Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons

How do countries think about the bomb?

Norman Cigar

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317243953
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East remains an issue of concern. Saudi Arabia's actions will largely rest on Iran's decisions, and discussions and preparations within Saudi Arabia would suggest that it is ready to react to potential shifts in the region's nuclear powers.

Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons uses an "inside out" approach that emphasises the Saudis' own national interests in relation to the nuclear threat, and their understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in defense, foreign policy and the concept of deterrence. It is the first study with comprehensive use of the local Arabic language military and civilian media to provide this understanding of official thinking and policy. The Saudi case study is contextualised against the prevailing proliferation models, to conclude that the Saudi case shares both commonalities and elements of uniqueness with other proliferation cases, implying the need for a 'multi-causal' approach. Its comparative analysis also suggests potential implications applicable more broadly to the issue of nuclear proliferation.

A comprehensive study of Saudi Arabia's attitude to nuclear weapons, this book offers an exploration of nuclear proliferation that would interest students, scholars and policymakers working in Middle East studies, as well as Military and nuclear proliferation studies.

1

Introduction

Bounding the problem

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to pose a continuing challenge to international security interests and to regional stability, and perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the Middle East. Efforts to halt or manage this process must address how regional powers decide whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons and how they might plan to use them, although this may not always be an easy process, given the often closed nature of decisionmaking in that region. Saudi Arabia is certainly interested in the issue of nuclear weapons and may be one of those countries at least contemplating the possibility of joining the nuclear club at some time in the future, and that factor has already had an impact on its policymaking.

The thesis of this study is in itself dynamic, that is conditional and dependent on the key variable of Iran, both in the latter’s behavior on the nuclear issue and, more broadly, in Iran’s regional policy, although these two elements intersect to a significant degree. Specifically, the thesis is that had Iran acquired nuclear weapons at any point Saudi Arabia would also have done so, and that as long as Iran adheres to the agreement concluded in July 2015 with the 5+1 Group (the United States, Great Britain, France, China, Russia, and Germany) and does not acquire nuclear weapons for the next 15 years, very likely neither will Saudi Arabia. However, should Iran at any time decide on a nuclear breakout, then Saudi Arabia would very likely follow suit. In that sense, as long as Iran remains a non-nuclear state, this case study of Saudi Arabia will be one of the latter’s non-proliferation, whereas that could change to one of proliferation if Iran—the key variable—became a nuclear state. Significantly, over the past few years Saudi Arabia has been developing the various components of the policy, public environment, legitimacy, and institutional and military infrastructure that could lay the groundwork to facilitate the option to acquire nuclear weapons at the appropriate moment if and when that decision is taken in response, in particular, as noted, to any acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, whether in the near or more distant future.

This study will close with the de facto U.S. confirmation in September 2015 of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (hereafter the “Nuclear Agreement”) concluded between Iran and the 5+1 Group in July 2015 and the September 2015 Saudi–U.S. summit. This is a logical cut-off point, as it marks the closure to a stage in the regional nuclear issue, as well as in Saudi thinking and policymaking on nuclear weapons. To be sure, in some ways, this apparently significant milestone in nuclear counterproliferation may perhaps only usher in a new phase of Saudi policy re-assessment of the changed regional security and political environment, and Riyadh can be expected to continue its contingency preparations as a precaution against any future Iranian breakout. In effect, over the past few years, one can identify a focus in Saudi Arabia on mobilizing support in both the civilian population and in the military for such an option, as one can see from the media intended for each audience. Moreover, in more tangible terms, there have been efforts ranging from securing religious approval for nuclear weapons to visibly developing the country’s Strategic Rocket Force and a nascent space program. Even the promotion of nuclear power in the civilian sector can be seen, at least tangentially, as part of this process, if only by reinforcing the legitimacy and acceptance of nuclear power.

The results of this study should remain relevant as long as Riyadh believes there is a possibility of an Iranian nuclear breakout, and the focus here is on the deliberations in Saudi Arabia about nuclear-related policy options that are enduring and that illustrate what is perhaps representative of assessments and discussions within many countries who have faced or are facing the prospect of a nuclear-armed neighbor and the need to address the resulting change in the threat environment. Moreover, in tangible terms, the development by Riyadh of the basic justifications, institutional components, and political conditions for a potential nuclear capability will remain in place (and probably be developed further), available for activation if there should be a reversal at any time in the future in what appears to be Iran’s present accommodating policy orientation. In addition, this study will address other parameters of Saudi thinking about nuclear threats and nuclear weapons, including the Saudi conceptualization of deterrence and the impact that a nuclear threat could have on reshaping Riyadh’s relations within the Gulf.

The terms of reference and methodology

Analytical tools

Scholars have long sought to understand why some countries decide to embark on a nuclear path while others do not, and elements of the resulting approaches or models may be helpful in analyzing Saudi Arabia. Conversely, conclusions drawn from this case study may qualify or call into question at least certain facets of such models, and this study will seek to separate the commonalities which the Saudi case may share with general concepts of proliferation applicable to other similar situations from what may be specific to Saudi Arabia.

Efforts to develop a universal model to explain nuclear proliferation have deepened our understanding of the phenomenon but have not generated a complete consensus, despite a substantial scholarly literature on the subject.¹ Initially, the somewhat deterministic “realist” model was prevalent. The latter perspective of nuclear proliferation, in its essence, had focused on states as unitary actors and as the appropriate level of analysis who, when faced with international security threats (especially nuclear ones) in an anarchic world system, coupled with the absence of adequate alternative options such as reliable alliances, would respond with nuclear weapons in an almost reflexive pursuit of a balance of power as the desired end-state.²

Over the years, this model was weakened by the many exceptions of countries that did not follow the nuclear path as the realist model posited they would, and scholars highlighted the shortcomings of the realist approach. As will be seen throughout the following study, additional insightful models have also been developed in subsequent years as analytical and explanatory tools, usually by focusing on specific alternative facets that may have a bearing on decisionmaking in proliferation, such as domestic actors and politics, the influence of international nonproliferation regimes and standards of behavior (constructivism), degree of international economic integration, or leadership psychology. Etel Solingen, for example, developed, in particular, the idea of a country’s elites’ desire to integrate into the world economy as an indicator of the likelihood that a country will or will not pursue a nuclear option.³ Maria Rost Rublee, instead, focuses attention on states that have not proliferated, highlighting the cumulative impact of international regimes on the likelihood of nuclear nonproliferation.⁴ Jacques Hymans and K. P. O’Reilly, for their part, have seen as key the psychology of individual decisionmakers—and particularly of “oppositional nationalist” leaders for Hymans—who respond to national security threats based on a psychological national identity.⁵

On the other hand Peter R. Lavoy, in his perceptive overview of models, identified empirical shortcomings that certain approaches can have—shortcomings that often arise in the form of countries which do not conform to specific theories.⁶ While finding the realist model too abstract and unable to explain the timing or the specific political, technical, or psychological variables which may determine decisionmaking on proliferation, at the same time—while seeing the idealist models as better at accounting for cultural and national specificities, motives, and decisionmaking styles of individual countries—he observes that such models, too, have limitations insofar as they cannot always explain why policymakers ignore associated constraints.⁷ Noting that the “why” of acquisition is often intertwined with sets of macro-indicators that have been developed to help recognize decision points or stages of a process leading toward or away from proliferation, Lavoy proposed a helpful analytical tool that he called “nuclear mythmaking.” This latter perspective makes possible a more inclusive analytical approach by allowing for due appreciation of genuine security threats while offering a framework by which to recognize and assess the process as a continuum toward or away from the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Specifically, Lavoy draws attention to national elites engaging in what he calls “nuclear mythmaking,” that is when they:

(1) emphasize their country’s insecurity or its poor international standing; (2) portray this strategy as the best corrective for these problems; (3) articulate the political, economic, and technical feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons; (4) successfully associate these beliefs and arguments (nuclear myths) with existing cultural norms and political priorities; and finally (5) convince senior decisionmakers to accept and act on these views.⁸

Scott D. Sagan, in a useful early critique of the conventional understanding of why countries decide to go or not to go nuclear, for his part offered a more complex perspective, identifying three alternative motivations or models—the “security model,” that is recourse to nuclear weapons in order to increase security in response to foreign threats; a “domestic politics model,” that is the use of nuclear weapons as a tool to advance domestic and bureaucratic interests; and a “norms model,” where nuclear weapons serve as a symbol of a state’s modernity and identity—and demonstrates the applicability and limitations of each of these.⁹ While some cases support one or another of the models as an explanatory framework, he pointed out that others may not. Instead, he made a convincing argument for a more complex analysis requiring a range of variables. As he put it, “multicausality … lies at the heart of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation and nuclear restraint have occurred in the past, and can occur in the future, for more than one reason: different historical cases are best explained by different causal methods.”¹⁰

Ursula Jasper, too, rather than searching for an overarching explanatory theory, has contributed what she calls a “pragmatist” approach as an additional analytical tool, to which the present study will have recourse at times. A key element of her perceptive approach is that “the analysis of beliefs and narratives gains center stage.”¹¹ That is, she posits that:

we should depict a state’s (non-)proliferation moves as the result of an ongoing process in which the state’s identity, its role and position in the environment are discursively established and in which potential courses of action are construed … In other words, the key to understanding why states pursue or abandon nuclear weapons programs lies in understanding the key underlying beliefs that are evident in the national “nuclear discourses.”¹²

Any “model,” of course, cannot have the precision or predictability of an algebraic equation where it would be sufficient to just insert well-defined values and expect a reliable and definitive answer. However, where a model can be useful is in suggesting relevant questions to ask. In that light, arguably, one can benefit from selected insights and limitations drawn from a variety of taxonomies, which can be adapted for use in analyzing the Saudi case, even if at times their tenets may be embedded only implicitly in the analysis presented here. In many ways, the present Saudi case can benefit from an approach using an amalgam of elements from all three of the models that Sagan had identified—the security model, the domestic politics model, and the norms model—and supports the utility of “multicausality” as an analytical approach. This construct is complemented by Jasper’s insightful focus on the national narratives, that is on the national analysis and argumentation that is underlain by enduring identity and beliefs which operate interactively between the country’s leaders and key sectors of Saudi society.

Rather than providing new theoretical insights or models, the intent of this study is more modest, namely to focus on Saudi Arabia as a significant regional actor in order to try to understand the latter specifically and the implications of its policy for the region. Nevertheless, the study will also gauge to what extent Saudi Arabia’s experience conforms to or differs from prevailing theories about nuclear proliferation. To be sure, given all the variables and uncertainty surrounding both Iran’s nuclear intentions and the regional situation, all one can do is forecast potential outcomes based on a study of the available data against an analytical background of Riyadh’s strategic culture and political dynamics. Admittedly, even using the same available data, analysts can arrive at different conclusions with respect to Saudi Arabia. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, for example, in a well-argued essay, concluded that “There is little evidence … that Saudi Arabia would seek to engage directly in a regional nuclear arms race.”¹³ In support of that position, he adduced that such factors as the degree of its international economic integration, the presence of an international regime, fear of an Israeli intervention, fear of stimulating further Iran’s nuclear program, and an informal alliance with the United States “tilt[ed] decisively in the direction of Saudi nuclear restraint.”¹⁴

The concern of this study is not just with the binary question of whether Saudi Arabia will or will not acquire nuclear weapons, although that in itself is a very important question, of course. In addition, what this study seeks to address is the impact that simply grappling with the nuclear issue has had for Saudi Arabia’s ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The dynamics of Saudi strategic culture and the decisionmaking process
• 3. Developing nuclear threat assessments
• 4. Analyzing the threat in Riyadh: Why would a nuclear Iran be so dangerous?
• 5. Thinking in terms of solutions: How to stop Iran
• 6. Thinking in terms of solutions: The evolution in Saudi thinking toward a nuclear option
• 7. Thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons: Deterrence and beyond
• 8. Where does the civilian nuclear power sector fit in?
• 9. A nuclear environment and foreign policy: Reshaping relations within the Gulf
• 10. The Rouhani era in Tehran and a new age of anxiety in Riyadh
• 11. Coming to terms with the 14 July 2015 nuclear agreement: Saudi anxiety overcome?
• 12. Conclusions and implications
• Index