This chapter provides an understanding of statecraft. The discussion presented here defines the attributes of statecraft, which will in turn be utilised to examine the central topic of this book â middle powers (MPs). This chapter enables the study of MP statecraft because it establishes the crucial components of statecraft that can then be employed within the study as areas of enquiry. The scholarship of the authors discussed in this chapter (and listed in the bibliography) should be consulted to join the theoretical discussions of statecraft as a distinct subject. Thus this chapterâs purpose is to provide an understanding of statecraft, which establishes areas of statecraft behaviour that can be used as a structure for enquiry.
Firstly, this chapter considers how state sovereignty is established and discusses the various definitions of statecraft. The definition of statecraft differs depending on the perspective and approach of the scholar. There are empirical and theoretical studies, domestic (internal) and international (external) perspectives, as well as the participant and observer approaches. The purpose of statecraft is identified and the tools or techniques of statecraft will be displayed within taxonomies and their use explored. Finally, an appreciation of the locus of statecraft is developed from the study of various scholarsâ understanding of the practitioners of statecraft. Underlying the broad discussion is an attempt to comprehend the relationship between sovereignty, state and statecraft for the purpose of enquiry into MPs and their statecraft.
The concept of statecraft encapsulates and is dependent upon the state as an organisational entity. It explains the existence of the state and is often purported as the actions of the state. Given the diverse and numerous definitions of the state, a brief review of the origin of the contemporary state is provided as a foundation from which to proceed.
The state as discussed in this chapter has its foundation in the Treaty of Augsburg of 1555. A legal concept or precedent of geographic separation resulted from the treatyâs clause cuius regio, euis religio (whose the region, his the religion). The legal recognition of exclusive authority within geographic regions, however, was not put into effective practice until after the 30 Years War and the eventual Peace of Westphalia which concluded the religious warfare between Protestants and Catholics in 1648. Philpott (1995, 360) identifies this historical fact as âthe first modern revolution in sovereigntyâ, a revolution that established the modern state and provided a definition of state sovereignty as supreme legitimate authority within a territory (Philpott 1995, 357).
The Definition of Statecraft
âStatecraftâ is a vernacular word which originated in northern Europe to mean the âscience of governmentâ (Anderson 1977). Various schools of thought, from political scientists to sociologists, have paraphrased this rudimentary understanding. The common contemporary interpretation of political economists holds it to mean the actions of a state. Such a definition could include domestic and international actions and include the development and implementation of policy. Several contortions of the definition are below.
In 1920 Sir Geoffrey Butler wrote Studies in Statecraft. In the text he covers the development of theories of international organisation through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and contradicts the idea of the need for a state. Bishop Roderickâs notion of Renaissance Pacificism, William Postel and World Peace through World Power, and the âGrand Designsâ of Sully and later Emerich Cruce are explored/examined through a combination of factual chapters, biography and period theories of the European balance of power. Butler provides no definition of statecraft; however, his text implies an understanding of statecraft that allows for the study of the foreign policies through the analysis of âstatespersonsâ and their ideas on a comparative historical basis. Butler, it can be comprehended, employs the idea of statecraft from the position of observer and teleologist. This position also acknowledges the existence of statecraft prior to the emergence of the state.
David Baldwin (1985, 8â12), in his text Economic Statecraft, argues that the use of the term has been largely rejected by domestic affairs scholars (with the exception of Charles Anderson and his work of 1977, Statecraft) and under-employed by political scientists from international relations and other strands of internationalist studies, invoking it as a perspective from which to study the international economic interaction of states. For fundamental definitions of statecraft Baldwin finds three international relations scholars of the 1970s most useful, with the following interpretations from Harold and Margaret Sprout (1971) and K. J. Holsti (1976 & 1988 5th edn) being the most useful to his interests. Statecraft:
âŚembraces all the activities by which statesmen [sic] strive to protect cherished values and to attain desired objectives vis-a-vis other nations and/or international organisations. (Sprout 1971; Baldwin 1985, 8)
âŚ[is] the organised actions governments take to change the external environment in general or the policies and actions of other states in particular to achieve the objectives that have been set by policy makers. (Holsti 1976 & 1988 5th edn; Baldwin 1985, 8â9)
Baldwin himself employs these definitions with the modifying addition of non-state actors to the category of international organisations. International organisations are targets of state influence. Baldwin (1985, 9) therefore expands Holstiâs definition to include ââŚchanges in beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions, and/or propensities to actâ.
Baldwinâs goal is to treat international economic policy as a technique of statecraft and to include it as a tool to be utilised by states. In order to do this he classifies and then considers economic statecraft in literature, in international thought, in relation to bargaining, national power, foreign trade, foreign aid, legality and morality and within classic cases such as the League of Nations or United States of America-Japan relations. The general thrust of Baldwinâs text is to equip the state and state representatives with a tool of statecraft by providing a âhow-to manualâ or guide. Baldwinâs approach differs from Butlerâs understanding in that Baldwin is concerned with the use of statecraft as a perspective which can improve and increase the ability of states to manage and thus obtain their goals through a more appropriate and formally acknowledged use of state power.
Charles Anderson whose scholarship focuses on domestic or public policy, concentrates on the process of statecraft by dividing it into three distinct activities: policy, strategy and structure. Andersonâs work is similar to Baldwinâs, in that it is read like an instruction book, but he focuses on the domestic rather than the international. He finds decision making to be the heart of a craft of politics. In 1977 Anderson wrote in the preface to his work:
I chose it [statecraft] for the title of this book because it suggests that some aspects of the practise of politics have the form of a craft or an art and that they require skill, technique, and judgement. It also implies that politics can be practised well or poorly, that it can be done with painstaking care and creativity, or that it can be haphazard and nonchalant. (Anderson 1977, vii)
Andersonâs understanding focuses on the decision-making aspect of statecraft by arguing for the practice and improvement of the skills of statecraft in order to increase its usefulness. He attempts to place his reader as participant rather than spectator and sees the object being ââŚthe process of making public decisions themselvesâŚâ rather than an analysis of the process (Anderson 1977, viii).
In 1990 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George produced the second edition of their work Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. Theirs is a text which approaches statecraft with a combination of historical analysis of the evolution of the international system from the seventeenth century, and a perspective which analyses contemporary concepts and policies of international relations such as Negotiation, Deterrence, Coercive Diplomacy, Crisis Management, War Termination, Detente and United States of America-Soviet Union Security Cooperation. The approach places statecraft as a rubric of international relations and as a position from which to understand the use of force by states. In this Craig and George hold the middle position between Butler at one extreme (that is, being international in scope and analytical in method), and Anderson at the other (with a domestic scope and a process-based method).
The definition of statecraft uses a broad canvas. Authors, such as those mentioned above, have employed the term within their own interests but generally follow one of two main constructions of the term. The first sees statecraft as the actions of a state internationally, actions that are guided by the stateâs desire to achieve international goals. Baldwin found that â[a]mong students of foreign policy and international politics the term is sometimes used to encompass the whole foreign-policy-making process, but more often it refers to the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy goalsâ (1985, 8). Therefore, to internationalist scholars the term is generally not inclusive of the development of the policy goals but concerned with the implementation of them. The second holds a view of statecraft that sees it as the political process of a state, a view which focuses on the establishment of domestic policy, and the examination of the process rather than the attempt to implement the policy itself. Both of these positions, however, remain grounded by the existence of the state as sovereign; whether the domestic or international interests of states are taken as the area of inquiry, the state itself remains autonomous.
Beyond the empirical study of the domestic and international aspects of statecraft there exists a theoretical or philosophical approach. The work of Richard Devetak confronts the premise of state sovereignty, which is critically accepted by other scholars of statecraft: âThe argument advanced here [by Devetak] is based on a claim which can be stated quite boldly: there is statecraft, but there is no complete stateâ (Devetak 1995, 19). Derrida and Machiavelli inform Devetak. He finds that:
[S]tatecraft names the activity by which states are maintained and given form; it is the ongoing political struggle to prevent the founding of a state from becoming a foundering [sic]. So statecraft, as the constant maintenance of the state, does not so much bring about the completion of the state as constantly attempts to cancel inconveniences and threats to its maintenance. (Devetak 1995, 21)
Devetakâs understanding is paradoxical because it describes statecraft as an activity which has a purpose (the construction and reconstruction of the state) which can never be completed. It is an activity that maintains a dialectic within itself and which is challenged continually by the purpose of the activity itself.
The inability of the state to finalise its existence within an evolving international political economy requires it to practise statecraft in order to continue as an incomplete state holding challenged sovereignty. This sovereignty has to be continually justified and defended against the predatory operation of the international states system and the existence of potential threats that may be constituted as economic, political, military or in the form of a natural disaster. The state as such is an organisation that recreates itself through statecraft. Statecraft itself then can be identified as not the actions of a state, but the âaction of stateâ. That is, the act of (re)creating a state.