The Social Psychology of Collective Action

Sara Breinlinger, Caroline Kelly

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317791621
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

In recent years there has been a growth of single-issue campaigns in western democracies and a proliferation of groups attempting to exert political influence and achieve social change. In this context, it is important to consider why individuals do or don't get involved in collective action, for example in the trade union movement and the women's movement.
Social psychologists have an important contribution to make in addressing this question. The social psychological approach directly concerns the relationship between the individual and society and a number of theories have been developed in the field, particularly by contemporary European researchers. Yet, surprisingly, there has never been, until now, a concerted attempt to bring these various strands of research together in a coherent, detailed presentation of the social psychological approach to collective action.
The authors of The Social Psychology of Collective Action review and integrate a number of theories developed in this field as well as presenting their own original research and data. The research discussed in the book ranges over a number of different contexts, with a particular focus on women's groups organizing around issues of gender. Questions addressed include: why do women get involved in women's groups? What part is played by experiences of discrimination in the family and in the workplace? What are the benefits of group involvement? How are feminist activists perceived by others who choose not to get involved? Findings from questionnaires and interviews are integrated with contemporary social psychological theory, especially social identity theory.

Chapter 1
Introduction

There is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families (Margaret Thatcher, interviewed in Woman's Own, 31 October 1987).

Since 1979 in Britain successive Conservative governments have promoted a radical individualism, emphasizing individual interests over group interests, individual action over collective action, where the family is the only legitimate source of social identity. The extent to which this aim has been achieved has been the subject of both social scientific and popular discussions during the 1980s and 1990s.

It is 30 years since Europe witnessed a surge of collective organization and activity. For example, from 1968 the trade union movement in Britain passed through a period of spectacular growth, as membership rose by almost three million, peaking at an all-time record figure in 1979 of 13-3 million. Associated with this growing membership of a primarily collective organization was a dramatic resurgence of collective action. Between 1968 and 1974, and again in 1978-79, Britain experienced its biggest waves of strike action for 50 years.

The growth of collective organization and activity was not, however, confined to the industrial relations system, or the economy, but was part of a much more comprehensive 'cycle of protest' (Tarrow, 1991). The 1960s marked the beginnings of the anti-war movement in America, the upsurge of civil rights campaigns by American blacks and Northern Irish catholics, the renewal of the women's movement after a long period of quiescence and the rapid appearance of a politicized and radical student movement in many advanced, capitalist countries. Tarrow (1994) describes a wave of student and labour unrest which swept across Europe between 1968 and 1972, notably in France, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Germany and Poland.

The appearance of such a multiplicity of social movements raised important theoretical and empirical issues which are still the subject of intense debate. Above all, what was the relation between the old social movements based on unions and workers' parties and the allegedly new social movements with their cross-class constituencies?

Yet even as this issue was being debated, the economic and political context of collective action was being radically transformed. The post-war economic boom ran out of steam and the long years of economic growth, full employment and job security gave way in the 1980s and 1990s to the return of mass unemployment. Politically, Britain and America witnessed significant shifts to the Right as the governments of Thatcher and Reagan came to office, determined to roll back many of the social changes of the postwar period, such as extensive welfare spending and public provision of services. Ideologically, these administrations were concerned above all to promote a rigorous form of individualism and to roll back the collectivist tide. The British government set out to weaken collective organizations, such as trade unions; it introduced restrictions on forms of collective action, such as demonstrations; cut back on collective provision of essential services; facilitated increased individual ownership of housing and company shares; and encouraged individuals and their families to become self-reliant and financially independent of others. These political developments were associated with the winding down of Tarrow's 'cycle of protest' as trade union movements went into decline, the women's movement fragmented and the incidence of collective actions, such as largescale street demonstrations and workers' strikes, fell away, particularly but not exclusively, in Britain and America. In Europe the number of workers involved in strike action fell sharply after 1980, most of all in France, Italy and Belgium.

This in turn led to debates about the decline of collectivism and the rise of individualism. For present purposes, we may define this alleged change as declining identification with, and dependence on, groups outside the family, though as we shall see later, there is much debate about the nature and definitions of individualism and collectivism. Attention focused among other things on whether the alleged decline of collectivism was a product of short-term political and economic circumstances or whether it was the consequence and the symptom of a much deeper shift to a post-industrial or post-modernist era. Equally contentious was the issue of whether all forms of collectivism were in decline or whether it was more specifically the trade union collectivism of organized workers that was being displaced by a more complex pattern of specific collectivisms organized through the 'new social movements' (Crook, Pakulski and Waters, 1992). Finally, there was growing debate about the continued salience of social class as a form of group identity and a determinant of behaviours such as voting (see Crewe and Sarlvik, 1983 and Heath, Jowell and Curtice, 1985, for opposing interpretations of what came to be known as the 'class de-alignment' debate).

We now turn to a more detailed discussion of the two specific social movements which are the contexts for the present empirical research, namely the trade union movement and the women's movement. Subsequent sections focus on the key concepts of collectivism and individualism and the main theoretical approaches which have been developed to study collective interests, organization and action. Finally, in this chapter, we consider the methodological issues which determined our own choice of research strategy.

The Trade Union Movement

Between 1968 and 1979, British trade union membership rose by 2.9 million and strike activity (frequency of strikes, workers involved and days lost) reached levels that had not been seen for almost 50 years. In the years after 1979, the membership gains of the 1970s were completely wiped out and the number of employees in unions fell from the 1979 peak of 13 3 million to just over 8.4 million by the end of 1993. Strike activity showed an equally precipitate decline. Between 1968 and 1979, the annual number of strikes never once fell below 2000 and was often much higher, peaking at just under 4000 in 1970. Since 1979, the annual total has never been above 2000 and has continued to fall way below that figure: In the early 1990s, the annual average number of strikes was about 300-400.

The British miners' strike, which lasted for one year from March 1984 until March 1985, was the longest large strike in British history. At its peak, over a quarter of a million workers were on strike, 10,000 strikers were arrested in the cause of the strike and the number of days lost through the industrial action was over 22 million, the ninth highest annual total since records began in 1893.

Historically, miners had come to be regarded as the vanguard of the trade union movement: In the 1950s, approximately three-quarters of all strikes in Britain took place in the coal mines and the national strikes of 1972 and 1974 by the 300,000 strong National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) helped to bring down the Conservative government. The victorious strikes of the early 1970s symbolized both the industrial and political power of the trade union movement and encouraged other groups of workers to emulate their actions.

By contrast, the defeat of the year-long strike of 1984-85 came to symbolize the collapse of union power in the context of economic recession and in the face of a militant, right-wing government. Within ten years of the 1985 defeat, the NUM has seen its membership collapse from 250,000 to just 15,000. In the aftermath of the defeat, strike activity in Britain has fallen significantly, while in the political sphere, the demise of the NUM has greatly weakened left-wing opposition to the moderate wings of the trade union movement and the Labour Party. Not surprisingly given the way in which the strike continues to figure in public consciousness ten years on, an enormous literature has developed around the strike: One study, published in 1989, discovered over 600 published items (books, chapters, journal and magazine articles and pamphlets) (Winterton and Winterton, 1989).

A wide range of economic, political and legal factors have been discussed in the debate about the decline in union membership and activity. One persistent theme, recently restated by a number of very influential writers, is that the current decline of union membership and activity is not just the normal downturn associated with economic recession, but is the product of a deeper, and secular, decline in collectivism (see Gallie, 1989).

According to Bassett and Cave (1993), unions are organizations that must operate in two markets: They must recruit employees in one market, but they must also persuade employers to recognize them for the purposes of collective bargaining. Since 1979 the demand for union services has declined in both these markets. Employees are less interested in joining unions, as shown by the figures on membership decline. Employers are also less attracted to unions as shown by the fall in the percentage of the workforce covered by collective bargaining arrangements. Moreover, employers are increasingly seeking to individualize their relations with employees, for instance, by negotiating with them individually rather than collectively. It is argued that in response to employer initiatives, as well as to State policies in the 1980s, employees themselves have become more individualistic and less interested in the traditional, collective services supplied by unions. Flowing from this analysis are a series of proposed reforms of union organization and activity, central to which is the downgrading of collectivism, described by the authors as simply an 'operating technique', not a root principle of trade unionism. In general, they urge unions to concentrate on individual, rather than collective, services to members, such as advice on contracts, legal assistance and financial packages.

H.P. Brown (1990) offers a more historical and wide-ranging analysis of the decline of worker collectivism, arriving nonetheless at very similar policy prescriptions. For Brown, worker collectivism was understood as a sense of interdependence and solidarity with fellow workers. It was rooted in the deprivations of industrialization, in particular, the poverty, job insecurity and lack of rights that were the normal conditions of life for the early working class. This deprivation engendered a powerful sense of collectivism that was reinforced by the concentration of workers in large factories and by their geographical segregation in the poorest areas of large towns and cities. Hence the characteristic pattern of working-class collective organization and activity, common throughout the capitalist world, of trade unions, social democratic parties, strike action and political agitation.

But the development of twentieth-century capitalism has gradually eroded the roots of worker collectivism and contributed to the recent decline of the trade union movement. Affluence has removed the worst excesses of poverty and led to increased financial independence for working-class households. (According to Triandis, 1989, financial independence should lead in turn to greater social independence as workers become less dependent for their welfare on membership of particular unions or political groups.) The growth of unions and political parties has secured more rights for workers, while the emergence of the welfare state further reduced poverty and ameliorated the worst consequences of job insecurity.

The effects on collectivism of large workplaces and residential segregation have been greatly weakened by the recent sharp fall in the average size of manufacturing workplaces and by the longer term disintegration of working-class communities. The latter has been further undermined by the geographical mobility of the workforce and the expansion of travel-to-work areas. All of these factors further weaken the attachment of individual employees to particular workplace or residential groups and strengthen their individualism. Insofar as trade unionism is the embodiment of worker collectivism, then these developments throughout the twentieth century have gradually weakened its traditional appeal. It is again argued that if unions are to survive at all in the future it will be because of their adaptation to the new, and probably irreversible, tide of individualism and their promotion of individual rather than collective services.

Some of the trends depicted by Bassett and Cave (1993) and Brown (1990) are undeniably taking place: Individualization of pay bargaining, employer resistance to union recognition, geographical mobility, decline of old, working-class communities, decline of workplace size (at least in manufacturing, though not in retail, where the trend is in the opposite direction) and a rise in living standards. However, the argument that these trends are responsible for an erosion of worker collectivism is more controversial. Kelly and Waddington (1995) argue that evidence shows that employees continue to define their interests collectively (see for example, Kelly and Kelly, 1991) and that what has changed since 1979 in Britain is a shift in the balance of power between unions and employers. As union power has declined, so too has perceived union effectiveness. On the plausible and well-supported assumption that people's reasons for joining unions are largely instrumental (Millward, 1990), then a decline in perceived effectiveness is likely to have eroded potential union support amongst employees. In relation to employers, there is indeed declining demand for unions in the employer market, but this is because employers have the power to resist unionization and not because employees have become more individualized.

Brown's argument about affluence, deprivation and collectivism is also problematic. Employees can feel relatively deprived at almost any salary level and can still feel unfairly or unjustly treated (Runciman, 1966), In addition, whereas working-class communities did reinforce a sense of collectivism amongst their members, it is clear from the upsurge of union membership and strike activity in the 1970s, much of it involving white-collar workers, that such communities are not necessary for the genesis of worker collectivism.

In conclusion, there has undoubtedly been a decline in various forms of collective organization and action in the industrial relations sphere, but the extent to which this trend is symptomatic of a deeper decline in collectivism is more controversial and not well supported by empirical evidence. We turn now to consider the other social movement which is the main context for the present research, namely the women's movement.

The Women's Movement

According to Ryan (1992), the rebirth of feminism in the 1960s alongside other social movements can be traced partly to the family-centred years of the 1950s. This was an era which re-established women's place in the home after their brief move into paid employment during World War Two. Although women's labour force participation continued to rise in the post-war period, cultural ideology still defined the wife/mother's role as women's special duty and path to fulfilment. Increasing urbanization and the move away from the extended family network left women isolated. Informal women's groups offered a platform for women's discontent.

As the critical dimensions of women's lives, which traditionally centred on children and domestic labour, were transformed by an urban industrial economy, a new definition of womanhood emerged. During the 1960s there was an increased emphasis on women as workers and less on women as mothers, although in keeping with the ideological contradictions governing women's experience, work outside of the home was still thought to put the child at risk of deprivation (Klein, 1984). However, approval of married women working increased dramatically from 25 per cent in 1945, to 44 per cent in 1967, and to 64 per cent in 1972 (Konek and Kitch, 1994). The traditional view that becoming wives, homemakers and mothers is women's natural destiny was no longer a matter of consensus by 1972. Firestone describes the second wave of feminism as the 'inevitable female response to the development of a technology capable of freeing women from the tyranny of their sexual reproductive roles' (1970: 37). Indeed, with the advent of contraceptive technology, the age of marriage went up and the birthrate decreased. As could be expected, this 'freedom' saw women drawn in increasing numbers into outside employment, yet despite the loosening of traditional roles and an increasing expectation of 'equality' between the sexes, women soon discovered that equality did not always mean equal pay or job opportunities (Randall, 1987).

Opportunities for higher education also expanded in the 1960s and the numbers of highly educated women in both America and Britain rose significantly. Firestone (1970) argues that it is amongst these women that the experience of disparity in status between men and women was most acute and a sense of deprivation vis-ā-vis male peers most predominant. Increased education and the vocalization of discontent went hand-in-hand. By the early 1970s, the notion that 'the personal is political' came to the fore with more demands for personal liberation through social and political action, which contrasted with earlier beliefs (prevalent in the 1950s) that individual problems required individual, even therapeutic solutions.

In the mid-1970s, divisions within the women's movement became more obvious, particularly over the question of separatism. For example, in 1977 militant radical feminists began calling themselves revolutionary feminists, insisting on the total separation of men and women's organizations, at the same time distinguishing their position from cultural feminists (Coote and Campbell, 1987).

Despite conflicts between the different factions of the women's movement, by 1980 there were 99 women's groups and 200 refuges; by 1983 Spare Rib was listing 20 rape crisis centres in England alone; from the late 1970s there were a series of marches to 'Reclaim the Night' from male attackers, and issues of sexuality and pornography also came to the fore.

During the 1980s, the popular media presented the feminist movement as one in crisis. They suggested that this was reflected in the relative infrequency of protests, demonstrations, marches and the dissolution of many of the early consciousness-raising groups. There was also more audible self-criticism within the movement which may have signalled to some observers that contemporary feminism had little to offer women. It was suggested that we had entered into a post-feminist era where feminism is no longer appropriate or necessary (see Faludi,...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures and Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Chapter 1 Introduction
• Chapter 2 Social Psychological Approaches to Collective Action
• Chapter 3 Social Beliefs and Participation: Exploring Associations
• Chapter 4 Explaining Initial Involvement: Why Join Women's Groups?
• Chapter 5 Outcomes of Participation
• Chapter 6 Explaining Non-activism
• Chapter 7 Conclusions
• Appendixes
• References
• Index