French Arms Exports

The Business of Sovereignty

Lucie Béraud-Sudreau

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000093018
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: National Security
• Index: Politics & International Relations

From De Gaulle onwards, France's strategic independence has been predicated on self-sufficiency in modern weapons. To achieve and maintain the requisite defence-industrial base, in the context of limited domestic orders, Paris sought to promote the export of its arms. During the Cold War, this underpinned but was also an expression of France's determination to resist bipolar domination. France offered customers around the world an alternative to reliance on one superpower or the other; and in doing so it generated the revenue to support an extensive domestic arms industry. The end of the Cold War ushered in fundamental changes, however: Western defence spending shrank and the global market was turned upside down. While France's arms-export policy was less affected by human-rights concerns than other democracies, it was not immune to pressures stemming from the consolidation of Europe's defence-industrial base and the increased interest of the EU in regulating the arms trade.

This Adelphi book considers how France has responded to changing political and market circumstances in the way that it promotes and controls the export of weapons. It examines the rationale for considering a liberal arms-export policy as essential to French independence, and the institutional arrangements that underpinned this. It tracks the dramatic changes in the global arms market since 1990, in terms of demand and market competition, and charts the response of the French government to these changes. The book underlines how the French machinery of government, as a directing force behind the defence industry, has been resistant to the notion of export restraint – even in the case of sales to authoritarian regimes. However, it argues that France now faces a dilemma over whether to continue with a long-successful course, or to moderate its independence through greater collaboration to bolster European integration and better compete globally.

CHAPTER ONE
The policy model for French arms exports

‘We work on strictly commercial terms,’ an adviser to Mr Debré says. ‘We tell other countries: if you want arms, we sell them. It is all very simple.’ ¹

1. Arms sales as the by-product of strategic autonomy

An independent arms industry serving an independent defence policy

When General Charles de Gaulle returned to power as president in May 1958, one of his objectives was to regain for France the independence and sovereignty that, in his view, his predecessors had compromised. Key tenets of de Gaulle’s foreign policy were independence in decision-making, in particular from the United States, and the quest for grandeur (greatness) and rang (rank) on the international stage. Grandeur and independence went hand in hand, though they were not entirely synonymous. Independence meant being able to conduct foreign and defence policies that were not subject to constraints from other states, but grandeur also entailed seeking to influence international relations and break the logic of East–West confrontation. De Gaulle’s foreign policy was thus centred on France having an active and independent role in international relations, and looking to increase its prestige.

The foundation of independence in defence, in de Gaulle’s view, was nuclear weapons. The French nuclear doctrine was tous azimuts, a metaphor meaning ‘in all directions’, and it meant that no adversary was directly named – the Soviet Union was not clearly designated as the threat. The tous azimuts doctrine thus expressed a form of non-alignment, and above all allowed France to protect its territory without US assistance. However, producing nuclear weapons required a strong, autonomous and technologically advanced defence industry.

Under successive French governments, each of which subscribed to de Gaulle’s vision, grandeur entailed the development of a strong and autonomous defence industry. Only by producing a full range of defence materiel for its armed forces – as well as nuclear weapons – could France avoid dependence on an external source of arms, namely the US. The defence industry therefore came to be seen a cornerstone of an independent defence policy and, in turn, a vital component of the country’s strategic autonomy. This view of an independent defence industry as the guarantor of French independence lay at the heart of a consensus on defence policy that was accepted across the political spectrum.

The French state’s main tool for developing an autonomous defence-industrial base was the Délégation ministérielle pour l’armement (DMA), part of the Ministry of Defence, which was created in April 1961 and is known today as the Direction générale de l’armement (DGA). The DMA held a pivotal position in French armaments policy as it purchased weapons from the defence industry, controlled and implemented defence-industrial policy, and was itself a weapons manufacturer.

Within the Ministry of Defence, the director of the DMA – a position first occupied by General Gaston Lavaud – was second only to the minister in terms of influence. The DMA was responsible for all issues relating to armaments, and initially had two main purposes: to develop an independent nuclear capability, and to procure conventional weapons to meet the needs of the French armed forces.

After the Second World War, the leaders of the Fourth Republic (1946–58) had begun to rebuild French defence-industrial capacity and lay the foundations for de Gaulle’s later achievements in this field. Significant assistance came from the United States, which helped re-equip France’s armed forces – for example in the post-war years the French Air Force bought US aircraft including the F-47 Thunderbolt – and contributed to the rebirth of the French defence industry by transferring manufacturing licences to French companies, which then produced main battle tanks and artillery systems based on American designs. After 1961 it was the DMA that look the lead in reshaping the French defence industry, through a consolidation process that created a number of large companies, each with a monopoly in its sector. Between 1952 and 1972, 40 entities were converted, regrouped or closed.² The DMA allotted armaments programmes to the new companies; there was only a limited tendering process, and indeed very little competition in general.

The concentration and rationalisation process lasted throughout the Cold War. By the end of the 1980s a handful of defence manufacturers dominated each sector. Land-armaments production became a state monopoly, with companies and factories regrouped under the DMA’s Direction technique des armements terrestres (DTAT) – later to become the Groupement industriel des armements terrestres (GIAT) and now known as Nexter. Naval production also became a virtual state monopoly, under the DMA’s Direction des constructions navales (DCN). The aerospace sector, meanwhile, underwent a dual process of consolidation and specialisation. The production of combat aircraft became the preserve of a private company, Dassault (renamed Dassault Aviation in 1990), while production of helicopters and military transport aircraft was allotted to state-owned companies. In 1970 those state-owned companies were regrouped into a single entity, SNIAS, which was later renamed Aérospatiale and also took on responsibility for producing ballistic missiles.

By the end of the 1980s the only sectors where competition took place were tactical missiles and satellites (Aérospatiale and Matra), electronics (Thomson-CSF and Dassault Électronique) and military vehicles (GIAT Industries, Panhard and Renault Véhicules Industriels).

From autonomy to exports: forging a consensus in favour of arms sales

Throughout the Cold War the French narrative about grandeur and independence in defence policy developed in parallel with the defence industry itself, consolidating the foundations of the rationale for promoting arms exports.

The economic argument was essentially that France could not sustain a defence industry capable of fully equipping its own armed forces without massive sales abroad. Strategic independence was to be achieved through the domestic production of nuclear weapons, for which it was necessary to have autonomous capabilities in defence research and development (R&D) and in arms production. Though investment in the development of nuclear weapons implied a lower budget for conventional weapons, policymakers were nevertheless set on establishing a defence industry that could produce the full range of conventional equipment for the armed forces. This ambition could not be realised on the basis of the French defence market alone. Production runs for major weapons systems are relatively short, and the funds available for R&D are limited. But if the arms in question can also be exported, unit costs are lowered and there is more revenue available for reinvestment in innovative technologies.

France’s desire for independence in defence policy, combined with inevitable budget constraints, forged what Edward Kolodziej called a ‘chain of logic’ that compelled the country to sell weapons widely abroad – tous azimuts – so as to maintain the productive capacity of its defence industry and not have to import arms itself.³ Or to put it another way, arms exports played a vital role in ensuring that the French defence industry could meet the requirements of the country’s own armed forces.

Arms exports were also regarded as benefiting the French economy as a whole, not only through their direct contribution to the balance of payments and job creation but also through spillover effects for civilian industry. This argument was habitually used by the defence industry and politicians, with the result that by the 1970s, as Kolodziej put it, ‘any suggestion to cut arms sales abroad was perceived as tantamount to abandoning economic growth and modernization’.⁴

The doctrine that the government should promote arms exports emerged very clearly in French political discourse in the early years of the Fifth Republic (1958–). In 1961, for example, members of the Senate, the upper house of parliament, applauded the creation of an export-support department within the DMA, arguing that jobs were at stake and demanding improvements to other export-support mechanisms.⁵ In 1967, a report submitted to the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, strongly made the case that the defence industry depended on exports.⁶

Unsurprisingly, France’s defence ministers also employed these economic arguments. Pierre Messmer (defence minister from 1960–69) declared in October 1966 that ‘the prosperity of our aerospace industry depends essentially on exports’.⁷ His successor Michel Debré (1969–73) was a strong proponent of arms sales, saying for example that exports were ‘a question of the existence or non-existence of our arms industry. If it were restricted to the domestic market, it could not keep going, and there would no longer be any possibility of a truly national defence policy.’⁸ The first Socialist defence minister during the Fifth Republic, Charles Hernu (1981–85), made a similar case in 1983: ‘The additional contribution that foreign sales make to the activities of our arms industry is fundamental in order to ensure our country has an independent industry and to supply our armed forces at a sustainable cost for our economy.’⁹ And this economic rationale is still powerful today: for example a 2014 study by McKinsey for the Ministry of Defence and the main defence-industry association (CIDEF) concluded that arms exports reduced France’s trade deficit by 5–8% and sustained 40,000 jobs.¹⁰

The doctrine can also be seen, for example, in a letter sent in 1970 by defence minister Michel Debré to economy minister Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, in which he argued that a reduction in domestic arms procurement had obliged the defence industry to turn to foreign markets,¹¹ and in an internal Ministry of Defence memorandum sent in 1976, which stated that:

A defence policy necessarily includes a policy of arms supply necessary for the armed forces. If we want a non-dependent defence policy … we are driven to maintain a significant national arms industry. But the arms industry is a cutting-edge industry, in which investment and R&D spending are high. If the industry were to satisfy only national needs, its prices would be prohibitive. Therefore we must widen the markets, through joint weapons development, offset agreements, and simple exports. … Conclusion: arms ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Note on interviews
• Glossary
• Introduction
• Chapter One The policy model for French arms exports
• Chapter Two The new post-Cold War arms market: competition, regulation and Europeanisation
• Chapter Three The ambiguity of French arms-export policy in the post-Cold War era
• Chapter Four President Sarkozy’s stimulus package for arms exports
• Chapter Five President Hollande: continued backing for arms sales
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Notes
• Index