Ideology And Policy

The Political Uses Of Doctrine In The Soviet Union

Terry L Thompson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429713026
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Representing a milestone of further accomplishment in scholarly investigation of the dialectics for ideological evolution in the USSR, this book will be a treasure for all who are interested in the development of Soviet ideology and should merit the attention of all specialists in Soviet studies. It is uniquely valuable because it is the first exte

1
Introduction

Soviet Ideology and Policy

In the Soviet political system, "ideology" in the broadest sense refers to the body of philosophical principles considered axiomatic in Marxism-Leninism. These principles (atheism, a theory of classes and class struggle, and the historical mission of the proletariat) are not subject to change and comprise the fundamental dogma of the ideology.¹ Although they form a common frame of reference and worldview for Soviet leaders, the principles of Marxism-Leninism are not generally evident in policy decisions that are focused on practical matters.

In contrast, the "normative" component of ideology is generally more visible. Highly flexible by nature, norms change in response to the values of the leader in power and the evolving needs of the political system. Ideology in this sense is more pragmatic and can be defined as "a reasonably coherent body of ideas concerning practical means of how to change and reform a society."² The normative component may therefore be termed the "official ideology" of a given regime. The official ideology forms the basis of doctrinal statements in the CPSU Party Program, the Soviet Constitution, and other programmatic documents and reflects the agreed-upon ideological framework for change. Throughout this book, "ideology" used without a modifier refers to the official ideology.

An examination of official ideology is critical to a thorough understanding of regimes in the Soviet Union and other Leninist states. Because Leninism contains very little practical guidance for post-revolutionary development, Leninist parties are forced to create their own policy guidelines appropriate to the conditions of their society and political system and consistent with leadership goals. However, because they are Leninist parties, they must justify their actions in the context of Marxism-Leninism. Ideological legitimation is thus as important as organizational or operational approaches in the formulation of policy.³

In their efforts to provide an ideological context for policy decisions, Soviet leaders have found the official ideology to be extremely flexible and have modified it "creatively" (in Soviet terms) to justify their policies. Examples of such creativity abound. Stalin's reversal of the Leninist concept of a worldwide communist revolution with his notion of "socialism in one country" allowed him to direct more resources to the development of a Soviet industrial base and gave him a convenient pretext to discredit Trotsky and the "left opposition." Khrushchev, as part of his overall effort to broaden participatory opportunities in the Soviet political system and signal an end to Stalin's reign of terror, publicized the concepts of the "all-people's state" and "mature socialism." Brezhnev promoted the notion of "developed socialism" to support policies designed to overcome the problems created by Khrushchev's schemes and bolster Soviet prestige in the international communist movement. Gorbachev has abandoned developed socialism in his pursuit of far-reaching political and economic reforms to overcome the stagnation of the late Brezhnev era. Similar examples can be found in other Leninist systems.⁴

The historical record indicates that changes in official ideology most often follow rather than precede policy changes. Mature socialism, for example, was used predominantly in the last years of Khrushchev's regime, after his reform program had been implemented. Similarly, developed socialism was not incorporated into official ideology until 1971, well after the policy preferences of Leonid Brezhnev had become the basis of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. A similar phenomenon is occurring under Gorbachev. His policies so far have been justified in the broader context of "Leninism" and "socialism," although these are almost certainly temporary slogans that will last only until the Soviet ideological establishment can develop a new concept to encapsulate the theoretical basis of Gorbachev's campaign for perestroika, demokratizatsiia, glasnost', and "new thinking."

The sequence of events (changes in official ideology follow changes in policy) does not indicate that Soviet leaders ignore ideology while they are consolidating power. Indeed, each Soviet leader since Lenin has felt compelled to justify his policy agenda in terms of theory, and the theoretical basis for his agenda is an important part of his authority-building strategy.⁵ Typically it is the individual leader's ideological values rather than the official ideology that are most evident in the early stages of any regime. He may use the existing ideology as a point of departure, but he will express his own ideas in more general terms such as Leninism. Later, as his values become accepted into official ideology, he will use specific ideological formulations to convey the theoretical basis of his policy agenda.⁶

This is not a straightforward process, however, since no leader's beliefs, values, and habits are developed in isolation. To fully understand the relationship between individual values and ideology, we must consider the interaction between the leader's ideological values and the overall leadership consensus about the general direction of policy. This interaction is especially critical in the early stages of a new regime when the leadership may be in flux. Because the Soviet system lacks a consistent method of selecting new leaders, no General Secretary has yet come to power with absolute authority; such authority has had to be earned (or taken) over a period usually lasting for several years. To maintain support long enough to consolidate power, the General Secretary must offer both an agenda for change and a theoretical basis for that agenda that are within the parameters of the consensus of the party leadership. He may offer new ideas, even radical ones such as Gorbachev has done. But he must not stray too far from the general consensus that put him into power in the first place.⁷ To be successful, a leader must express not only policy options but also ideological values that reflect what he believes is proper and legitimate and also what he thinks is possible.

The early years of Stalin's regime provide an illuminating case. After Lenin died, Stalin took the lead in expediting the publication of his works. Significantly, and unlike Trotsky and Zinoviev, Stalin did not publish his own collected works. He offered instead an interpretation of Leninism that established his legitimacy as an ideological as well as a political heir. In his struggle against Trotsky and Zinoviev, Stalin proposed what amounted to a revision of Lenin's ideas in his formula for "socialism in one country," but shrewdly proclaimed this notion to be consistent with Lenin's thought. He never rejected the traditional goal of worldwide revolution and was thus able to use the new formulation to defeat the leftists and justify redirecting resources to the domestic economy. Similarly, in 1928-1929 he joined Bukharin and other party leaders in advocating the collectivization of agriculture. He then seized upon the general attitude of crisis in the party to force the tempo of collectivization, eventually undermining the gradualist approach of Bukharin and the "right opposition." Stalin again justified his policy initiatives in terms of Leninism, implying that the emergency measures of War Communism provided both the policy precedent and the theoretical justification for his "revolution from above." Thus, Stalin plied a careful course for five years following Lenin's death. He offered new ideas in theory and policy that enhanced his authority, but maintained an overall frame of reference that was clearly Leninist. And he adroitly manipulated the leadership consensus regarding the need for policy changes to serve his own ends. Later, of course, after he had gained the dominant leadership position, the official ideology was modified to reflect the "inevitability" of Stalin's actions.⁸

The example of Stalin is consistent with the pattern described above: policy determines the substance of the official ideology, which is then used to justify policy and explain regime goals.⁹ This complex "dialectical" relationship between ideology and policy has been described most succinctly by Karl Mannheim in his seminal 1936 study of ideology:

Theory arising out of a definitely social impulse clarifies the situation. And in the process of clarification reality undergoes a change. We thereby enter a new situation out of which a new theory emerges.¹⁰

While complex, the relationship between ideology and policy provides a tool for analyzing the Soviet political system. By examining a General Secretary's ideological values and policies, we can gain unique insights into his authority-building strategy, societal management program, and views on the existing institutions of the political system. By comparing his views with the overall leadership consensus expressed in the official ideology and other programmatic statements, we may also assess the General Secretary's influence in the development of that consensus. These dimensions of Soviet politics are important; despite glasnost and the extraordinary degree of candor under Gorbachev, we still know too little about them.

Ideology and Policy Under Brezhnev

Most of this book concerns the connection between ideology and policy in the Brezhnev period, an era that offers several advantages for such a study. Brezhnev's official ideology, developed socialism, has been described and commented on by countless Soviet writers. Moreover, developed socialism has distinct boundaries; it was officially accepted into Soviet ideology at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress in 1971 and was rejected by Gorbachev at the Twenty-seventh Congress in 1986. The policies associated with the ideology are readily identifiable and, more important, can be associated with Brezhnev's policy preferences, thus providing insight into how ideology was reshaped to reflect Brezhnev's own ideological values and agenda for change. Finally, because many of Brezhnev's policies have been targetted for revision by Gorbachev, an examination of the Brezhnev era provides a solid foundation for understanding the post-Brezhnev consensus within which Gorbachev's reform program has evolved.

Although it was not incorporated into official ideology until 1971, the concept of developed socialism originated in Eastern Europe in the mid-1960s and had been debated by Soviet ideological specialists since 1966. This debate focused on two critical issues of the post-Khrushchev era: the need to reassert Soviet primacy within the international communist movement and the need to deal with the question of Stalinism. Both issues were consistent with Brezhnev's values and provide insight into his policy agenda. The origins and evolution of developed socialism are thus addressed in Chapter 2.

Chapters 3-6 examine the more visible dimensions of developed socialism that encompassed Soviet domestic policy and consisted of several doctrines relating to social, economic, and political development.¹¹ Chapter 3 addresses the use of material incentives as a tool in the development of the "new Soviet man." Chapter 4 discusses the "Soviet nation," defined as "a new historical community" uniting Soviet citizens across class and ethnic boundaries. Chapter 5 describes the "all-people's state," a concept used to publicize the expanded scope of political participation in Soviet society. Chapter 6 treats policy toward the Communist Party, focusing particularly on the "leading and guiding role" of the party that emerged as the key principle of developed socialism. All these concepts originated under Khrushchev and were included in the 1961 Party Program. They were not, however, identified as components of developed socialism until 1971, by which time they had been modified to reflect the policy preferences of the new regime and particularly of Leonid Brezhnev. Chapter 7 discusses the fate of the ideological and related policies of developed socialism in the interim regimes of Yurii Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko. Against this background, Chapter 8 addresses Gorbachev's ideological values and agenda for change.

Examining these policy areas helps clarify several roles for ideology in the Soviet political system, including: protecting the theoretical heritage and legitimacy of the Soviet leadership; discussing and debating policy options; and explaining and publicizing the regime's policy line after it has been decided upon.¹² These are extremely important functions in an "ideological" political system, which, in contrast to an "instrumental" system, requires a theoretical basis for all policies. Although to a certain extent any politician is driven by pragmatic concerns, in the Soviet context pragmatism by itself is an insufficient basis for action; policy must be based on ideology. This relationship is ingrained in the minds of the leaders, ideological and academic specialists and rank and file party workers. Ideology thus simultaneously provides a framework for establishing regime goals and sets limits on the policy options that can be considered.¹³

In the Brezhnev era, the need for ideology to protect the theoretical heritage and legitimacy of the Soviet leadership was very clear in a lengthy and intense debate about the concept of developed socialism itself. The focus of this debate was whether to declare developed socialism a new stage in socialist evolution. The need for such a debate was based on two equally important stimuli. First was the concern about Khrushchev's brash prediction in 1961 that communism would be achieved in the 1980s. Something had to be done to change this prediction, to show that progress toward communism was still being made but that its attainment was more than a few years away. Second, there was concern about China usurping the Soviet Union's leading role in the international communist movement. The competition between the USSR and China that followed Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalin—which undercut the USSR's claim as the world's leading socialist state—contributed greatly to the Sino-Soviet rift. When Brezhnev took over, Mao Zedong was perceived as a serious ideological threat since he was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, in contrast to his Soviet counterparts who were a generation removed from Lenin.

Mao's Great Leap Forward in 1958 had been at least partly designed as an ideological challenge to the Soviets, not in the least because it was almost certainly modeled on Stalin's "Great Leap" in the collectivization of agriculture. Although tension had eased subsequently, it was exacerbated in 1966 with the launching of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which again challenged the Soviet ideological and political model. Many Soviet ideologists believed that the Chinese ideological threat could be overcome by declaring a new stage of socialism, one that the Soviet Union had attained but the Chinese had not. In this way not only could the Soviets retain ideological supremacy, they could presumably regain prestige among other communist and communist-leaning nations.

Somewhat surprisingly, however, the esoteric and deeply theoretical discussion about a new stage of socialism soon turned into a emotionally charged argument about the most sensitive topic in Soviet history: Stalinism. Although there was no mention of Stalin in any of the programmatic documents of developed socialism, the need to resolve this issue was evident throughout the debate conducted in party and specialist journals. Strong feelings were expressed, both pro and con, on Stalin's role in Soviet history, and a wide-ranging discussion of Stalinism was evident throughout the first several years of Brezhnev's leadership. This debate ended abruptly in early 1968, however, because of the need for ideological unity in support of the threat to Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe caused by the Dubce...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Origins and Evolution of Developed Socialism
• 3 Motivating the New Soviet Man: Wage Incentives Policy
• 4 Soviet Nation or Russian Nation?
• 5 Withering of the State: The Role of Political Participation
• 6 CPSU Policy
• 7 Between Brezhnev and Gorbachev
• 8 Gorbachev's Ideology and Policy
• Bibliography
• Index