The Costs of Crime and Justice

Mark A. Cohen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780429776359
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Theory
• Index: Economics

This book presents a comprehensive view of the financial and non-financial consequences of criminal behavior, crime prevention, and society's response to crime. Crime costs are far-reaching, including medical costs, lost wages, property damage and pain, suffering, and reduced quality of life for victims and the public at large; police, courts, and prisons; and offenders and their families who may suffer consequences incidental to any punishment they receive for committing crime.

The book provides a comprehensive economic framework and overview of the empirical methodologies used to estimate costs of crime. It provides an assessment of what is known and where the gaps in knowledge are in understanding the costs and consequences of crime. Individual chapters focus on victims, governments, as well as the public at large. Separate chapters detail the various methodologies used to estimate crime costs, while two chapters are devoted to policy analysis – both cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis. The second edition is completely updated and expanded since the first edition in 2005. All cost estimates have also been updated. In addition, due to a significant increase in the number of studies on the cost of crime, new chapters focus on the costs to offenders and their families; white-collar and corporate crime; and the cost of crime estimates around the world.

Understanding the costs of crime can lead to important insights and policy conclusions – both for criminal justice policy and other social ills that compete with crime for government funding. Thus, the target audience for this book includes criminologists and policy makers who are seeking to apply rigorous social science methods to assist in developing appropriate criminal justice policies. Note that the book is non-technical and does not assume the reader is conversant in economics or statistics.

PART I

Introduction

1

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Introduction

On April 20, 1999, 17-year-old Dylan Klebold and 18-year-old Eric Harris walked into Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, and began a shooting rampage that was heard around the world. This single act of violence resulted in the death of 13 students and teachers, serious injuries to 28 others, and the death of the two gunmen. This tragedy certainly took its worst toll on the victims and their families. Although no amount of money can bring back the individuals whose lives were lost, the amount of money that was lost as a result of this incident was still enormous. For example, this incident caused the victims and their families to spend a significant amount of money on medical bills, caused them to lose time at work, and imposed other direct costs. One family who was uninsured estimated their medical bills would total $1–2 million (Cullen, 2009: 353).

Numerous indirect costs were also likely to have been incurred, such as the cost to families who took their children out of public schools out of fear, and incurred private school tuition, or those who incurred the cost of moving to another school district or city. Charities around the world helped out with an estimated $6 million being contributed directly to help families of victims (Washington, 1999). The fact that the murder victims will no longer earn a living means that over their expected future lifetime, hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of dollars in earnings will have been lost. However, the loss to the victims and their families was considerably more than this amount. Any assessment of their loss must account for the tremendous pain, suffering, lost quality of life, and grief they suffered.

Many would argue that no amount of money would be adequate to compensate the victims or their families for this loss. We’ll put that issue aside for now and return to it throughout this chapter and this book.

This act of violence affected others beside the family and victims. The impact and resultant costs were felt by thousands of friends, relatives, and neighbors who attended the funerals – perhaps taking time off work. They bought condolence cards, flowers, spent time visiting, brought food to the grieving family, and also suffered a nontrivial amount of grief and fear themselves. An estimated 70,000 people – many of whom traveled from out of town to express their grief, attended a memorial service for the community. Local florists donated 25,000 bouquets for the service as fighter jets flew overhead as a tribute (Serrano and Moehringer, 1999).

School children who were not injured – but endured the five-hour ordeal – were traumatized and spent weeks or months with counselors and therapists. School was canceled for more than a week and resumed half-days at a nearby high school. This tragedy was so massive that mental health providers were inundated for assistance. One report indicated that three weeks after the tragedy, “demand for care has not abated. One mental health provider in Littleton . . . said crisis calls have quadrupled and requests for ongoing services have gone up 50%. In the metro Denver area, managed care providers are reporting a 40% to 100% increase in requests for mental health services” (Cart, 1999). The mother of a victim who was left partially paralyzed committed suicide six months after the incident (Los Angeles Times, 1999), and a close friend of one of the victims who also attended school at Columbine committed suicide a year later (Weller, 2000). For many, the consequences continue to this day. One student who witnessed the shootings but who was not physically injured has written about her continued struggles through the years – including huge college debts from continually dropping out of school, not being able to afford mental health counseling long after the Columbine-related assistance was gone, suffering from nightmares and addiction, and turmoil within her family including a father whose own wartime PTSD might have recurred following the shooting, resulting in serious family disruptions. While not all witnesses to such events will suffer such long-term consequences, and whether or not these individual harms are causally related to the Columbine event, they illustrate the vast potential consequences that stretch beyond direct victimization (Lindholm and Lindholm, 2005; Quenqua, 2012).

The city government (and hence taxpayers) was also significantly affected by this act of violence. Police SWAT teams and investigators were needed to respond to this tragedy. Extra police were required to be on duty to help control traffic during the funeral and memorial services. The mayor’s time was diverted from more productive activities to responding to reporters’ questions, meeting with concerned citizens and the school board. Numerous lawsuits were filed by family members of victims against the city and police for not preventing and/or not adequately responding during the incident. While most of these lawsuits have since been dismissed, millions were paid out by local agencies and insurance companies – including one representing the parents of one of the killers who was sued (Cullen, 2009).

The indirect costs of the Columbine High School shooting went far beyond Colorado. Schools around the country reported high absenteeism rates in the days immediately following the incident, as students and parents feared copycat shootings (Samuels, 1999). Interest in home schooling increased dramatically as parents around the country developed a renewed interest in a safe alternative to public schools. In Colorado, calls to the state Department of Education reportedly more than doubled following the shooting (Lloyd, 1999). Nationwide, hundreds of bomb threats were called in, schools were closed, and students arrested in the months immediately following the shooting (Reid, 1999). In the immediate aftermath, schools around the country reportedly underwent expensive remodeling projects to enhance security in response to these shootings (Kass, 1999), instituted training exercises for police, fire, and school officials, and hired additional security guards and police officers to patrol high schools (Wilgoren, 1999).

Finally, there is evidence of additional impacts beyond the direct financial and victimization impacts. For example, parental fear for their child’s safety in school jumped from 37 percent to 55 percent “in a poll conducted April 21, the day after the 1999 Columbine High School shootings in Colorado. Worry remained elevated for months after Columbine, finally dropping below 40% in August 2000” (Jones, 2017). Either fear or some other “stigma” was also attached to the Columbine area, as a study of property values near the school estimated that in the year following the shooting, home prices were devalued by 10 percent – despite the fact that there was reportedly no decrease in school quality following the shooting (Gourley, 2015). The total value of lost property value sales during 2010 was estimated to be $19 million in the vicinity, with reduced value continuing 15 years after the shooting.

Perhaps most troubling is the possibility that the Columbine shootings encouraged copycat killers. Indeed, there is evidence that the shooter at Virginia Tech in 2007 was influenced by Columbine. According to a member of the review panel investigating the shooting, “It appeared as though the Columbine shooting set off in his mind the fantasies around suicide and homicide which were picked up in a class essay . . . and was picked up by the teacher who then sought the parents out and suggested that he be evaluated and which led to the psychiatric evaluation and the intensification of the counseling” (Moran, 2007). The shooter also apparently sent a video to media outlets shortly before his own shooting rampage showing the eighth anniversary of the Columbine massacre. While it would be inappropriate to claim that Columbine directly caused the shooting at Virginia Tech, there is growing anecdotal evidence of such copycat killings (Helfgott, 2015).

Although there has been no accounting of the total “cost” of the Columbine tragedy, it surely cost society hundreds of millions – if not billions of dollars. Highly publicized cases such as this extreme case of school violence in the US have highlighted the fact that although crime rates have been declining over the past decades, violence is still a significant social problem and the cost to society is no less real. Recent estimates have tallied the annual cost of crime to victims in the US to exceed $2 trillion. What do these numbers mean and what should they be used for? How does crime compare to other social ills? This book provides a comprehensive review of the theoretical foundations, methodologies employed, and empirical estimates of the cost of crime. It also examines some of the possible uses – and misuses – of crime cost data.

A complete characterization of crime costs can be an important tool in formulating criminal justice policy. Identifying and quantifying costs and consequences of victimization may be helpful both in characterizing the crime problem and in examining ways to address it. Ignoring the nonmonetary benefits of crime reduction can lead to a misallocation of resources. For example, suppose that an additional year of incarceration for a rape offender will prevent one additional rape incident. Considering only tangible, out-of-pocket costs, the average rape (or attempted rape) that is reported to police costs about $10,000 – less than the $33,000 annual cost of a prison cell. The bulk of these expenses are medical and mental health care costs to victims. However, if rape’s effect on the victim’s quality of life is monetized, one estimate values this loss at about $150,000 – thus total costs are in excess of $160,000 – many times greater than the cost of prison. Taking into account broader social costs beyond the cost to victims increases the cost of rape even further – an estimated cost of $250,000 or more. Thus, from society’s standpoint, it is worth spending $33,000 in additional prison costs in exchange for at least $250,000 in benefits from one less rape. Put differently, the “cost” to society of one rape is $250,000; hence it is certainly worth more than $33,000 to prevent one rape from occurring.

By allowing analysts to combine statistics on disparate crimes into a single, readily understood metric, monetary valuations of crime costs may be used to help guide resource allocations across crime types. For example, is a police patrol pattern that prevents one rape better than one that prevents three burglaries? One way to answer such a question is to ask residents of the affected area which they prefer through polling or referenda. However, in many instances, policy makers must rely on less direct methods of determining an appropriate choice. In such cases, one would need to have a metric that allows for comparisons between rapes and burglaries. Dollars provide such a metric for this comparison.

Why do we need estimates of the "cost of crime"?

To most economists, there is no question that crime costs should be estimated. Economics involves the allocation of scarce resources in society. Criminal justice policy decisions always involve choices between two or more alternatives, each having their own costs and benefits. The enumeration of those costs and benefits puts the various alternatives on a level playing field and can help policy makers make more informed decisions that enhance society’s wellbeing. Of course, if the enumerated costs and benefits are inaccurate, there is a risk that more information can lead to worse decisions. Further, many non-economists would argue that there is neither a moral justification nor adequate empirical basis for placing dollar values on int...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of boxes
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• PART I Introduction
• PART II Bottom-up estimates of the cost of crime and justice
• PART III Methodologies for estimating the cost of crime
• PART IV Policy analysis of crime control and prevention programs
• PART V Special topics in the cost of crime and justice
• Index