Exploring Sport and Leisure Disasters

A Socio-Legal Perspective

Hazel J. Hartley

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429647802
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 2001. This book provides a socio-legal analysis of disasters by setting out two sport and leisure disasters (the 1989 Hillsborough and Marchioness disasters) and considering them in their broader legal/political/economic and policy contexts. It bases the analysis on in-depth examinations of the legal responses to these disasters. The foundations for the case studies are laid by reviewing critiques of relevant contemporary legal problems. These include the concepts and contexts of disasters; the law in a liberal democracy; negligence, mass actions and policy in PTSD cases; statutory regulation of and safety; the laws of corporate reckless manslaughter and the contemporary legal problems of inquests and public inquiries into disasters.

The theoretical and policy chapters are followed by the presentation of the two case study disasters, drawing on documentary sources and interviews with academics, policy makers, key legal practitioners and campaigners for legal reform, involved in these post-disaster legal processes. The analysis returns to the critical themes of the earlier chapters and ends with conclusions and recommendations for further research and legal reform arising out of this area of 'disaster law'.

Students in sport and leisure courses will be required to tackle legal and ethical issues. Law modules and courses in sport and law are developing an increasingly socio-legal, if not multi-disciplinary approach. This book takes account of this, taking a critical, multi-disciplinary approach to sport, leisure and the law. However, it will be useful to a broader group of readers who study, practice or work in the law or legal reform and apply their work to disasters.

CHAPTER 1

DISASTERS – CONCEPTIONS AND CONTEXTS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is divided into two parts and begins with a review of traditional conceptions of disasters as Acts of God, which are viewed as unforeseeable and therefore beyond human control. It examines the various approaches to the complex task of conceptualising disasters and challenges the notion of disasters being restricted to a particular time or place. Alternative conceptions of disasters with phases of development, both long-term and short-term, are explored. Building on the idea of phases of a disaster, in which systems failures gradually unfold, such long-term histories are theorised in terms of broader contexts of vulnerability in the 1980s in the United Kingdom.

The influence of Government policy, through to organisational culture and pressures on individual workers in relation to the creation and maintenance of risks over a long period is articulated. This draws on theoretical material on political economy, changes in legal regulation of health and safety, and workers’ rights. In addition, research into organisational culture and working conditions is used, which may lay foundations for predispositions to both sudden and creeping disasters.

Part two examines three examples of disasters of the 1980s, the King’s Cross fire 1987, the Piper Alpha Oil Rig explosion, 1988 and the 1988 Clapham rail disaster. It draws on various sources including the public inquiries into these disasters, exploring the theoretical themes identified in Part One and Chapter 2. The enterprise culture of the Thatcher years, in the backdrop of multinational globalisation, and its permeation through deregulation, privatisation, company priorities and their risk-management strategies, is critically examined through the lens of the phases of these disasters. This assists in the evaluation of the possible influence of the theoretical themes in operation, in the empirical accounts of the public inquiries into these disasters.

This approach to disasters therefore attempts to challenge traditional conceptions of disasters as unforeseeable acts of god. It seeks to demonstrate, empirically that, prior to the Hillsborough and Marchioness disasters of 1989, there was evidence of broader political, economic contexts of vulnerability or predisposition. These contexts, repeatedly exerting their influence, possibly predisposed areas of United Kingdom industry, transport and tourism to disaster. Unless such contexts are acknowledged, compared across public inquiry reports and other academic sources, at the levels of both corporate work practices and Government policy, these patterns will continue, as layers of risk were demonstrated recently in rail disasters at Southall in 1997 and Ladbroke Grove, Paddington, in 1999.

PART ONE: CONCEPTIONS OF DISASTERS

There is no such thing as a typical disaster or a catch-all disaster definition. Some disasters highlight geographical and environmental factors (earthquakes or floods). Others are located in man-made, complex industrial systems (Flixborough chemical explosion, Chernobyl Nuclear Plant explosion). Disasters may be of a sudden type, for example, a plane crash or a bomb. Others, often known as creeping disasters, may affect similar numbers of victims but exert their influence over a much longer time scale. Definitions of, and attitudes towards disasters, are located within a wider political and legal agenda in a culture of risk, blame, grief, anger and frustration (see Scraton et al, 1995; Wells, 1995b).

Traditional conceptions of disasters as Acts of God, which are unforeseeable and cannot be avoided, can influence public attitudes towards victims or claimants or the commitment of the state to legal and public investigations into disasters. It is the quality and depth of legal and state investigations into disasters which can challenge such traditional conceptions and uncover a longer-term history of vulnerability, neglect at political, organisational and individual levels. However, the absence of such investigations or the various controls or restrictions placed on them, may only serve to reinforce the myth of blaming one person or higher beings for the catastrophic effects of disasters:

Disasters are essentially ill defined. They are social events that have a wide range of implications: fatalities, injuries, material and financial loss. Their consequences depend on the geographical area over which they take place, the wealth of the region that suffers the incident and its social fabric (Horlick-Jones, 1990, p 11).

Wells (1995b, p 5) describes disasters, by their nature as ‘relative, contingent and often indeterminate’ and notable by the absence of simplistic defining criteria. There are no typical disasters; they tend to be observed as varied and complex (United Nations, 1986; Taylor, 1987; Davis and Scraton, 1997). Attempts to define disasters are usually located in a particular function, such as emergency planning, aid, response, investigation; they tend to focus on effects rather than causes and may ignore the role played by human beings in predispositions to disasters. The ways in which disasters and risk are perceived and defined, related to what is natural and unnatural, is ‘culturally produced; attitudes to disasters are both the result and cause of acceptable ideas about risk and everyday activities’ (Wells, 1995b, p 9).

A disaster has been described as a ‘cataclysm, a catastrophe, a tragedy’ (Horlick-Jones, 1990). The derivation of the word disaster is from the Latin astrum – a star. Perhaps, as (ibid, Wells, p 9) suggests, our culture contains ‘powerful notions of divine retribution ... where disasters were seen as “Acts of God’”. Many approaches to defining disasters emphasise the sudden and devastating effects. Multiple deaths occurring simultaneously, with no human agent’ (Wells, 1995b, p 9) and the magnitude of fatalities (Horlick-Jones, 1990) are often seen as essential components of a disaster. The effects are sudden and devastating – a ‘sharp and furious eruption’ (Erikson, 1979, p 200).

Davis (1990) and Horlick-Jones (1990) focus on the characteristic of a damaging event that exceeds the capacity of locally mobilised resources to deal with it. Disasters fall within the categories of events regarded by the police as major incidents. These require the implementation of special arrangements for the rescue and evacuation of large numbers of casualties, the involvement of large numbers of people and the mobilisation of emergency and support services to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness (Home Office policy, cited by Horlick-Jones, 1990). Kreps (1984) continues the theme of damage, loss and disruption and located the disasters within particular times and places:

Disasters are events, observable in time and space, in which societies or their larger sub-units, incur physical damage and losses and or disruption to their routine functioning. Both the causes, and consequences of these events are related to the social structures and processes of societies or their sub-units (Kreps, 1984, p 309, cited Wells, 1995b, p 5).

Fritz (1961, p 655, cited in Fagan, 1990, p 9) restricts disasters to those ‘events concentrated in time and space, in which society ... undergoes severe danger, and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and fulfilment is prevented’. Tierney (1989) also suggests that disasters manifest themselves in ‘a particular geographic area with some degree of loss, interfere with the ongoing social life of the community and are subject to human management’ (Tierney, 1989, cited in Fagan, 1990, p 9).

Disasters have been classified in various ways, for example, natural, industrial and humanistic in such primary elements as earth, air, water and people (Taylor, 1987). Here the approach was to offer common remedies but the main focus was on ‘cause determining response rather than analysing cause per se’ (Fagan, 1990, p 13). The pioneering work of Turner (1978) developed notions of disasters as man-made systems failures with a long-term incubation period where risks were created in layers across technical, managerial and social contexts. However, the polarisation of natural and man-made disasters has been criticised, since the ‘interaction of technology and the environment leads to and exacerbates the detrimental impact of natural phenomena such as floods ...’ (Wells, 1995b, p 5). The differential effects of earthquakes of a similar magnitude could be determined by ‘population, capability of the community to mitigate against the impact and effects of an earthquake hazard’ (Tierney, 1989, cited in Fagan, 1990, p 9). Camp sites have been located in flood-prone areas avoided by builders; deforestation in estuaries has increased chances of flooding; and poor quality buildings have been located on or near earthquake fault lines.

Disasters may also be of a financial nature such as the collapse of the Barings Bank, following the trading activities of Nick Leeson or the impact of the 1995 drought on Yorkshire Water pic. Wells (1995b, p 5) suggests a tripartite version of environmental, technological and social hazards. Here, environmental replaces natural in ‘recognition of the role of human activity in distorting the effects’ and technological comprises ‘those disasters emanating from human-designed technological systems’; social includes ‘human induced disasters, such as terrorism and arson ...’ (ibid, p 5). Berren et al (1989, p 44) argue that a definition of a disaster can be liberalised to include ‘an event that stresses a society, or a portion of that society, beyond the normal limits of daily living’. They move away from Fritz’s version of disasters, which restricts such events to a particular time and place (Fagan, 1990). Davis and Scraton (1997, p 1) observe that ‘modern transport, communication and organisational systems are significant in widening the constituency affected by specific disasters’. This supports the work of Wright et al (1990, p 37) who suggest that this broader constituency might be defined ‘by a community of meaning-rather than a community of place’ without a ‘clearly defined site or front line’ (cited in Davis and Scraton, 1997, p 1).

A conceptual framework that recognises different kinds of devastating effects -economic, social, physical, psychological – does not restrict a disaster to a sudden moment, time and place (unlike Fritz, 1961; Erikson, 1979; Kreps, 1984). It would embrace creeping or slow onset disasters. Such disasters have a devastating effect on a large number of people but are not located within a limited or sudden time frame or place. Examples of creeping disasters include those related to products (Thalidomide, Opren or benzodiazepene, haemophiliac Factor 8) or work-related illnesses or deaths (asbestosis), the latter seen as ‘the greatest problem we face on the occupational health front’ (Benton, 1987; Eagle, 1997, p 7). Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) may turn out to be the worst creeping disaster in the history of the United Kingdom (see Gifford, 1996, on deregulation, disasters and BSE).

Rather than conceptualising disasters as a sudden Act of God, Toft and Reynolds (1997, p 13), suggest that ‘the underlying causes are far more complex than just divine wrath’ and ‘invariably have organisational and social dimensions’. The media has played a key role in challenging the classification of several UK disasters as Acts of God and have regularly contributed to increasing public awareness of disasters as having a broader, long-term history, which maps management awareness and or weaknesses in responding to problems.

It may be that a genuine natural disaster, with no man-made contributions, might fulfil the criteria of an unforeseeable Act of God that no one could have prevented. However, many of the UK disasters of the 1980s, including Zeebrugge 1987; King’s Cross 1987; Piper Alpha 1988 and Clapham 1988 display technical, managerial and social elements. They have revealed patterns of vulnerability and predispositions iri a broader political economic context, which demonstrate failures by management to assess and respond to risks or to the concerns of workers or authorities. Such features in the long-term build-up to the disaster have been repeatedly identified in the official discourse of public inquiries. Those inquiries have examined the long-term history of the disaster, often going back several years. The public inquiry is the only legal process that takes such a long-term perspective. It is useful to conceptualise and examine disasters in terms of several phases, in their broader political, economic and managerial contexts, rather then focusing on the moments of the disaster unfolding.

Scraton et al (1995) interpret disasters as having eight stages: historical context; immediate context; immediate circumstances; the moment; rescue and evacuation, immediate aftermath; short-term aftermath and the long-term aftermath. Such an approach does not merely operate at a theoretical level. It draws on multi-disciplinary research and critiques, leading to recommendations on definition, policy and context, encompassing a broader socio-political context. Previous work in disaster planning began to either examine long-term incubation periods (Turner, 1978; Horlick-Jones, 1990) or address management and efficient clearing of the disaster scene. Scraton et al (1995) and Davis and Scraton (1997), take the idea of phases much further, providing a multi-disciplinary perspective. The historical context covers the years and months leading up to the disaster, often regarded, by Turner (1978) as the incubation period. This medical model of incubation, crisis and rescue implies that, during this period, there are no signs of the disease. In fact, signs are often visible during the incubation or historical period and might be to those agencies that have collective responsibility for planning health and safety:

Despite their immediacy and suddenness, disasters rarely happen without warning. Over time, and often through complacency, circumstances are repeated and become accepted, giving the impression, through habit and familiarity, that all is well and will remain so (Scraton et al, 1995, p 7).

Disasters are actually the ‘logical outcome of sloppy, institutionalised practices’ (Scraton et al, 1995, p 7). Without exception, the inquiries into the disasters of the 1980s, repeatedly identified institutionalised weaknesses, set in broader socio-economic, political contexts of vulnerability, which built-up layers of increasing risk over a long-term, historical period. The immediate context covers the weeks leading up to the disaster that ‘brings together key elements or factors and directs then towards a particular set of circumstances’ (Scraton et al, 1995, p 8).

During this phase, there are often ‘changes in the pattern of an organisation and management of situations which increase the likelihood of a disaster at a particular moment. These can be changes in working practices, alterations to plans, cost-cutting exercises, introduction of key personnel to key control positions’ (Scraton et al, p 8). There is a tendency to focus on the day of the disaster as the time when risks suddenly begin to accelerate or accumulate accompanied by an assumption that, in such a short-time scale, there is no time to respond and change the inevitable chain of events. However, risks are created and accumulated during all of the stages of a disaster and are often a combination of a structural, environmental, physical, managerial and human kind. During the immediate phase faults in the system, after lying latent for a time, these faults may propagate with alarming speed’ (Hale, 1989, cited in Young, 1993, p 23).

The specific circumstances set the scene close to the moment of the disaster. ‘The historical and immediate context combine to establish the potential but there are always specific circumstances which realise that potential’ (Scraton et al, 1995, p 9). The final initiator or catalyst (for example, the dropped cigarette at Bradford City FC in 1985, or on an escalator at King’s Cross in 1987; the assistant bosun in charge of closing the bow doors on the Herald who fell asleep and failed to close them) is often the focal point of attention given to disasters. But it is the interface between the initiator or catalyst and the vulnerable systems, set in their br...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Half Title
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: Disasters – Conceptions and Context
• Chapter 2: Liberal Democracy, the State and the Rule of Law
• Chapter 3: Strength in Numbers? Mass Actions in Nervous Shock
• Chapter 4: Safe in Their Hands? Criminal Liability: Breaches of Statutory Duties and Corporate Reckless Manslaughter
• Chapter 5: Two Versions of an Inquisition: Inquests and Public Inquiries into Individual and Mass Deaths
• Chapter 6: Case Study One: The 1989 Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster
• Chapter 7: Case Study Two: The 1989 Marchioness Disaster
• Chapter 8: Critical Evaluation and Conclusions
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index