2.1 Beyond Semantics: Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Practice
What is pragmatism, and what does it imply for the philosophy of science? It seems that pragmatism has largely fallen off the standard philosophy curriculum, so it may not be such a bad idea to start with a quick review of the standard meanings of pragmatism. Let us pick up from where todayâs students and general public are likely to begin. Google defines pragmatism as âan approach that evaluates theories or beliefs in terms of the success of their practical application.â1 In more and better detail, Websterâs Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1986) defines pragmatism as
an American movement in philosophy founded by C. S. Peirce and William James and marked by the doctrines that the meaning of conceptions is to be sought in their practical bearings, that the function of thought is to guide action, and that truth is preeminently to be tested by the practical consequences of belief.
This is in fact quite a good definition. The first part of it is a version of Peirceâs âpragmatist maxim,â paraphrased by James here:
to attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involveâwhat sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.
(James 1907, 46â7)2
The PeirceâJames pragmatist maxim naturally led to the semantic interpretation of pragmatism, which is perhaps the dominant one today. Christopher Hookway says, âthe pragmatist maxim is a distinctive rule or method for becoming reflectively clear about the contents of concepts and hypotheses: we clarify a hypothesis by identifying its practical consequencesâ (2016, sec. 2). In this way, pragmatism shares much with operationalism, the homegrown philosophy of the Harvard physicist Percy Bridgman, and with the verificationism that was widely taken as a core doctrine of logical positivism. This focus on meanings continues in the current pragmatist works of Robert Brandom, Huw Price, and others.
In a similar vein, James presented pragmatism as a âmethod for settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminableâ (1907, 45). Unless some âpractical differenceâ would follow from one or the other sideâs being correct, the dispute is idle. Hookway (2016, sec. 1) recalls âa memorable illustration of pragmatism in actionâ by James, which shows âhow the pragmatist maxim enables us to defuse an apparently insoluble (albeit âtrivialâ) dispute.â On a visit to the mountains, Jamesâs friends engaged in a âferocious metaphysical disputeâ about a squirrel that was hanging on to one side of a tree trunk while a human observer was standing on the other side. James described the dispute as follows:
This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not?
(James 1907, 43)
James proposed to solve the problem by pointing out that which answer is correct
depends on what you practically mean by âgoing roundâ the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute.
(James 1907, 44)
In this manner, the âpragmatic methodâ promises to eliminate all apparently irresoluble metaphysical disputes, and rather more important ones, too.
Even though I completely endorse the semantic tradition of pragmatism, my own emphasis is different. My inclination follows Philip Kitcherâs (2012, xiiâxiv) warning against the âdomesticationâ of pragmatism. Focusing on semantics is a very effective method of domestication, making pragmatism look like a rather innocuous and interesting variation on normal analytic philosophy. I want pragmatism to be a philosophy that helps us think better about how to do things, not just about what our words mean. Recall the second part of the dictionary definition of pragmatism: âthe function of thought is to guide action.â Hearing the story of Jamesâs squirrel, one might wonder: âBut isnât this just a matter of defining oneâs terms carefully? Does it really have anything to do with pragmatism?â My take on that question is that the disambiguation offered by James is tied closely to potential practical ends. If my objective is to make a fence to enclose the squirrel, then I have gone around the squirrel in the relevant sense; if the objective is to check whether the wound on his back has healed, then I have failed to go around the squirrel in the relevant sense. It is the pragmatic purpose that tells us which meaning of âgoing roundâ we ought to mean.
2.2 Pragmatism as Empiricist Realism
One very important reason why people often do not like to go beyond the semantic dimension of pragmatism is the fear of what happens if we go further and adopt the pragmatist theory of truth. This issue needs to be tackled head-on. It is a core part of my interpretation of pragmatism that we should reject the common misperception and prejudice that pragmatism just means taking whatever is convenient as true. The âpragmatic theory of truthâ attributed to James is widely regarded as absurd, and this has contributed greatly to the disdain for pragmatism among tough-minded philosophers. Here is probably the most notorious statement by James: ââThe true,â to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as âthe rightâ is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashionâ (James 1907, 222). I think Jamesâs choice of the word âexpedientâ was unfortunate, as sounding too much like just âconvenientâ or âusefulââor perhaps the word had quite a different connotation back then; that is for James scholars to debate. At any rate, the statement actually continues as follows:
And expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight wonât necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our present formulas.
(James 1907, 222)
I want to argue that what this passage really shows is James the staunch empiricist, declaring that the source of truth is experience, and that it is futile to entertain any more grandiose notion of truth. This provides an important clue to my interpretation of pragmatism. My proposal is to understand pragmatism as a deep or thoroughgoing empiricism, which recognizes experience as the only ultimate source of learning and refuses to acknowledge any higher authority. Something does need to be said in justification of empiricism, but for now let me take it as a credo, as an article of faith; some sort of empiricism might be the inevitable starting point of epistemology in our scientific age, as much as the presumption of God would have been the inevitable bedrock of any intellectual discourse in Europe in an earlier age.
The spirit of empiricism has been summarized rather poetically by Clarence Irving Lewis, in his review of John Deweyâs 1929 masterpiece, The Quest for Certainty:
Man may not reach the goal of his quest for security by any flight to another worldâneither to that other world of the religious mystic, nor to that realm of transcendent ideas and eternal values which is its philosophical counterpart. Salvation is through work; through experimental effort, intelligently directed to an actual human future.
(Lewis 1930, 14)
This passage is especially nice because it brings together the two pragmatist philosophers that I have found most inspiring.
On such an empiricist conception of knowledge, how might we make sense of traditional epistemic and metaphysical notions such as truth and reality? Central to my thinking is the notion of operational coherence, a harmonious fitting-together of actions that is conducive to a successful achievement of oneâs aims.3 To put it somewhat more precisely: an activity is operationally coherent if and only if there is a harmonious relationship among the operations that constitute the activity. The concrete realization of a coherent activity is successful ceteris paribus; this serves as an indirect criterion for the judgment of coherence. Operational coherence pertains to an epistemic activity (or a system of practice), not to a set of propositions; it is measured against the aims of the activity (or system) in question. Coherence may be exhibited in something as simple as the correct coordination of bodily movements needed in lighting a match or walking up the stairs, or something as complex as the successful integration of a range of material technologies and various abstract theories in the operation of the Global Positioning System. It has social and emotional aspects as well as material and intellectual ones.
Coherence is the chief characteristic underlying a successful epistemic activity. It is the vehicle through which the mind-independent world is brought to bear on our knowledge. Operational coherence carries within it the constraint by nature, and in fact it is the only way in which reality can give input to our knowledge. Using this notion of coherence, I propose a new coherence theory of truth: a statement is true in a given circumstance if (belief in) it is needed in a coherent activity (or system of practice).4 Truth understood in this way comes with a specific scope or domain attached to it in each case, which allows us to legitimize intuitive statements such as âNewtonian mechanics remains true in the domain of macroscopic objects moving at low velocities.â And because coherence is a matter of degree, so is truthâand I think that is also right. J. L. Austin noted long ago (1979, 117, 130â131) that âvery true,â âtrue enough,â and such are perfectly sensible locutions. Catherine Elgin (2017) has more recently shown the pragmatic power of âtrue enoughâ accounts. It is not necessary to conceive of truth itself as a binary yes-no property,5 and insist on speaking in terms of approximate truth or partial truth when we wish to discuss degrees of truth. The notion of (empirical) truth I propose can ground a kind of realism that is not at all contrary to empiricism.