Insight and Creativity in Problem Solving

Kenneth J. Gilhooly, Linden J. Ball, Laura Macchi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351386814
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

To date we have only a fragmentary understanding of the thought processes that engender insightful solutions to problems that require a change in representation or the discovery of distant associations to presented information. We likewise have only a piecemeal understanding of the thinking that underpins creative problem solving, where solutions are needed that are new to the solver. Recently there has been a growing interest in removing the mystery from insight and creativity through better specified theories and theory-driven experimentation.

The chapters in this volume reflect key developments in this expanding field of insight and creativity research. Collectively, the chapters converge on a nuanced view of insight and creative thinking as often arising from the interplay between two qualitatively distinct types of processes that interact to yield sudden, surprising and innovative solutions to problems that initially seemed impenetrable and resistant to the application of inventive ideas. This dual-process perspective, which capitalises on the distinction between 'special' (automatic, unconscious and associative) Type 1 processes and 'routine' (controlled, conscious and analytic) Type 2 processes, helps advance a theoretical understanding of insight and creativity, whilst also provoking important new research questions. This book was originally published as a special issue of Thinking and Reasoning.

Insight and creative thinking processes: Routine and special

K. J. Gilhooly, Linden J. Ball, and Laura Macchi

In recent years there has been an upsurge of research aimed at removing the mystery from insight and creative problem solving. The present special issue reflects this expanding field. Overall the papers gathered here converge on a nuanced view of insight and creative thinking as arising from multiple processes that can yield surprising solutions through a mixture of “special” (automatic, unconscious and associative) Type 1 processes and “routine” (controlled, conscious and analytic) Type 2 processes.

How people tackle problems that can be solved by routine search through problem spaces has become well understood thanks to the pioneering work of Newell and Simon (1972) and subsequent researchers in the information processing tradition. In contrast, how people deal with problems that require a change in representational spaces (insight tasks) or require solutions new to the solver (creative problems) remains poorly understood and even somewhat mysterious. In recent years, there has been a growing interest in removing the mystery from insight and creativity through better specified theories and theory driven experiments. The present special issue of Thinking & Reasoning on insight and creative thinking reflects this expanding field and it is hoped will itself contribute to progress in the field.

Themes that strongly emerge from the papers in the special issue include the relative roles of conscious and unconscious processes and the roles of special processes particular to insight as against routine processes found widely in problem solving.

Let us now briefly indicate the contributions of the papers in this special issue.

Weisberg (2014) focuses on alternative routes to restructuring in insight. It has often been suggested that while non-insight problems can be solved by conscious, analytic processes that can be labelled as “business as usual”, insight problems require additional processes, “special” to the development of restructuring and that these processes are unconscious and associative (e.g., Ohlsson, 1992). Weisberg marshals strong arguments that both unconscious, associative, “special” processes as well as conscious, analytic, “business as usual” processes play roles in restructuring and hence in insight. Although these alternatives have often been contrasted as mutually exclusive Weisberg presents a clear case that both types of processes are typically involved in episodes of insightful problem solving.

Similar conclusions emerge from Sowden et al. (2014) on the roles of Type 1 and Type 2 processes (see Evans & Stanovich, 2013) in the generative and evaluative phases of creative thinking, where Type 1 autonomous associative processes may be equated to “special” processes in insight solving and Type 2 controlled, analytic, conscious processes to “business as usual” approaches, as discussed by Weisberg. Sowden et al. draw particular attention to the importance of judicious switching between Type 1 and Type 2 processes and the role of individual differences in dispositions to switch.

Barr et al. (2014) present experimental data from an individual differences study indicating a major role for Type 2, controlled, analytic processes in complex creativity tasks such as the alternative uses task (AUT), consistent with Weisberg’s emphasis on the important role of analytic processes in insight and creativity.

Ball et al. (2014) report analyses of the effects of thinking aloud, articulatory suppression and irrelevant speech on solution rates for insight problems. Their results support the existence of special unconscious (Type 1) processes that facilitate solutions in the conditions where speech-based representations and conscious analytic (Type 2) processes are interfered with. However, they did find that solutions were still attained, if at a slower rate, when verbal processing was encouraged, supporting the view that special (Type 1) processes and routine (Type 2) processes can provide alternative routes to insight and are not mutually exclusive.

Pearson and Logie (2014) also address internal representational issues. In a study of creative problem solving with visuo-spatial material they found that normal visual imagery-based processing can be further facilitated by dynamically carrying out manipulations using a graphics package.

Sio and Ormerod (2014) consider two possible mechanisms underlying incubation effects in the remote associates task (RAT); that is, spreading activation or opportunistic assimilation of incidental cues. They suggest that opportunistic assimilation, an automatic process, is the likely mechanism and is most effective with difficult RAT items.

Gilhooly et al. (2014) also focus on incubation, but in the AUT as against the RAT, and explore the effects of thought suppression on incubation effects. It appears that in the AUT, simple suppression (directed forgetting of the task) yields markedly positive incubation effects. An explanation in terms of spreading activation (a Type 1 process) is proposed in this case, based on the idea that suppression has the ironic effect of boosting activation of the to-be-suppressed material.

Macchi and Bagassi (2014) specifically address analogies between restructuring in insight tasks and reinterpreting verbally ambiguous sentences to achieve a relevant understanding when a misunderstanding has occurred. An adaptive interpretational heuristic involving unconscious analytic processes is proposed to explain the overcoming of impasses in insight tasks. Attention is also directed to the important differences between correctly solving apparent insight problems with and without restructuring and insight.

In conclusion, the papers presented here converge on a nuanced view of insight and creativity, as arising from multiple processes that can yield surprising solutions, typically through a mixture of “special” (automatic, unconscious and associative) Type 1 processes and “routine” (deliberative, conscious and analytic) Type 2 processes. It is interesting to note that the notions of Type 1 and Type 2 processes, which feature strongly in the present papers, originally arose in analyses of reasoning and decision making (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011) and in those areas Type 1 processes are associated with errors and biases that interfere with the Type 2 controlled analytic processes needed for correct solutions. In the area of insight and creativity, Type 1 processes are seen as having positive roles, leading to novel solutions that may be hard or impossible to reach by purely Type 2 analytic controlled processes. Thus, Type 1 processes have the positive status of being “special” in the domain of insight and creative problem solving but a rather negative status as sources of error in the domains of reasoning and decision making (where the problems can be solved by routine rule following or “business as usual”). For the future, it would seem worth addressing more explicitly how the two broad types of processes do interact and whether practical evidence-based advice for creative thinking (e.g., on when it is optimal to take an incubation break) can be developed and applied in real-world settings.

REFERENCES

Ball, L., Marsh, J., Litchfield, D., Cook, R., & Booth, N. (2014). When distraction helps: Evidence that concurrent articulation and irrelevant speech can facilitate insight problem solving. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 76–96.

Barr, N., Pennycook, G., Stolz, J. A., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014). Reasoned connections: A dual-process perspective. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 61–75.

Evans, St. J. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition: Advancing the debate. Perspectives in Psychological Science, 8, 223–241.

Gilhooly, K. J., Georgiou, G. J., Sirota, M., & Paphiti-Galeano, A. (2014). Incubation and suppression processes in creative problem solving. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 130–146.

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: MacMillan.

Macchi, L., & Bagassi, M. (2014). When analytic thought is challenged by a Misunderstanding. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 147–164.

Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ohlsson, S. (1992). Information processing explanations of insight and related phenomena. In M. T. Keane & K. J. Gilhooly (Eds.), Advances in the psychology of thinking (pp. 1–44). London: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.

Pearson, D. G., & Logie, R. H. (2014). A sketch is not enough: Dynamic external support increases creative insight on a guided synthesis task on creative thought. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 97–112.

Sio, U. N., & Ormerod, T. C. (2014). Incubation and cueing effects in problem-solving: Set aside the difficult problems but focus on the easy ones. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 113–129.

Sowden, P. T., Pringle, A., & Gabora, L. (2014). The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 40–60.

Weisberg, R. W. (2014). Toward an integrated theory of insight in problem solving. Thinking and Reasoning, 21, 5–39.

Toward an integrated theory of insight in problem solving

Robert W. Weisberg

The study of insight in problem solving and creative thinking has seen an upsurge of interest in the last 30 years. Current theorising concerning insight has taken one of two tacks. The special-process view, which grew out of the Gestalt psychologists’ theorising about insight, proposes that insight is the result of a dedicated set of processes (the “insight sequence”) that is activated by the individual’s reaching impasse while trying to deal with a problematic situation. In contrast, the business-as-usual view argues that insight is brought about by the same processes that underlie ordinary thinking (analytic thinking). Although those two views are typically treated as being in opposition, it has recently been proposed that a complete understanding of insight will require bringing together aspects of both views. The present paper carries that proposal further. Critical analysis of those two viewpoints demonstrates that each has a positive contribution to make to our understanding of insight, but also is unable to deal with certain phenomena. An integrated view of insight is presented and implications are discussed.

The study of insight in problem solving has been of interest to psychologists for almost 100 years since its introduction by the Gestalt psychologists (Koffka, 1935; Köhler, 1925; Wertheimer, 1945, 1982), who proposed that there are two ways to solve problems. One mode, the default mode, is based on reproductive thinking, i.e., the transfer of a solution from a familiar problem that is similar to the one at hand. The transferred solution typically unfolds in a sequence of conscious steps, and the individual has a feeling of steady incremental progress. This mode can be called a solution based on analysis or analytical thinking; the Gestalt psychologists called it reproductive thinking. The second mode of problem solving is through insight, which is based on achieving understanding into a problem and which sometimes comes about suddenly, in an Aha! or Eureka! experience. The Gestalt psychologists proposed that achieving understanding and insight typically requires that one put aside one’s knowledge and attempt to deal with the problem “on its merits” (Wertheimer, 1982, p. 67; see also Ohlsson, 2011).

The central theoretical question concerning insight that psychologists have grappled with centres on whether the occurrence of insight requires postulation of a dedicated thought process, or whether all problem solving, including problem solving through insight, is the result of a single set of processes. Historically, this debate has been couched in either-or terms: either insight is brought about through the functioning of a dedicated set of thought processes or it is brought about by analytic thinking, the same thought processes that underlie our other behaviours. However, it has recently been proposed that there may not be a sharp distinction between insight and analysis as modes of solving problems, and that there is more than one way to achieve insight into a problem (Fleck & Weisberg, 2004, 2013; see also Jones, 2003). That proposal leads to the conclusion that, rather than trying to prove that one conception of problem solving is “right” and another “wrong,” we should be working toward an integrated theory of insight, which incorporates useful aspects of more than one theoretical perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to provide further support for the idea that the most productive way to view problem solving is as a concept that incorporates a set of diverse but interrelated processes, more than one of which can produce insight. The specific tasks of the paper are twofold. On one hand, I will carry out a critical review of recent research and theory on insight, to demonstrate first that no single viewpoint can capture the broad range of results, but also to show where each theoretical position has a positive contribution to make to our understanding. I will then extend the proposal of Fleck and Weisberg (2013) concerning how we might begin to incorporate under one conceptual umbrella the multiple ways in which individuals can achieve insight in pr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Preface
• 1. Insight and creative thinking processes: Routine and special
• 2. Toward an integrated theory of insight in problem solving
• 3. The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory
• 4. Reasoned connections: A dual-process perspective on creative thought
• 5. When distraction helps: Evidence that concurrent articulation and irrelevant speech can facilitate insight problem solving
• 6. A sketch is not enough: Dynamic external support increases creative insight on a guided synthesis task
• 7. Incubation and cueing effects in problem-solving: Set aside the difficult problems but focus on the easy ones
• 8. Incubation and suppression processes in creative problem solving
• 9. When analytic thought is challenged by a misunderstanding
• Index