Social Philosophy and Ecological Scarcity

Keekok Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000698954
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Ecology
• Index: Biological Sciences

Originally published in 1989 Social Philosophy and Ecological Scarcity presents a systematic study of the implications of ecological scarcity for social philosophy. The book argues for a new social philosophy based on a conception of the 'good society' and the 'good life' which makes fewer, rather than more demands on scarce ecological resources. The book shows that the two major competing social philosophies in modern philosophical thought – the bourgeois liberal and the state socialist – are both forms of capitalism. Despite their obvious differences, they both pursue the logic of capitalism, of ever-increasing accumulation, growth and consumption. This pursuit is carried out by means of modern science and its technology, which assume that Nature's resources are inexhaustible and can be exploited to meet infinite human wants or needs, ignoring ecological scarcity. The recognition of ecological scarcity would lead to a social philosophy, based on a frugal mode of socialism which has more affinities with the social visions of Fourier and Morris than with that of Marx. Their theories, far from being too 'utopian', are shown as more 'realistic' and less 'fantastic' than either bourgeois capitalism or state capitalism based on the Marxist model.

Chapter One
A Rational Basis for A Naturalistic Ethic and Social Philosophy

1. Traditionally, moral and social philosophers, when pushed to give a ground or foundation for their systems of values or norms, have relied on the following methodologies:

• (a) that God is the final source and authority, whether divinely revealed or through the use of human reason;
• (b) that they rest ultimately on intuitions which one simply and self-evidently perceives to be true;
• (c) that they are to be justified by reference to facts about the world and ourselves;
• (d) that the will is the final arbiter, that is, the individual human will chooses certain values while rejecting others, not in a rational but irrational or non-rational, though sincere manner.

Method (a) — the transcendent route — is no longer available in a secular age, quite apart from its inherent logical and conceptual difficulties. Method (b) cannot overcome the fundamental criticism that different people appear to subscribe to very different self-evident truths, without conceding either a form of mysticism or a form of subjectivism about values, thus collapsing into method (d) above. Method (d) itself openly admits that systems of values are, at their very basis, no more than arbitrary subjective choices or commitments, albeit sincere ones made by the will — it is held that while matters pertaining to the cognitive faculty may be said to be true or false, it is inappropriate to maintain that matters pertaining to the will may be said to be true or false; however, they may be said to be sincerely or insincerely committed to. Method (c) is therefore the only hope remaining to those who wish to construct a rational naturalistic system of values.

However, method (c) is considered by many philosophers (especially since the beginning of this century) to be irredeemably logically flawed, for it commits the so-called Naturalistic Fallacy, that is to say, it attempts logically to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. If this charge were valid, then I think one must concede defeat. But I do not accept the indictment. Whilst it is true that logical derivation of an ‘ought’ or normative proposition from an ‘is’ or factual proposition constitutes a fallacy, it is not true that moral and social philosophers using method (c) try to do what is logically misconceived. Their aim is not to achieve logical derivation, but something else, to show that another logical relationship, which I have called epistemic implication, obtains between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ propositions, that will provide a warrant for a rational passage from factual evidence to prescriptive or normative conclusion.[1]

If my defence above survives critical scrutiny, then method (c) is back in business. I also maintain that a moral/social theory, like theories put forward in other fields of inquiry, may be subjected to criticism. I suggest four tests of adequacy which could be used to decide between competing moral/social theories. These are: (1) the check of logic, (2) the check of facts, (3) the check of empirical/scientific assumptions and claims, (4) the check of the problem.[2]

My task in this book is a slightly different one. This time, I hope to construct the outline of a social philosophy in accordance with these tests of adequacy, and in that way to justify rationally the system of values in question. I will in particular pay attention to checks (2) and (3), and to argue that social theories which do not pass such tests are fantastic theories with no application to the real world you and I, as human agents, occupy. Such theories ipso facto also fail check (4), the check of the problem. Social problems arise because of certain features about human agency and the environment within which it acts and interacts. Such problems cannot be solved by theories which conjure away those very features about ourselves and the world, which in the first instance, give rise to them.

But as my meta-ethical approach leads to the claim that it is possible to justify values critically and, therefore, rationally, I feel obliged to say something more about the state of meta-ethics in general. Contemporary Western moral philosophy (using Weber and G. E. Moore as convenient starting points), by and large, subscribes to the contrary thesis of value irrationalism, namely, that all values (including social/moral values) are incapable of being critically and, therefore, rationally justified. This is inferred from the invalidity of method (c) raised above. Three sub-theses follow from it (1) that it makes sense to talk about a disagreement in values or attitudes towards a state of affairs between two people, even in the absence of any disagreement about the facts of the case; (2) that it makes sense to conceive of values remaining unchanged, even in a world very different from the one currently occupied by human agents; (3) the individual ego (or the communal consciousness) is the moral sovereign, and each ego creates its own moral universe. I wish here to look more closely at these three entailed sub-theses, rather then the main one of value irrationalism itself.

The apparent intelligibility of (1) partially rests on the habit of many moral philosophers of constructing artificial and, therefore, highly simplified and schematic examples of moral disagreement between people. Quite often, it even simply consists of asking the reader or hearer to imagine disputant A being still able to disagree with disputant B about the morality of the case, even if A were to agree with B that the facts he, A, relied on, were wholly false, and that those, which B relied on, were acceptable. Suppose the case to be the morality of euthanasia. A maintains that to permit euthanasia is morally wrong on the grounds that foolproof safeguards could never be devised to prevent abuse. Next imagine that B could assure A that such safeguards are after all available. It is then claimed that it would still be meaningful for A to hold against B, that to permit euthanasia is. wrong, in spite of the (hypothetical) agreement on the part of both that adequate safeguards are available to prevent abuse.

But apart from the constant iteration that such disagreement of values can occur, it is not obvious that it does make sense. If A really were to agree that the facts he relied on turned out on more careful consideration to be false, and if A had agreed in advance that these were the basis for his original claim that permitting euthanasia was wrong, then A could not stubbornly carry on maintaining the original claim, after having conceded that his reasons turned out to be false or untenable. If he were to do so, this would show that those reasons either (a) were not the real reasons he claimed that they were, or (b) that they were not the only reasons as he had admitted in the first instance, (c) but that he had some other reasons (more adequate perhaps) for believing that euthanasia was wrong.

If one could at the start of the discussion get A to agree that (i) the reason he cited (in this case, the lack of safeguards to prevent abuse) is his real reason for maintaining that euthanasia is wrong, and (ii) it is also his only reason for holding such a moral belief, then, should he in the course of the discussion, come to agree with B that, after all, adequate safeguards could be erected, then he would be perverse from the standpoint of a critical and rational methodology to go on holding that permitting euthanasia remained morally wrong.

At every stage of the (real) moral argument between A and B, the same methodological procedure as outlined above could be adopted and the same implication would obtain, that a disputant who violates these rules is guilty of perversity from the critical, rational standpoint.

In real life moral disputes, such as the morality or otherwise of nuclear armaments, of racism, of sexism, of orgiastic consumption, etc. disputants do differ about matters of fact. For example, as we shall see (in Chapter Three), those who hold that a lifestyle of orgiastic consumption is morally acceptable believe as a matter of fact (i) that there is no absolute scarcity, (ii) that, instead, there is relative scarcity, but it can be successfully overcome by more and more sophisticated technology. In real life moral arguments which involve very complicated facts, it may not be a simple matter to convince such people that they are factually (and scientifically) mistaken. In a good many cases, it involves projection about future consequences which could flow from a proposed course of action. But the projection is only valid if the various parameters presupposed by the course of action would obtain and continue to obtain. As a result, this can give rise to (factual) disputes about the facts. And because of this, disputants can hang on to their respective moral views without actually violating the methodological procedure outlined above.

But this, however, should not be interpreted to mean that in any one instance when all the reasons cited by disputant A, say, in support of his case turn out to be factually mistaken or unsound in other ways (such as, by failing the check of logic), that it is intelligible to maintain that A could continue maintaining that he is right, and that B, his opponent is wrong, even though he now agrees that B’s reasons in support of his claim are sound and that his own are faulty.

However, to talk in a blanket way of the disagreement of facts between people is already to oversimplify matters grossly. For there are at least two types of factual disagreement. (I have already referred to one variety, that based on projection about future consequences of action.) The first is the more familiar straightforward kind — A believes that p is the case, whereas B believes that -p is the case. A maintains that X is morally right because he believes that p obtains, whereas B maintains that X is morally wrong because he believes that -p obtains. This presupposes that A and B are agreed that whether p obtains is crucial to the outcome. So if it can be shown that -p obtains, say, then A must concede that he can no longer hold X to be morally right; otherwise, he could be accused of methodological perversity.

The other kind exists where A does not seem to be aware that certain facts obtain whereas B does. As A is unaware of them, he naturally does not mention them. Call these q. But as B knows that q obtains, B cites q, not only p which A also cites, as the sole reason for holding that X is morally right. Suppose the dispute between A and B to be whether capitalism in Britain since its inception 400 years ago, could, on the whole, be said to be a morally acceptable system. A holds that it is. In evidence, he agrees with B that while it was true that in some period like the nineteenth century, the proletariat suffered greatly (that is p₁), but even the proletariat benefited(s) as economic growth occurred and continues to occur (that is P₂). B accepts p₁ and P₂. If p (that is, p₁ and P₂) is all that is under discussion, it is conceivable that B would concede that, on the whole, capitalism in Britain is a morally acceptable system. But B cites further evidence q.

q takes the following form: (i) that the suffering of the majority of people in Britain was not simply confined to the nineteenth century, although this is the most publicised aspect of it, but that it started to occur much earlier when the Enclosure Laws (even beginning in Tudor times) forced people off the land to provide labour for the growing industries, like the woollen industry (operating initially as homework), and later to drift into the developing industrial urban centres to nourish the factory manufacturing sector of the economy; (ii) that the economic growth enjoyed by Britain was made possible (a) by the enslavement of African peoples, whose labour was required to develop the newly conquered north American continent, whose indigenous population had been either killed off deliberately or unwittingly (Britain is not the only culprit but for the sake of simplicity, I only mention her and not others); Britain benefited directly and indirectly by colonial development in general, and directly by engaging in the slave trade itself; (b) by the countries of her empire which supplied cheap raw materials to feed the metropolitan economy, and, in turn, to function as captured markets for the goods produced by her factories; (iii) today Britain, it is true, has no empire, but the terms of trade between her and other developing economies (which include former colonies) and the penetration of multi-national capital are such that though formal colonialism has ended, it is not obvious that economic domination ended with it.

It is difficult to conceive A still holding on to his original view given the new information now made available to him, and assuming, of course, he finds it hard to dispute it. (But if he does dispute it, the dispute remains a factual one and does not jeopardise the methodological requirement that if all facts are agreed upon, it is perverse for A to continue to disagree with B. Indeed, his attempt to dispute the facts indicates that he actually abides by the methodological procedure, as he is implying, that it is only intelligible for him to continuing disagreeing with B morally, provided that he and B are in disagreement about the facts of the case, which constitute the reasons to justify his moral assessment.) It would only make sense for him to do so, if in addition to p and q, he now goes on to maintain something else, such as that while the fate of white British people matters (whether they prosper or not under capitalism), the fate of many more non-white peoples does not. However, this shifts the dispute about the morality or otherwise of capitalism in Britain to another issue, the morality or otherwise of racism. But whether racism itself is morally justified involves a critical assessment of the reasons used by A (and others) to justify the claim, including the factual reasons he may cite. The same critical methodological procedure applies here as it applies in the original debate.

Sometimes in a real life argument disagreement is not even about what may be called ‘naturalistic facts’, that is, matters pertaining to the world we agents, here and now, occupy or did occupy. (In the case just examined, for instance, whether African peoples were captured, bought and sold as slaves to fuel Western economies in the modern era is such a matter.) Sometimes, it shifts to other things, such as whether there is a God, what kind of God He is, what His will is, the relation between God and His creatures, etc. In a debate on abortion, suicide (and even euthanasia), quite often, and quite soon in the discussion, theology enters the picture which brings with it its own complexities. Since I myself am not interested in grounding morality on theology (nor do I believe it is possible to do so), I leave this possibility alone, and confine myself to disagreement of ‘naturalistic facts’.

When the ‘naturalistic facts’ involved are relatively simple, it is not difficult to show that A suffers from ‘prejudice’, if A continues to hold the original moral assessment, even though the evidence he cites, in support of it, turns out to be false and without basis. A sexist might maintain that women ought to be treated in a manner inferior to men because females have lower I.Q.s than males. It can be shown that this is incorrect. If A continues to discriminate against women unfavourably (without citing further conceivably relevant and true evidence) then he could be convicted of sexual prejudice. ‘Prejudice’ is precisely defined as ‘preconceived opinion’, ‘unjustified attitude’ — preconceived because it is not formulated in the light of correct evidence but independent of it and unjustified, because the evidence cited in support of the attitude is not well-founded.

I do not, however, wish to create the impression that moral disagreements turn round only on factual disputes, and that they are capable of being easily settled at that, although factual matters must constitute a very important element. Another very significant element determining who has the better argument is, of course, bringing to bear on the discussion the usual panoply of principles of critical and rational thinking, such as the principle of consistency, of avoiding fallacies of reasoning, etc. These are just as relevant to moral discourse as to other forms of discourse which claim to be critical.

Sub-thesis (2), reinforced by (1) gives rise to the illusion that social/moral values float in a vacuum, entirely divorced from the world and what it is like as occupied by human and other agents. Such an illusion enables philosophers to argue, for instance, that the moral norm against maiming, assault, etc. would still remain in place and occupy the central place it does in morality, should it turn out to be false, that if X (a human agent) chops off Y’s (another human agent) arm, Y feels great pain, Y will not grow another arm instantly to replace the chopped off one, and Y will not be able to carry on life as it used to be before the episode. If it turns out that we are simply mistaken about certain matters, that sharp devices could penetrate human flesh and sometimes even bones, causing injury and pain, that we, human organisms, contrary to what we have always believed, have the capacity for instant organ renewal and not merely tissue renewal, then surely, it would not be sensible to attach urgency to the moral norm against injuring, maiming others. Perhaps, instead, we might even encourage competitions to see who could chop off the most number of arms and legs within a minute, and consider it great fun to do so.

Conversely, it also encourages what I have called ‘fantastic’ social/moral theories which presuppose a world radically different from the one we occupy, thereby rendering them irrelevant as solutions to the problems which face us in the real, non fantasy world. These problems arise crucially because the world possesses certain characteristics and we, human agents, as part of that world, also possess certain features, and because of the necessity of exchange in our actions between ourselves and the world of nature. An adequate social/moral theory must, therefore, address itself to these characteristics and the character of the exchange. If it does not, whatever solution it has to offer is of no relevance or significance to our preoccupations and problems.

If no facts about the world are ever pertinent to the (critical) assessment of social/moral theories, then it is indeed possible for the individual ego to establish itself as the moral sovereign, each creating her/his moral universe (sub-thesis 3), regardless of what the world is really like. The ego and its will could then be entirely unfettered, entirely ‘free’ to choose whatever norm it pleases its fancy or whim to adopt. But if facts about the world are pertinent to the issue of norm-creation, then it cannot be up to the individual ego and its will arbitrarily to decide what ought to be done.

The will will have to take into account certain sorts of facts, to follow the requirements of the critical assessment of facts and the formal principles of rationality. If so, there cannot be as many moral universes as there are individual egos, each of them held to be as correct, valid, adequate, relevant as the other. There may be only one moral universe which it makes sense for all of us to create and to share. This moral universe, this book argues, is the one which recognises absolute or ecological scarcity, the details of which will be presented and argued for in the rest of the book.

This approach invites the following retort — those who adhere to value irrationalism will argue that it is a waste of my time to try to establish that there is ecological scarcity, for on their view, my ability to shift the position of my opponent from one of endorsement of the morality of our contemporary civilisation to one of condemnation presupposes that such a person already is predisposed favourably to an ecologically sustainable lifestyle. If such a favourable attitude did not already exist, then no amount of facts would, and could, shift his position.

However, this retort would not do, for it turns out to be a mere do...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1 A Rational Basis for a Naturalistic Ethic and Social Philosophy
• 2 The Principles of Ecology and the Laws of Thermodynamics
• 3 Ecological Scarcity
• 4 Human Agency and its External Relations
• 5 Rates of Reproduction and Consumption
• 6 Economics at Odds with Ecological Scarcity
• 7 Civilisation, its Contents and its Discontents
• 8 Work and the Two Socialisms
• 9 Redistribution, Equality as the Distributive Value
• 10 Human Capacities and Needs
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index