Wittgenstein on Thought, Language and Philosophy

From Theory to Therapy

Christoffer Gefwert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351731423
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This title was first published in 2000: What was Wittgenstein's relation to "theory of meaning" in his post-1937 writings and what was his characterization of "philosophy"? How does "philosophy" in Wittgenstein's later writings differ from what is usually accepted in modern academic 'analytic' philosophy? This book discusses problems encountered in looking at Wittgenstein's texts after-1937, focusing particularly on whether the problem of philosophy amounts to a systematic or a theoretical activity. Arguing that philosophy can be characterized as a form of conceptual investigation, Gefwert aims to demonstrate that a theoretical view does not correspond to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. For example, philosophy is not transcendental as he thought it was before 1929. Neither is philosophical language universal as Wittgenstein 1929-1936 thought it was. Proposing that a philosophical conceptual investigation is analogous to a psychotherapeutical session of Freud, with the common aim to dissolve the conceptual problems in language that haunt us in our everyday life, Gefwert's examination of the post-1937 writings of Wittgenstein concludes that "philosophical investigation" is a very different activity than that assumed by the Logical Positives and others adhering to a theoretical view.

III Thought and Privacy

III.1 Introduction

In an unpublished manuscript, written in 1913, Russell states that 'I think it may be shown that acquaintance with logical form is involved before explicit thought about logic begins, in fact as soon as we can understand a sentence'.¹ Wittgenstein had seen the manuscript and was well acquainted with it. We also know from the available literary sources that Wittgenstein was hostile towards this view-that logical form is somehow distinguished (logically independent) from language (which we, for example, meet in certain interpretations in the modern topic of Cognitive Science)-and that he therefore did reject Russell's thesis. He maintained the insight that logic cannot depend on the experiencing of a fact, whether logical or empirical [NB 3], Furthermore, in 1914, Wittgenstein explicitly criticized Russell's theory which asserted the existence of an abstract formal structure [NB 2-3] where the logical experience of the structure would precede understanding of any proposition whatsoever. Russell assigned the conditions of the meanings to the elements inherent in the very constituents of the propositions. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, it is a fact that Russell in his text was '... trying to express something that cannot be expressed'[NB 31].

It seems that Wittgenstein entertained the position that a proposition achieves its meaning '... as if it were off its own bat'[NB 26], We know that he retained this position in the Tractatus which was published in 1921 (the English version in 1922)[Gefwert (1) 56-69], For example, he wrote that '... the precedent to which we are constantly inclined to appeal must reside in the symbol itself[T §5.525], This clearly shows the continuation of his thought during the turn of the decade concerning the question of how a proposition achieves its meaning. We can therefore conclude that this was the situation, as far as the problem of thought (and 'intention') is concerned, when Wittgenstein, in 1920, left active work in philosophy. But, we also know that he, at the end of the decade, returned to this problem when he began to preoccupy himself with philosophical problems again [Supra I.1]. It is therefore of crucial interest to investigate the situation in somewhat more detail as it occures at this time.

Wittgenstein took up the problem of 'thought' and 'intention' in 1929 when he had returned to Cambridge. In his later texts we encounter two themes which, indeed, could be characterized as the 'problem of thought' and the 'problem of intention'. 'Thinking is the use of symbols', he puts down in his notebook on June 29, 1930, adding, some pages later, that '[t]hought, insofar as one can speak of it at all, must be something quite pedestrian'[MS 108], We also know that Wittgenstein was occupied with, for example, the problem of 'intention' from 1929 to 1950 because, in his later years, as late as in October 1948, he wrote that [RPP II §178]

Intent, intention, is neither an emotion, a mood, nor yet a sensation or image. It is not a state of consciousness. It does not have a genuine duration. Intention can be called a mental disposition. This term is misleading inasmuch as one does not perceive such a disposition within himself as a matter of experience.

From this quotation one can notice that the 'problem of intention' was stili an important topic for him at this late stage of his life. But what, exactly, did Wittgenstein mean by 'thought' and 'intention'? How is one to understand the 'problem of thought' and the 'problem of intention' (for example, when we perform a calculation in mathematics or program a task in computing science with the explicit intention of achieving a certain result)? It is these problems that we shall investigate here and try to provide an answer to.

We shall focus the attention on the theme of 'thought' and 'intention', as we find that they are being investigated by Wittgenstein in the beginning of the 1930's, in the texts which he came to call Philosophische Bemerkungen [WA I-IV], It is in these manuscripts that we find, for example, the whole complex of problems concerning the topic of 'intention' to reach their peak. In connection with this topic one finds that Wittgenstein is weaving what can be characterized as a kind of thematic fabric concerning different aspects around the topic of 'intention'. These aspects amount to the examples he provides in conjunction with his thoughts concerning such additional themes as 'thinking', 'meaning', 'waiting', 'understanding', 'reading', etc. Thus, one can say, like Wittgenstein, that this 'concrete' and apparently mental problem, in its most general form, ' ... gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems'[PhI §109].

I do not assume the problems of 'thought' and 'intention' to occur everywhere in his texts as an explicit and major theme within those of his numerous writings in which we find him specifically discussing aspects of it. To make such an assumption would, indeed, in reality be to simplify matters far too much. Neither do I assume 'thought' and 'intention' to occure as an explicit topic everywhere in Wittgenstein's texts during the different periods in his philosophical production. Perhaps one can characterize the situation by saying that, on the one hand, 'thought' and 'intention', as themes, are 'implicitly' in a dominating position as far as his whole production is concerned, but, on the other hand, that this is not the case as far as each distinguishable part of his philosophical production is concerned.

Secondly, we are not dealing with what can be characterized as a single monolithic and sharply demarcated problem (that we, e.g., find in science between universals and particulars) but, rather, with what we can characterize, in Wittgensteinian terminology, as a 'family' of problems [Phi §67], This 'family' of problems exhibits the characteristic features of both overlapping and partial similarity-'family resemblance' properties-as far as the common thematic resemblance is concerned [Infra IV.4], Indeed, this is indicated, for example, when Wittgenstein says that '[t]he expression of the intention can't contain the intention, for language can't explain itself[L (2) 112]. But it is nevertheless connected with that constructive impulse which is asserted by Wittgenstein to bridge the gap holding between a sign and its application. This is an unavoidable gap which cannot be saved by any explanation, nor negotiated by any reason, since, as Wittgenstein emphasized, '[n]o reason compels us to learn language'[L (2) 67],

Another point which it is important to be aware of is that when reading Wittgenstein's texts one notices that the word 'intention' occurs relatively seldom in his vocabulary. We encounter this expression most frequently in those texts which he wrote during a brief period in the beginning of the 1930's. Thus we find, for example, in the Philosophische Bemerkungen [WA I-IV], where the first part was written around the turn of the decade 1929-1930, a quite remarkable discussion by Wittgenstein concerning 'internal relations' as well as 'intentionality'[PhR 63-74], Here we find that he, in one of his manuscripts, writes the interesting comment that [WA II 196]:

Wenn man das Element der Intention aus der Sprache entfernt so bricht damit ihre ganze Funktion zusammen.

This crucial comment, i.e., that if one excludes the element of intention from language then its whole function collapses, is especially interesting [PhR 63], For those members of the school of Logical Empiricism, i.e., the majority (cf., for example, Carnap), who only knew of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought through their specific (and mistaken) interpretation of the Tractatus [Supra II.5], these writings concerning 'intentionality' would have been extremely disturbing [cf. PhR 63-74], But, it is important to remember that Wittgenstein did not, despite, for example, his contacts with Schlick and Waismann, regard himself as being a member of the philosophical school of Logical Empiricism [Supra 1.2],

It seems to be a fact that after the brief-but intense-period, in the beginning of the 193 O's, we find the theme of 'intention' to occur less frequently in his texts. Nevertheless, it does not entirely disappear because one can still find this theme explicitly mentioned in a few places in those texts which Wittgenstein wrote after 1937. For example, in a paragraph written between 1938 and 1939, we encounter the following remark connected to this theme when Wittgenstein asks ' ... what kind of super-strong connexion exists between the act of intending and the thing intended?'[RFM I §130], In the same manuscript one also finds that he emphasizes the important insight that such an 'intentional connection' does not amount to an empirical one [RFM I §128], Thus, his position is that 'intention' cannot be treated, for example, by an ordinary scientific (and empirical) 'behaviourist' Outer view, or, alternatively, a rational cognitive Inner view of some kind. But, he also later, say, in the Philosophical Investigations, explicitly acknowledges the importance of 'intention'. But here, in this text-in contrast to his earlier texts-he seems to treat this problem in more or less a random fashion [PhI §197], Thus one is given the impression that the notion of 'intention' in these later post-1937 texts seems to have lost the key feature that we find them still to inhabit in his earlier writings.²

This feature is connected to Wittgenstein's overall path of intellectual evolution; an evolution which one could, perhaps, characterize as being reminiscent of what could be called a continuous evolvment 'towards the concrete'. This tendency of evolvment 'towards the concrete' (for example, in connection with calculations) must be seen as one of the most central efforts through the whole of Wittgenstein's philosophical span of evolution. As a result of this it does, when superficially viewed, indeed look as if Wittgenstein during his most 'mature' period completely dismantles the theme of 'intention'. However, it is important to understand that such an account amounts to an illusion and is therefore not correct. In this chapter I will attempt to show that even if we cannot identify 'intention' as an explicit theme in these latter texts one can, nevertheless, still find it to be a genuine ingredient 'surfacing' now and then. Thus we can always read and understand his later texts within the scope of this theme. That is, regardless of the fact that the theme of 'intention' is not everywhere explicitly mentioned in Wittgenstein's texts we find it-due to the illusions that one encounters again and again in 'philosophical' discourse-to be constantly at work in the background.

We shall attempt to show how Wittgenstein wanted to understand the problems of 'thought' and 'intention' by focusing our attention on certain specific aspects of these problems. To begin with it is a fact that when studying Wittgenstein's texts we do not, for example, find a single explicit chapter named 'Intention' in his Nachlass. Thus we cannot by 'intention' mean something occurring in his texts as an explicit theme or as a theory of some sort. However, what we can do is to attempt to exhibit those 'implicit' aspects of Wittgenstein's view of 'intention' which one cannot find to be explicitly mentioned in his published texts. These aspects show themselves when one is able to correctly understand them. This does not mean that our aim is to primarily extract any particular 'philosophical theses' (as in 'analytical philosophy') which one may assume to be, say, subconsciously (or, in an Anti-Realist vocabulary, 'implicitly') existing 'below the surface' of these texts. That is, our aim is not, for example, to formulate any kind of 'theory of meaning' (a semantical structure), so even in that respect we are not interested in anything that can be characterized-in a psychoanalytical terminology-as being some kind of 'repressed intentions'. What we are to do is simply to rearrange (but not distort) Wittgenstein's written material in accordance with our own limited philosophical needs (in Wittgenstein's sense). If we express our task with his own words, then, what we aim to do here is to make an attempt to investigate the notion of 'intention' as something ' ... which we see when we look into the thing, and which an analysis digs out'[PhI §92],

What we shall do is to make an attempt to reconstruct the main outlines of Wittgenstein's thought as far the problems of 'thought' and 'intention' are concerned. This we shall do by scetching the assumed evolution of the problem for Wittgenstein (1) as it seems to occur in his 'earlier' writings, notably the Tractatus [Gefwert (1) 46-70], (2) by drawing the outlines of the 'problem of intention' as we find it in his texts during the beginning of the 1930's and (3) by characterizing the problem when it culminates in his so called 'mature philosophy' in his post-1937 writings [Infra IV.3-51.

When reading Wittgenstein's texts the typical feature that one frequently encounters is the strong impression that there is something which the writer attempts to show, or indicate, with his comments [Gefwert (1) 27-35], This is connected to two main points in Wittgenstein's writings:

• (1) Structuralist (introspectionist) psychology can never explain meaning.
• (2) Contrary to the ideas of the Realists/Anti-Realists the primary creation of meaning is indescribable (as a 'theory of meaning').

According to Kenny, the result is that'... common to both [points] are the tasks and method of philosophy of mind: to clarify psychological statements by separating out the logical and intentional from the contingent and empiricall'.³ These aspects of his writings are extremely important and need to be taken into account.

When one views Wittgenstein from such an angle one can notice an interesting and quite remarkable reminiscence to one of the famous oracles of Greece. Similarly to the oracle of Delphi, as we, for example, find it to be depicted by the Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesos (ca. 540-480 BC), one can characterize what Wittgenstein is attempting to achieve by saying that he, like the ' ... oracle [of] Delphi neither utters nor hides [the] meaning, but shows it by a sign'.⁴ By emphasizing also this side of Wittgenstein one finds that his investigations become an act of balancing between, on the one hand, the requirement of not to say what, according to him, cannot be said, and, on the other hand, the requirement to avoid the danger of shortcutting and trivialising relevant thoughts.

We are then faced, when we look at the problem from an historical and chronological point of view, with the necessity to recognize the fact that, despite Wittgenstein's continuous development of his thoughts after the composition of the documents called the Philosophische Bemerkungen, it becomes, after the writings of these texts, virtually impossible to find any major changes in his views as far as the problem of 'intention' is concerned. For example, already in the Big Typescript [BT], compiled around 1931-1933, we encounter certain remarks concerning 'intention' which we also find, in essence, to be repeated almost verbatim in the Philosophical Investigations. The upshot of the previous discussion is then to make it clear to the reader that what we are to do below is to investigate Wittgenstein's notion of 'intention' in the spirit of his own philosophical investigations.

III.2 Intention: Historical Sources

We shall now attempt to historically trace the most important literary sources from which Wittgenstein may have received his views concerning the theme of 'intention'. This is not an easy task because it has never been solved in a satisfactory way from where he, suddenly, around the turn of the decade 1929-1930, acquired the concept of 'intention'. There are, nevertheless, a few likely texts which could have acted as literary sources for his novel insights. Thus it seems highly plausible that the concept of 'intention' that we find Wittgenstein to apply in his texts in the beginning of the decade can be traced back to at least two-perhaps three-possible sources. We can mention (1) the article Der Gedanke [LoI 1-30], from 1918, by Gottlob Frege, (2) the book Allgemeine Erkermtnislehre, from 1923, by Moritz Schlick⁵ and (3) certain writings by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) concerning the phenomenological school of philosophy, as being possible sources for Wittgenstein's texts on 'intention'.

If we begin our investigation in chronological order the first likely source for the concept of 'intention' may have been the article Der Gedartke published, in 1918, by Frege in the periodical Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. This article was intended to be a part of a book called Logische Untersuchungen which Frege was never able to finish. We do not know when Wittgenstei...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• INTRODUCTION
• I THE UNIVERSAL MEDIUM
• II METHODOLOGICAL ILLUSIONS
• III THOUGHT AND PRIVACY
• IV PHILOSOPHY AS GRAMMAR
• V THE REALIST/ANTI-REALIST ILLUSION
• VI CONCEPTUAL INVESTIGATIONS
• CONCLUSION