China Diplomacy

The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle

John F. Copper

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429715198
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica asiatica

This book, examining the process that created the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), endeavors to assess the TRA in terms of its role in guiding or determining U.S. China policy, in preserving the sovereignty of Taiwan, in promoting democracy there, and in resolving the "Taiwan issue."

1
U.S. China Policy and the Taiwan Relations Act

China Policy to 1978

Before Mao Zedong's victory in the Chinese civil war and his establishment of a new government—the People's Republic of China—in 1949, the U.S. had for some years enjoyed good relations with China. In fact, the United States had been a special friend to China for a quarter of a century or more. And both friendship and support were reciprocal.

China also represented a positive force in Asia. After the defeat of Japan in 1945, American policy makers viewed China's stabilizing role in Asia as even more important than before. Washington regarded the Republic of China as the most important country and America's best ally in East Asia. For that reason the U.S. rejected the idea of allowing Japan to rebuild its heavy industry and become a military power again. A balance of power in Asia was repudiated.¹ To realize this policy, the U.S. spent $2 billion dollars to aid China in an effort to revitalize China's economy and bring peace to a country split by the civil war between the Nationalist government and the Communist guerrillas led by Mao.

The perceived failure of American policy resulting in Mao's victory caused political shock waves at home. Blame was cast. Critics castigated Communists and their sympathizers in the Foreign Service. The State Department purged its China experts. Others blamed the corrupt Nationalist Chinese government and military. The whole process polarized the U.S. politically. After the State Department found new China experts, the Truman Administration, in January 1950, tried to end the problem by formally cancelling America's obligations to the Chinese Nationalists and disassociating the U.S. from the Chinese civil war. Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that Taiwan was not within the U.S. "defensive perimeter" in Asia. Washington thus abandoned Chiang and Taiwan.

However, with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, this policy was reversed. On June 27, President Harry Truman declared that a Communist attack on Taiwan would be a threat to American security. Acting on such sentiments, he sent the U.S. 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to neutralize it—meaning blocking the invasion of Taiwan for which Mao was preparing. Truman also reopened the question of Taiwan's legal status, noting that it was a question to be decided in a peace treaty with Japan or by the United Nations. The President's actions reflected a changed world situation due to the war in Korea. Communist China was now regarded as a puppet and a loyal ally of the Soviet Union. Thus the China issue became part of the bipolar world struggle.

Even before 1950, public opinion in the United States was nearly six times more favorable toward the Nationalist than the Communist Chinese. The "loss of China" translated into hostility toward the People's Republic of China, or "Communist China." U.S. forces subsequently fought Chinese forces in Korea. As a consequence, ill feelings in the U.S. (both in the public and in the government) increased. Washington pressured the United Nations to order a general boycott against the People's Republic of China. The United States then cut all meaningful relations with Beijing and supported the Chinese Nationalists' claim to represent the Chinese people both diplomatically and in other ways. This support included economic and military aid and advice. But U.S. help also included pressure on the Nationalist government to adopt a land reform program and implement its constitution and democracy in Taiwan. America hoped for a democratic China, at least on Taiwan.²

Following the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, which temporarily ended the fighting in Vietnam, Beijing turned its attention back to the "Taiwan issue." In September, Communist forces opened fire on Quemoy and Matsu—small islands off the coast of China which the Communists had failed to capture in 1949 and that were still in Nationalist hands. The U.S. came to Taipei's assistance, thus dissuading Mao from continuing to try to take the islands. Three months later, in December 1954, Washington and Taipei signed a military agreement subsequently known as the U.S.-Republic of China Defense Treaty. In this treaty the U.S. pledged to help Taiwan if Taiwan were threatened militarily or attacked.

Meanwhile, in 1952, the U.S. concluded bilateral defense treaties with Japan and the Philippines and, by 1954, had organized two alliance systems, the Australian-New Zealand-United States alliance (ANZUS) in 1951 and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, to stop the spread of communism in Asia. The treaty with the Republic of China was thus part of a broad U.S. effort to contain communism. In early 1955, the U.S.-ROC treaty was strengthened by a joint resolution of Congress that gave the President authorization to employ armed forces of the United States "as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores" in addition to "related positions and territories" in "friendly hands"—meaning the Offshore Islands. By this action, the United States declared its resolve to keep the Offshore Islands in Nationalist hands, linking them to the security of Taiwan.

In 1958, responding to a second attack by Communist forces on Quemoy, the United States demonstrated that the joint resolution was not just empty words. The U.S. Navy entered the conflict in order to resupply Nationalist forces on the island and even placed an "atomic cannon" on Quemoy (though nuclear shells were not provided). Beijing once again backed down, thus ending the conflict.³

Critics of Washington's actions, however, argued that America's vacillating, ambiguous policy had precipitated the two conflicts. While the faultfinders did not influence U.S. policy makers to any significant degree at the time, after the 1958 crisis subsided the U.S. began to see a need to reassess its China policy. There was a growing realization in decision-making circles in Washington that the government of the People's Republic of China was not going to collapse and that the Nationalists had little hope of recovering China. Fear that the Chinese Nationalists could start a conflict with Beijing at will, drawing the U.S. into the conflict, spread.⁴

During the early 1960s, U.S. differences with the People's Republic of China over a number of issues, plus the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam in 1964, precluded better relations between Washington and Beijing. Taiwan was also a major obstacle to a Washington-Beijing rapprochement. The United States tried to persuade Chinese leaders in Beijing to renounce the use of force in the Taiwan area in order to remove this impasse. Beijing refused, replying that the U.S. should end its "occupation" of Taiwan.

As a product of this situation, a new—some would say more neutral— China policy began to evolve in the U.S. Policy makers in Washington were of the mind that Taipei and Beijing could not resolve their differences through negotiations and that any confrontation between the two would involve the U.S. in a war it did not want. Thus, keeping the antagonists apart became a central tenet of U.S. China policy. To American decision makers this meant, sooner or later, two Chinas or one China and one Taiwan; in short, it meant formal separation. It also meant trying to have relations with both Beijing and Taipei.⁵ This translated into a U.S. two-China policy.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and the Chinese nuclear test in the fall of 1964, events that occurred almost concurrently, were sources of further alienation between Washington and Beijing. Escalating U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, Chinese military and economic aid to Hanoi, and the radicalization of both domestic and foreign policy in China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution made efforts to end the hostility between the two nations difficult to impossible. Any change in U.S. China policy, especially one built on better relations with Beijing, could not be made in this context.

The impasse in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, however, began to fade in 1968-69—for strategic reasons. The Soviet military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, beginning in the early 1960s and escalating in the late 1960s, became a grave concern for Chinese leaders in Beijing. Beijing's fear and apprehension of Moscow were amplified by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the parallel announcement of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that the Kremlin had the right to ensure stable governments and pro-Soviet leaderships in Communist bloc countries. Given Mao's radical policies during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leadership was hardly "stable"; nor was it pro-Soviet. Intense fighting on the border in 1969 (which many observers referred to as a "war") caused the split between the Communist giants to widen further. Most importantly, these events and subsequent Soviet military actions on the border and elsewhere persuaded Mao to change his attitude, and his policies, toward the United States.⁶

Meanwhile the United States had its own problems—in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive in 1968 convinced the American population of the hollowness of Lyndon Johnson's promise that the war would soon be over and of the wisdom of continuing present policies. The upshot was that the President opted (or was forced by these circumstances) not to run for office again, and Richard Nixon was elected with a mandate to "get out of Vietnam with honor." Nixon perceived that the only way he could accomplish that was to dramatically change U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China. His plan to get out of Vietnam, to not get involved in such a war again, and to deal with America's inability to compete with the Soviet Union's military expansion meant converting China from an enemy to a friend or even an ally. Nixon's new policy was enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine announced in March.⁷

In 1970, the U.S. withdrew the 7th Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. In 1971, Washington "allowed" Beijing admission to the U.N. (which the U.S. certainly could have blocked). In February 1972, President Nixon visited Beijing, after which the two sides issued a joint communique— the Shanghai Communique. This was a watershed event. It represented a thaw in U.S.-China relations. It augured better—much better—relations between Washington and Beijing.

During the meetings between President Nixon and his Chinese counterparts in February 1972, the Taiwan "issue" was considered a major obstacle. The two sides, however, simply agreed to disagree—perceiving that they both had more important problems with which to deal. The Soviet Union's rapid military buildup, a threat to both countries, was at the top of the agenda. Vietnam was an important issue for the U.S. Economic development and a legitimate and expanded role in world affairs were important goals for Beijing.

To Nixon, Taiwan was not a real obstacle; it could be ignored. Taipei would not cause trouble. Chiang Kai-shek had, some years earlier, proclaimed that retaking the mainland was seventy percent a political problem—meaning that he no longer considered military actions feasible. This appeared to mean (or so Nixon interpreted it) that Chiang was giving up that task and accepted (or would accept) a separate Taiwan. Many of Taiwan's leaders had indeed given up hope for a military solution when Taipei failed to take any direct actions against China during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. They did not expect another such opportunity soon, if ever. Furthermore, Taiwan was doing well economically and was in the process of realizing democratic reforms; both situations had increased the gap between the two Chinas. Few in Taiwan thought it feasible, or desirable, that Taiwan and China merge, at least in the short run.

Beijing's decision makers, or at least most of them, apparently perceived that the Soviet Union had become a threat to the degree that the Taiwan question had to be shelved in order to build friendly ties with the United States. Mao no doubt also realized there was some possibility that Taipei might play the "Soviet card" and that America's ties with Taiwan, for the moment at least, were not really undesirable. Zhou Enlai had said earlier that the "Taiwan question" could be solved in ten, a hundred, or a thousand years. Finally, Beijing had a no-win situation on its hands. The likely results of an attack on Taiwan were: (1) a conflict of monumental proportions (probably resulting in one or two million casualties, all Chinese), (2) strained relations with many nations of the world, (3) and an embarrassment for Beijing if—as seemed inevitable—it created horrendous refugee and human rights problems.⁸

As a result of Mao's response to Nixon's diplomacy, the United States and the People's Republic of China entered into a tacit alliance against the Soviet Union. Mao spoke of a "global united front" (with the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan) to check Soviet "hegemony." In Henry Kissinger's terms, there was a "new balance of power" in the world that made it possible for the US. to substitute diplomacy for an arms race the U.S. was losing and would continue to lose. In any case, Washington and Beijing, once arch-enemies, were antagonists no more. The U.S. no longer saw Beijing as a greater danger to world peace than the Kremlin; in fact, the perception of the two was reversed. Similarly, Mao perceived Moscow to be "worse than the United States" in terms of hegemonic ambitions (because the U.S. had learned a lesson in Vietnam).⁹

In ensuing months, because of improving U.S.-People's Republic of China relations, the "Taiwan issue" was ignored. The U.S.-Republic of China Defense Treaty remained in force and military assistance to Taipei continued. Of course, leaders in Taipei began to have second thoughts about the United States. There was some talk of employing the "Soviet option" or even of going nuclear in the event the United States abandoned Taipei. But these options were little more than last resort contingencies. Many of Taiwan's leaders did not seriously fear being sacrificed because of better Washington-Beijing relations. Alternatively, they perceived they had to take actions to maintain close ties with the U.S. and prevent a Washington-Beijing rapprochement.

In any event, warmer ties between Washington and Beijing were thwarted both by events and by changing world circumstances. Watergate paralyzed the Nixon Administration. President Gerald Ford could not push China relations ahead, for his was an "interim presidency." There was also opposition in the U.S., particularly among Ford's supporters, to a drastically different China policy. On the other side, Beijing felt betrayed by U.S. efforts (called detente) to pursue better relations with Moscow. And, even though the Taiwan issue had been conveniently shelved, it could not be buried.

In addition, defeat in Vietnam in 1975 proved to be a major disappointment to the U.S. Better relations with Beijing had been built to a large degree on the assumption that China would help the U.S. get out of Vietnam honorably. The reality was that Beijing did not control the situation in Vietnam; the Soviet Union did. But many in the U.S. did not accept this explanation. Finally, Mao's death in 1976 resulted in political uncertainty in the People's Republic of China. The U.S. now had to deal with a new leadership, whose policies were not clearly understood.

Thus, from 1974, when Richard Nixon resigned the presidency, to 1978, when, after a two-year power struggle following Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China's paramount leader and President Jimmy Carter's decided to grant diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, U.S.-China relations did not improve. In fact, relations during this five-year period were in a state of limbo. Had it not been for the fact Deng perceived that China needed the United States to guarantee the success of China's domestic reforms (that were primarily economic and required Western trade and investment to work) and this coincided with President Carter's need for a foreign policy victory, ties between Washington and Beijing probably would have improved only gradually.

U.S. Diplomatic Recognition of Beijing

Before his election to the presidency, Jimmy Carter had been a one-term governor of Georgia. He had no experience in national government, nor had he held any job which related to foreign policy making. His world view, he said, was influenced by Reinhold Niebuhr's notion of attaining a "new world through a transforming 'Presence.'"

This was a universal, or one-world, view of international politics. His perception of America's role in the world was similarly an idealistic one. Carter also said he wanted to do something about North-South relations, environmental problems, the oil crisis, and moral issues. According to Carter, Henry Kissinger had "Europeanized" American foreign policy by the "chessboard approach." Carter called Kissinger a "Lone Ranger" and said that he and Nixon had "lied to the American people." Carter was likewise critical of Nixon's "balance-of-power view of the world" and his "overemphasis" on U.S.-Soviet relations. He sought to supplant the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy with one that downgraded the Soviet threat and emphasized human rights. Carter said he hoped his foreign policy was one that "Americans can be proud of."¹⁰

China policy, however, played no special role in President Carter's world view. Thus, during the first few months of his presidency, Carter made no overtures to Chinese leaders in Beijing, nor did he make any special efforts to alter U.S.-China relations. The importance of China to the U.S. was downgraded. President Carter said that he had no plan to use the "China card"; in fact, he had repudiated any intention of playing one nation against another or of viewing world politics as a game.

Soon after he became president, however, Jimmy Carter changed his views drastically on many things. Foreign policy was foremost among these. Carter was moved to change mostly by disappointment and embarrassment. A few months into his term, the new president sent a letter to Nobel Prize-winning Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, expressing sympathy with his views and objectives. Almost simultaneously he made several new proposals to Kremlin leaders regarding a strategic arms treaty. The Soviet leadership's response was to flatly, and rudely, reject his proposals. Carter, according to close observers, "suffered a disappointment he never forgot."

President Carter was also disillusioned by efforts to cut U.S. arms sales; he had expected that his moves would serve as an inspiration to the Soviet Union and that other nations would do likewise. Rather than reducing arms transfers and arms spending, Moscow increased both by large amounts. In fact, the Carter Administration found the problem of a growing global Soviet military threat even more pressing than did the Nixon Administration. And unlike the maneuvering and flexible diplomacy which Nixon had found at least somewhat effective, Carter's "soft" approach served only to humiliate the new president and demonstrate how little influence he could bring to bear on the Kremlin through rhetoric about human rights and via unilateral proposals to limit arms building and sales.

The Soviet challenges to Carter's foreign policy were particularly salient in Asia. There, in an area where Soviet naval and air power had not been relevant before, the Soviet military buildup was both bigger and faster than elsewhere. The Soviet Far East Fleet was becoming its biggest naval force. In Southeast Asia—in Cambodia—the worst human rights violations in mo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 U.S. China Policy and the Taiwan Relations Act
• 2 The TRA Versus the Three Communiques: The Formal Basis of U.S. China Policy
• 3 Beijing, Taipei, and the Taiwan Relations Act
• 4 The Taiwan Relations Act and Democracy in Taiwan
• 5 Summary and Conclusions
• Appendix 1: Shanghai Communique (1972)
• Appendix 2: Normalization Agreement (1979)
• Appendix 3: Taiwan Relations Act (1979)
• Appendix 4: U.S.-China Joint Communique (1982)
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index