Equality

John W. Chapman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351311588
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Equality--the battle cry of the French Revolution--has come to be accepted as everyone's birthright today. But what is equality? Is it a chimera in a world manifestly still abounding in inequality among individuals, nations, and races? To this eternally fascinating subject, eighteen outstanding political scientists, jurists, and philosophers address themselves with vigor and profundity in this important and illuminating work.

Part I deals with fundamental concepts of equality. The first paper in this section explores such issues as the meaning, the justification, and the dialectics of equality, wherein some of its manifestations are confronted and limited by others. While the second paper criticizes the first essay and examines the legal aspects of equality. Another paper pursues the notion of proportionate equality to what he views as its ultimate reality: that of a purely formal logical concept, while another argues that "egalitarianism" has reference to human interests, which in fact give it content. Another viewpoint considers how far different kinds of equality are compatible with one another and with the enlargement of freedom and fraternity in industrial society. The final paper in this section talks widely over basic issues raised by the various interpretations of equality.

Part II deals with sources of beliefs about equality. The papers in this section consider the implications for egalitarianism of Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism. The final essay in this section surveys the treatment of and implications for egalitarianism in the thinking of the existentialists.

Part III is concerned with the political and legal applications of equality. One of the papers suggests that Tocqueville's "providential fact of the gradual development of the principle of equality" might possibly be on the eve of a reversal, and concludes with justification of political equality. Another attacks the notion of equality of opportunity, contending that it is not an authentic expression of the democratic ideal and temper, which requires instead an "affirmation of being and belonging." Following that the highly topical problem of equality in the administration of justice is discussed as well as, the deals with many subtle distinctions involved in the application of the idea of equality to the rule of law. The book concludes with the topic of treatments of the problem of equality in the realm of international politics and organization.

CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY

1

Egalitarianism and the Idea of Equality

Hugo Adam Bedau

This chapter undertakes two rather independent tasks. The first section attempts to show how equality is related to sameness and how useful it is to distinguish the essentially descriptive considerations in the meaning of “equality” from any question of the desirability, fairness, or justice of equality. The second section offers a review of egalitarian thought, organized around the notion of radical egalitarianism, in order to see where the plea for the greatest possible equality among men breaks down. Some with passionate egalitarian sympathies may find my conclusions rather discouraging.

I

Nearly a century ago, Fitzjames Stephen, the conservative utilitarian critic of egalitarianism, complained that “equality is a word so wide and vague as to be by itself almost unmeaning.”¹ Even the late R. H. Tawney, one of the warmest friends egalitarianism will ever have, allowed that “‘Equality’ possesses more than one meaning.”² Such charges of vagueness and ambiguity are not without foundation, and they arise from several quarters: the failure to identify the respects in which the (allegedly) equal things are equal; the failure to understand the conceptual network of equality, i.e., the logical relations among such expressions as “equal,” “identical,” “same,” “similar,” their cognates and neighbors; the failure to distinguish between whether a certain distribution or policy is in fact an equal one and, if it is, whether the equality is also equitable, justifiable, or just; and the failure to realize that the justifiability of a given distribution is often erroneously argued through alleging its equality, thanks to the conceptual affinity of “just,” “equal,” and “equitable,” quite apart from any demonstration of its actual or factual equality.

It may seem strange that “equality” should sometimes be used to express approval of, or to declare the justifiability or justice of, a distribution the actual equality of which is in some doubt. But this is the only way to interpret John Dewey’s statement, for instance, that “Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action.”³ This cannot be literally true; Dewey has not told us what “‘equality’ denotes”: The fact that our shares are “unhampered” does not imply that they are equally unhampered; the fact that each of us has an unhampered share in “the consequences of associated action” does not imply that we have equal shares. Yet unless something of this sort were true, what reason could we have for finding equality in such a distribution? Dewey states his position in this language because he is defending a social ideal according to which a certain distribution is believed to constitute equality (despite the fact that its equality as such has never been established) on the grounds that it is a desirable and justifiable distribution; as Dewey puts it himself in his next sentence, the sort of distribution he speaks of is “equitable.” Thus it is that “equality” comes to be used to endorse a distribution or a policy, in the face of the most flagrant inequalities, simply because the policy is thought to be equitable or fair! No wonder the central concept of egalitarianism is thought to be vague and ambiguous, or “almost unmeaning”!

The concern of this section is fourfold: (1) to try to show how our concept of equality is applied in relatively neutral and un-controversial contexts, (2) to see how it is applied in cases of interest to the social philosopher, (3) to review some of the conceptual relations among “equality,” “identity,” “sameness,” and “similarity,” and (4) to examine three interesting passages in which the argument turns in part on different senses of “equality,” such as was illustrated in the passage just cited from Dewey.

1. If a recipe calls for equal amounts of sugar and flour, then it calls for the same amounts of sugar and flour; not similar amounts, but equivalent amounts. Different amounts (e.g., a heaping cup of sugar and a level cup of flour) are not equal amounts, though in some cases (e.g., a level cup of sugar and slightly less than a level cup of flour) we could describe them as roughly equal amounts. If several suits are equally expensive, then they each cost the same; only if they are not equally expensive can their costs differ. If someone says, “The blue serge, the gabardine, and the tweed are all equally expensive, though you realize the gabardine costs a bit more,” he has certainly not said what he meant, for (barring some special explanation) he has contradicted himself. If I am told to equalize the tension on a set of springs, I must loosen some and tighten others, in order to put each spring under the same tension. “Equalize the tension, but don’t make it the same on all springs” is a self-contradictory order. If you tell me that a peso is more nearly equal in value to a dime than to a nickel, then I know that the value of a peso and a dime are more nearly the same than are the value of a peso and a nickel. These examples merely illustrate what the dictionary already suggests, that “equality” locutions (“equal,” “equally,” “equality,” “equivalent,” “equalize,” etc.) are typically used in situations where reference is made to two or more things that are not identical and that are, or are about to be, or should be, the same, or the same sort of thing, or the same in some respect, By “the same” here, I do not mean exactly the same, except of course where “equal” means exactly equal. But it doesn’t always; two things, e.g., two equal servings from a pie, can be equal without being exactly equal. So they can be the same without being exactly the same.

2. Now, how well, if at all, is this semantic affinity between equality and sameness borne out in cases of interest to the social philosopher? Consider first the right to vote, (a) If you and I have an equal right to vote, then neither of us has more or less right to vote than the other, because we have the same right. The answer to the question, “With what right do you attempt to vote?” when addressed to me, must be the same as the answer when the question is addressed to you. (b) If you and I have the right to an equal vote, then our votes must be counted at the same rate or value, because my vote is worth no more and no less than yours. If you vote for White and I vote for Black, then our votes are equal only if they cancel out. If we both vote for White, then our votes are equal only if they yield two votes for White. If you vote for Black and I don’t vote at all, then our votes are equal only if Black gains exactly what he would have if I had voted for him and you had not voted at all. Nothing can be different in the rate or value of our votes without affecting the truth of “We have an equal vote.”⁴

Similarly in other cases. “We have an equal right to run for Secretary” means that we have the same right to run for the office of Secretary. “Everyone over 21 is equally liable to the draft” means that men and women, the halt, lame, and the blind, all have the same draft liability if over 21. “Negroes deserve equal opportunities with whites” means that Negroes deserve the same (job, educational, or other) opportunities as whites. “We’re all equal here” means that we here may all expect to be accorded the same privileges, granted the same rights, and extended the same consideration. Notice that nothing so far said implies that any or all of these equalities are just or justifiable. These analyses merely indicate the meaning, not the merit, of typical claims involving the concept of equality in politics.

3. Dare we generalize the facts so far by saying that “equal” means “same,” as though the two words were synonymous? Clearly not; the requisite condition of substitutivity for synonym-pairs fails for this pair. If I gave Mark and Paul equal servings, I did not give them the same serving; what I did was to serve them the same amount, servings of the same size. If I gave you the same answer I gave him, I didn’t give you an answer equal to the one I gave him; I gave you the very answer I gave him. To say a man is equal to the task is not to say the man is the same as the task, but that he is up to performing the task. And so on. The relation between equality and sameness is not like that so often claimed for “bachelor” and “unmarried male.” Nevertheless, we can coordinate the concept of equality and the concept of sameness, as the discussion so far suggests. Barring anything misleading due to excessive abstractness, I think the following proposition holds: Persons have (received) an equal distribution, equal treatment, or equal rights etc., if and only if they have (received) the same distribution, treatment, rights, etc.

It is often claimed that (a) things equal to each other are always equal in one or more respects, and (b) in these respects the equal things are similar to each other. The latter seems to me not so. Things that are equal in a certain respect will normally be quite dissimilar to each other in other respects; whereas in the respect in which they are equal they are not merely similar but the same. A dozen pears and a dozen sheep are equal in number, but they are not therefore similar to each other, least of all is it correct to say they are similar in number. No more can one say that persons who have equal rights are therefore similar to each other; they are not. Being equal in number or in rights is not a respect in which things and persons are similar to each other, rather it is a respect in which they are the same as each other. In light of the Leibnizian principle that things the same in every respect are the same thing, my position that equality implies sameness (i.e., the above biconditional) raises the question whether two things could be equal to each other in every respect. If they could, then my position implies that they would be the same in every respect; and this would imply in turn, given the Leibnizian principle, that they would be identical. But this is an intolerable consequence. If we know that the man in the dock is the man who robbed the bank, we know enough not to say that the men are equal; for we know they are the same man. Our ordinary concept of equality does not admit of our saying that Tully is equal to Cicero, or that water is equal to H₂0, or that any two things are equal to each other unless we are ready to deny the possibility of their identity. (N.B. Making x and y more nearly equal does imply making them more nearly identical, i.e., the same in some respect or in several, but not into the same thing; think, for example, of making x and y more nearly equal in shape.) Equality, thus, not only does not imply identity, it implies non-identity.⁵ Does this mean that equality can hold between individuals or things only in some respects and not in all? Or is there a gross error in my claim that equality implies sameness? Despite some reservations about the Leibnizian principle itself,⁶ I am inclined to the former implication. Generally, however, we can say that from the fact that equalities are samenesses, it no more follows that things equal to one another in one respect are (or cannot be) equal in yet other respects, any more than it follows that things equal to one another in one respect ought to be equal in that (or some further) respect.

4. The nature of the concept of equality, as it has so far been outlined, and the importance of distinguishing whether things are equal or unequal from whether their equality or inequality is justified, may be illustrated and perhaps confirmed by examining the following three passages of philosophical argument in which this concept and these distinctions seem to be misunderstood or misapplied.

a. In Leviathan, Hobbes writes, “There is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution of anything than that every man is contented with his share.”⁷ Suppose you have been given twice as much of the same stuff as I have, although so far as anyone can tell we are equally satisfied with our shares. Perhaps this is because I don’t know how large your share is, or if I do know, I think you deserve or need more than I. Is our mutual contentment a “sign” of equal distribution? Suppose, on the facts assumed, a third party thinks so, and says, “The stuff has been equally distributed between the two of them—though, of course, one got twice as much as the other.” This remark is too plainly paradoxical as it stands. Either he has incorrectly assessed the distribution—it isn’t an equal distribution at all, as is proved by the fact that the one share is double the other, i.e., the shares are not the same—or he expressed himself incorrectly, meaning by “equally distributed” that despite the inequality of the shares, the distribution was fair. Had he said, “The stuff has been fairly distributed between the two of them—though, of course, one got twice as much as the other,” no one would raise his logical eyebrows, although his moral antennae might bristle pending further clarification. One certainly could not say, “The stuff has been fairly distributed, though of course one got twice as much as the other; and thus the stuff was equally distributed after all.” Once we know that the shares were not the same, we know that they were not equal; and even if the distribution was fair, we know too much to countenance the inference. To think otherwise is to rely on some such principle as “Fairness implies equality” (cf. proposition (3) in section II, infra). But there is no such principle, at least, none by which we can override a known inequality, declaring that the inequality is an equality merely because it is justified.

b. Consider the following remarks: “Suppose that society is allotting musical instruments to C and D, and that C prefers a banjo and D a guitar. If society gives C a banjo and D a guitar it is treating them differently yet equally.”⁸ This is curious. The notion of treatment is being made to do double duty, both for the way in which C and D were treated and for what was allotted to them. The result is that when they are said to have been “equally treated,” this cannot mean they were given the same treatment, for how could the treatment be both the same and “different”? “Equally treated” here can only mean that the “different” treatment was nonetheless fair or just. Actually, however, the facts assumed in this example deserve to be stated quite differently. The clearest way in such a case for society to have “treated” C and D “differently” would have been to grant C what he “prefers,” to treat him exactly as he wished to be treated, and then to refuse to do this to D (or vice versa). This would have been unequal treatment, not the same treatment, and, presumably, unfair as well. We would understand D’s complaint, “We were treated unequally, because C got what he wanted and I didn’t.” In this statement, “unequally” would be doing double duty, both for differently and for unfairly, though it is unlikely we would be misled. But in the original case, on the facts assumed, nothing of the sort was done, and so to say that they were “treated differently” makes no sense. Were C to complain, saying “I was treated differently from D, because he got a guitar whereas I got a banjo,” we would not know what to make of it. (Consider also the following variant situation: Suppose that C and D had each been allotted what the other preferred. Then neither would have been treated as he—probably—deserved, and thus both could complain of unfair treatment. But they could not complain that they had been treated unequally.) The reason such a complaint would be baseless is not that despite a difference in treatment, C and D were treated “equally,” and only unequal treatment would justify (7 s complaint. The reason is that they were treated in the same way and therefore treated equally; there simply was no difference at all in their treatment. Saying, in such a case, “They were treated differently but equally” is needlessly confusing, and it does not indicate what was different. The difference lies in what was allotted, and this constitutes a difference in distribution, not in treatment. Treatment (or consideration) and distribution (or allotment) are different concepts, and therefore equality of treatment and equality of distribution can be independent of each other. But the respect in which each involves equality is the respect in which each raises the question, “Was it (the treatment, the distribution) the same for all involved?” Were there not this relation between sameness and equality, it would be possible for us to understand treating people the same and yet to doubt whether they had been treated equally (by which I do not mean “fairly”). This seems to me an impossible possibility.

c. It has lately been argued that the maxim, “To each according to his need,” is really a “maxim of equal distribution,” for despite the manifest inequality of needs among men, to follow this maxim, we are told, is to practice “the most perfect form of equal distribution.”⁹ Is this really true? If the question arises in a simple case such as w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Preface
• Introduction by J. Roland Pennock
• I. CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY
• II. EGALITARIAN IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF BELIEF SYSTEMS
• III. POLITICAL AND LEGAL EQUALITY