p.1
1
INTRODUCTION
Antonis Gardikiotis, Gerasimos Prodromitis, Stamos Papastamou
It has been six years since the last edited volume on social influence (Martin & Hewstone, 2010) appeared and we believe that the time has come for a volume that presents the latest developments in the field and, above all, will subsequently stimulate the continuation of research efforts into majority and minority influence. We believe we are at a point where research into social influence must seek new directions and perspectives so that the field that constitutes the core of social psychology may experience a renaissance.
Initially, we could make an assessment of the state of current research in the field of social influence. The number of empirical articles published over recent years, from the 1990s onwards has been decreasing and objectively interest in research into majority and minority influence is following this trend (see Prislin et al., this volume). Why is this happening? Have the theories and research context of this field lost their power and are they not used to explain the relative phenomena? Have the phenomena been explained sufficiently and is there no longer a need to deal with these phenomena? Reality, however, is stubborn and the social changes we can observe around us require more adequate interpretation on all levels of socio-psychological analysis.
One more observation, which will be useful to us in our discussion and interpretation of the current state of theoretical and empirical production in the field of social influence, is the awkward relationship between research into social influence and that of persuasion. Both these theoretical traditions, with different starting points, will lead to convergence with some benefits but also costs. The literature of persuasion, focusing on attitudes and how these have changed, offered methodological and analytical innovations but at the same time limited the theoretical range of the explanatory context which had developed in the field. Following the interpretive tools of persuasion to a great extent, the literature of influence confined itself to an intra- and inter-individual level of analysis of the phenomena thereby setting aside mainly the ideological and representational level of analysis.
p.2
Indicative of this convergence and, at the cost of the approach to influence, the majority and minority influence are now understood as different manifestations of the same process. In this way the sources of the majority or the minority are treated as stages in the degree of consensus and the different representational and socio-cognitive processes connected to each other are not taken into account. Characteristic of this is the almost unilateral designation of the majority and the minority in exclusively numerical terms.
The aim of this book is to spur and revive the discussion concerning societal meanings that determine and regulate majority and minority influence. Our hypothesis is that the reality of social groups surpasses the available research context and this context must experience a renaissance with social reality in mind, the explanation of which remains the ultimate aim of research activity for those dealing with the mechanisms and phenomena of social influence.
The book’s structure
In the following nine chapters the authors attempt, in their own way, and case by case to ‘reread’ the theoretical and research data of social influence. Taking their many years of important contribution to the location of mechanisms as their starting point, highlighting phenomena and attempting to apply their findings to the explanation of reality, they propose corrections, recommend that dichotomies and unilateral views be transcended, endeavour to synthesize and attempt to converse with aspects of real life, as theory tests its explanatory validity.
In Chapter 2, Stamos Papastamou, Antonis Gardikiotis and Gerasimos Prodromitis examine the birth and dissemination of S. Moscovici’s genetic model of influence as a case of a minority attempt at influence in the epistemological area. Following the rupture with the dominant theoretical and methodological approach up to the end of the 1960s, which treated influence phenomena in a single dimensional way through the mechanism of dependence, confining them to conformity, with the aim of achieving social control and the maintenance of the status quo, they stress the ideologically charged, consciously political nature of the epistemological proposal that highlights the ability of those who are ‘different’, the few stigmatized to change the way in which a society thinks of itself. From the analysis of the theoretical and methodological tenets of the model, it transpires that this constitutes – according to T. S. Kuhn’s criteria a change of ‘epistemological paradigm’ in the study of phenomena of influence, on a theoretical and epistemological level, given that, without any doubt, the genetic model of influence sets new questions, proposes new readings of reality, aims at new objects of study and, in the explanations it proposes, constructs new levels of analysis. On a methodological level, however, it reproduces the beaten track, unable to fully control – at least during the first years of its formation – its complex hypotheses. The later enrichment of the model with the perspective of the interactive relations between authority, minority and population, and the highlighting of the dynamics of processing the conflict, that introduces the minority presence both on a relationship and ideological level, rendered the approach in question a minority within the area of study of influence phenomena. The examination of direct and indirect influence, exercised by the genetic model over the last four decades, forms an eloquent example of the epistemological area constituting a field of exercising influence and provides useful directions for the re-examination of the terms of convergence and merging of the various approaches to influence and persuasion. The conclusion derived from this is that the dominant lines of theoretical and methodological approaches to influence constitute an algebraic sum of the failed attempts by the genetic model to exercise direct influence, and a successful indirect penetration of its principal theoretical tenets at the centre of the theoretical and research quests of the area.
p.3
In Chapter 3, William D. Crano introduces the context/comparison model (CCM) for social influence phenomena and in an analytical way presents the different processes responsible for majority and minority influence. In his efforts to explain the relative phenomena he combines different traditions of social psychology such as the classic theory of persuasion, social categorization and intergroup relations as well as social cognition. The model describes the processes leading to the influence of the majority and the minority analytically. The influence of the majority is not based on its power to control and impose alone. A first decision taken by the recipients of the majority attempt at influence is governed by the relations they have with the majority. The common classification of the recipient with the majority in a significant categorization is a necessary prerequisite, according to the model, for the recipient to proceed to the next decision which concerns the legitimization of the majority source. To what extent is it legitimate for the majority to express the specific arguments? Does it have the necessary knowledge and is it creditworthy enough? If the answers to the questions are positive, then the recipient evaluates how far the majority message is personally relevant in some way. In this context the recipient is urged to process the message in depth; if the majority’s arguments are strong, he is led to thoughts congruent with the message. Congruent thoughts are related to the recipient’s tendency to change his attitudes according to the message. On the other hand, in his explanation of minority influence, Crano proposes a leniency model, which describes the terms for successful minority influence giving priority to the ingroup nature of the minority group. Only an ingroup minority (that is, a group that is perceived to be part of a broader social group to which the individual belongs) can enjoy some tolerance and be given the possibility to express its arguments with the promise, at least, of being heard and accorded some attention by the majority. If the message of this minority does not constitute some threat for the group then the recipients evaluate it and think about it in depth. The quality of the arguments of the minority message will determine, according to the model, the fate of the attempt at persuasion. Direct public minority influence is rarely observed. What is usually perceived is an indirect influence, that is a change not in the matter directly concerning the minority’s arguments, but in matters linked and related to them. The hypotheses and the steps of CCM are analytically and clearly described and can be examined empirically.
p.4
In Chapter 4 Alain Quiamzade, Gabriel Mugny, Juan Manuel Falomir-Pichastor and Juan Antonio Pérez focus on the minority influence and attempt to merge two theories which in the bibliography up till now offer opposing interpretations of social influence phenomena, the theory of self-categorization (Turner, 1982) and the theory of dissociation (Mugny & Pérez, 1991). The first theory maintains that only ingroup minorities can lead to influence while the second proposes that outgroup minorities are those that lead to influence. The first theory proposes that the similarity with the source of the message creates the social context where influence is possible. Thus the recipients perceive the source as ‘one of them’ and accept it in order to process and think about their arguments. The second theory proposes that an ingroup minority that suggests positions opposite to those of the recipient constitutes a threat to the identity and cohesion of the group. On the other hand, precisely because the outgroup minorities do not constitute a threat to the identity and cohesion of the group, they are listened to and the recipients evaluate their arguments, ‘disconnecting’ the minority status from their message. Hence the representation of the minority for both theories is a dichotomy, it concerns either an ingroup or an outgroup. Quiamzade et al. adopt a synthetic approach which reconciles the hypotheses and projections of both theories, proposing multiple social categorizations as the process that combines many of the opposing hypotheses and tenets of the two theories. They maintain that very often the dichotomy categorization of a group into an ingroup and an outgroup (mainly for the requirements of laboratory study) does not correspond to the real social conditions where individuals are simultaneously categorized in many social groups. Thus, opposed to the dichotomy category distinction, they propose the concept of group identity in terms of a continuity where the two extremes are determined as ingroup and outgroup and in between there is a variety of identities which are more or less ingroup or outgroup, or, as they are called, hybrid minorities. In these hybrid minorities the processes of similarity and identity-threat function in combination. In fact, Quiamzade et al. propose that a new mathematical approach is required for the modelling of the relationship of the two processes other than the usual linear function which is often applied in psychological research, the sigmoid function, and which is used in neuron networks. They present a series of empirical studies where they demonstrate that outgroup hybrid minorities lead to influence when identity-threat is great, while ingroup hybrid minorities lead to more influence when the threat is minimal.
In Chapter 5, Javier Horcajo, Pablo Briñol and Richard E. Petty stress the cognitive processes involved in majority and minority influence. They define the status of a source of influence as a variable of the communication context, which interacts with a series of other variables resulting in the change in attitude of the recipients of a persuasion attempt. Examining these interactions between the status of the source (majority or minority) and of the other variables (e.g. the strength of the message’s arguments) they seek to determine when and how these attitudes change. In their analysis they make the distinction, substantial for their arguments, between primary and secondary cognition processes involved in the processes of majority and minority influence. In primary cognition emphasis is placed on the thoughts of the recipients of the influence messages concerning the objects of the discussion and the content of the messages (e.g. ‘the arguments of the source’s message are strong’). In this field the Elaboration Likelihood Model is mainly used to explain the phenomena. In secondary cognition, i.e. metacognition, emphasis is placed on the thoughts of the recipients on the ideas and thoughts they had already produced (e.g. ‘I am quite sure the arguments are strong’). Self-validation theory is introduced in this field to explain the relative phenomena. Horcajo et al. propose that the majority and minority source of a message may lead to a change in attitudes through many paths and mechanisms, mainly through interaction on the level of the cognitive processing which is dominant at that specific moment. In addition, the moment in which the information about the majority or minority status of the source is given is significant: before or after processing the influence message. When the status of the source is given before the processing of the message and the level of cognitive processing is low (the recipients of the message are not motivated to think in depth about the message) then the prestige of the source functions as a peripheral cue, with the majority in this case leading to greater change in attitudes. When the level of cognitive processing is high (i.e. the recipients of the message are motivated to a significant degree to think in depth about the message) then the prestige of the source leads to biased processing of the influence message. Whereas, when the level of processing is not confined by other variables, the prestige of the source interacts with a series of circumstantial and individual factors with both the majority and the minority being able to achieve a heightened processing of the influence message. On the other hand, when information on the status of the source is given after the processing of the influence message then thoughts are validated, when processing is high, with the majority reaching a greater degree of certainty or, when processing is low, simply functioning as a peripheral cue, with the majority again achieving a greater degree of change in attitudes through a different process this time. Overall in their chapter, Horcajo et al. analytically describe the processes of cognitive processing (primary or metacognition) which moderate or mediate majority and minority influence.
p.5
In Chapter 6, Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone examine the matter of changing attitudes and their features after majority and minority influence. They examine how far attitudes that have changed have different characteristics because they have resulted from different psychological processes. More particularly, they focus on the attitude strength formed during the majority and minority influence. Based on Moscovici’s theory of conversion, their hypothesis is that majority influence is linked to a process of comparison, and minority influence to a process of validation. When attitudes change under the pressure of the majority they must be weak, whereas when they change under the process of validation during minority influence they must be strong. If this is actually the case and minority influence leads to a more systematic processing of the message and subsequently stronger attitudes, then a feature of these attitudes must also be persistence, that is, they are not likely to change over time, whereas the opposite occurs in majority influence: attitudes that have changed will fray and be susceptible to change. The results of the research presented by the authors confirm the above hypothesis. In this research the different psychological processes related to majority and minority influence are demonstrated, so that minorities lead to a more systematic processing, which leads to an indirect attitude change (that is, to the attitudes not mentioned in the influence message); something that is not observed in the majority influence. Despite all this, when there are reasons supporting an increase in the degree of cognitive processing, as in the case of a high need for cognition, then persistence is observed in attitude change even under majority influence. The results of the experiments presented in Martin and Hewstone’s chapter concern the consequences of majority and minority influence in attitudes, simultaneously proposing a series of interesting ideas regarding how future research in this field could proceed.
p.6
In Chapter 7, Deborah F. Hellmann, Nina Dickel, Gerd Bohner and Hans-Peter Erb ascertain that Moscovici’s theory of social influence, which places the idea of conflict at the centre of the analysis, may simply constitute just one case among many others. To explain phenomena of social influence they make the distinction between matter and mind. Matter refers to the characteristics of the influence setting (e.g. the status of the source, arguments, etc.) and mind refers to how these characteristics and the reactions to them are comprehended by the recipient of the influence message. Thus, according to Hellmann et al.’s approach, to understand the significance of the minority status of the source, for example, we must examine how this interacts with the mind states of the recipient. The recipients of an influence message may not take the status of the source into account if they deem that it is not a piece of useful information for the formation of their judgement. They may of course take it into account when they need to compare their views with those of others who are ‘out there’. In addition, as opposed to Moscovici’s initial perception that minority source is perceived as something negative (people do not want to look as though they are agreeing with a minority), minority status may be treated as something positive when the individual, for example, has a need for uniqueness; that is, he desires to stress his uniqueness and that he differs from the many.
Hellmann et al. propose a general and overall evaluation of social influence claiming that the distinctions between cues and arguments, or between informational and normative influence, or between conformity and conversion may simple constitute different information, which the individual uses according to a series of factors. Such factors may be the perceived association of every piece of information or the desire and ability of individuals to invest in cognitive efforts in order to process this specific information or even the motives of a given moment.
In Chapter 8, Fabrizio Butera, Jean-Pierre Vernet and Jorge Vala deal with the phenomenon of cryptomnesia, according to which people accept and support some social values while at the same time forgetting the minority social groups which fought for the establishment of these values in society. In this way, the minority groups that worked and fought for these values continue to be on the receiving end of negative evaluation by society and the successful conclusion of their fight is neither acknowledged nor credited to them. The process of cryptomnesia is included in tactics implemented by a majority as resistance to minority influence. Similar tactics are those like the justification of the system (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), where minorities accept their inferior position in the hierarchy of society as legitimated, or the psychologization (Papastamou, 1986) which attempts to connect the position of the minority with some psychological characteristic of theirs so as to reduce the power of their influence. The cryptomnesia phenomenon has been explain...