liberalization of Underdevelopment or the Criminalization of the State? Contrasting Explanations of Africa’s Politico-Economic Crisis Under Globalization
• 5 Does Globalization Advance or Hinder Democratization in Africa?
• 6 Globalization, the State and Economic Development in Africa
• 7 Science Parks as Magnets for Global Capital: Locating High-Tech Growth Engines in Metropolitan Shanghai
• 8 The State and Globalization of Labor: Labor Export and Import in Taiwan’s Economic Restructuring and Development
• 9 Trade Liberalization and Economic Development in Mexico: A Case for Globalization?
• 10 Neoliberalism in South Africa
• 11 From Anarchy to Rennaisance in Africa in the New Millennium: New Regionalisms As Responses to Globalizations
• 12 State, Donor and NGO Configurations in Malian Development 1960–1999: The Enactment and Contestation of Global Rationalized Myths in an Organizational Field
• 13 Peripheral Vision: Globalization, Sustainable Development and the Political Ecology of Cotton Production in Mali
• 14 Conclusion: From Globalization Towards Universalization in the Twenty-First Century
• Index