Free Will, Responsibility, and Crime

An Introduction

Ken M. Levy

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351251761
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

In his book, philosopher and law professor Ken Levy explains why he agrees with most people, but not with most other philosophers, about free will and responsibility. Most people believe that we have both – that is, that our choices, decisions, and actions are neither determined nor undetermined but rather fully self-determined. By contrast, most philosophers understand just how difficult it is to defend this "metaphysical libertarian" position. So they tend to opt for two other theories: "responsibility skepticism" (which denies the very possibility of free will and responsibility) and "compatibilism" (which reduces free will and responsibility to properties that are compatible with determinism). In opposition to both of these theories, Levy explains how free will and responsibility are indeed metaphysically possible. But he also cautions against the dogma that metaphysical libertarianism is actually true, a widespread belief that continues to cause serious social, political, and legal harms.

Levy's book presents a crisp, tight, historically informed discussion, with fresh clarity, insight, and originality. It will become one of the definitive resources for students, academics, and general readers in this critical intersection among metaphysics, ethics, and criminal law.

Key features:

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• Presents a unique, qualified defense of "metaphysical libertarianism, " the idea that our choices, decisions, and actions can be fully self-determined.

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• Written clearly, accessibly, and with minimal jargon – rare for a book on the very difficult issues of free will and responsibility.

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• Seamlessly connects philosophical, legal, psychological, and political issues.

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• Will be provocative and insightful for professional philosophers, students, and non-philosophers.

1

INCOMPATIBILISM VERSUS COMPATIBILISM

Introduction

Free will is both critical and paradoxical. It is critical because it is thought to be essential to human dignity, moral responsibility, our social interactions, and the criminal justice system. It is paradoxical because the very possibility of this foundational phenomenon is in question. We seem to be in the strange situation of desperately depending on something that may not even exist.

Why think that free will is impossible? Centuries ago, the main threat to free will was thought to be divine foreknowledge.¹ If God knew in advance how I would act at any particular moment, then I really had no choice; I had to act in accordance with God’s prior beliefs. While this argument still lingers in the literature, the threat that God was thought to pose against free will has been largely replaced by the theory of determinism, which maintains that the laws of nature plus the initial conditions of the universe have uniquely caused or necessitated every event, including every human being’s actions.² People who believe that determinism is incompatible with free will are called “incompatibilists.”³

It might seem at first as though incompatibilism is both the beginning and the end of the discussion. Either our actions are determined or they are not. If they are, then we lack free will; if they are not, then we have it. So all we need to do to figure out whether we have free will is figure out whether determinism is true or false.

But, alas, things are not so simple. First, it is very difficult to establish whether determinism is true or false. While quantum physicists generally believe that indeterminism reigns at the subatomic level, the matter has not been definitively resolved.⁴ Second, even if we could definitively resolve this question, many people do not accept incompatibilists’ central assumption that determinism and free will are incompatible in the first place. On the contrary, they believe that determinism is perfectly compatible with free will. Hence their label: “compatibilists.”⁵

Although compatibilism strikes most Philosophy 101 students as counterintuitive, it has attracted many followers, including many professional philosophers. Some may be persuaded into compatibilism by the arguments for this position, but my sense is that many more compatibilists are persuaded into this position by the arguments against its opponent, incompatibilism. In this chapter, I will let the reader decide for herself. I will present the most powerful arguments both for and against both positions in the form of a dialectic between them.

I. Incompatibilism

Incompatibilists believe that determinism is incompatible with free will because it is incompatible with two conditions that they believe are required for the latter: the ability to do otherwise and “ultimate self-causation,” my being the very first or ultimate, uncaused cause of my actions.⁶

Suppose that I am choosing between two actions – eating a cookie (“C”) and refraining from eating the cookie (“R”). Suppose further that, after trying for a few seconds to resist (that is, to R), I end up giving in and C-ing. Suppose finally that, while I did not know it, I was determined all along to C.

To say that I was determined all along to C means that this event was caused by my brain state in conjunction with the laws of physics, that this brain state was itself caused by the immediately preceding brain state in conjunction with the laws of physics, and so on all the way back to the Big Bang – or at least to a time long before I was born.⁷ The idea is that, like all other human beings, I am a physical object – as physical an object as a billiard ball. And just as the “behavior” of a billiard ball is determined entirely by a combination of its intrinsic nature (made out of phenolic resin, spherical, 2.25 inches in diameter, and weighing 5.5 ounces), environment, and the laws of physics, so too my behavior is determined by my much more complicated nature, environment, and the laws of physics. I am, in effect, a very complicated billiard ball – or set of billiard balls. But this extra complication does not make me any less determined than the much more simple billiard ball itself. It is a difference only in degree, not in kind.

Some incompatibilists – the “free will skeptics” – use this picture to argue that I cannot have free will. Their first argument involves the ability to do otherwise: While it may have appeared to me that I could have done otherwise – that is, that I could have R-ed – this appearance is an illusion.⁸ I simply was not aware of the deterministic causal chain behind my action, a causal chain extending all the way back to the Big Bang. The hidden causes of my action, the laws of nature in conjunction with my previous brain states, really left me no choice. Even though I did not realize it, I had to C. I was like Spinoza’s rock, flying through the air, thinking – erroneously – that I can at any point stop flying or fly in a different direction. If we extend determinism to all of my actions, then I can never do otherwise. Despite appearances, I never have a real choice about how to act. Therefore free will, which requires the ability to do otherwise, is incompatible with determinism.

Peter van Inwagen (1983, 16, 55–105) crystallizes this line of reasoning in his “Consequence Argument.” The Consequence Argument consists of two premises. First, if determinism is true, then every event, including every human action, is uniquely determined by the laws of nature in conjunction with the initial conditions of the universe. From this first premise, it follows that if I ever could have done otherwise, it must have been the case that I could have changed either the initial conditions of the universe or the laws of nature. The second premise, however, is that it is impossible for me to change the initial conditions of the universe (not to mention the more recent past) or the laws of nature. From both premises, it follows that, if determinism is true, I never could have done otherwise and therefore never have free will.

Incompatibilists’ second argument is that free will requires me to be the ultimate author of my action – C-ing.⁹ I needed to initiate this action, to be its first cause. So if I was determined to C – if, that is, my C-ing was determined by a preceding cause, this preceding cause was itself determined by a further preceding cause, and so on all the way back to the Big Bang – then I am not the first cause of my C-ing. Instead, I am more like the “middleman” between the Big Bang and C, directly “pushed” or compelled by my brain state, environment, and the laws of physics and indirectly pushed by all preceding causes in the deterministic chain. My C-ing was inevitable. I was destined – doomed – to C from a very long time ago. And what applies to C applies to all of my other choices and actions; I cannot be the ultimate cause of any of them either. Therefore, once again, determinism is incompatible with free will.

II. Indeterminism

Incompatibilists believe that free will and determinism are incompatible because the latter conflicts with two conditions required for the former: the ability to do otherwise and ultimate self-causation. If determinism is true, then – despite appearances – we must always act as we do, and we are never the ultimate, uncaused causes of our actions. We are, in short, nothing more than puppets on the strings of whatever created the universe, whether the Big Bang or an eternal deity.¹⁰

For some incompatibilists – “metaphysical libertarians” – indeterminism is the key to saving free will, at least the possibility of free will. By cutting the “chains” of determinism, we make room for the two conditions necessary for it – again, the ability to do otherwise and ultimate self-causation.

If the world is indeterministic, then there are at least some events that are not determined. Undetermined events fall into one of two possible categories: either they have no cause at all or they have a non-necessitating cause.¹¹ If an event is completely uncaused, then it just spontaneously happens. It is not merely the case that we cannot find its cause; it just has no cause. The Big Bang – a universe arising out of nothing – is the most dramatic example of an uncaused event (assuming that there was no pre-existing entity such as a deity).

If an event has a non-necessitating cause, then this event did not have to happen as it did.¹² For example, if after a collision, one particle moves at speed S₁ in direction D₁, the collision counts as a non-necessitating cause if the particle might – under the very same circumstances – have moved at a (slightly) different speed than S₁ or in a (slightly) different direction than D₁. Were the universe somehow reversed back to the point of collision, the particle might now – in the second iteration – move away at speed S₂ or in direction D₂.

Newtonian physics, which is deterministic, does not allow for either possibility, either uncaused or non-necessitated events. On this pre-quantum-physics theory, everything that happens had to happen and could not have happened otherwise. For every collision between two particles, both particles had to move at exactly the speeds and in exactly the directions they did. If the universe were somehow rewound back to the collision a million times, it would always lead to the same exact effects.

III. Compatibilists’ First Objection to Incompatibilism

Compatibilists respond that indeterminism is no more compatible with free will than incompatibilists think determinism is. Their argument is that (a) free will requires self-determinism and (b) indeterminism is incompatible with self-determinism.¹³

(a) is true by definition. Both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that my will, my choice or action, cannot be free unless I – my self – makes it happen.¹⁴

(b) is much more complicated. Compatibilists think that indeterminism is incompatible with self-determinism because the absence of a cause behind my choice or action means the absence of my self behind this choice or action.¹⁵ Even to call such a choice or action mine is misleading. Just as spontaneous motion by the body is undetermined, not self-determined, so too with spontaneous eruption in the brain. Like a twitch, convulsion, or spasm, an uncaused choice or action just happened to me rather than by me.

Assume, for example, that Sally believes she is overweight, wants to lose ten pounds over the next month, puts herself on a strict diet, and tries to exercise at the gym at least four days per week. On Friday night, Sally goes out to dinner with some friends. They all order a number of desserts, including Sally’s favorite: chocolate cake. Now suppose that while she is struggling between her desire to eat the cake (C) and her desire to resist (R), one of her neurons indeterministically fires and thereby causes Sally to side with the former rather than with the latter. In this situation, Sally’s decision is just a matter of chance – no different than the result of a random coin toss. It is not self-determined but rather chance-determined – her brain just figuratively flipped a coin – and therefore not freely willed.¹⁶

If a neuron randomly firing would not amount to free will, then it is difficult to see why a self randomly “tilting” toward ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism
• 2. New Compatibilism versus the Ought-Implies-Can Principle
• 3. Moral Responsibility Does Not Require the Power to Do Otherwise, But It Does Require at Least One Alternative Possibility
• 4. The Puzzle of Responsibility
• 5. Contrary to Responsibility Skepticism, Metaphysical Libertarianism Is Metaphysically Possible
• 6. The Dark Side of Metaphysical Libertarianism
• 7. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Psychopaths
• 8. Criminal Responsibility Does Not Require Moral Responsibility: Situationism
• 9. Addiction, Indoctrination, and Responsibility
• References
• Index