Human Factors in the Maritime Domain

Michelle Grech, Tim Horberry, Thomas Koester

• Publisher: CRC Press
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000709186
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Industrial Health & Safety
• Index: Technology & Engineering

The piecemeal fashion in which human factors research has been conducted in the maritime domain makes information retrieval available only by scanning through numerous research journals and conference papers. Bringing together human factors information from this and other domains, Human Factors in the Maritime Domain integrates a common body of knowledge into one single volume.

The book provides the vital background information necessary to acquire a core knowledge base and a much-needed overview of human factors within the maritime domain. It starts by putting the topic into an historical and theoretical context, moves onto more specific and detailed topics and contemporary thinking in human factors, then reviews new maritime technology. The authors take a holistic approach based on a model of the socio-technical system of work in the maritime domain. They synthesize available knowledge and research, then present in an easily acceptable framework with example, illustrations, and case studies whenever possible, making the text rigorous, useful, and enjoyable.

The three authors draw on a range of diverse backgrounds including working as a maritime surveyor, transport consultant, human factors lecturer, and mechanical engineer. They have undertaken maritime research in Denmark, Australia, Malta, and the UK. They have published several other human factor books on related topics. This combination of human factors knowledge, maritime wisdom, and substantial publication experience results in a book that is effective and practical.

chapter one

Introduction to maritime human factors

1.1 History and development of maritime human factors

1.1.1 Early days: hazards of shipping

To appreciate the importance of the human element within maritime operations, we need to understand how this domain historically has gone about its business. Historical maritime snippets may enlighten us on this issue.

Some of the qualities most valued in mariners prior to mechanically propelled ships included physical strength, endurance, an ability to withstand a high level of discomfort, and to some extent an indifference to pain and even death. This is summed up in Gomes De Brito’s translated description of a mariner’s life in the fifteenth century.

Being about to write down the disastrous voyage of this great ship, it occurred to me how rash men are in their undertakings, chief among which, or one of the greatest, was confiding their lives to four planks lashed together, and to the discretion of the furious winds, with which they live in such wise that we can rightly say “quia ventus est vita mea” (my life is like a wind), and thus traverse the vast expanse of the watery element, encompassing the whole earth. (Gomes De Brito, Boxer, and Blackmore 2001)

Shipping, although profitable, was considered a dangerous business in those days and men who traversed the sea were believed to be either reckless or foolish. The ship Sao Paolo, referred to as “the great ship” in the above text, foundered off the coast of Sumatra in 1562. This was actually one of several tragic shipwrecks that occurred during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on what was then known as the carreiri da India, the sea route between Portugal and the Indian subcontinent. This trade route was known to be very profitable, but not without its hazards. It was well recognized as notoriously dangerous. During the period from 1550 to 1650 sources point to losses from shipwrecks reaching “alarming proportions.” Most of these shipwrecks occurred on the homeward journey, suggesting that most were overladen with cargo. Information from several sources revealed that the primary cause for the loss of so many carracks^* in the Indian Ocean:

were mainly due to willful overloading by the officers, passengers and crew, and to the superficial and inadequate careening carried out during the ship’s stay at Goa. Contributory causes were inefficient stowage of the cargo; leaving Goa too late in the season; the crankiness of the top heavy four deck carracks; ships in a fleet parting company so as to reach Lisbon first and get a better market for their “private trade”; the mulish obstinacy of some of the pilots; and the inexperience of some gentlemen-commanders. (Gomes De Brito, Boxer, and Blackmore 2001)

Human error, although not mentioned explicitly, had already been identified as one of the primary factors contributing to these casualties. To some extent, there was some kind of control exercised on these “dangerous practices,” as they were called in those days. During this period there were so-called standing orders in place that contained stringent rules against “overloading, improper stowage of cargo, abuse of berth and deck space, the enlistment of unqualified mariners, or their substitution by inexperienced men” (Gomes De Brito, Boxer, and Blackmore 2001). These orders were introduced mainly as a curb to the large losses of galleons and their expensive, lavish cargo, rather than as a risk-reduction strategy for preventing any further loss of lives. In addition, a punishable offense was instituted for pilots found guilty of failing to communicate effectively with their colleagues on board. Printed regulations were also distributed to all ships on this route. However, ship losses continued. It was only after 1650 that records point to a sudden drop in shipwrecks. The main reason for this was attributed to the hanging of some ships’ officers who were charged with misconduct over the loss of two galleons in the late 1650s. This may perhaps explain why a punitive attitude is still so deeply rooted in the maritime domain, although the domain does not go as far as hanging ships’ crew anymore. The perception in this domain, even today, seems to be that punishment works (Chapter 7 provides further discussion on this topic). These hangings actually did act as a deterrent for a short while, dropping the shipwreck toll in line with the English and Dutch ships, which set an average “good” standard for that time. Other nations, such as France, introduced a more regulatory approach. Its measures included ship inspections to ensure that vessels complied with loading regulations of the time. However, such deterrents were short-lived, with hazard prevention being a more or less rudimentary matter.

1.1.2 1800s to World War II: birth of international ship safety regulations

Up to the mid-1800s, people avoided traveling by sea as much as possible, as it was well known to be a hazardous venture. Navigational aids were virtually non-existent, with mariners relying on crude implements to guide them. Shipboard fires and collisions with icebergs were feared and cited as contributory causes in a large number of ship losses. During the winter of 1820 alone, maritime casualty statistics point to figures of as many as two thousand ships lost in the North Sea. Winter travel was seldom undertaken in the days of the more vulnerable wooden ships, but this changed dramatically with the advent of the “invincible” iron ship.

The 1850s hailed the arrival of iron and steel and steam engines, which provided the technology for the construction of larger, stronger, faster ships, considered to be more controllable and less susceptible to damage. Such technical advances, however, introduced a new breed of hazards. Early steam engines were not without their problems and did tend to explode sometimes, leaving behind huge death tolls. The American steamboat Sultana was one such ship. On 27 April 1865, three of its four boilers exploded while traveling on the Mississippi River in Memphis, Tennessee (Potter 1992). An estimated 1,700 of the Sultana’s overcrowded 2,400 passengers were either killed in the explosion or drowned when the Sultana sank. An official enquiry revealed that the cause of the tragedy was a leaky and poorly repaired steam boiler, exacerbated by the overcrowding, which made the vessel too top heavy. There was much finger pointing as a result of this tragedy; however, in the wake of the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln and the end of the Civil War in the United States at that time, interest in the Sultana disaster fizzled.

Maritime safety standards were at best laissez faire in the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, people’s perception of sea travel changed dramatically, and by the late 1800s and early 1900s it became one of the most popular modes of travel. Advances in technology opened a market for passenger ships. Maritime transport was at this stage booming, so it was natural for authorities to start exercising at least some kind of control via regulatory national safety standards available at the time, especially because the general population venturing to the sea had extended beyond the typical mariner. This period also heralded the birth of classification societies, which were private organizations that provided information to insurance companies on the quality of ships and their equipment. Accidents and majors disasters encouraged various countries to cooperate more where introduction of certain maritime safety standards was concerned. This sparked the start of a reactive maritime culture in which new safety rules were introduced following major accidents. In 1879, the first joint rules for an international code of signals were adopted by nineteen countries. In 1880 and 1881, the first set of international rules on the “prevention of collisions at sea” and “health and safety” for “steam navigation” were signed. This led to adoption of more rules relating to wireless telegraphy and lifesaving equipment. It was not long after, that safety standards in specific areas were adopted at a rapid pace, especially where passenger travel was concerned. One of the most discussed and well-known tragedies in history initiated a significant campaign toward improved passenger ship safety standards. On April 14, 1912 the RMS Titanic struck an iceberg off Newfoundland (Canada) and sank together with 1,500 of its passengers and crew. This tragedy created a media frenzy when the realization dawned that, had the vessel been fitted with adequate safety equipment, the death toll would have been significantly less. This sparked the first International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held in London in 1914. The conference addressed safety technical issues that came out of the Titanic enquiry, such as the adequacy of lifeboats, hull subdivision, and radio communications equipment on passenger ships. World War I, however, kept the 1914 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention at bay for a while, but not for long. The first SOLAS Convention came into force in 1919.

Regrettably, maritime history is plagued with ship accidents and losses such as the Titanic, although fortunately not always as severe. Reaction to high-profile accidents has historically resulted in the introduction of new regulatory measures. This trend continues even today within the international maritime community. Recently, however, there has been a shift in this approach and the international maritime community has finally come to realize that being proactive, rather than following a historically reactive approach, is the key to accident prevention.

1.1.3 World War II to the end of the 1960s: beginnings of maritime human factors

World War II created a springboard for specific scientific human factors work, attributable mainly to human limitations becoming more apparent. This, however, was not as a response to the soaring rate of maritime accidents and lives lost at sea. Instead, the requirement for people to perform more effectively was seen as important during time of war. In this regard, an increase in personnel efficiency of between 15 and 35 percent was frequently quoted as a result of scientific studies in human factors conducted during World War II. This provided the impetus for further research work in the area of maritime human factors—it also happened across other domains such as aviation.

Some of the more prominent work in maritime human factors was initiated by the United States with the establishment of the Committee on Undersea Warfare in 1946. A Panel on Psychology and Physiology was appointed with a specific mandate to draw up an outline for a number of surveys in applied research on problems related to human factors in undersea warfare. Wartime dictated that most of this work focused mainly on naval vessels. Donald Lindsley, then chairman of the panel, had a pretty good notion of what he wanted to achieve from these surveys.

In each case there is the problem of whether the task imposed by equipment and the amount of information to be obtained from it is within the range of the capacities of the human individuals using it, whether they can translate the information, interpret it if necessary, and pass it on to controls centers where it can be used to best advantage. (Donald Lindsey, Preface for Panel on Psychology and Physiology, 1949)

Although the outcome of the reports that came out of these surveys focused on submarine issues, the intention was to allow cross transfer of research and development effort to other maritime platforms. The studies focused on such factors as visual and auditory problems, design ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• The Authors
• Chapter 1 Introduction to maritime human factors
• Chapter 2 Individual factors: Psychological capabilities and limitations
• Chapter 3 Individual–task interaction factors
• Chapter 4 Communication and team work
• Chapter 5 Work environment
• Chapter 6 Interacting with technology
• Chapter 7 Organization, society and culture
• Chapter 8 Methods for data collection
• Chapter 9 The future: Trends in maritime human factors
• References
• Glossary
• Index