Values in Higher Education Teaching

Tony Harland, Neil Pickering

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2010
• ISBN:
  9781136902680
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Values in Higher Education Teaching explores the way in which teaching, research, learning and higher education are a values enterprise and that an exploration of values is necessary to work out the full purposes of a higher education to guide practices and help academics understand academic work. Values inform thinking and actions and although this is well recognized, values are seldom brought to the forefront of inquiries as practices in higher education are developed. This book argues that by putting values firmly on the agenda of those who teach, work and learn in higher education the academic profession can open up new spaces for value conversations and potentially transform the way in which they practice.

Values in Higher Education Teaching is key reading for university lecturers, those with responsibility for leadership and management of higher education and postgraduates studying for higher degrees in higher education.

There are few books that directly address the broad and complex question of values in teaching in higher education yet at the same time values are widely recognised as permeating all our practices. In this sense an accepted part of academic life remains in the realm of 'taken for granted' rather than being consciously and explicitly explored and practiced. The book deals with the idea of values in both a philosophical and practical manner. It is based on original research and uses both empirical data and theory to address teaching values in higher education and the current values of the higher education system. It explores what academics have valued historically in teaching and also addresses the major reforms of the last 20 years. Reforms have essentially changed the nature of western higher education but have made little real difference to the outcomes for student learning and society whereas teaching with values in all subjects has the potential to radically alter student experiences.

Chapter 1
Values

Working towards a clear understanding of values and valuing is a complicated business. The difficulty seems to be most acute when we think of all our thoughts and actions being imbued with values, and that even to believe in such a position is itself a value decision. Then, because we know that values can change and be learned, the teacher who explicitly includes values in their practice has to resolve the problem of the values they want for themselves and their students (and of course this is also a value decision). To do this the teacher needs to go beyond thinking of values as an expression of personal beliefs and begin to think of valuing as a practical and systematic activity. Values with all their theoretical and practical complexity then become an essential dimension of academic work that a teacher can strive to gain more insight into. In this chapter we will argue that the process of thinking about values and what it means to be a values-teacher will lead to a more reflexive practice that can provide a critical perspective to inform personal theories of higher education, research, teaching and academic life.

What are values?

To put it simply, valuing is about choices. We evaluate as we make decisions about what we do and how we live, and under normal circumstances our thinking and actions express or reflect our values. In turn, our thinking creates the values of the world and, with respect to the focus of this book, the values of teaching and higher education.

There has been considerable argument as to whether the construction of the world reflects only the values humans put out there, or whether anything out there has a value independently of how we decide to value it. But whichever approach we take to this broad question, it is reasonable to think of higher education as a values-enterprise with everything we do, as teachers and learners, being value-driven. This includes the choices we make in what we teach, how we teach, what we select for our research, how we conduct ourselves and how we organize our activities.

We would extend that claim even to the concepts that might normally be thought of or agreed to be ‘value-free’ (such as theories, evidence and so forth) as these are chosen and used by individuals. Objects and ideas may be recognized as being of ‘high quality’ or be seen as ‘worthwhile’ or ‘desirable’. As such they provide motives for action. Values therefore become the underlying rationale for the driving force of individuals. If valuing is characteristic of what it means to be human then our values define us in some way and teaching them requires an understanding of their nature and also some effort to keep values at the forefront of our thinking.

However, constantly reflecting on values could be quite disabling and most values become less prominent in our thinking as time passes. Yet when reminded or asked or challenged, we can say that certain objects, thoughts and actions have more value than others. We can describe the values in the different properties of these objects and actions (honest, intelligent, elegant, caring and so on) and as such can recognize a good essay or a remarkable lecture. Yet our judgements about values and their properties will not necessarily be stable and may change over time. Somehow we integrate changing values in our everyday living without needing to have these explicit or well theorized. Elbaz (1992) has suggested that values in general are typically not open to immediate conscious inspection. We generally just ‘know’ and leave ourselves free for thinking about ‘other’ more pressing decisions (which, in our argument, is still value-based).

Although all valuing (or value decision making) has validity for the individual, we don’t wish to suggest a position where ‘anything goes’ or that one person’s valuing is as good as another’s. Some value decisions are simply better and within our communities and social groups we all know this intuitively, and there can be much agreement. For example, although it may be difficult to choose between, say, happiness and rationality, it would be easier to make a choice between slavery and freedom or truth and deceit. When we argue that a value should be more widely held this may give the impression that individual preferences or diversity among individuals are not respected. However, although valuing will be relative to the individual this is always mediated by interpersonal experiences in the social world, for example, through debate. Furthermore, ‘respecting diversity’ is a value that should also be open to challenge. It could be argued, for example, that if diversity promotes division among people, rather than harmony, it might not be a good value position to hold.

What values are shared and by whom will reflect people’s experiences. Many of those who have had the privilege of a higher education will no doubt have many values in common and it is likely that most university lecturers would, for example, agree that critical thinking is a shared value of university life and of teaching and learning. If this idea of commonly held values has validity, then the implication is that not all valuing can be reduced to individual preferences.

So if we believe that some values are better than others and that somehow values can be shared, then the temptation is to look for a foundation for this idea. Such an argument might be termed ‘foundationalist’ and it counters the ‘relativist’ stance that all values are relative and depend on who you are. In contrast, the foundationalist idea depends on a ‘real-world’ view – a view that the source of the value is outside humans and is discoverable. Yet neither the foundationalist nor relativist positions seem to adequately describe either the way in which values appear to work or the complex situations of academic life. This point is well illustrated in all the stories about teaching in this book.

Although we feel the need to reject a dualistic position of foundationalism versus relativism, or a factual world in opposition to a values world, we recognize that we do not have access to an adequate theory that sits outside of these concepts or embraces them both. People are tempted to work within a rigid division between ‘objective’ ideas or foundational beliefs on the one hand, and ‘subjective’ or relativistic on the other. But both may direct our responses in different circumstances, and as we negotiate our lives and practices within our communities and society, there will inevitably be times when we call upon either (or both) objective facts and subjective feelings, even as we reject such a false separation. However, the choices that are made may need to be justified and from time to time we will have to try and articulate or negotiate a value position. Because of this, we require an awareness of our values and such an idea sits quite happily as part of the critical traditions of higher education.

An example of practice that seems to transcend a dualistic theory of values comes from the educator, Jean McNiff. She would clearly like a more caring and rational society and in this context she talks about her own values in teaching:

My values are always those of the other’s best interest, where I am concerned to develop the latent potential in each and every one of my clients. We live in a pluralistic society, and I must ensure that each person maintains her integrity to develop according to her own individual potential – always with the provision that she will act in the other’s best interest.

(McNiff, 1996, p. 106)

McNiff appeals to both a values pluralism, which doesn’t seek to define individual potential but rather facilitate it, and to a shared and limiting value in the pursuit of personal potential. Both modes of thought co-exist and it shows the interdependence of the two seemingly opposing philosophies. It would probably make no sense for McNiff to frame her ideas as foundationalist without relativism. Her logic is embedded and integrated in her view of the world and it is interesting that she chose ‘acting in the other’s best interest’ as a foundation that also serves to get round possible objections to the relativistic ideas in the first part of her statement. Collier (1993) also supports the idea that values are dispositions towards an activity that need an obligation dimension.

In contrast to McNiff, we met academics in our preliminary inquiries who believed that values teaching was not their business or that we should not be influencing student’s values. A typical response was that it is not values but disciplinary knowledge that needs to be taught in higher education. Such a view may stem from the difficulties the teacher faces when they try to come to terms with the value concept. It is so much safer to stick with various forms of subject knowledge even though the values of the discipline have shaped this. Academics may have already been convinced that what is most important in their work is their subject and many seem to spend much of their time ensuring the next generation understands this.

A major problem with teaching values is that we often only become aware of them when they are not shared or they are denied us, and because we are constantly reminded of this experience it adds a negative dimension that feeds into our disposition towards values. How we think about values teaching will be affected by how we understand the concept of values and these views will be influenced by our experiences of their use and misuse in human discourse and personal interactions.

Values often arise in practice, such as the practice of a discipline. The values and valuing of a discipline or other social subgroup can be seen as based in that discipline and can be challenged on this ground. Challenge is necessary and can be positive, but we also experience this in a negative way. This feeling may arise when values are criticized or dismissed as ‘subjective opinion’ and we cannot always defend ourselves on the basis of rational thought and argument. Someone’s values can even be acknowledged and dismissed at the same time because value judgements may be seen as either an inferior way of thinking or as something private to the individual; ‘you are entitled to your view’ followed by the dismissive comment ‘but it’s just a value judgement’ (or something similar). Such arguments can easily close down discussion and are a commonly used tool for both the subordination of ideas and the control of people. Ideas can be more easily rejected if they are constructed as based on a value judgement rather than ‘the facts’ or a numerical justification. In these situations values may be denigrated because facts can be more precisely rendered and their source more easily traced, while values may be less choate and less specifiable. We are taught to use facts first and in a modern Western society there is high value placed on objective evidence-based knowledge. Yet when others dismiss our values they are trying to replace them with their own and they may be either unaware of this or convinced that theirs are better, perhaps more rationale, and also immune from counter-challenge.

Some values can also be seen as ideological, particularly if they are of a political or religious nature. An ideology is a collective and comprehensive set of ideas and beliefs that are adopted by individuals or communities, and higher education has its own ideologies. Often the assumptions underpinning ideologies go unchallenged but when an individual’s personal philosophy does not sit well within an ideological position, they may be motivated to critique and challenge the dominant view. Ideology often has a negative connotation of bias or being untrue, yet bias is inevitable as people act on deep-seated beliefs and assumptions about how the world really is. These ideologies are part of each of us and in academia we teach our values and, in this ideological sense, indoctrinate our students, whether or not we are conscious of doing so. We agree, however, with Barnett (1990) that although ideology is endemic to much of our thinking it is not necessarily an inversion of truth:

Ideology does not therefore imply falsity; but it does imply partiality, reflecting social interest. From the judgement that all thought is potentially ideological, we should not immediately suspect that falsity is ubiquitous.

(Barnett, 1990, p. 88)

Values in teaching

In an early draft of its current teaching plan, our university suggested that we should teach ‘knowledge, attitudes and values that really matter’. A statement and direction of this type would not be unusual for an institution of higher education but will be highly problematic for most teachers if taken seriously. The knowledge part of the directive seems straightforward (although knowledge that ‘really matters’ could complicate things as this is a clear value statement), however, adding the ontological task of teaching attitudes and values (that really matter) to the epistemological task is much more difficult. If values are commonly associated with personal or cultural beliefs or morals, then academics in most fields, perhaps all those outside of philosophy, sociology and ethics, are unlikely to see values as part of their teaching. And even in these subjects values are likely to be investigated and explained rather than taught to the students. Presumably because of this very difficulty, ‘attitudes and values’ became the ‘development of skills and the building of attitudes’ in the final draft.

There are several practical explanations as to why academics may not see themselves as having a responsibility for teaching values. First, the main claim to expertise for the job of lecturer is that of research training in a specialist subject. Academics are then employed as teachers without the necessary level of skill or knowledge and must develop these as they teach, learning on the job apprentice-style. Adding the task of reflecting on the values inherent in teaching during this period (rather than teaching them unreflectively by default) presents the novice with the dual problem of coming to terms with the values-construct and thus becoming an inquirer in an area of knowledge that comes across as rather ‘philosophical’ in nature. Such deeper meanings of practice at this stage are likely to be outside of the teacher’s subject expertise, unlikely to be a priority and perhaps of little interest.

A second reason why academics may not see themselves as values teachers is that there is an epistemological barrier from schools of thought based on technical rationality and the doctrine of objective value (or the value of objectivity) that suggests, particularly in science, that some things are true while others are false. Learning about the subject of values is difficult in this context because value knowledge and value thinking is typically seen as subjective, abstract and full of inconsistencies. The complex relationships between values are not easy to unpick or talk about in purely rational or objective terms and our personal understanding of values always has limits.

Yet values are certainly not merely abstract. The meaning of a value (such as intellectual honesty) has to be appreciated in concrete and particular situations. Values are practical and lie at the heart of our personal or shared dedication to and interest in things around us. They are practical when they are seen as the basis of judgements about what is important in life, what is worthwhile, how one mi...

Table of contents

• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Values
• Chapter 2 Understanding values in practice
• Chapter 3 Teaching values
• Chapter 4 Valuing higher education
• Chapter 5 Foundational values
• Conclusion
• A note on the methodology of narrative inquiry
• References
• Index