Where do the days of the week come from? Do they come from the sun or from the clocks?
Who would not be intrigued by Isabellaâs thinking? The puzzling mind of a young child comes through loud and clear in her question as she tries to understand an everyday (literally!) event. It makes a fitting opening for a book which is about young children as active, persistent thinkers, driven by a desire to make sense and meaning in their lives, to connect what they know and understand to what they do not yet understand. In this first chapter some fundamental, underpinning ideas about thinking are considered, posed as questions which set a context for the book as a whole. In considering these questions links are also made to many other parts of the book, emphasizing a model of thinking as an activity which connects every part of young childrenâs experience.
What is thinking?
Thinking is a fundamentally human characteristic, an activity in which we all engage from before we are born. As a child in Fisher (2005: 1) says: âIf we didnât think thereâd be no usâ. What, though, do we mean when we use the language of thinking, for example, when we say âIâm thinking about itâ? How do we feel when we get a card that says âthinking of youâ? Bartsch and Wellman (1995) identify three different uses of âI think.â First, they suggest, think is effectively a synonym for belief, such as âI think sheâs a nice personâ. Second, they suggest thinking is a form of imagination. Their final meaning is the main, though not exclusive, focus here, that of thinking as an activity. As Sam (aged 4.10) said to me: âI thinked in my head and then I done itâ.
White sets out four characteristics of thinking. First, he says, thinking is intentional, it is always âof or about something, or thinking that something is the caseâ (2002: 101; emphasis in original), which suggests the important role of knowledge and experience for thinking. Second, he says, it is an activity. We engage in it deliberately; it does not happen to us. Sometimes thinking is directed towards an end, and at other times it may be an end in itself. Whiteâs third proposal is that thinking employs concepts, whatever the context or activity in which the thinking is happening. His final suggestion is that thinking is a skill. As we shall see later, however, particularly in Chapter 11, and as White himself emphasizes, it is not just a skill, important though this is. Equally important is the development of the disposition to make use of this skill, to want to be a thinker and to enjoy thinking.
What does thinking mean to you, and how would you describe it? Practitioners in one nursery identified words such as predicting, representing, recalling, wondering, deciding and evaluating as useful words related to the practice of thinking. They also suggested other, perhaps initially less likely, words, including pretending, playing, picturing and dreaming (Ann Bridges and Pat Gura, in collaboration with the staff, children and parents of Vanessa Nursery School). Let us take three possible words that often come up in discussions about thinking, and consider them in a little more depth: âintelligenceâ, âlearningâ and âknowingâ.
Intelligence
The idea that thinking is related to intelligence is pervasive. It finds its expression in approaches to intelligence testing and IQ scores, considered in more detail in Chapter 6. For the public, âintelligenceâ has often assumed the role of a badge of social approval (White 2002).
Defining what we mean by intelligence is, however, tremendously difficult, although this has not stopped people from trying. Siegler et al. (2017) suggest that one of the difficulties in defining intelligence is that it is possible to describe it in three different ways: as a single trait, as a few basic abilities or as many things. The single trait perspective rests on the idea that we each possess a certain amount of so-called general intelligence, or g, a term coined by Charles Spearman (Siegler et al. 2017), and analogous to IQ. This general intelligence influences all aspects of cognitive functioning, and is common to all intellectual tasks. The idea of intelligence as a few basic abilities is most simply reflected in a view that there are two types, described as crystallized intelligence and fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence refers to factual knowledge about the world (Cattell 1971; Sternberg 1985) or the âaccumulation of schooling, acculturation and other learning experiencesâ (Meadows 2006: 217), whilst fluid intelligence involves the ability to solve novel problems, and to think on the spot (Cattell 1971; Sternberg 1985). Recent research supports a distinction between the two (Nisbett et al. 2012). The third way of describing intelligence is to see it as composed of numerous cognitive processes such as remembering, planning, reasoning, solving problems and so on, all drawn upon in the performance of cognitive tasks such as reading, or arithmetic (Siegler et al. 2017). In an attempt to reconcile these three differing perspectives, Carroll (2005) proposes the three-stratum theory of intelligence, which features g at the top, with a number of basically general abilities, including fluid and crystallized intelligence in the middle, and a lower tier of specific processes such as visualization, memory span and language comprehension.
Francis Galton, developing mental testing in the nineteenth century, saw intelligence as fixed, inherited and underlying all cognitive activity. Those who came after him, including Eysenck and Burt, thus defined it as âinnate, general cognitive abilityâ (Burt in White 2002: 78). This looks very different to Claxtonâs definition of intelligence as âknowing what to do when you donât know what to doâ (1999a: 4). As he emphasizes (2015), this will be dependent upon the world you are living in, and what is valued and needed at that place and time. Thornton suggests that intelligence is âthe capacity to solve problems and interact with the world in adaptive waysâ (2002: 179), a wide-ranging definition that, as she says, views intelligence as the product of all of an individualâs knowledge, strategies and âmental toolsâ.
Sternbergâs triarchic theory (1985) proposes three types of intelligence: analytical (similar to standard âIQâ definitions), creative (the ability to pose interesting questions and to come up with novel solutions) and practical (the ability to solve real-life problems). Gardner (1983), as we shall see, argues for the existence of multiple intelligences (MI), identifying a number of forms of âintelligenceâ, not just one.
How we view intelligence will have implications for what we value. Nunes (2005), for example, records teachers in her studies assessing and defining the childrenâs intelligence almost exclusively in relation to their verbal and literacy ability. In Chapter 2 a range of theorists is looked at, all of whom have ideas about intelligence.
Learning
In thinking about thinking, it can be difficult to steer a clear path between it and learning, and the two are sometimes used interchangeably, as if they were one and the same. In addition, there is disagreement about how learning happens and where (for example, is it solely in the mind, does it happen as a dynamic interaction between people and the tools and artefacts of their environments or is learning embodied?). What influences learning and how can we know if it has occurred?
Learning can be defined as âchange brought about by an experienceâ (Mercer 2018: 114). Such change may or may not be deliberate, thus learning can be unintentional as well as intentional, but to qualify as learning the change must be relatively permanent. What, though, is changed? In Chapter 2 we will look in more detail at this, in particular whether the change is to knowledge or behaviour. What is clear is that learning begins before birth (Mercer 2018) and takes a number of forms, including habituation, perceptual learning, statistical learning, imitation and active learning (Siegler et al. 2017). These terms will be returned to throughout the book.
In recent years there has been considerable interest in what has been termed the âscience of learningâ (SoL) (see, inter alia, Hattie and Yates 2014; Horvath et al. 2017; Meltzoff et al. 2009), an interdisciplinary field that brings together findings from disciplines such as social, developmental and cognitive psychology, neuroscience and education. Much of this is aimed particularly at improving learning experiences in formal contexts â schools and nurseries â and thus focuses as much on teaching as on learning. From meta-analyses of a range of studies, Hattie identifies over 250 âinfluences on student achievementâ (Corwin Visible Learning plus 2018).
Claxton argues for an approach which he calls learnacy, or learning to learn. Crucially, for Claxton, this learning is not confined to âthe articulate, the numerate, the explicit and the measurableâ (1999a: 11). Rather, it is about taking a broad view of learning, which includes the use of the imagination, a playful disposition, persistence and the ability to learn with and from others.
The relationship between play, learning and thinking is an important topic throughout the book. Broström (2017), for example, draws attention to the long-standing debate which he characterizes as play versus learning. Many early childhood curricula, including the Statutory Framework for the Early Years Foundation Stage in England (DfE 2017) are underpinned by the idea of play for learning (Nilsson et al. 2018). These authors argue for what they term play as learning, arguing that young childrenâs engagement with the world is predominantly focused on play and exploration. Children themselves have clear ideas about what they see as play and learning (Goodhall and Atkinson 2017; ĂlafsdĂłttir and EinarsdĂłttir 2019; Robson 1993), including evidence that they may see digital technologies as sites for play rather than learning, for example (Oliemat et al. 2018; Sulaymani et al. 2018). They also have views about how they learn. Sobel and Letourneau (2018), for example, found that the 3 and 4 year olds in their study believed that they learnt through their freely chosen actions, whilst the older 4 and 5 year olds had a more nuanced view, of learning through both action and instruction.
Much attention has been focused in recent years on the idea of learning styles, and the view that we all have preferred ways of learning. In particular, approaches such as VAK (Visual, Auditory and Kinaesthetic) and VARK (Visual, Auditory, Read/write and Kinaesthetic) (Fleming and Baume 2006) have gained popularity in early childhood settings, to the extent that Howard-Jones (2014) found that over 90 per cent of teachers in five countries (including the UK) believed that children learnt better when they received information tailored to their preferred learning styles. These ideas have also sometimes been linked to Gardnerâs multiple intelligences (MI) theories, something which he is keen to refute. He asserts that linking the two is a confusion of ability (MI are essentially descriptions of ability traits) and style (Gardner 2013). As Hattie and Yates (2014) point out, having different abilities does not, of itself, imply that strengths in one area are matched by weaknesses in others, but learning style theory suggests a hierarchy of strengths and weaknesses in a preferred style.
What is the evidence for the claims of those who advocate learning styles approaches? Coffield et al. (2004) identify 71 different approaches. Much of the evaluation of these is small-scale, often concerning older children and adults, and conducted by the programme developers themselves. They suggest that there is considerable variability between the different learning styles approaches, and that it is difficult to be clear about the impact of any of them. Indeed, they go further to stress the low reliability, poor validity and negligible impact of many of the instruments (usually questionnaires) used to assess learning style, and recommend their use be discontinued. Rogowsky et al. (2015) conclude that there was no relationship between the expressed learning style preferences (in this case either visual word or auditory) of the adult participants in their study and aptitude, that is, their performance on reading or listening comprehension tests. In fact, the visual learners performed best on all kinds of tests. With regard to VAK, Howard-Jones (2007) cites evidence suggesting that presenting material in three different styles, targeted at the supposed learning styles of ch...