Social Influence

The Ontario Symposium, Volume 5

Mark P. Zanna, James M. Olson, C. P. Herman

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317767596
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

First published in 1987. This volume presents papers from the Fifth Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology, held at the University of Waterloo, August 21-23, 1984. The contributors are active researchers in the area of social influence. One of the purposes of this volume is to provide an accurate picture of our current knowledge about social influence processes. Thus, the chapters describe important recent developments in this area. A second and perhaps more important purpose of this volume is to bring together scholars with different perspectives on the social influence process in order to stimulate further research and theorizing in this area.

II


COMPLIANCE AND CONFORMITY

5


Self-Perception Theory: A Current Perspective

Russell H. Fazio

Indiana University

It is now some 20 years since Bem first proposed self-perception theory (Bem, 1965). Elegantly simple, this theory argued that attitudes were inferences stemming from observation of one's behavior. The theory immediately captured the attention of social psychologists. It generated a great deal of research unique to the theoretical perspective. Furthermore, because self-perception theory was presented as an alternative to dissonance theory, it instigated theoretical and empirical controversy that, I believe, benefitted the field enormously. Finally, coinciding as it did with the rise of the attributional perspective in social psychology, the introduction of the theory linked such attributional processes to the domain of attitudes.

The present chapter reviews briefly this central and important theory and provides an update of where the theory stands at this point in time. In particular, I focus upon recent empirical advancements stemming from my own and others' research that have provided answers (or at least clues) regarding some longstanding questions about self-perception processes. Finally, I conclude by discussing some of the more general implications of what has been learned about self-perception processes for attitudes and social influence.

Bem's initial theoretical statements stemmed from a Skinnerian radical behaviorist perspective involving a somewhat mysterious language of “mands” and “tacts”—terminology that has befuddled many a psychology major. Nevertheless, as intimated a moment ago, the simplicity of self-perception theory is part of its elegance. By 1972, the theory had taken on more of an attributional perspective, and Bem was able to summarize the theory very simply. “Individuals come to ‘know’ their own attitudes, emotions, and other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/or the circumstances in which this behavior occurs” (Bem, 1972, p. 2). Given that the situational cues indicate that the behavior was not manded, i.e., attributable to some external force, one's attitude can be inferred directly from the behavior via an implicit self-selection rule, “what must my attitude be if I am willing to behave in this fashion in this situation?”

Such self-observation is by no means the only manner by which individuals may form attitudes. However, the theory suggests that overt behavior and the situational cues surrounding that behavior provide the individual with a clear indication of his or her attitude toward the object in question. In fact, a second postulate of the theory even more directly points to the critical role of behavior by suggesting a partial equivalence between self and interpersonal perception. “To the extent that internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the individual is functionally in the same position as an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those same external cues to infer the individual's inner states” (Bem, 1972, p. 2).

Very early on, it became evident that self-perception theory had the potential to serve as a viable alternative to cognitive dissonance theory. For years, the field was embroiled in a controversy as to which perspective provided the most appropriate account of attitude change following the performance of freely-chosen counterattitudinal action. This is not the time to review the controversy. It will suffice to note that empirical investigations that focused on the role of arousal proved supportive of the dissonance theory claim that arousal is critical to the attitude change process in such situations (see Fazio & Cooper, 1983, for a recent review of this work). Ironically, then, self-perception theory no longer appears an adequate alternative to dissonance theory.

Yet, as Fazio, Zanna, and Cooper (1977) tried to point out, self-perception theory remains useful. It is supported by much independent evidence that is beyond the domain of dissonance theory. It has much to say about one process by which attitudes are formed and how at least some types of attitudes are modified by inference from behavior that is not markedly discrepant from initial attitudes (e.g., Kiesler, Nisbett, & Zanna, 1969). Furthermore, the theory provides a viable interpretation of a number of social influence phenomena. Self-perception processes are central to the interpretation of the foot-in-the-door phenomena, i.e., people's greater likelihood of compliance with a large request when that request has been preceded by a less demanding act of compliance (e.g., Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Uranowitz, 1975). Self-perception theory also provides a viable account of the overjustification effect, i.e., the undermining of intrinsic interest in an activity that stems from the perception that one has engaged in the activity only as a means of reaching some desirable end (e.g., Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Ross, 1975). Furthermore, self-perception processes have been shown to be relevant to such diverse topics as interpersonal attraction (e.g., Seligman, Fazio, & Zanna, 1980) and pain perception (e.g., Bandler, Madaras, & Bem, 1968; Corah & Boffa, 1970). Thus, although it is no longer as capable of addressing some phenomena as it was once believed to, the theory remains a powerful conceptual framework.

Having briefly reviewed self-perception theory in a historical perspective, let me now turn to some research that concerns a series of questions that are not addressed in Bem's theoretical statements. The consideration of three such matters will permit the desired updating of self-perception theory. (1) What prompts self-perception? That is, what motivates individuals to form attitudes via a self-inference process? (2) From what behavioral evidence are individuals willing to draw attitudinal inferences? In particular, is one's failure to engage in behavior regarded as attitudinally informative as overt performance? (3) What can be discerned about the status of the attitude before and after an individual's having engaged in a self-perception process? As we shall see, recent research on these three questions serves to clarify ambiguities that are not addressed by the original theoretical statements and to document previously unsubstantiated aspects of self-perception theory.

THE MOTIVATION FOR ATTITUDE FORMATION

Bem speaks of individuals coming to “know” their attitudes via a self-perception process. The first question to be addressed centers upon this phrase “come to know.” Why do people want to know? What motivates people to self-perceive, i.e., to undertake a self-perception analysis so as to form attitudes?

Bem's theoretical statements are fairly mute with respect to this issue. Indeed, the only relevant statement I could find is “self-perception theory lacks any motivational construct other than an implicit assumption that individuals are willing to answer inquiries concerning their internal states” (Bem, 1972, p. 44). Thus, the implication is that it is a need to respond to a verbal inquiry that motivates people to undertake a self-perception analysis. There is in fact a great deal of evidence to suggest that people engage in self-perception when faced with an inquiry about their attitudes (e.g., Kiesler et al., 1969; Salancik & Conway, 1975). They consider recent and/or salient behavior that they have performed and infer their attitude via an implicit self-selection rule. But, is a verbal inquiry the only inducement to self-perceive?

Actually, this question can be addressed at a far more general level. When do individuals naturally and spontaneously form attitudes? That is, what situational factors prompt individuals to reflect upon their behavior, integrate whatever information they have about the attitude object, or do whatever, to develop an attitude? In discussing the functional value of attitudes, theorists have argued that attitudes serve to organize and structure a rather chaotic universe of objects, i.e., an object appraisal or knowledge function. An attitude is thought to provide, according to Smith, Bruner, and White (1956), “a ready aid in ‘sizing up’ objects and events in the environment” (p. 41). The obvious implication is that individuals might form attitudes when it is functional for them to do so. Any situational cue that suggests that it might be useful to have a “ready aid” may prompt immediate attitude formation.

Two such cues were examined in a recent pair of experiments conducted by Fazio, Lenn, and Effrein (1984): (1) an expectation of future questioning about the attitude object and (2) an expectation of future interaction with the attitude object. In order to be capable of responding more effectively to anticipated queries about the object or to interact more effectively with the object in the future, individuals may find it useful to form attitudes in the immediate situation, rather than to delay attitude formation until the later situation.

The major difficulty that had to be overcome to test these hypotheses concerned an appropriate methodology. How could we discern whether individuals had spontaneously formed attitudes following their perception of a cue that implied that it would be functional to do so? The logic underlying our methodology involves the use of response time and an experimental design that includes two critical comparison conditions. All subjects are first introduced to a set of novel attitude objects. One group of subjects, the consolidation condition, is forced to form attitudes toward the object by our giving them an attitude scale to complete. Another group, the no consolidation condition, receives neither the attitude scale nor a cue of any sort. These two conditions constitute the comparison conditions to which reference was made earlier.

The dependent measure involves subjects' latency of response to inquiries about their attitudes toward the objects. How quickly can individuals tell us that they like or dislike some object? Previous research has observed a difference between latencies in consolidation and no consolidation conditions (e.g., Fazio, Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982). Just as one would expect, people who had been forced to form attitudes out of the need to complete a traditional attitude scale responded faster than those who had not received this same prompt. Apparently, those in a no consolidation condition did not spontaneously engage in the cognitive work necessary to form attitudes. At minimum, whatever steps they did take in this regard were not as complete as what subjects in a consolidation condition did when responding to the attitude scale.

The critical issue is where a cue condition falls in terms of response latency. Do subjects not forced to consolidate but given a cue implying that it may be functional to form attitudes display response times equivalent to those in the consolidation condition or to those in the no consolidation condition? If the pattern is such that latencies in the cue condition are equivalent to latencies in the consolidation condition but faster than latencies in the no consolidation condition, then the cue must have been sufficient to prompt attitude formation. If, on the other hand, the pattern of latencies indicate that the cue condition is equivalent to the no consolidation condition and slower than the consolidation condition, then the cue did not prompt spontaneous attitude formation. By comparing latencies within a cue condition to latencies within consolidation and no consolidation conditions, then, it should be possible to discern whether the cue was sufficient to prompt attitude formation.

This is precisely what we did in two experiments. In each, subjects first worked in a 15 minute free-play setting with five types of novel intellectual puzzles that presumably were to form part of an aptitude test that was being developed. Consolidation and no consolidation conditions were created, along with a cue condition. In Experiment 1, the cue involved an expectation of future questioning. Subjects were briefly warned about a second major part of the experiment and were then told: “Basically, though, Dr. Clark, one of the psycholog...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Ontario Symposium on Personality and Social Psychology
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• I. Communication and Persuasion
• II: Compliance and Conformity
• III. Commentary
• Author Index
• Subject Index