Introduction
Timeframes of significant climate variability have occurred since the earthâs origin and through its habited ages. Humans, often characterized as the most adaptable of animal species, have always been able to successfully adapt to altered climates. Moreover, throughout most of the human history, we had a residual interference in the earthâs natural systems, at least until the Industrial Revolution.
There have been several authors who, since the modern environmental conservation movement, have argued that the period commonly identified as the Industrial Era may be the cause of radical climatic changes. Among them are George Perkins Marsh, who wrote The Earth as Modified by Human Action (1882), a pioneering book on conservation science; Nathaniel Shalerâs book Man and the Earth (1905); and Rachel Carsonâs Silent Spring (1962), among others (Hebbert and Jankovic, 2013).
In 1975, Wally Broecker specifically engaged with the matter of anthropogenic global warming. Through his paper âClimatic Change: Are We on the Brink of a Pronounced Global Warning?â Broecker was one of the first to argue that by the first decade of the 21st century, global temperatures would be warmer than any in the antecedent millennium (1975).
Later by the 1980s, sociologists Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens termed the concept of ârisk societyâ when reflecting upon modernity, and in particular, the growing environmental concern. For Giddens, a risk society is âa society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of riskâ (Giddens, 1999a, p. 3). At the same time, Beck describes risk as âa systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernisation itselfâ (Beck, 1992, p. 21).
The severe ecological disruptions that have resulted from industrial society, such as the climatic changes emphasized by the authors mentioned earlier, served as a key pillar for this analysis of the modern period. For Beck, environmental risks have become recurrent rather than exceptional. The author further argues that this occurrence is a result of âmanufactured constraints,â or, in other words, the result of pressures that are significantly determined by human actions (Beck, 1992, p. 175). In order to clarify the difference between external or ânaturalâ risks and âmanufactured risks,â Giddens elucidated that, âAt a certain point, however â very recently in historical terms â we started worrying less about what nature can do to us, and more about what we have done to natureâ (Giddens, 1999b, p. 3).
More recently, one of the most important reflections on this matter may be the suggestion made by Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer in 2000, that we have entered a new geological era after the Holocene. They coined the era as the Anthropocene and defined it as an unprecedented age in which humans are not just mere spectators but the primary forces shaping the world (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000).
In 2002, Crutzen developed from his original article with a commentary in the journal Nature, the âGeology of Mankind,â stating that âThe Anthropocene could be said to have started in the late Eighteenth century when analysis of air trapped in polar ice showed the beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methaneâ (Crutzen, 2002, p. 23).
Among other consequences, Crutzen and Stoermer argue that humankind has exhausted 40% of the known fossil fuels in only a few generations; nearly 50% of the land surface has been transformed by direct human action, from the dams holding sediment by the gigaton to the forestsâ devastation; more nitrogen is now fixed synthetically for fertilizers than is fixed naturally in all terrestrial ecosystems; there are now less than 50% of mangroves protecting coastal wetlands; fisheries remove more than 25% of the primary production of the oceans; and more than half of all accessible freshwater is used for human purposes (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000, p. 17).
The idea that we have transitioned to a new geological era where humanity is the main influencer has a far greater reach than a simple change of name. It implies a new perspective on how to manage the relationship between people and earth. It further implies that a new way of thinking and acting is urgent. This existential analysis we are forced into goes in line with the concept of âmodern reflexivity,â also widely argued by Beck and Giddens. For Beck, the key feature of âreflexivityâ is the process of society examining itself and acting accordingly: âwhat was made by people can also be changed by peopleâ (Beck, 1992, p. 157).
In 1988, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since then, this entity has been producing, at regular intervals, assessment reports (AR) on the state of knowledge on climate change. During an assessment experience of a quarter of a century, there were substantial progressions among the published results. Experts contributing and assessing these reports also substantially increased in number. While the FAR had the contribution of 97 authors, the AR4 received contributions from over 3500 experts from more than 130 countries (IPCC, 2015).
In 2013 there was a 97% consensus rate among climate experts in regard to anthropogenic global warming (Cook et al., 2013, p. 6). The remaining 3% not only question the consensus of climate scientists but also the consensus of evidence, which is mostly argued by the uncertainty associated with climate research. Sources of uncertainty have been identified as arising from measurement errors; aggregation errors; natural climate variability; future emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG); limited climate models; complexity in interaction of climatic and non-climatic factors; and future changes in socio-economic, demographic, and technological factors, as well as in societal preferences and political priorities (EEA, 2012a, p. 42). Other concerns include the vulnerability of systems and regions, the conditions that influence vulnerability and particular attributes of adaptation, such as costs of implementation and maintenance, effectiveness, and significance (Burton et al., 2001). For example, while the potential contribution of ice sheets to sea level rise (SLR) is very large, there are still many incomprehensible processes concerning their dynamics. As stressed by Michael Oppenheimer regarding this matter, âuncertainty is still large, and is unlikely to ever be reduced,â and âit is also likely that, despite the enormous progress, the phenomena of the 21st century will anticipate their proved predictionsâ (2010, p. 12) â arguments that not only question the existence of forthcoming perfect models but that also highlight our present unpreparedness in regard to projected impending weather events.
While in theory some uncertainties may be reduced by further research, others simply cannot, as they are related to the future. Indeed, there is no way around uncertainty in climate change studies. There is no way around the fact that no research will never be exact about the future. Scientists will only be capable of proposing ranges of partial or imperfect information that indicate approximate tendencies. Regardless, âclimate skepticsâ will always haunt climate change action.
Several authors and near-universal agreement1 have strongly argued for the need for countries to invest on increasing their capacity to cope with uncertainty rather than to increase risk through the use of ambiguous impact studies or no action (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 351). As stated by the British philosopher and logician Carveth Read, âIt is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrongâ (Read, 2012 [1898], p. 351).
Acknowledging that uncertainty about future weather events is a sure certainty, the ultimate question is how we can prepare and manage for our future. Particularly in regard to the transposition of this problem upon urbanism, and in light of the concept of Ulrich Beckâs ârisk society,â François Ascher was one of the first to argue that urban planning had to deal with uncertain risks and global impacts (Ascher, 2010[2001]). As stated by Richard Marshall,
Our cities have changed faster than we have been able to adjust our thinking. (âŚ) Our problem is not one of memory; it is one of adjusting our ideas of what is an appropriate urban form to be in line with the current reality of our culture and society. What is needed in urban design today, above all else, is a re-calibration of our ideas to the currency of our time.
(Marshall, 2001, p. 3)
For Lister, âif uncertainty and regular change are inevitable, then we must learn to be flexible and adaptable in the face of changesâ (Lister, 2005, p. 21). Following this line of reasoning, Jack Ahern further argued that uncertainty must be reconceived as an opportunity to âlearn by doingâ (Ahern, 2006, p. 129). In accordance with these arguments, designers and planners, which operate in the âreal world,â cannot be tied up until there are no more climate skeptics or the hopelessness of no more uncertainties.
In line with the research project Urbanised Estuaries and Deltas (Costa et al., 2013), however uncertain, climate change projections provide a sufficiently stable range of possible futures that serve to test available options. The methodological difference upon the planning process relies mainly on the shift from the search for the one optimal solution into the pursuit of various adequate alternatives.
1 Climate change adaptation through local, âbottom-upâ initiatives
Climate change has mostly been evaluated through global models, more specifically, through general circulation models (GCM), in order to anticipate climate change scenarios. However, many authors strongly support scientific evidence claiming that âchanges in climate are happening at multiple scales from global to regional to local and that there are independent anthropogenic drivers of change at each scaleâ (IPCC, 2007; Oke, 1997; Stedman, 2004 in Ruddell et al. [2012, p. 584]). As a result, regionalized models (RCMs, regional climatic models) started being used. These models derive from the down-scaling of the GCMs and cover a limited area of interest, such as Europe or an individual country. As a consequence of being based on an incomplete model per se, these regionalized models reinforce eventual errors and insufficient data. As stated by Hebbert and Webb, â[climatic] effects cannot be downscaled from a regional weather model, they are complex and require local observation and understandingâ (2007, p. 125). Global as well as regional models, particularly when considering the necessary combination of overwhelming information about all the natural and changing processes, are therefore further distanced approximations of reality.
In addition, although it is commonly recognized that great driving forces function at a global scale, such as greenhouse gas rates or financial dynamics, it is also widely acknowledged that various local phenomena influence global climate (Wilbanks and Kates, 1999, p. 602), from micro-environmental processes to demographic variations or resource-use undertakings, such as deforestation or coral mining. The urban heat island (UHI) effect, in particular, as a clear indication of significant acceleration of temperature changes in most existing cities worldwide, imposes direct repercussions upon global climate.
Other authors have further argued that, although the frequently mentioned greenhouse gas emissions unequivocally contribute to global warming, the witnessed disturbance of the small water cycle is a bigger catalyst on future climate extremes (KravÄĂk et al., 2007, p. 7). While most investigations analyze the impacts that climate change will have on the water cycle, KravÄĂk et al. question the reverse influence that an unbalanced water cycle may have on the exacerbation of climatic change. In light of the research presented by these authors, saturating the small water cycle through the conservation of rain-water on land would be a revolutionary solution to the given problems of anthropogenic climate change.
For a long time, carbon mitigation and/or adaptation to global warming have formed part of several international agendas, with monthly initiatives being disseminated throughout the global scientific community. Although these global endeavors are imperative, it has been argued that it is frequently âfocussed [on] the exposure of cities to hazards that have a huge impact but low frequency. It has little to say about the high-frequency and micro-scale climatic phenomena created within the anthropogenic environment of the cityâ (Hebbert and Webb, 2007, p. 126). Contrastingly, this tendency has been counterbalanced by various local undertakings such as the water saving projects in Zaragoza, the establishment of community-based early warnings against flash floods in northern Bangladesh or the neighborhoodâs action against the impact of urban heat islands in Portland, Oregon (Ebi, 2008 in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 321). These initiatives essentially confront the systematic assumption of realism in science (as highlighted by Beck, 1992, p. 5), deciding not to rely solely on justifications from global projections in order for adaptation to be advanced in cities. Rather than being restrained or expectant of downscaled or locally applied models, a wide range of cities have recognized the need to take action now in order to prepare for the future (Carmin et al., 2012).
In this line of reasoning, Jaap Kwadijk and others (2010) have identified two main approaches on climate adaptation policy: (1) a predictive top-down approach and (2) a more from the bottom-up resilience approach. While the first is essentially guided by global models, the second is relatively independent of âjustifications from atmospheric scienceâ (Ruddell et al., 2012, p. 601) and its associated uncertainties. Moreover, instead of reducing impacts, the latter rather focuses on reducing vulnerability by improving the resiliency of a system exposed to particular climate change risks (Te Linde, 2011 in Veelen, 2013).
Local scales are particularly sensitive to every climatic change, be it sporadic or ongoing. According to the IPCC, there is âhigh agreementâ and ârobust evidenceâ that âdisasters are most acutely experienced at the local levelâ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 293). When analyzing the risks of extreme events, the IPCC further highlights that while most events will not become severe enough to cause a disaster of national of international magnitude âthey will create ongoing problems for local disaster risk managementâ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 297). The degree of the impacts is also strongly linked with the existing social and physical local vulnerabilities âincluding the quality of buildings, the availability of infrastructure, urban forms and topographies, land uses around the urban centre, local institutional capacitiesâ (Bicknell et al., 2009, p. 362).
Furthermore, as locals are the first to experience and respond to hazards, they retain local and traditional knowledge that is not only aware of these hazards and existing vulnerabilities but also knows how to cope and work with them (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 298). In accordance, Ruddell et al. states that âIt is critical to ground support for climate adaptation and mitigation initiatives within local contexts of shared experiencesâ (2012, p. 601). In other words, local know-how should always be considered as added value for adaptation action, particularly when considering a known or often repeated hazard. Societal processes are thus critical for the success adaptation action. Ultimately, and regardless of national and reginal efforts, without a local approach that integrates the human scale, adaptation endeavors will fail their purpose.
On the other hand, projected scenarios and the increased record of more frequent extreme events (Coumou and Rahmstorf, 2012) will likely lead to unprecedented situations for which localities have no previous experiences. As corroborated by the IPCC, âextreme weather and climatic events will vary from place to place and not all places have the same experience with that particular initiating eventâ (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2012, p. 297). As such, local action should not be dissociated from a global and more encompassing scale in which scientific knowledge of future climate projections is crucial. For example, bearing in mind that local initiatives rely more on weather, ecology, a...