Mind, Culture, and Global Unrest

Psychoanalytic Reflections

Salman Akhtar

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9780429883200
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Histoire et théorie en psychologie

In this compact and pithy book, the distinguished and prolific psychoanalyst Salman Akhtar steps out of his consulting room to address certain matters of urgent global concern. These include migration across national borders, the current refugee crisis, ethno-racial prejudice, subjective distress of minorities, and, above all, the forever-present ominous shadow of terrorism. Akhtar evolves and advocates a uniquely 'anthropological psychoanalysis' which is a blend of depth psychology and humanities, including sociology, economics, political science, history, and, of course, anthropology. He deconstructs what seems self-evident and confronts his readers with some socio-politically unpleasant realities, both within psychoanalysis and in the prevalent perspectives on the on-going turmoil and bloodshed in today's world. His book is not all doom and gloom, however. It also delineates ameliorative strategies for dealing with the pain of the disenfranchised and the misguided violence of the radicalized. This is applied psychoanalysis at its best.

CURRENT GLOBAL UNREST

CHAPTER TWO

Religion, politics, and migration across national borders

In the focus upon economic and emotional aspects of immigration (Akhtar, 1999a; Grinberg & Grinberg, 1989), the role of religion and politics in the causes and consequences of people moving across national borders often gets overlooked. The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap. The ensuing discourse will be divided into sections dealing with: (i) the intricate relationship between religion and immigration, including reactive changes in the intensity of religious commitment, (ii) the politics of immigration, including the impact of immigration upon national economy, social fabric, and family values, (iii) the tension between the “new” immigrants and African Americans, (iv) the immigrants’ politics, including the post-migration hypernationalism and immigrant-generated secession movements, (v) the societal debate over the status of illegal aliens as well as the marginalization and suffering of individuals in this group, (vi) the troubling state of refugees and asylum seekers across the globe, and (vii) some concluding remarks that will bring the foregoing material together and underscore the inoptimally addressed matters in this realm. Separated for the purpose of didactic ease, these sections will inevitably have some overlap, especially while tackling the thorny issue of multiculturalism and its implicit “challenges to American national identity” (Huntington, 1996).

Religion and immigration

Although inoptimally noted in the psychological and psychoanalytic literature on immigration (e.g., Akhtar, 1999a, 1999b; Elovitz & Kahn, 1997; Grinberg & Grinberg, 1989), the relationship between religion and immigration is multifaceted and capable of having a significant impact on the psychosocial lives of immigrants (Cadge & Ecklund, 2007). The intersection between religion and immigration is especially noticeable around the religion-based motives for migration, religion’s role in postimmigration identity change, and the multiple functions of religious organizations founded by immigrants.

The place of religion among the motives for leaving one’s country

Faced with prejudice, hostility, and violence directed at them for no other reason than their belonging to a particular religion, its members might decide to emigrate. The scale of this might range from the unnoticed exit of a small group to a monumental exodus of masses. Human history is replete with examples of such persecution-based immigrations. The twelfth century BC exodus of the Jews from Egypt, the flight of Mohammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, and the eastward relocation of the Zoroastrians during the mid-seventh century are some of the well-known early illustrations. Closer to home, restrictions on religious practice also played a part in the earliest Anglo-Saxon arrivals in North America from England and Scotland. The bloody Hindu-Muslim “population exchange” during the tragic partition of India in 1947 was similarly triggered by real and imagined threats of religious persecution. Better known to the Western world is the post-Holocaust Diaspora which sent European Jews scurrying for safety and cover in nations as far apart and diverse as England, United States, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain, and Australia; the same mass immigration resulted in the creation of the state of Israel. More recently, a working paper released during Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Cyprus notes that many Catholics have fled the Middle Eastern countries from Iran to Egypt fearing discrimination by Muslims and many Catholics have arrived in the same countries from the Philippines, India, and Pakistan, fearing discrimination by Hindus (Simpson & Hadjicostis, 2010). To be sure, even more examples of the sort given above can be added but the point is made: Religious persecution can lead to mass immigration.

That said, it should be added that immigration can also be a result of human religious striving and search for meaningful experiences in the realm of spirituality. Some devout American Jews move to Israel for this reason and many individuals from the Western countries find themselves living in ashrams across India, Nepal, Tibet, and Japan in their search for an encounter with the Divine.

Religion’s role in post-immigration identity change

Becoming unmoored from familiar cultural anchors and encountering unfamiliar social customs and values leads to a slow and painful identity transformation among immigrants (Akhtar, 1995, 1999b). Issues of temporal continuity, optimal distance, language, food, music, history, political memory, and nostalgia play an important role in the psychic reconfiguration of the self after immigration. Religion can also matter in this regard. Choi-Kain (2009), for instance, notes the role of Protestant Christianity in both the migration and subsequent assimilation of Koreans in the United States:

The strong ties between Koreans in America and Protestantism may be the single greatest factor for Koreans assimilating in mainstream culture since Korean values founded in Protestant beliefs neatly converge with the religious basis of American culture and economy. First generation Koreans who came to this country for opportunity became well-known for their work ethic and business success. Because of their Protestant roots, Koreans in America not only worked hard to earn money, they eschewed spending such money on luxurious items or status symbols, but rather invested that money primarily into the education of their children. (p. 222)

The religious aspect of identity can become more salient for the immigrant in his new country than in his country of origin because of religion’s frequent contribution to ethnic identity. For instance, in a study of two Hindu subpopulations in the United States, Kurien (1998) has demonstrated that Hinduism helps a group of Indian immigrants ease the transition between being Indian and being American. By asserting pride in their Hindu heritage, they can claim a position for themselves at the American multicultural table. A similar observation has been made by Mohammad-Arif (2002) regarding South Asian Muslims living in New York City.

Such adaptive outcomes, however, do not exhaust the strands of interface between religion and immigration. Many other pathways exist. Some immigrants, for instance, become less devout and somewhat lax in their religious practices after immigration. Muslims who hid their transgression of the Islamic prohibition of drinking while living in their country of origin often become more “relaxed” (or “brazen,” depending upon the values of the observer) in this regard. Likewise, some Hindus break the taboo against eating beef once they arrive in the West. More often, though, one sees an intensification of religiosity as Third World immigrants encounter the more liberal social customs of the West. Many Muslims feel threatened by the pervasive presence of alcohol and by the sexual liberation of women. Many Indian Hindus feel narcissistically injured by their “demotion” to a minority status and by discovering that Muslims (who were a minority back home in India), with their multiple nationalities, outnumber them in the United States. The less educated among such Muslims and Hindus are especially illequipped for the rigors of acculturation. Separated from their native cultures and unable to internalize Western ways, they feel a void within and often resort to hyper-religiosity to fill this gap. Their emotional life becomes focused upon the scriptures and practices of their respective religions.

An opposite outcome is also seen sometimes. This involves the immigrant’s converting to the preponderant religion of the country of adoption in order to consolidate his new identity. Paradoxically, this can make it easier for him to express his ethnic characteristics. Ng (2002), for instance, argues that converting to the mainstream Christian religion in the United States often helps Chinese immigrants developing their own appropriations of cultural icons and rituals.

Immigrant religious organizations

The religious organizations founded and/or attended by immigrants often play an important role in determining whether, how, and to what extent would an immigrant participate in the civic matters of his adopted land. Immigrant churches, temples, and mosques constitute the psychosocial hub of immigrant activities (see also Chapter Four for homoethnic enclaves). These religious centers at times help their congregants navigate the process of becoming a citizen by offering help with learning the English language and/or with studying for the US citizenship test (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000). They also provide the members with a moral narrative and enhance their desire for community service. In this way immigrant religious organizations influence the development of a civic identity. Such positive contributions are, at times, eclipsed by problematic scenarios. When dealing with a religion that is too closely tied to the national identity of the country of origin, these organizations risk creating the civic identity as an “Other” in the mainstream culture (Rajagopal, 2000). Worse, the organization may turn into a cover for ethnocentric paranoia and even terrorist activities. Fortunately this happens on an infrequent basis. More often, the immigrant religious organizations make positive contributions though the forms these take can, at times, vary. One determining factor here is whether a particular religious group held a majority or minority status in the home country and whether this status is altered in the host country. The differing sociopolitical strategies of the Hindu and Muslim immigrant groups from India in the United States is a case in point (Kurien, 2001). Yang and Ebaugh’s (2001) comparison of a Chinese Buddhist temple and a Chinese Christian church in Houston, Texas, sheds even sharper light on this matter:

Chinese Buddhist immigrants commonly retain a secure Chinese identity because Buddhism has deep roots in Chinese tradition. However, Buddhism is a minority religion in the United States. Therefore, the Hsi Nan Temple strives hard to achieve an American identity, and one way of doing that is to recruit non-Chinese Americans. Meanwhile, the “authentic otherness” of Buddhism is an attraction to some Americans who seek an alternative to dominant, majority religions. Consequently, the Hsi Nan Temple is slowly but successfully gaining non-Chinese members. In contrast, Christianity is a minority religion in Chinese society, and Chinese converts to Christianity are sometimes chastised for becoming non-Chinese. Thus, the Chinese Gospel Church faces the task of asserting a Chinese identity for Christians in its efforts to convert fellow Chinese. However, the emphasis on Chinese culture sabotages the church’s attempts to go beyond ethnic boundaries. Christianity is a majority religion in the United States and many evangelical churches exist in the community to serve Americans. Consequently, in the course of Sinicizing the church, the Chinese church has a more difficult time attracting non-Chinese Americans. (p. 376)

Regardless of such nuances, the fact remains that the positive contributions of religious organizations are considerable and range from giving help in identity consolidation, assuring continuity with ancestral conditions, and encouraging community service. To top it all, there is evidence (Lien, 2004) that immigrants who are involved with their respective religious organizations are more likely to vote in elections. Moreover, since religious identity sometimes overlaps with racial and ethnic identity, these religious centers have the potential for forging and sustaining new types of political coalitions. The fact that they are able to accomplish all this is in no small measure due to their colorful celebration of traditional festivals, offer of ethnic food, and sponsorship of visiting dignitaries from “back home.”

The mention of such overlap between immigration, religion, and politics brings up the tension that has arisen vis-à-vis the large Muslim migrations (from North Africa, Bosnia, Turkey, and Iraq) to the West. While Sweden and France have the largest immigrant populations from Muslim countries, the “problem” also affects the UK, Germany, Holland, and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Needless to add that both parties—the immigrant Muslims and the native hosts—contribute to this tension. The former often find the magnitude of difference between their native cultures and those of the Western countries too much to bridge; they chafe at the West’s ignorance of their culture and insensitivity towards their religion (e.g., the publishing of cartoons involving Mohammad by Denmark’s newspaper, Jyllands-Posten). The latter deride the homophobia, marital rape, veiling of women, and polygamy they consider rampant among Muslim immigrants. The specific assertions of these opposing factions might be debatable (Bawer, 2007; Huntington, 1996; Said & Jensen, 2006) but far more important are the challenges this tension poses to the fundamental notions of free expression and, ultimately, to the institution of democracy itself. In Romano’s (2006) words:

To whom does any country’s physical territory belong? Those who have been there longest? A simple majority? The best educated? Must the cultural rules of longtime societies last forever? Or might it make perfect democratic sense for officially secular France to change should its Muslim population reach 50 percent, just as the English-speaking United States might need to accept Spanish as an equal language if Spanish speakers reach that mark? (p. H-12)

The jury is still out on this matter but the clock is certainly ticking.

The politics of immigration

To say that the issue of immigration is replete with political implications is a gross understatement. The fact is that laws and social policies regarding immigration feature prominently in political debates all over the industrialized and “developed” nations of the West. European countries (e.g., the UK, France, Holland, Portugal) that colonized parts of Africa and Southeast Asia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries now face the influx of “natives” of those regions. Germany, which did not have many colonies, receives immigrants (mainly from Turkey, but also from the former Yugoslavia and Italy) for filling the labor force, especially at the lower rungs of the monetary ladder. And, the United States—the golden land of promise—draws not only the ambitious and industrious fortune-seekers from all over the world but also its neo-colonial subjects (e.g., from the Philippines, Puerto Rico) and refugees from nations where it has militarily intervened.

The traffic across national boundaries of the West is thus heavy.¹ More heavy are the sociopolitical concerns of such influx and the group emotions that are associated with it. To be sure, the impact of immigration and the host population’s response to it varies from era to era and from region to region. Also important as determining variables are the magnitude of the new population being added to a country and the skill level (i.e., highly educated professionals versus menial labor) of the new entrants. Taking all this into account, the following discussion is mostly focused upon the situation in the United States, though occasionally referring to other nations as well. The proposal here is that the “politics of immigration” mostly revolves around four variables: (i) old versus new immigration, (ii) the impact of immigrants upon the national economy, (iii) the impact of immigrants upon the social fabric, especially North American family values, and (iv) the movement from the “melting pot” dream to the ideology of multiculturalism. A brief elucidation of each of these realms follows.

Old versus new immigration

Putting aside the “pre-historic” fact that some 32,000 years ago, wandering tribes from Mongolia and neighboring Himalayan regions walked across the Bering Strait into what is now Alaska and then southwards into the current United States and were later called “American Indians,” the history of immigration to this country can be divided into three phases: (i) first immigration (1619–1803 AD) which brought white, mainly English-speaking Protestant individuals from Western Europe; (ii) second immigration (1820–1924) which brought “darker” Europeans, such as Italians, Greeks, and Russians, more non-English speaking people, and those belonging to Catholic and Jewish faiths, and (iii) third immigration (1965-present) which brought people from the Third World, that is, poor countries of Latin America and Asia, predominantly non-English speaking, and of quite diverse religions (e.g., Catholics, Hindus, Muslims).² Each of these waves was mobilized by “push” (from the countries of origin) and “pull” (from the United States) factors of their own kind. The first wave of immigration was largely the result of a search for religious freedom—away from being forced to comply with uncompromising tenets of the Anglican Church by a succession of English queens and kings. Elizabeth I (1558–1603), James I (1603–1625), and Charles I (1625–1649) would not allow members of other religious groups to worship God in the ways they believed to be correct. Even if the groups fled to other European countries where their religious faith was tolerated, they could not flourish economically. Thus, the rush towards America was initiated. The second wave was caused by the breakdown of the traditional agricultural system in Europe and facilitated by a transportation revolution that made America more accessible. An additional “pull” factor, that especially involved immigrants from the Philippines, China, and Mexico, was constituted by need for labor in the United States. The promise of higher wages was alluring but not sufficient; deliberate recruitment seemed necessary. Between 1902 and 1905, nearly 7,000 Koreans were brought as plantation laborers to Hawaii, 1,000 of whom subsequently moved to the mainland (Houchins & Houchins, 1974). Mexican immigration too was initiated by large fa...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• INTRODUCTION
• PROLOGUE
• CURRENT GLOBAL UNREST
• EPILOGUE
• REFERENCES
• INDEX