Europe's Strategic Future

From Crisis to Coherence?

Sarah Raine

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781000733501
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Sicurezza nazionale

Europe has suffered a decade of crises, with sovereign-debt troubles leading to austerity policies that exacerbated divisions inside member states and between them. Thereafter the Union was confronted with the challenges posed by a revanchist Russia in Ukraine and by a surge in migration from the Middle East and other conflict zones. The June 2016 UK vote to leave the Union threatened further damage to an institution that acknowledges it has failed to punch its weight in the spheres of foreign, defence and security policy. While that is a chronic shortcoming, its impact is becoming more acute as economic power moves East and Europe can no longer count on the steadfast support and leadership of the United States. The costs of Europe's failure to achieve strategic coherence and effect are steadily rising. This Adelphi book addresses the consequences of Europe's multiple crises for its standing as a strategic actor, acknowledging its unique character and capabilities. It argues that strategic thought and action is belatedly being informed by the deteriorating security environment, and that nascent initiatives have the potential to effect a step-change. There are grounds for cautious optimism, visible in the success of stabilisation and counter-piracy operations as well as coordinated diplomatic activity. Also, the continent's leading powers are becoming more pragmatic about how cooperation is organised within and beyond the Union. These developments offer the possibility that Europe might meet its aspirations to be a strategic actor of consequence, despite a long-track record of disappointment and the still-considerable obstacles that lie in its path.

CHAPTER ONE
The context and anatomy of crises

The desire to preserve Europe’s strategic relevance in a changing global environment has informed the evolution of the European Union from the outset. Already in 1951, when six states signed the Treaty of Paris to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), cooperation was about more than just coal and steel. French economist and diplomat Jean Monnet was one of the community’s chief architects and a founding father of what has become the EU. Writing in 1954, when Europe still represented 37% of global GDP and 13% of the world’s population, he warned that ‘our countries have become too small for today’s world, faced with the … America and Russia of today and the China and India of tomorrow’.¹ Decades later, he remained steadfast in his outlook: ‘The problems that our countries need to sort out are not the same as in 1950. But the method remains the same: a transfer of power to common institutions, majority rule and a common approach to finding a solution to problems are the only answer in our current state of crisis.’²

The progress of process

The early concept that a European Community could become a key security provider for the continent was given impetus by the demands put upon the US during the Korean War and the impending tensions of bipolarity. In late May 1952, two months before the Treaty of Paris came into force, the ECSC’s six foreign ministers signed a treaty creating a European Defence Community (EDC), with the intention that it would last for 50 years. In the event, the treaty did not reach its second birthday. After a toxic debate over the loss of national sovereignty and the revival of German militancy that the initiative appeared to promote, in 1954 the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC. With America’s direct engagement in the future of European security increasingly embedded in the developing institutions of NATO, defence discussions under a strictly European umbrella were taken off the table.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which launched a more general common market in Europe, was explicit in the qualification it gave to its new venture: the European Economic Community (EEC). Although the EEC had no official mandate covering foreign and security policy, the European Commission was given responsibility for negotiating EEC trade policy with third parties, initiating a presence for the community on the international stage and beginning the development of today’s dense web of FTAs that serve not just Europe’s prosperity but also its profile and influence. The Treaty of Rome also established a multilateral European Development Fund to contribute to the economic and social development of the African colonies (and former colonies) of EEC member states. By 1963, the first seeds of EU development policy were in place. Here, too, the EU’s profile would grow over time as EU member states and institutions collectively became the world’s leading donor of official development assistance (ODA), with the possibilities for global partnerships and influence this entails.

Following the departure from the international stage of French President Charles de Gaulle, with his suspicion of supranational institutions, in 1970 community members finally agreed a format to enable foreign-policy coordination. Labelled ‘European Political Cooperation’ (EPC), it created a process for consultation in which ministers of foreign affairs would meet twice a year to discuss world affairs, supported by structures below them meeting with greater regularity as well as the appointment of a representative to handle EEC affairs in the foreign ministry of each member state. All business was to be conducted on a strictly intergovernmental basis. Regard for concerns of sovereignty was strict. It was not permitted to discuss foreign policy towards former colonies of member states, nor was it permitted to discuss defence policy. No mandate or role was given to the EEC’s institutions. Issues with the EPC’s capacity and efficacy quickly arose, in particular as more member states joined the community.

The EPC enjoyed a smattering of successes, most obviously with its sponsorship of the 1973 Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Conceived as a forum for promoting dialogue between East and West, this was the predecessor of today’s Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Yet the limitations of the EPC were also clear. Europe was, in the words of François Duchêne, one of Monnet’s key advisers, ‘long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’.³ Indeed, by 1982, international-relations theorist Hedley Bull would issue a clear indictment of the EU’s ‘civilian power’, arguing that ‘“Europe” is not an actor in international affairs, and does not seem likely to become one’.⁴

From Maastricht to Lisbon

The 1991 Gulf War highlighted Europe’s geopolitical irrelevance and disunity. Though the European Commission quickly rejected Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait as ‘contrary to international law’, as it became apparent that diplomatic statements alone would not dislodge Iraqi forces from Kuwait, national foreign-policy interests diverged. The UK and France, as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), both dispatched forces to the region. Anglo-French differences were on display, however, over the possibility of continuing the fight on Iraqi soil. Germany, by contrast, decided against deploying troops, confining its contribution to pledges of money and limited logistical support. Belgium reportedly refused to provide British troops with ammunition.⁵

As US leadership united a coalition to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait under the aegis of UNSC Resolution 678, Europe’s lack of a united approach to the use of military force precipitated a wider fracturing of its political responses to the crisis. One month prior to the war, the European Parliament voted to approve a resolution calling for no military action while there was a prospect for peaceful settlement. Fifty Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) wrote to their counterparts in the US Congress to note that European opposition to war was ‘broader and deeper’ than that being represented by European governments.⁶ French efforts to pull off a diplomatic coup through last-minute bilateral negotiations immediately prior to the UN deadline for Iraqi withdrawal were conducted without consultation or sanction from France’s allies. Not only was Europe a ‘political dwarf’, then Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens concluded, it was also ‘a military worm’.⁷

When the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established two years later as the second of three pillars (alongside European Communities and Justice and Home Affairs) under the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, it was evident that the institutions and processes being created would not quickly be matched by meaningful policies. And although foreign and security policy were now formally brought under the umbrella of the European project, the CFSP was excluded from the ‘community method’, limiting the influence of the supranational powers of the community – the commission, the parliament and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This made sound political sense but had practical disadvantages. The CFSP had no instruments of its own and no EU institutional actors to represent its interests. It also lacked direct links to any of the instruments where a common policy could most readily make itself felt. Trade and development cooperation, for example, fell under the first pillar of the commission. For at least some of its participants, moreover, the CFSP was as much about furthering integration, forging identity and even salvaging credibility as it was about having real external impact.

In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam put a single ‘face’ on the CFSP for the first time, in the form of a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The treaty also strengthened links to the Western European Union (WEU) (a parallel military structure grounded in NATO), adopting its 1992 ‘Petersberg Tasks’ including ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peace making’, as the military mission for the CFSP.⁸ That same year, EU heads of state and government adopted a ‘Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’, expressing their determination that the Union should ‘play its full role on the international stage’.⁹ The birth of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) marked the long-delayed inclusion of a military element to European integration. The CFSP was starting to get the mandate and processes to enable it to evolve into something more than a display of good intentions.

In December 1999 the Helsinki Headline Goal set a clear target for these emerging ambitions for defence cooperation. By 2003 the EU should have ‘an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises’. The Union should be able to deploy military forces for operations up to army-corps level (50,000– 60,000 troops) capable of conducting the range of Petersberg tasks. These forces should be deployable within 60 days and sustainable for one year. Concerns that ‘militarisation’ of the EU would weaken its unique selling point as a civilian actor helped fuel parallel EU efforts to boost civilian crisis-management capabilities, including in the areas of policing, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.¹⁰ In March 2003, in what is known as the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements, the EU was permitted to make use of NATO assets and capabilities. This development helped facilitate the EU’s first-ever military operation when, in December 2003, it took over from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony in Macedonia.

The gap between ambition and delivery nevertheless remained a persistent feature of EU foreign and security policy-making. Some critics have blamed this not so much on missed opportunities as on unrealistic expectations, arguing that what the EU can achieve in this sphere amounts to nothing more than ‘eternal fantasÿ.¹¹ Certainly events did not take long to re-expose the underlying differences that the EU’s progress on process had helped partially to conceal. The 2003 Iraq War was another low point in European unity in international affairs, as European countries differed between themselves and with their US ally over the threat to international security posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the legitimacy of military intervention.

In December 2003 the EU adopted its first European Security Strategy (ESS). ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ called for the EU to be ‘more active’ in pursuing its strategic objectives. One key challenge, as NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept had already noted, was the transformation of Cold War defence systems and practices to meet new collective security threats. The threats prioritised by the ESS – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and the threats of failed states and organised crime – could not be managed by individual member states on their own. In a changing world, cooperation in foreign and security policy was becoming not so much a question of ideology but of practicality.

The ESS was a good document, well-timed. In addition to its new operation in Macedonia, the EU had also begun two missions in the western Balkans and launched a modest military stabilisation mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In October 2003, moreover, France, Germany and the UK had sent their foreign ministers to Tehran with the support of EU High Representative Javier Solana, giving European nations a front seat in the efforts to negotiate a curtailment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The ESS prompted a new 2010 Headline Goal expanding the range of EU military tasks to include counter-terrorism training for third countries, support for security-sector reform and the development of EU rapid-response capabilities. It also laid the groundwork for new initiatives such as a European Defence Agency (EDA) to work on correcting European capability shortfalls, an EU Civilian– Military Cell and the establishment of EU Battlegroups.

In 2008, the European Council raised the bar further. The EU had now to strive to be capable of simultaneously planning and conducting two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations (up to 10,000 troops, up to two years), two rapid-response operations using EU Battlegroups, an evacuation operation for European nationals, a maritime or air surveillance/interdic-tion mission, a civilian–military humanitarian operation (up to 90 days) and a dozen ESDP missions including one major mission (up to 3,000 experts, lasting several years). The level of ambition for EU civilian crisis management was also updated. This included the capability to run several civilian missions (including a larger substitution mission in a non-benign environment and an enhanced rapid-response capability) as well as steps to ensure the close interlinking of civilian and military crisis-management operations.¹²

These upgrades in strategic ambitions continued, however, to be undermined by uncomfortable questions over the degree to which member states were willing to make good even on the promise of collating the capabilities these upgrades demanded, let alone deploying them in operations. Yet the EU had long developed through process- and institution-building, in the expectation that the substance to populate these initiatives would follow. In this respect, defence was being treated no differently to any other area of concern.

The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon was meant to be another turning point in increasing the coherence, effectiveness and visibility of the EU on the international stage, including through its engagements under the CFSP and ESDP. While making it clear that member states’ competencies in foreign policy would not be infringed, it brought all EU foreign policy under one treaty title, ending the pillar system of Maastricht.¹³ It also gave the EU its own legal personality, meaning that the EU could now sign international treaties in its areas of competence and join international organisations. The EU’s global standing and ambition would be represented and prosecuted by its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who now became one of the vice presidents of the commission (HR/VP) and who now chaired a newly created Foreign Affairs Council. The work of the HR/VP would be supported by a European External Action Service, a quasi-diplomatic service with delegations around the world.

The idea was to give EU foreign policy greater prominence and consistency. The ESDP was rebranded as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), with the range of Petersberg tasks expanded specifically to include activities such as disarmament operations, military advice and assistance, and post-conflict stabilisation. A mutual-defence clause obliged member states to ‘provide aid and assistance by all the means in their power’ if a member state were ‘the victim of armed aggression on its territory’. A new solidarity clause was intended to facilitate the mobilisation of the Union and its member states in the provision of mutual assistance following natural or man-made disasters, including terrorist attacks, on the territory of a member state.¹⁴ The treaty also provided for the possibility of ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’ (PESCO) between member states on defence, activated in consultation with the HR/VP and with the support of a qualified majority.

Other provisions with foreign-policy implications included a policy objective on the security of energy supplies and a move to develop a European space policy. While calling for consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these and other policies, the treaty cemented ‘the comprehensive approach’ as the ‘guiding principle for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution’.¹⁵

With the Lisbon Treaty, structural divisions between the EU’s institutions and its member states were meant to be diminished, a common understanding of what European external action should look like evolved, and institutional barriers to effective follow-through on this understanding decreased if not quite removed.

Beyond CFSP/ESDP

At least as signif...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Glossary
• Introduction
• Chapter One The context and anatomy of crises
• Chapter Two The internal consequences of crises
• Chapter Three Europe, the EU and foreign affairs
• Chapter Four Europe, the EU, security and defence
• Chapter Five Determining Europe’s strategic prospects
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Index