The Social Psychology of Gullibility

Conspiracy Theories, Fake News and Irrational Beliefs

Joseph P Forgas, Roy Baumeister, Joseph P Forgas, Roy Baumeister

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9780429515620
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Gullibility, whether we like it or not, is a fundamental characteristic of human beings. In The Social Psychology of Gullibility, Forgas and Baumeister explore what we know about the causes, functions, and consequences of gullibility, and the social psychological processes that promote or inhibit it.

With contributions from leading international researchers, the book reveals what social and cognitive psychology contribute to our understanding of how human judgments and decisions can be distorted and undermined. The chapters discuss the nature and functions of gullibility, the role of cognitive processes in gullibility, the influence of emotion and motivation on gullibility, and social and cultural aspects of gullibility. Underpinned by a wealth of empirical research, contributors explore captivating issues such as the psychology of conspiracy theories, the role of political gullibility, gullibility in science, the role of the internet in fostering gullibility, and the failures of reasoning that contribute to human credulity.

Gullibility has become a dominant topic of interest in public discourse. The Social Psychology of Gullibility is essential reading for researchers, social science students, professionals and practitioners and all those interested in understanding human credulity and the role of gullibility in contemporary public affairs.

1 Homo credulus

On the Social Psychology of Gullibility

Joseph P. Forgas

UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Roy F. Baumeister

UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND

Introduction

Gullibility as a scientific concept does not currently feature prominently in social psychology research, and one would search in vain the subject indexes of many social psychology textbooks for entries under “gullibility.” So why devote an entire book to this topic, and why do it now? The answer is twofold. First, in the past few years, and especially since Brexit, the election of Trump, and the emergence of crypto-fascist dictators in a number of countries including some inside the European Union such as Hungary (Albright, 2018), the question of human gullibility has become one of the dominant topics of interest in public discourse (see also Cooper & Avery, Chapter 16 this volume; Myers, Chapter 5 this volume). People opposed to these developments often suspect that those who voted for them must be gullible.

Second, even though gullibility is rarely studied directly in social and cognitive psychology, these disciplines do have a great deal to contribute to our understanding of how human judgments and decisions can be distorted and undermined. In consequence, a book dealing with the social psychology of gullibility is highly topical, and as this volume demonstrates, there is a wealth of directly relevant empirical research we can draw upon to understand this phenomenon (Gilbert, 1991; Gilovich, 1991). The objective of this volume is thus to provide an integrative survey of the current state of social psychological research on human gullibility, and so offer an informative contribution towards understanding the role of gullibility in contemporary public affairs.

What Is Gullibility?

Gullible as a term was first recorded in 1793, derived from the earlier word “cullibility” (1728), and possibly connected to “gull,” a cant term for “dupe, sucker,” which in turn is of uncertain origin. Its etymological roots can be traced perhaps from the bird (sea gull), or to the verb “gull” (to swallow). Some of the synonyms of gullibility, such as credulity, artlessness, ignorance, inexperience, simplicity, also confirm the pejorative character of gullibility. So consensually negative social evaluation, as we shall see later, is an essential component of gullibility.

The standard definition of gullibility, as a failure of social intelligence in which a person is easily tricked or manipulated into an ill-advised course of action, confirms this view. Gullibility is closely related to credulity, which is the “tendency to believe unlikely propositions that are unsupported by evidence” (Wikipedia). Gullibility is thus a factor in social influence processes, as a person’s willingness to believe false or misleading information facilitates the influence.

The Criteria for Gullibility

Is there some accepted standard of truth or reality relative to which a person can be judged as gullible? Conceptually, gullibility can be inferred in one of two situations. Either an individual’s beliefs are manifestly inconsistent with facts and reality, or an individual’s beliefs are at variance with consensual social norms about reality. A believer in a flat earth can now be labeled as gullible, since there is ample empirical evidence confirming the true state of affairs. However, the question of criteria for gullibility is far more complex. We often use the term gullible to describe persons whose beliefs violate some consensual rather than scientific standard of how reality should be viewed. Serious and largely unresolved philosophical issues about the nature of knowledge within the domains of ontology (the philosophical study of what is, the nature of reality), and epistemology (the philosophical study of how do we know) also make the unambiguous definition of knowledge, and by implication, gullibility, problematic (see Krueger, Vogrincic-Haselbacher, & Evans, Chapter 6 this volume).

Adopting a Popperian epistemological view, and accepting that all knowledge is imperfect and temporary, offers little help towards defining gullibility. Even on matters amenable to scientific research and potential falsification, such as the iatrogenic climate change theory, there remains ample scope for agnosticism and disagreement (Lewandowsky, Oreskes, Risbey, Newell, & Smithson, 2015). Our knowledge about the world is imperfect, and the more complex the question we address, the more likely that unequivocal answers are difficult to find. We can label those who question the truth of the climate change hypothesis as “gullible,” or with a rhetorical flourish, as “deniers,” as if there was an absolute and incontrovertible truth here to be denied (see also Jussim, Stevens, Honeycutt, Anglin, & Fox, Chapter 15 this volume). Yet those who remain skeptical or agnostic on this issue can reciprocally label absolute believers in the climate change hypothesis as gullible. Believers in conspiracy theories also often see themselves as careful, motivated skeptics who are motivated by a quest to avoid gullibility, while those who doubt their beliefs are the gullible ones (see Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, Chapter 4 this volume; Unkelbach & Koch, Chapter 3 this volume; van Prooijen, Chapter 17 this volume). As long as knowledge is incomplete and subject to future falsification, identifying gullibility is more a matter of consensual value judgment rather than a statement of incontrovertible fact. Gullibility may thus often be a matter of perspective, residing in the eye of the beholder. It is no wonder, then, that gullibility has been historically an endemic feature of all human societies, as the next section will suggest.

The Social History of Gullibility

Human cultural history is replete with striking examples of human gullibility (Greenspan, 2009; Koestler, 1967; Rath-Vegh, 1963). In an attempt to understand, predict and control the social and physical world, humans have created an amazing range of absurd and often vicious and violent gullible beliefs (Koestler, 1967). Ancient meso-American cultures believed that cutting out the beating hearts of thousands of their captives was essential to preserve the goodwill of their gods and to ensure a good harvest (Koestler, 1967, 1978). Throughout the Middle Ages, witches were tortured and burned to death for allegedly harming others (Pinker, 2012). As recently as at the beginning of the eighteenth century, even a well-educated person might still firmly believe in witches, werewolves, magic cures and magic potions, alchemy, and of course, a flat earth (Wooton, in Pinker, 2018).

Contemporary religious beliefs about virgin birth, walking on water, resurrection, or transubstantiation continue to persist yet they contradict everything we know about the world. Folk tales and literature abound with demonstrations of the pitfalls of gullibility. In the Bible, the serpent’s deception, and Adam and Eve’s gullibility are the primal source of humanity’s eternal fall from grace. Homer’s Trojan Horse is a classic tale of deception and gullibility, and Shakespeare’s Othello is a tragedy brought about by credulity. In tales such as the “Emperor’s New Clothes” we learn that the veil of consensual gullibility can sometimes be torn apart by a single voice that reveals the truth. In “Little Red Riding Hood,” the heroine is first deceived, but then she learns the art of deception herself to deceive a second wolf. Even more instructive is the character of Pinocchio who had to learn to avoid being duped by others in order to become a full human being (!).

Examples of striking gullibility, self-deception, hubris, and wishful thinking continue to characterize human affairs to this day (Greenspan, 2009), including where one would least expect it, in the halls of academia (Jussim et al., Chapter 15 this volume). Sokal’s famous hoax in submitting a text intentionally full of nonsense to a “reputable” post-modernist journal where it was duly accepted is a well-documented recent example of academic gullibility in the humanities. More recently, Pluckrose, Lindsay and Boghossian (2018) perpetuated an even more impressive hoax, successfully publishing seven (!) explicitly nonsensical “academic” papers, including one using text from Hitler’ Mein Kampf in highly reputable feminist and “grievance studies” journals. In the economic sphere, irrational gullibility produces recurring investment “bubbles” at least since the famous “tulip bulb” craze in the eighteenth century. Our social rituals associated with April Fool’s Day gain their popularity by allowing us to mislead others without adverse consequences, and so practice our skills of deception (Forgas, 2017). These examples, and countless others, suggest that far from being an aberration, gullibility seems a pervasive feature of the human condition. This pattern continues today, with sometimes alarming consequences, an issue we will turn to next.

Truth and Gullibility in Contemporary Public Life

Concern with gullibility in public life has become highly topical in recent years. Gullibility may have played some role in the election of leaders like Trump. His detractors regard his supporters as gullible for supporting a novice politician who claims to be a world expert on almost everything and has a narcissistic view of his own abilities (see also Myers, Chapter 5 this volume). Meanwhile, his supporters view his detractors as gullible for embracing the “politically correct” views and practices and relish Trump’s overt, mocking rejection of what they regard as elite hypocrisy. Another recent surprise election outcome was Great Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, marked by excesses of credulity on both sides. Voters willingly believed contradictory forecasts of either a smooth exit or impending economic catastrophe. Elsewhere, voters seem blithely willing to elect and re-elect quasi-fascist nationalist leaders who are destroying their hard-won democratic systems (Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Russia, Phillipines, Venezuela), or succumb to misleading messages laced by archaic nationalism and populism (Catalonia, Scotland, etc.).

Gullibility is found across the political spectrum. Fascist leasers from Mussolini and Hitler to Erdogan, Putin, and Orban have exploited voters’ gullibility with disastrous consequences. Arguably, the fascism of Mussolini and Hitler was closely linked to the political left. The Nazi party was the “National Socialist German Workers’ Party” that admired and copied America’s New Deal, while Mussolini was lionized in US progressive circles (Goldberg, 2008). It is especially puzzling how a closed and quasi-religious system of thought such as Marxism could remain the dominant philosophical perspective of many left-leaning Western intellectuals for over a hundred years. This occurred, despite the fact that Marxism’s economic predictions have been consistently wrong, its view of history as class struggle has been misconceived, and the social systems it produced turned out to be perhaps the most horrific and genocidal in human history. Part of the answer is that as Karl Popper (1947) showed, totalitarian systems of thought like Marxism are constructed to be unfalsifiable, and so their lack of predictive power can always be explained away by “true believers” (Koestler, 1967). Most religions have the very same immunity to disproof.

Over the past few decades, Marxism and Marxist intellectuals have promoted a range of social theories and movements to gullible followers ostensibly to increase social justice and equality, but in reality, relying on the collectivist rhetoric of group rights, identity politics, and collective social class struggle as the sole method of social progress. These quasi-Marxist collectivist movements, like radical feminism and multi-culturalism, are fundamentally incompatible with the Enlightenment emphasis on the rights of the individual (Pinker, 2018). Arguably, some versions of radical feminism even display elements of classical conspiracy theories, suggesting the existence of an entirely fictitious gender-based conspiracy against women. True believers in such ideologies are no less gullible than earlier believers in similarly closed systems of thought.

One important recent influence promoting gullibility is the advent of Internet-based communication. Until recently, it was the privileged class of experts, truth-seekers, and truth-tellers who following the Enlightenment were institutionally established in our social systems and whose job it was to discover and communicate truth. They have now lost their privileged position and information monopoly, and it seems truth in public life is now also at risk. It would indeed be an ironic and paradoxical effect if the immense success of our “scientic age” would be undermined by the very scientific progress and information technology it helped to create. Given the damage that populism, demagoguery, “fake news,” and the rising tide of identity politics and nationalism have produced in our public life, a better understanding of the social psychology of gullibility is now recognized as of considerable importance (Albright, 2018; Pinker, 2018; see also Cooper & Avery, Chapter 16 this volume; Mye...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• 1 Homo Credulus : On the Social Psychology of Gullibility
• Part I The Nature and Functions of Credulity
• Part II Cognitive Processes and Gullibility
• Part III Affective and Motivational Processes and Gullibility
• Part IV Social and Cultural Aspects of Gullibility
• Index