Gun Barrel Politics

Party-army Relations In Mao's China

Fang Zhu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429721298
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book tests the model of civil-military dualism to explain People's Liberation Army's (PLA) political engagement and its loyalty to the party in Maoist China. It explores how the party maintained its control— through penetration of the armed forces or non-intervention and civilian control.

1
Introduction

Political Involvement and Loyalty to the Party

China's party-army relations since 1949 have presented a continuous paradox. On one hand, the military leaders were deeply involved in intra-party conflicts, colluding or cooperating with their civilian colleagues for political power and policy influence. On the other hand, even at the peak of its political power, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was never able to overthrow the party leadership.¹ Instead, it displayed remarkable discipline and loyalty to the party regime. Two fundamental questions thus arise: What caused the PLA to become so involved in party politics, and what prevented it from taking over?

The PLA's involvement in politics has been evident in every key political crisis since the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The first such crisis came in 1953, during a major power redistribution in the leadership, which ended with the purge of the "Gao-Rao Antiparty Clique." Gao and Rao were senior political-military leaders with substantial power in their respective military and administrative regions. Soon after they were transferred to the central leadership in Beijing, they were accused of trying to usurp power on the top level. We now know that they did not act alone. Among their chief supporters were some of the highest-ranking commanders of the communist army. It was remarkable that the party center was able to purge Gao and Rao without causing any significant disturbances in the military ranks. This was the first case of intraparty conflict that ended with a majority of the military elite yielding to the central party authority.

The next major leadership conflict occurred in 1959. At a series of Politburo meetings known as the Lushan Conference, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai took the lead in criticizing Mao's economic policies known under the rubric of the Great Leap Forward. Initially, a majority of the party elite shared Peng's views. Yet when the party center headed by Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai decided to suppress the critics, the opposition collapsed. Peng was subsequently dismissed, together with his chief of general staff and other military and civilian associates. Again the central authority of the party had prevailed. However, the seeds of division were deeply planted, and the Peng case later would reemerge, triggering the biggest political turmoil in the PRC's history, during the Cultural Revolution.

The PLA played a leading role throughout the Cultural Revolution. With military support led by Lin Biao, Mao was able to overrule the majority of the party leadership in 1966, turning the nation drastically to the left. Yet when the Maoist Red Guards tried to seize power from party and government organizations in 1967, a majority of the local PLA collaborated with their civilian colleagues to suppress the young rebels in spite of Mao's personal blessings to their revolutionary radicalism. This powerful resistance forced Mao to back off from his original plan to reshuffle the entire ruling echelon. Although the PLA acquired substantial political power in both the center and the provinces in the wake of the power seizure campaign, it did not directly challenge the political sovereignty of the party. After the fall of Lin Biao, the military gradually was eased out of party and state apparatuses. This was another example of the party's ultimate control.

The PLA's power and influence had risen with the political star of Lin Biao, reaching its peak at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. In spite of his enormous stature in the armed forces and the party, however, Lin never attained the party's chairmanship. His alleged coup never materialized. The power struggle between Mao and Lin ended with Lin's death when his military jet crashed under suspicious circumstances in Mongolia, in late 1971. His followers were subsequently purged, and the PLA was reorganized to root out Lin's influence.

In the final succession contest at the end of the Mao era, the military again played a pivotal role. With the majority of PLA leaders supporting the moderate faction of the party, the radical "Gang of Four" was arrested during a palace coup shortly after Mao's death. However, repeating its customary pattern of behavior, the military refrained from using this opportunity to topple the party leadership, even though Mao was by now out of the picture and his successor, Hua Guofeng, was politically vulnerable.

These events display the PLA's behavioral pattern, which combined the praetorian tendency with ultimate submission to party authority. The cases of Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai involved no use of force, yet they represented military participation in political decisionmaking in areas far beyond those of defense and national security. The early stage of the Cultural Revolution was a case of military blackmail of party and state authorities, and it marked a more threatening and more consequential form of military meddling in politics. The military's resistance to the 1967 campaign to seize power was an instance of political involvement by force. It succeeded in reversing Mao's most excessive policies but stopped short of replacing the central party leadership. The 1976 military coup did lead to the replacement of the left-wing party leadership. However, it was carried out in the name of a civilian leader, Hua Guofeng, who took command of the party, state, and military as Mao's hand-picked successor.² The coup attempt by the Lin group in 1971, if successful, could have led to the establishment of a military regime, which would have meant the highest level of praetorianism. Yet its failure shows that a majority of the PLA officer corps was not ready to rebel against the political authority of the party, despite Lin's powerful influence in both the party and the army. In short, the PLA, although highly active in politics during the Maoist era, never went so far as to supplant the political authority of the party. Its political participation covered all three domains specified by Colton, but stopped at the third mode on Finer's four-mode scale of military intervention.³ It was an ever present, powerful player, but at the same time, one that conceded every time to the final authority of the party leadership.

Models of Civilian Control

The deep political involvement of military elites during the Mao period suggests a general breakdown of civilian control in the Chinese political system. Yet the absence of a successful military takeover indicates the existence of effective political control. We thus are challenged with an intriguing question: If there was effective political control over the armed forces, why did it allow military elites so much political power? To answer this question, we must understand the nature of the Maoist political control system and how it differed from other systems.

The Liberal Model

In the West, civilian control is achieved through the institution of military professionalism, defined traditionally in terms of "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness" (Huntington 1957:7-18). The element most pertinent to civil-military relations is responsibility—that is, the set of professional ethics or values internalized by the soldiers, inspiring them to respect and obey the civilian authority and to hold a neutral stance in political debates (Nordlinger 1977:13; Huntington 1957:71). The "liberal model" of civilian control requires a mutual respect between the civilian and military elites for each other's professional expertise and realm of responsibilities. In such a system, civil-military institutions are highly differentiated, and military operation is limited by well-defined constitutional structures. The political role of the military is confined to providing expert advice on budgetary and foreign policy issues related to its mission of national security. Any activity beyond this purview is generally considered military intervention. The liberal model is commonly upheld as an ideal type of civilian control that maximizes military professionalism and makes the military a tool of the state (Huntington 1957:83). Even though the system does not always work perfectly, it does provide a foundation for civilian control and political stability in most liberal democracies in the West (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982:780).

In Maoist China, however, control of the armed forces was not based on military professionalism. Although the PLA displayed certain professional aspects, it was too politicized to belong in the category of professional armies. However, this is a controversial issue, involving the debate on the definition of professionalism. Obviously, Huntington's definition is based on the prototype of modern Western armies that are held responsible to act only for "socially approved purposes" (1957:14-15). The Western model requires the establishment of a firm civilian control over the military, which is expected to stay as neutral politically as possible. However, this view of professionalism has been challenged on the grounds that it rules out any elasticity to cover different degrees of professionalism and political involvement (Abrahamsson 1972:159; Paul Godwin 1978:220). The challenge was well grounded in that the definition seems too exclusive and that perfect civilian control and political sterilization of the military are difficult, if not impossible, to realize in the empirical world. Even the best professional armies may on occasion become praetorian to protect the military's corporate interests or to save the nation from corrupt and incompetent civilian governments (Nordlinger 1977:13, 14, 86; Colton 1990:9). Consequently, a new formula has been proposed, which retains the original elements of "expertise" and "corporateness," but leaves the specifics of the "responsibility" deliberately vague as "certain ethical rules" (Abrahamsson 1972:15).

With the standard of political neutrality lowered, the concept of military professionalism becomes almost the same as that of military modernity. This makes it easier for non-Western and more politically involved armies to join the club of professionalism. However, the new formula fails to capture a crucial distinction between the revolutionary army, such as the PLA, indoctrinated to participate in politics, and the Western type of professional army trained to keep its political role minimal. The difference is not just intellectual. It has serious political and social consequences. In Maoist China, the military role in politics not only compounded and intensified the power struggle in the leadership, but it was also directly responsible for the outbreaks of political and social turmoil. For instance, the Cultural Revolution, which caused so much damage to the society and economy and ruined so many people's lives, could not have occurred without military participation. It is hard to argue that the military's support of radical Maoism was a "professional" act, by any definition. The millions of victims of the Cultural Revolution would not accept such a definition of military professionalism. To insist on strict political neutrality as a standard for military professionalism may be too extreme; but to completely abandon it would be equally so.

Even when we allow more elasticity in the requirement of political neutrality, the PLA during Mao's rule remained fundamentally different from professional Western armies. Its political involvement was extensive and high profile, and it was more of a norm than an exception. For instance, at the peak of the PLA's political power, in late 1968, army leaders took control of twenty-one of the twenty-six provincial administrations in the country (Ding Wang 1970:96). By the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, military representation in the Politburo was greater than fifty percent (Klein and Clark 1971a:119), and in the Central Committee, greater than forty-four percent (Whitson 1972a:62). Its leader, Marshal Lin Biao, had acquired the status of Mao's successor. Although this "golden age" of PLA political dominance did not last very long, it is enough to make the point that the Chinese military was far more than an obedient tool of the communist party-state.

The Penetration Model

If the liberal model does not capture the essence of the Maoist political-military system, the "penetration model" may be the answer to our inquiry (Nordlinger 1977:15-19). Rather than relying on the legally based professional ethics of civilian supremacy and political neutrality, the political authorities could maintain their control through ideological and organizational penetration of the military system. This model has been widely used to analyze communist party-states such as those of the former Soviet Union and of East European countries (Kolkowicz 1967:11-35, 80-98; Volgyes 1981:183-230). The control mechanisms commonly adopted by the ruling party included the establishment of party organizations in the armed forces, vigorously imposed ideological indoctrination, politically oriented personnel policies, and the surveillance of the officer corps by political officers and the secret police. Using Huntington's terminology, this type of civilian control is "subjective" as opposed to "objective"(1957:80-85). Instead of encouraging military professionalism, it minimizes it and thereby reduces military autonomy.

Analysts have applied both the penetration and the liberal models to explain the PLA's role in politics. Some have considered the PLA by and large a professional army, with a strong commitment to nationalism and civilian supremacy (Joffe 1967; Jencks 1982; Godwin 1988). Others have stressed the party's penetration power or organizational control to account for the military loyalty to the party (Gittings 1967; Chang 1986; Shambaugh 1991). On balance, the penetration model provides a more convincing explanation for the military's compliance with the party rule. However, it shares the same weakness with the liberal model in explaining the consistent involvement of army elites in the political life of the nation. Most analysts have faulted the civilian party for failing to exercise effective control and to keep the military out of the political process. Various explanations have been offered for this failure, including the existence of "intraparty conflict" (Joffe 1984:20), the "lack of secure civil authority" (Jencks 1991:15), and the "pressure of party leaders, especially Mao" to draw the military into political battles (Chang 1986:135-138).

It is true that political instability generally breeds military praetorianism. The PLA's engagement in politics correlated strongly with intraparty conflicts and leadership instability. However, a careful analysis of these conflicts would demonstrate that political instability in China was more a symptom of military involvement than a cause of it. Military leaders were often no less guilty than their civilian colleagues in generating instability and intraparty conflicts. They were inside players of the political game, not spectators who were invited to step in when the conflicts among civilian elites got out of hand. Gao Gang, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and Ye Jianying all displayed apparent political ambitions and the willingness to act on them with or without civilian invitation.

Both the liberal and the penetration models are based on the following three assumptions: First, there is a clear-cut differentiation between civilian and military roles. Second, because of this differentiation, civil-military relations are marked by inter-institutional tensions. Third, there is a generally accepted norm that the military should not meddle in matters beyond its professional expertise. All these assumptions are questionable in analyzing communist systems (Odom 1978; Albright 1980; Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982). They definitely do not fit the case of Maoist China.

The Neotraditional or Symbiosis Model

The single most important attribute that sets the Maoist system apart from many others, including the former Soviet system, was its much lower differentiation between civil and military institutions. Party membership in the PLA officer corps was one hundred percent. Military leaders concurrently held party and government positions at all levels. Many were members of the party's Central Committee, some of the Politburo, and the top few, even of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. This could be considered a revised version of the penetration model in which not only the party penetrated the army but vice versa. The result was a two-way merging of political and military authorities. The image of such a system was more like a marble cake than a layer cake in which the roles of the elites were blurred. This rather unique arrangement in which the two elites relied upon each other for the preservation of their power and status has been referred to as the "symbiosis model" (Sandschneider 1989; Shambaugh 1991; Swaine 1992). The system could be regarded also as "neotraditional" because it resembled that present in premodern Europe, when there was no significant difference between civil and military elites (Huntington 1957:19-58). It was a system in which "the same men wore both hat and helmet" (Nordlinger 1977:11). Even when the two elites were somewhat differentiated, they maintained a harmonious relationship on the basis of shared social class and family backgrounds. These political-military elites would not rebel against the monarch, who represented the class interests of the aristocracy. Similarly, the military elites in Maoist China stayed loyal to the party regime, to which they owed their political and social privileges. In the Maoist system, civil-military cooperation was rooted in the elites' self-interest, which was often more reliable and longer lasting than a system based on coercive measures alone.

However, the symbiotic system was not without its costs. When soldiers were officially incorporated into the political leadership, military professionalism was downgraded to a large extent. Consequently, the military "responsibility" was extended into nonmilitary realms, which meant a serious deficit in civilian control. However, military "corporateness" also was undermined due to party-army interpenetration and to cross-institutional linkages between civil and military elites, which had the opposite effect of enhancing the political control of the party at the expense of military autonomy and unity The entanglement of elites in intraparty factionalism continually divided the officer corps, making it easier for party leaders to maintain control. Thus, the politicized military elites tended overall to promote the interests of the party regime as opposed to the more narrow, corporate interests of the military bureaucracy (Jencks 1981:122-123).

Conceptually, what we have here is a party control model rather than a civilian control model. The two are categorically different in nature. In China, the party has never been purely civilian. It contains both civilian and military elements. For a long time before 1949, the party was even more military than civilian. Party control does not equate with civilian control, as the military is a major component of the party and its leadership; indeed, party control might be considered the antithesis of civilian control. As military officers were obligated to participate in politics, the PLA's involvement in policymaking and in intraparty conflicts cannot rightly be regarded as "intervention."

In comparison, the neotraditional model is much more complicated than the liberal and penetration models. It also has more explanatory power for the case of Maoist China. The structural integration of military and civilian power reconciles the two seemingly paradoxical aspects of the PLA's behavior as it simultaneously explains the military's loyalty and its political activism. However, models do not have to be mutually exclusive. For instance, political control in China was apparently achieved through both the party's penetration of the PLA and the PLA's penetration of the party. This does not change the fact that the substantial military representation in the party leadership was evidently the primary reason for the military's consistent involvement in politics.

Two factors could be identified as causes of the party-army interlocking in Mao's China. The first was the fact that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power through a lengthy, peasant-based civil war in which the party and the army were hardly distinguishable. These historical roots of civil-military symbiosis set a pattern that persisted after the civil war and that was institutionalized in the Maoist era, in spite of noticeable variations from period to period. The other factor was the nature of the totalitarian party-state. The party penetrated every political, social, and economic institution, and by so doing, allowed itself to be penetrated as well. Elites from the government and the milita...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Civil-Military Dualism
• 3 Military Regionalism and the Gao-Rao Incident
• 4 Crisis on Lushan
• 5 Launching the Cultural Revolution
• 6 Resistance to Power Seizure
• 7 The Lin Biao Incident
• 8 The Fall of the Gang of Four
• 9 Conclusion
• References
• Index