Metacognition

A Special Issue of personality and Social Psychology Review

Janet Metcalfe, Janet Metcalfe

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781317759041
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This special issue on the psychology of knowing about knowing bridges the parallels between social and cognitive psychology. It further illustrates the benefits of pursuing in depth these connections and the phenomena and implications associated with them.

Accessible Content and Accessibility Experiences: The Interplay of Declarative and Experiential Information in Judgment

Norbert Schwarz

University of Michigan

Recall tasks render 2 distinct sources of information available: the recalled content and the experienced ease or difficulty with which it can be brought to mind. Because retrieving many pieces of information is more difficult than retrieving only a few, reliance on accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences leads to opposite judgmental outcomes. People are likely to base judgments on accessibility experiences when they adopt a heuristic processing strategy and the informational value of the experience is not called into question. When the experience is considered nondiagnostic, or when a systematic processing strategy is adopted, people rely on accessible content. Implications for the operation of the availability heuristic and the emergence of knowledge accessibility effects are discussed.

Judgment researchers have long been fascinated by how minor events may temporarily influence the accessibility of information in memory, which, in turn, may result in pronounced differences in judgment and behavior. In conceptualizing the role of accessible information, researchers have emphasized two different aspects. On the one hand, several related lines of research focused on what comes to mind, that is, the content that is rendered accessible (see Higgins, 1989, 1996; Schwarz, 1995; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Some of this research showed that we interpret ambiguous information in terms of the applicable concepts that are most accessible at the time (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Other research demonstrated that we rarely retrieve all information that may bear on an issue but base our judgments on the subset of relevant information that is most accessible in memory (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987). In contrast to this emphasis on accessible content, other lines of research focused on how easily something comes to mind, that is, the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of recall. Highlighting the role of subjective accessibility experiences, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic holds that we form judgments of frequency, likelihood, and typicality on the basis of the ease with which exemplars can be brought to mind. Subsequent lines of research explored the role of ease of retrieval in metacognitive judgments (see Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996), including feelings of knowing (e.g., Koriat, 1993), confidence in the accuracy of one’s knowledge (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay, 1993), or judgments of memory (e.g., Jacoby & White-house, 1989). In most cases, research into accessibility phenomena has focused either on the role of accessible declarative information or on the role of subjective accessibility experiences.

In this article I extend this research by addressing the interplay of accessible declarative information and subjective accessibility experiences, focusing on the operation of the availability heuristic and the emergence of knowledge accessibility effects in social judgment. In the first section I summarize key theoretical assumptions and highlight the fact that many of the classic experiments are inherently ambiguous, because the obtained effects may reflect differences in what comes to mind as well as differences in how easily it comes to mind. In the subsequent sections I review research that disentangles the distinct influences of accessible content and accessibility experiences and identifies conditions under which people are likely to draw on accessible content versus subjective accessibility experiences in forming a judgment. In the final section I address the theoretical implications of this research for theorizing in social and cognitive psychology.

The Different Faces of Accessibility: Content and Experience

Psychologists’ differential emphasis on accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences is most clearly exemplified in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic on the one hand and social cognition research into knowledge accessibility effects in social judgment on the other hand. I address both in turn.

Availability Heuristic

Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic postulated a metacognitive judgment process: Individuals are assumed to estimate the frequency of an event, or the likelihood of its occurrence, “by the ease with which instances or associations come to mind” (p. 208). Presumably, they monitor their cognitive processes and infer that a given class of events is frequent when relevant exemplars are easy to bring to mind but rare when exemplars are difficult to bring to mind.

Although this heuristic has stimulated an enormous amount of research (see Sherman & Corty, 1984; Strack, 1985; Taylor, 1982), the classic studies on the issue do not allow strong conclusions about the underlying process. For example, in one of the better known experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1973, Experiment 3) observed that participants overestimated the number of words that begin with the letter r but under-estimated the number of words that have r as the third letter. This finding presumably reflects the fact that words that begin with a certain letter can be brought to mind more easily than words that have a certain letter in the third position. More important, however, this differential ease of recall may influence participants’ frequency estimates in two different ways. On the one hand, participants may use the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of recall as a basis of judgment, as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) description of the availability heuristic. If so, they would estimate a higher frequency if the recall task was experienced as easy rather than difficult. On the other hand, they may recall as many words of each type as possible within the time allotted to them and may base their judgment on the recalled sample of words. If it was easier to recall words that begin with a certain letter, these words would be overrepresented in the recalled sample, again resulting in an estimate of higher frequency. Note, however, that in the latter case, the estimate would be based on recalled content rather than on the subjective experience of ease of recall. In a related study, Gabrielcik and Fazio (1984) observed that exposing participants to subliminally presented words containing the letter t increased participants’ estimates of the frequency of t words. Again, this finding may indicate either that participants could generate more words including a t if primed or that they relied on the ease with which relevant exemplars could be called to mind.

Similar ambiguities apply to other experimental procedures. In another well-known Tversky and Kahneman study (1973, Experiment 8), participants were read two lists of names, one presenting 19 famous men and 20 less famous women and the other presenting 19 famous women and 20 less famous men. When asked, participants reported that there were more men than women in the first list but more women than men in the second list, even though the opposite was the case (by a difference of one). Again, the famous names were presumably easier to recall than the nonfamous ones, resulting in an overestimate. In fact, participants were able to recall about 50% more of the famous than the nonfamous names. This difference in actual recall again highlights the ambiguity underlying most tests of the availability heuristic: Are participants’ judgments indeed based on the phenomenal experience of ease or difficulty of recall, as Tversky and Kahneman’s description of the availability heuristic suggests? Or are their judgments based on the content of recall, with famous names being overrepresented in the recalled sample?

As these examples illustrate, manipulations intended to increase the subjective experience of ease of recall are also likely to affect the amount of recall. In most real-world situations, these two factors are naturally confounded. Unfortunately, this confound renders it difficult to determine whether the obtained estimates of frequency, likelihood, or typicality are based on a meta-cognitive strategy that draws on individuals’ recall experiences or on a biased sample of recalled information. As Taylor (1982) noted, the latter possibility would render the availability heuristic rather trivial—after all, “one’s judgments are always based on what comes to mind” (p. 199, italics added). In fact, some textbooks have chosen the latter interpretation in introducing the availability heuristic, as a quote from Medin and Ross (1997) illustrates:

The availability heuristic refers to a tendency to form a judgment on the basis of what is readily brought to mind. For example, a person who is asked whether there are more English words that begin with the letter t or the letter k might try to think of words that begin with each of these letters. Because a person can probably think of more words beginning with t, he or she would (correctly) conclude that t is more frequent than k as the first letter of English words. (p. 522)

Knowledge Accessibility Effects in Social Judgment

Similar ambiguities apply to the social judgment literature. This literature has traced many context effects in social judgment to differences in information accessibility (see Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Higgins, 1989, 1996; Martin & Clark, 1990; Schwarz, 1995). The underlying assumptions are somewhat different, depending on whether the judgment pertains to a known target, about which information is recalled from memory, or to a new target, about which information is acquired at that time.

When asked to form a judgment about a known target, individuals recall relevant information from memory. However, they do not recall all information that may be relevant to the target but truncate the search process as soon as enough information has come to mind to form a judgment with sufficient subjective certainty. As a result, the judgment is dominated by the information that is most accessible at the time. For example, Schwarz, Strack, and Mai (1991) asked respondents to report their general life satisfaction and their marital satisfaction and varied the order in which the questions were presented. When the general life satisfaction question preceded the marital satisfaction question, the reports correlated r = .32. When the marital satisfaction question was presented first, however, this correlation increased to r = .67. Presumably, answering the marital satisfaction question first rendered information about one’s marriage highly accessible and this, rather than other, information was subsequently used in evaluating one’s life as a whole (see Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Accordingly, unhappily married individuals reported lower life satisfaction when the marital satisfaction question was asked first, whereas happily married individuals reported higher life satisfaction under this condition. It remains unclear, however, if effects of this type are solely based on the content that comes to mind. Instead, it is conceivable that the ease with which previously activated content comes to mind may affect the judgment in its own right, either by suggesting that this information is particularly relevant (or else, why would it pop to mind?) or by suggesting that there are many similar features, as implied by the availability heuristic. Hence, the underlying processes may involve a metacognitive component that draws on subjective accessibility experiences.

Similarly, when individuals acquire new information, they are likely to interpret it in terms of the applicable concept that is most accessible at that time. Given that many pieces of information are inherently ambiguous, which concept is brought to bear on them is of crucial importance. For example, Higgins et al. (1977) described a target person with ambiguous behaviors, such as

Once Donald made up his mind to do something it was as good as done, no matter how long it might take or how difficult the going might be. Only rarely did he change his mind, even when it might well have been better if he had.

As expected, their participants inferred from these behaviors either that Donald was stubborn, a negative trait, or that he was persistent, a positive trait, depending on which trait concept had been rendered accessible by a preceding task. Again, it is conceivable that the apparent ease with which a trait concept came to mind while reading the behavioral description contributed to the obtained effect.

Summary

In sum, different bodies of literature have traced accessibility effects either to what comes to mind or to how easily it comes to mind. Unfortunately, most manipulations that influence what comes to mind are also likely to influence how easily it comes to mind, rendering it difficult to determine the underlying processes. In this article I address this ambiguity. In the next section I review research that demonstrates that subjective accessibility experiences can serve as a source of information in their own right, consistent with the metacognitive proposal entailed in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) availability heuristic. In the subsequent sections I review research that has created conditions under which reliance on accessible content leads to different judgmental outcomes than reliance on accessibility experiences, thus providing a methodological tool for determining the variables that govern the use of these different sources of information.

Accessibility Experiences as a Source of Information

If subjective experiences of ease or difficulty of recall serve as a source of information in their own right, their impact should vary as a function of the perceived diagnosticity of the experience, as has been observed for other types of experiential information, such as moods (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) or arousal (e.g., Zillman, 1978; see also Schwarz & Clore, 1996). According to the availability heuristic, we should infer, for example, that there are many words that begin with the letter t if we find it easy to bring relevant examples to mind. This inference is based on the generally correct assumption that it is easier to recall exemplars of a frequent than an infrequent category. Suppose, however, that you have reason to assume that a temporary situational factor renders t words more accessible than might otherwise be the case. If so, the experienced ease of recall may reflect this irrelevant influence rather than the actual frequency of t words. Hence, you may discount the subjective experience as a relevant source of information. Conversely, if you had reason to assume that a temporary situational factor inhibits the recall of t words, but you find them easy to bring to mind nevertheless, the experienced ease of recall should seem particularly diagnostic. The emergence of such discounting and augmentation effects (Kelley, 1972) would provide compelling evidence for the role of accessibility experiences in frequency judgments.

The Diagnosticity of Accessibility Experiences: Frequency Judgments

To test these predictions, Wanke, Schwarz, and Bless (1995) conducted a modified replication of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973, Experiment 3) letter experiment. In the control condition, participants received a blank sheet of paper and were asked to first write down 10 words that have t as the third letter and subsequently 10 words that begin with the letter t. Following this listing task, they rated the extent to which words beginning with a t are more or less frequent than words that have t as the third letter. As in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) study, participants estimated that words that begin with a t are much more frequent than words having a t in the third position. To isolate the role of experienced ease, the diagnosticity of the experience was manipulated in two experimental conditions. Specifically, participants had to record 10 words that begin with a t on a sheet of paper that was imprinted with pale but visible rows of ts. Some participants were told that this background would make it easy to recall t words (the facilitating condition), whereas others were told that this background would interfere with the recall task (the inhibiting condition). As expected, participants who could attribute the experienced ease of recall to the impact of their work sheet assumed that there are fewer t words than did participants in the control condition. Conversely, participants w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• Dedication
• Introduction
• Articles