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Proxy Warfare
About This Book
Proxy wars represent a perennial strand in the history of conflict. The appeal of 'warfare on the cheap' has proved an irresistible strategic allure for nations through the centuries. However, proxy wars remain a missing link in contemporary war and security studies. In this timely book Andrew Mumford sheds new light on the dynamics and lineage of proxy warfare from the Cold War to the War on Terror, whilst developing a cogent conceptual framework to explain their appeal. Tracing the political and strategic development of proxy wars throughout the last century, they emerge as a dominant characteristic of contemporary conflict. The book ably shows how proxy interventions often prolong existing conflicts given the perpetuity of arms, money and sometimes proxy fighters sponsored by third party donors. Furthermore, it emphasizes why, given the direction of the War on Terror, the rise of China as a global power, and the prominence now achieved by non-state actors in the 'Arab Spring', the phenomenon of proxy warfare is increasingly relevant to understandings of contemporary security. Proxy Warfare is an indispensable guide for students and scholars interested in the evolution and potential future direction of war and conflict in the modern world.
Frequently asked questions
Information
CHAPTER ONE
What is Proxy War?
Defining the Parameters of Proxy Wars
⢠Can one classify as a proxy war one in which an external power intervenes directly?
No. Indirect intervention is the fundamental element of proxy war (see the later section for a full discussion of this issue).
⢠Is it essential that both small states in a local war serve as a proxy for an external power?
No. The premise that proxy wars build upon inter-state conflicts is misleading; however, it is not indicative of such wars to be symmetrical in their provision of proxies. Furthermore, such wars are not confined to âsmall statesâ acting as the proxy (as the final question addresses), as this assumes that proxy wars only grow out of pre-existing inter-state wars between such states. They can feed off other forms of war too, and involve large states or non-state actors.
⢠Can we regard a war by proxy for one side and not the other?
Yes. Take, for example, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. For the Soviets, this war constituted a direct intervention involving the overt deployment of large numbers of their own troops in order to prop up an allied regime. For the Americans, however, it presented itself as an opportunity to engage in a proxy war by funding and arming the mujahedeen fighters who wished to repel the Soviets. The same war therefore represented two distinct forms of intervention, one direct and one by proxy, for the two main superpowers (see the next section on the dynamics of proxy wars for a further discussion of this issue).
⢠Does the consideration of the war by one external party as a war by proxy make it possible to define a war as such, or do we need more external parties to define it as a war by proxy?
No. The categorization of a conflict as a proxy war is not necessarily for states themselves to certify. Indeed, external parties are more likely to refer to it as âforeign internal assistanceâ, âlong-range projection capabilitiesâ, or some other such semantic device.
⢠Does the consideration of the war by the external parties as a war by proxy make it possible to define a war as such, or do we need it to be considered as a proxy war by one or both of the small states?
No. Again, it is less the involved parties who are likely to classify themselves as being engaged in a proxy war, but more likely the wider, non-involved, international community. But the more important point remains not who asked whom to intervene (for example, a client-state request or a benefactor-state offer), but how the very presence of externally provided arms or money is affecting the dynamic of that war.
⢠How does one distinguish between proxy relationships and alliance relationships?
On occasion, with difficulty. It is often pre-existing alliances between states that lead to the request for, or offer of, proxy intervention. However, it remains important for us to distinguish between the meaning of an ally as a treaty-bound friend willing to share in the blood cost of a war to achieve a shared strategic vision, and a benefactor state utilizing a proxy war strategy exactly because they are not willing to share that burden. A proxy relationship is therefore far more impermanent, temperamental and opportunistic than alliance relationships, which are often built on more common foundations of shared identity or threat perceptions.
⢠When is a big state helping a small state and when is it using the latter?
This comes down to a subjective interpretation of the motive behind the intervention (see chapter 2 for a thorough discussion of these motives). We always need to bear in mind what Bertil DunĂŠr has labelled the âcompatibility of interestsâ during such interventions.11 This is the foundation of the benefactorâproxy relationship, as it reveals the perceived mutual benefit that the intervention reaps if the strategic goal motivating the proxy war is achieved. This, however, must be couched in terms of the asymmetry between the actors, traditionally (but not exclusively) encompassing a more powerful resource-rich state and a less influential state or non-state proxy.
⢠Does a big state act as a proxy for a small state?
On occasion, yes. This answer in large part is predicated upon an understanding that big states can unwittingly fight a proxy war on a smaller stateâs behalf. The American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Husseinâs regime, for example, fulfilled a long-term Iranian ambition by cementing Tehran as a pre-eminent regional power despite the Americanâs lack of desire for this outcome. The fulfilment of a strategic goal by proxy does not necessarily have to be a conscious or deliberate act.
⢠Is the definition of the term âwar by proxyâ limited only to big powerâsmall state relationships?
No. Proxy wars are not fought exclusively by or for states. Particularly in the post-Cold War period, non-state actors have been harnessed as proxies (such as the utilization of Hamas by Syria to attack Israel). Chapter 3 engages in detail with exactly who fights proxy wars, and explores the dynamic between states and non-state actors.
The Dynamics of Proxy Wars
Table of contents
- Cover
- HalfTitle
- TitlePage
- Copyright
- Content
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction: The Rise of Proxy Wars
- 1: What is Proxy War?
- 2: Why Does Proxy War Appeal?
- 3: Who Engages in Proxy War?
- 4: How are Proxy Wars Fought?
- 5: The Future of Proxy War
- Conclusion: The Continuing Appeal of Proxy Warfare
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index