Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy

Prevarications and Evasions

Clair Apodaca

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781351205818
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politik

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy provides a comprehensive historical overview and analysis of the complex and often vexing problem of understanding the formation of U.S. human rights policy.

The proper place of human rights and fundamental freedoms in U.S. foreign policy has long been debated among scholars, politicians, and the American public. Clair Apodaca argues that the history of U.S.human rights policy unfolds as a series of prevarications that are the result of presidential preferences, along with the conflict and cooperation among bureaucratic actors.

Through a series of chapters devoted to U.S. presidential administrations from Richard Nixon to the present, she delivers a comprehensive historical, social, and cultural context to understand the development and implementation of U.S. human rights policy. For each administration, she pays close attention to how ideology, bureaucratic politics, lobbying, and competition affect the inclusion or exclusion of human rights in the economic and military aid allocation decisions of the United States. She further demonstrates that from the inception of U.S. human rights policy, presidents have attempted to tell only part of the truth or to reformulate the truth by redefining the meaning of the terms "human rights, " "democracy, " or "torture, " for example. In this way, human rights policy has been about prevarication.

Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy is a key text for students, which will appeal to all readers who will find a historically informed, argument driven account of the erratic evolution of U.S. human rights policy since the Nixon Administration.

1 The Battlefield of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

Prevarication denotes a lie. However, the connotation of prevarication softens to a half-truth or convoluted falsehood. Prevarication is about using ambiguity, omissions, or evasion to bend the truth and to mislead. In 1823, Clarke wrote that

prevarication is the giving of contradictory or inconsistent evidence, which affects the credibility of the evidence, though neither the extent of the witness’s falsehood, nor the precise points in which he has departed from the truth be capable of ascertainment.

(Clarke 1823 as quoted in Schneider 2007: 316)

Thus, while to prevaricate means to lie, it also implies making it difficult to discern exactly what the lie is through the use of ambiguous language and the withholding of information. Since the inception of U.S. human rights policy, presidents have attempted to tell only part of the truth or to reformulate the truth by redefining the meaning of the terms human rights, democracy, or torture, for example. In this way, human rights policy has been about prevarication.

Presidents prevaricate for any number of reasons, but the primary reasons are convenience, self-promotion, and to further their political agenda. The aim of policy prevarication is to ensure that Congress and the public view the president’s agenda favorably. In order to do so, the president will shade the truth, cherry-pick facts and circumstances that favor his position, while neglecting inconvenient evidence that may derail his program. Presidents, in the words of Cannon, have “a difficult time resisting the short-term gain a lie can afford them” (2007: 65). This suggests that presidents have both a capacity and a disposition to lie.

Before reviewing the prevarications associated with U.S. human rights policy, we will review the Congressional and bureaucratic structure and conflict associated with foreign aid. After all, Congress and executive bureaucracy either assist or resist the deception. It is possible that the Congress and the executive bureaucracy are complicit in presidential prevarications. On the other hand, it is also possible that Congress and the career bureaucrats harbor misgivings regarding the president’s agenda and actively subvert and resist its implementation.

Presidential-Congressional Struggle over Foreign Aid

The foreign aid budget is subject to the budgetary process of bargaining and negotiating between the President and Congress (Brady and Volden 2005). The two-president thesis stipulates that the president’s ability to direct policy differs between domestic and foreign affairs. The president enjoys certain advantages in foreign policy such as greater agenda-setting powers, with little interference from Congress. And the public tends to be less knowledgeable or concerned with foreign policy and relies heavily on presidential messages to mold their opinions (Meernik and Ault 2001). However, on domestic matters, the president is restrained by Congressional prerogative. Foreign aid blurs the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. Foreign aid concerns domestic economic and commercial interests and the U.S. budget, with the resources directed at influencing foreign nations and people while supporting U.S. national interests. Congress funds program accounts, but the president can redirect funds within the program account to his desired countries, unless Congress earmarks the aid (Caddel 2013).

Congress and the President both use the foreign aid budget to impose their view and direction on foreign policy. However, it is generally assumed that, in foreign policy, the president holds the upper hand. The president is proactive by setting the foreign aid agenda while Congress is reactive and often follows the lead of the executive. The president has what is known as first mover advantage in aid allocations. The president, not Congress, initiates the foreign aid budget, and Congress can only consider the allocations once the president has submitted his budget proposal. Research by Canes-Wrone et al. (2008) found that, generally, the president has considerable success in attaining his requested budget levels for foreign policy and even greater success if his party controls Congress. The president’s ability to set the agenda or blueprint for aid allocations, which Congress then increases, decreases, or accedes to, provides the president with considerable influence in foreign policymaking. However, the president cannot act—and can be completely stymied—until Congress appropriates the funds necessary to implement his policies. Thus, the budget is the battleground where Congress attempts to maximize control over U.S. foreign policy.

Congress can support the executive’s policy program by heavily funding it, reject the program by starving it of resources, or attaching rigid conditions and exhaustive stipulations onto the legislation, or provide policy direction by earmarking funds. Human rights legislation, specifically the foreign aid budget, became an important tool for Congress to supervise and monitor presidential behavior. The threat to withhold funding “remains one of Congress’s few effective legal tools to regulate presidential initiatives in foreign affairs” (Koh 1990: 131). Moreover, according to Liang-Fenton, the Congressional threat of aid termination can “prod the White House into action on issues that it may be reluctant to address and send a strong signal to foreign governments about the seriousness with which the United States regards particular human rights issues” (2004: 441). If Congress does not monitor human rights compliance, the more inclined the executive branch will be to ignore congressional preferences (Lindsay 1994). In the realm of human rights, Congress can also count on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist in the surveillance.

The inclusion of human rights into the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was a crucial procedure in Congress’ effort to restrain Presidential powers. Congress wrote into the FAA provisions linking foreign aid and trade benefits to the status of human rights in foreign countries thereby regulating presidential and bureaucratic activities. Furthermore, Congress can earmark foreign aid funds, managing which states and programs may receive funds. In protecting and promoting human rights, Congress has on occasion refused to provide aid to those countries that violate the human rights of their citizens. Congress can constrain the executive’s ability to use foreign aid as a tool of diplomacy or coercion by refusing to fund programs or by earmarking aid dollars. Thus in effect terminating any activity that Congress does not approve. An active Congress can thwart the President’s ability to pursue his foreign policy strategy through the foreign aid allocation process. Congressional members are often divided on many issues, yet they frequently find common ground when it comes to opposing the President.

Congress has several other tools at its disposal to direct foreign policy and restrain executive choices and behaviors. Congress can also hold investigative hearings to examine and publicize foreign aid issues and events. Hearings are a commanding device that can shape the landscape of Congressional-Presidential relations by shifting the balance of power between the Hill and the White House. The Fraser Committee hearings in the 1970s are credited with establishing human rights as a policy concern in foreign aid allocations against the wishes of the executive. Congressional hearings are powerful tools to expose incidents, formalize congressional opinion, and shape foreign policy objectives. Another key method of Congressional oversight is the reporting requirement placed on the executive branch. For example, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for compiling the annual public reports on the human rights conditions of every United Nations (U.N.) member state. Hearings and reports can also keep Congress informed regarding bureaucratic activity, thereby helping to prevent renegade behavior. And, perhaps most importantly, hearings and reports keep the executive branch accountable.

The Conflict within Congress over Foreign Aid

The foreign aid budget reflects the preferences of domestic decision-makers (Greene and Licht 2018). Legislators anticipate their constituents’ preferences and act accordingly in order to maximize their chances of reelection. Although the majority of the American public think the United States spends too much on foreign aid, that it is simply a giveaway program producing few foreign policy benefits, and that the aid is often misused, Americans do support providing humanitarian, health, and disaster assistance to foreign people. Foreign aid may not have a formal interest group, but there are certainly supporters, as well as opponents, among the American public. Foreign policy issues, including foreign aid allocations, do have a constituency. Aldrich et al. (1989) determined that the influence of foreign policy issues varied substantially depending on the salience of the issues. American voters are concerned with where tax dollars are going and thus the issue of foreign aid influences voting choices. Political leaders do not necessarily “waltz before a blind audience” (Aldrich et al. 1989), although the audience may be severely nearsighted. In addition, human rights interest groups are perhaps among the best organized and persuasive, thus playing an important factor in Congressional foreign policy decision-making (Milner and Tingley 2011).

A Congressional member’s support for foreign aid is a reflection of how her constituents are affected by foreign aid disbursements (Milner and Tingley 2010). Members who represent districts that have high-skilled workers, businesses, universities, nongovernmental organizations, or individuals holding contracts with U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or any other aid agency are significantly more likely to support foreign aid legislation than are members from districts with lower-skilled workers and fewer contractors and businesses. Milner and Tingley (2010) show that although the U.S. economy benefits from the allocation of aid, not every individual benefits equally. Each individual American has to pay higher taxes to finance the aid, but “due to the terms-of-trade effect, each individual receives a different amount of factor income… relatively unskilled labor in the donor are likely to lose from aid” (Milner and Tingley 2010: 207–208). In other words, lower- and working-class citizens do not benefit from generous allocations of economic aid. Highly skilled workers and businesses benefit substantially from foreign aid contracts, manufacturing opportunities, and shipping agreements due to procurement tying.

Procurement tying is a method of ensuring that U.S. foreign aid has a direct benefit to U.S. citizens and businesses. Tied aid is when a country binds its aid to the procurement of goods and services from the donor country. For example, tying aid occurs when the United States requires that aid recipients purchase the equipment, arms, materials, supplies, parts and services, or other commodities made in the United States or from the U.S. corporations, that they use contractors or consultants from the United States, or that the equipment be shipped via ships or airplanes flagged in the United States. The intent is to increase market opportunities for American businesses. Radelet (2006) reports that, historically, the United States has tied approximately 75 percent of its aid. Naturally, there is a struggle over foreign aid allocations between Congressional members whose districts benefit from large disbursements and those Congressional members whose constituents lose (that is, foot the bill), as a result of generous foreign aid programs.

Moreover, Congress, with its structure of committees and subcommittees, falls prey to a form of bureaucratic politics. Halperin et al. (2007) explain that Congressional committees, along with committee staff, behave much like bureaucracies in the desire to protect and advance committee interests. Each committee has a specific mission to perform and must jockey with one another for jurisdiction over policy and control over resources. Committees seek to expand their jurisdiction over policies and the agencies tasked with carrying out those policies. Legislation is often considered simultaneously in multiple committees due to increased issue and procedural complexity that crosses over committee boundaries, thus increasing tension between committees. For example, Arel-Bundock et al. (2015) report that, during the 111th Congress (2009–2010), 18 different committees and 44 separate subcommittees held hearings related to international affairs or foreign aid. Each Congressional committee and subcommittee seeks greater policy jurisdiction in order to enhance its prominence and stature in Congress. Some in Congress wish to reduce foreign aid allocations; others want to increase expenditures.

When Congress is polarized, it is more difficult for the legislative branch to reach a consensus on possible alternative foreign policies different from those put forward by the president. In this case, it is often easier for Congress to simply accept the president’s agenda. Legislators’ ideological leanings influence their support for foreign aid too. There is a continued ideological polarization in Congress over foreign aid, particularly when foreign aid packages include funding for family planning and reproductive health issues. Research has shown that the traditional left-right political spectrum often identifies which political leader will support foreign aid. Liberals are thought to favor foreign aid more generally. The granting of foreign aid serves basic humanitarian purposes: to eradicate poverty and hunger, to save the lives of children, or to improve the health of the poor. Social justice is an important but not primary rationale for aid allocations. For conservatives, on the other hand, foreign aid is often considered a give-away program at the expense of U.S. taxpayers. Individual effort, rather than welfare for foreign nations, and the free market are seen as the key to economic growth and to the betterment of citizens in developing countries. Unless, of course, foreign aid is a foreign policy tool supporting U.S. national interests. In such cases, for conservatives, foreign aid can be a useful tool of foreign policy that ought to be concentrated in nations that are economically and militarily important to the United States and further U.S. national interests. Although liberals and conservatives may both support aid, they have different objectives for that aid.

Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Aid Allocations

The competition between the President and Congress in foreign policy is further complicated by the bureaucratic politics of the foreign policy bureaucracies, the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Treasury, and the USAID, that implement foreign aid programs. The President initiates foreign policy, Congress legislates foreign policy, but they have to rely on a vast bureaucracy to implement it. The executive bureaucracy is officially under presidential authority, but Congress appropriates funds for the establishment, maintenance, and salaries of the foreign policy bureaucracy, thus defining its missions and goals. In addition, Congress has considerable influence on the kind of policies the bureaucracies will implement due to its oversight authority.

However, bureaucracies have their own agenda, too. When Congressional or executive mandates are viewed as detrimental to the bureaucracy, they are often delayed or simply ignored. Thus, there is often a significant difference in policy outcomes from the President’s agenda or Congressional legislation. The bureaucracy’s ability to resist, reform, or remake unpopular legislation is higher when there is disagreement between the executive and Congress on the purpose and function of the policy. As Norton Long states, “the bureaucracy is likely, day in and day out, to be our main source of policy initiative” (1952: 810). Foreign policy outcomes are more often the result of bureaucratic cooperation and rivalries than congressional legislation or Presidential directive.

A principal-agent framework adds to our understanding of bureaucratic conflict in the allocation of foreign aid. Political leaders delegate authority to a bureaucracy to implement, monitor, administer, and supervise government policy. The principal hands over control to the agent because the agent has expertise over a complex issue and the principal lacks the knowledge or time to oversee the issue. This gives the bureaucracy a great deal of power in determining policy. Because the principal entrusts the agent with power over the program, the agent is able to substitute its own preferences for the principal’s directives. The ease of substitution is intensified when the agent has multiple principals (the President, Congress, powerful ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• 1 The Battlefield of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy
• 2 U.S. Human Rights Policy during the Cold War: A Historical Overview
• 3 U.S. Human Rights Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: A Decade of Lost Opportunities
• 4 The Prevaricator in Chief: George W. Bush (2001–2009)
• 5 The Prevaricator of Change: Barack Obama (2009–2017)
• 6 A Prevaricator Who Told the Truth: Donald Trump (2017–)
• 7 The Future of U.S. Human Rights Policy
• Index