Transitions From Dictatorship To Democracy

Comparative Studies Of Spain, Portugal And Greece

Ronald H. Chilcote, Stylianos Hadjiyannis, Fred A. III Lopez, Daniel Nataf, Elizabeth Sammis

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317841036
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1991. In the late 1970s, Nicos Poulantzas, in Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Spain, Greece, applied his well-known theoretical perspectives to a concrete analysis of the major transformations that occurred in those three countries during 1974 and 1975. His provocative and interpretative analysis not only provided a basis for comparative study but also examined several important theoretical questions about transition from dictatorship to representative democracy and on to socialism. The present essays offer a retrospective assessment of this transition and examine current developments with particular attention to the role of the state and social classes in the overthrow of the old dictatorships, the evolution of representative democracy and political parties, and the formal integration of these countries into the European Eco nomic Community and the international capitalist system.

Chapter 1

Southern European Transitions in Comparative Perspective

Ronald H. Chilcote

During 1974 and 1975 Southern Europe was shaken by the overthrow of military dictatorships. On April 25, 1974, the nearly 50-year-old Portuguese regime, initiated by coup in 1926 and sustained under António de Oliveira Salazar and Marcello Caetano, fell to progressive elements in the armed forces long disenchanted with the debilitating colonial wars in Africa and desiring change at home. On July 24, the seven-year-old military Greek junta fell, the consequence of an abortive intervention in Cyprus and dis-illusionment among both bourgeois and popular classes. A year later began the gradual dismantling of the regime of Francisco Franco, who had ruled since victorious in the Spanish civil war in 1939.

Acompanying these dramatic events were popular euphoria and expectations and demands for reforms and substantial change from the authoritarian practices of the old regimes. A transition from precapitalist to capitalist relations of production had been evident for some time in all three countries despite their obvious backwardness when contrasted to the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe. The immediate objective was achievement of a transition from the old dictatorships to democracy, but the problematic of attaining a democracy involved alternative courses of action: on the one hand, the establishment of formal representative or parliamentary democracy, the preservation of bourgeois capitalist hegemony, and the further consolidation and expansion of capitalism; on the other, the struggle toward socialism, the implementation of democratic socialism, participatory democracy, and ultimately the socialization of the means of production.

During the middle of the nineteenth century in his analysis of the state and class struggle in revolutionary France, Karl Marx, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte (1852), focused on this problem of a transition to democracy. In the late 1970s Marxist academics set forth to unravel the intricacies of the transition in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. In a series of published letters, French philosopher Louis Althusser reflected briefly on the need of fascist states to establish a mass base, including not only the monopolistic and nonmonopolistic bourgeoisies but also the middle classes, poor and small peasant farmers, and a fraction of the working class (Althusser and Rebello 1976, 21). In a more elaborate and insightful analysis, Greek political sociologist and theorist Nicos Poulantzas played upon this theme and also offered a comparative study of the three cases. His The Crisis of the Dictatorships (1976a) departs from prior theory, concentrates on an elaboration and analysis of causes and their repercussions, and assumes a relatively informed readership. He was especially interested in the experience “of popular movements confronting the exceptional capitalist regimes” (1976a, 8). Poulantzas was the first social scientist to study these transitions. His pioneering comparative work serves as a point of departure for our own essays. My introduction focuses on his work, first, by examining the theoretical foundations of important thinkers such as Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Gramsci who preceded and influenced him; second, with a brief synthesis of what he wrote about the transitions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece; and, third, through an assessment of his analysis in light of the ensuing decade, as drawn from the three case studies in this volume.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

State and class are essential concepts employed by these Marxist thinkers, and they provide the framework of analysis for Poulantzas as well as our own essays. Poulantzas affirmed: “I think that in Marx and Engels, and also in Lenin, not to mention Gramsci, whose contribution is very important, there are certainly elements of what I am trying to develop” (1978a, 14). The ensuing discussion examines their ideas before turning to Poulantzas.

Through a critique of Hegel in Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law (1843), Marx acknowledged the separation of state from civil society and provided a rudimentary theory of the state, although he did not elaborate his theory in a systematic manner. Whereas the state is conceptualized briefly in later works with Engels such as The German Ideology (1845–46) and Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), Marx works out a more complex class theory of the state in Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850 (1850), The Eighteenth Brumaire (1852), and “Critique of the Gotha Programme” (1875). Several themes appear in these works: the distinction between the economic base and the political superstructure in which the state is a reflection of the capitalist economy and where political struggles are but illusions of the real conflict among classes; the state as an instrument of the ruling class, a perspective found in the Manifesto where the executive of the modern state is recognized as a committee that manages the affairs of the bourgeoisie; the perspective that the state is a means of cohesion of socially necessary and class interests in the social formation; and the assumption that the state is an “institutional ensemble,” allowing the adoption of “an institutional approach in combination with a firm grasp of Marxist political economy and an historical appreciation of the nature of class and popular-democratic struggles” (Jessop 1982, 23). It is possible to identify theoretical fragments, but no unitary and coherent theory of the state is discernible in the thought of Marx.

In On the Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884), Engels emphasized that “a power, apparently standing above society, became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict and keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arising out of society, but placing itself above it and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state ….” (Engels, n.d., 148). Under capitalism the state assumes many of the functions necessary in society because of the estrangement between public and private life, the division of labor resulting in social classes, and the fragmentation of society into competing private interests. The state legitimizes the right of individuals to pursue particular interests through the possession of private property, which promotes inequality and disunity among people.

Lenin extended this analysis in State and Revolution (1918) by insisting that the state does not reconcile class conflict but ensures the oppression of one class by another. He believed that state power must be destroyed through violent revolution and that reformist solutions would not mitigate class antagonisms. Gramsci defined the state as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci 1971, 244).

Gramsci (1957) focused on bourgeois hegemony in civil society, an idea that one writer has characterized as “the ideological predominance of bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes” (Carnoy 1984, 66). He located the hegemony of the bourgeoisie in such a manner as to show that the state functioned as a coercive apparatus of the bourgoisie to the extent of being “involved in reproducing the relations of production” (Carnoy 1984, 66). Hegemony thus became the means whereby the dominant class established its view and shaped the interests and needs of other classes. It also became “a process in civil society whereby a fraction of the dominant class exercises control through its moral and intellectual leadership over other allied fractions of the dominant class” (Carnoy 1984, 70).

Contemporary Marxist thinkers extrapolate various interpretations from these theories of the state. First, the state is viewed as an instrument of the ruling class, which influences public policies through its control and ownership of production; the work of English scholar Ralph Miliband (1969), exemplified this perspective. Second, the state is often seen as autonomous and not a passive tool of the ruling class. Autonomy is apparent especially in “exceptional” periods such as during the empire of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte from 1852 to 1870. Poulantzas (1973, 1975) combined this notion with a structural interpretation that was popular among French social theorists of his time. The contrasting views of Poulantzas (1969, 1976) and Miliband (1970, 1973) stimulated widespread debate over the nature of the state during the 1970s. Third, in opposition to instrumentalist and structuralist theories, the state may be seen as consisting of institutional apparatuses and bureaucratic organizations, norms, and rules that represent legitimate authority and a monopoly of coercive force in regulating the public and private spheres of society; influenced by the Frankfurt School and by the Weberian understanding of bureaucracy, Claus Offe (1972, 1975) represented this “political” view. A fourth perspective is “derived” from Marx’s theory of capital and political economy and assumes that through intervention and policy the state can build infrastructure that stimulates and ensures capital accumulation. Analysis of the state depends on the constraints and limitations that capitalist accumulation places on the state; German writers such as Joachim Hirsch (1978) advanced this position. Finally, emphasis is given to politics and democracy; whereas bourgeois democracy involves representation of the bourgeoisie in or direct control over parliament so as to mystify the actions of the state administration and deceive the masses, proletarian democracy allows the direct and continuous participation of people in the affairs of society and government—struggle over these positions was evident, especially in the Portuguese revolutionary period of 1974 and 1975. Given the lack of a unified theory, a class theory of the state can employ these various approaches as relevant to conditions of particular states, their forms and apparatuses (see Carnoy 1984; Jessop 1982, for elaboration of these and other approaches).

Marx also did not delineate an explicit theory of class. In the Manifesto he and Engels emphasized two classes under capitalism; capitalist owners of the means of production and wage laborers who sell their labor power in order to subsist. The conception of class in the studies of midnineteenth-century France embraced a variety of classes, including the aristocracy, financial bourgeoisie, industrial bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, lumpenproletariat, industrial proletariat, bourgeois monarchy, and big bourgeoisie. In the last chapter of the third volume of Capital, Marx referred to three big classes—landowners, industrial capitalists, and workers—yet he also identified less important groups. These categories of class may assist in a class analysis of the state, and some of them are employed in our analysis of Spain, Portugal, and Greece.

Contemporary Marxist thinkers also develop different and conflicting theories of class from the analysis of Marx. One of the important controversies focuses on the class position of salaried intermediary workers (who Marx identifies in his brief last chapter of volume three of Capital) and their role in the class struggle, how to define the boundary between the intermediate class and the working class, and the political question of whether the intermediate classes will align with the proletariat or bourgeoisie or find a third position. Poulantzas was particularly interested in this question, and his analysis stimulated considerable debate. Among the perspectives are Poulantzas’ theory of the new petty bourgeoisie (1975); Erik Olin Wright’s theory of class structure and exploitation (1985); Guglielmo Carchedi’s theory of the new middle class (1977); and Barbara and John Ehrenreich’s theory of the professional-managerial class (1977) (see Burris, 1987, for a useful analysis of these various theories).

Another controversy addresses the issues of deterministic and reductionist class analysis by insisting that Marxian theory is class theory in terms of overdetermination: “the Marxian view assigns no priority to economic over noneconomic aspects of society as determinants of one another. All the different aspects shape and are shaped by all the others. No one part of a society, neither the economy nor any other part, determines the whole society. Every aspect of society, including the economic, is overdetermined by all the others” (Wolff and Resnick 1987, 134). In the concluding chapter I return to this theme because Poulantzas, although faithful to Marxism, offered a revision of his class theory of the state, and I believe that the shift in his thinking was based on his personal experience and interpretation of the transition to democracy in Southern Europe. This in turn led many scholars to a movement away from class analysis, and Wolff and Resnick help to bring the entire debate back into perspective by sharply distinguishing between Marxian and neoclassical theory: “what differentiates Marxists is their view that theories and explanations are all partial, their own included, while neoclassical theorists presume that final causes of events exist and that their theory can and will disclose them in a finished and completed explanation” (Wolff and Resnick 1987, 21).

The search for a class theory of the state in the study of transitions from dictatorship to democracy suggests a focus on the form of the state that evolves from the relations of production in a capitalist society where the state is the political expression of the class structure and the contributions of accumulation inherent in production. I believe it important to avoid economistic analysis that concentrates on the economic base or infrastructure of society in isolation from class relations of production, at the same time being careful not to overemphasize political concepts or to examine superstructure (the state and its apparatuses) without recognizing the need for a materialist critique of political economy. Concentration on political institutions may lead to static analysis; the appearance of political parties, for example, may divert attention from the locus of power in the state and economy. This search for a class theory of the state prompts a number of questions, however. For example, to what extent are the form and function of the state determined by relations of class within the capitalist mode of production and what determines how successful it will be? Must the capitalist class mobilize the state as a counterforce to the crises of capitalism, and what determines how successful it will be? Does the state bureaucracy operate independently of the capitalist class, yet serve the interests of that class because of dependence on capitalist accumulation? Is the state an arena for class conflict? Does the bourgeoisie in certain instances delegate power to the bureaucracy to act on behalf of the ruling class and preserve political interests? Or is autonomy the rule in “exceptional” periods when all classes are unable to rule and a Bonapartist personality assumes power and plays off the classes against each other? What of the contradictions between the constraints of an autonomous state and a bourgeoisie that no longer is content with Bonapartist rule or a restless proletariat that threatens revolt? Can the state successfully manage and implement programs and policies that represent competing and contradictory interests of different classes? Can the state serve to permit and stimulate direct and continuous participation of the populace in government and society? If bourgeois and proletarian democracy are incompatible, must workers seize the state and its apparatuses, as Lenin advocated? Can workers find their place within the bourgeois state or should they establish a parallel organization to exert demands for participatory democracy?

These questions help in understanding the events of 1974 and 1975, and although they guide us in the case studies of Spain, Portugal, and Greece, we have not found answers to all of them. They remain central to theoretical debates today in Europe and in other parts of the world where democratic openings have appeared. They are important because in many countries social democratic and democratic socialist regimes have come to power through an electoral process. Once in power these regimes must decide whether their systems will transcend representative and bourgeois forms of government and institutionalize direct participation of all people in their own affairs. In their advocacy of some form of socialism, they must also face the question of to what extent the means of production can be socialized.

As is evident in our ensuing analysis, we initiate our search for a class theory of the state through careful examination of the Poulantzas approach, which yielded a useful but controversial interpretation in the heat of complex and rapidly changing events; in hindsight our own analysis reveals problems with that interpretation, and we are inclined not to settle at the outset on a rigid theoretical formulation to guide us in our own work but to test various theories through the experience in Southern Europe. Whatever his faults, Poulantzas demonstrated that theory can lead to a basis for comparison as well as insights and understandings beyond the descriptive accounts that characterize most studies of the region. At minimum, we hope to be able to suggest a theoretical approach that could lead to a more definitive analysis of the cases under study.

We believe that, whereas the Marxist tradition yields a variety of approaches and that one need not rely on a particular “correct” theory, our work differs substantially from other comparative studies of Southern Europe. For example, Beate Kohler (1982) focused on political developments in Spain, Portugal, and Greece with attention to political parties and parliaments that acted to counter the authoritarian forces that continued to dominate in the democratic period. He noted that only in Portugal had any transformation of social power taken hold, but he explained the shift to the right after the revolutionary period of 1974–75 as a reaction to the economic crisis and despair over unrealistic socialist aspirations, which led to increasingly conservative politics. He believed that links with the European Economic Community gave support to the domestic political configuration. His analysis of the Greek transition was based on the ties binding civil service, power groups, and the army, which opposed social change. Political stability in Spain he saw as threatened by regional disparities. His account tends to be descriptive, with particular attention to institutional forces; there is little theoretical perspective, and the comparative discussion looks to common patterns emerging from the experience of the three cases.

Likewise, most of the essays edited by Geoffrey Pridham (1984) tend to present overviews of major events and historical processes in the nascent democracies, with attention to political parties, monarchies, armed forces, and so on. No common theoretical basis underlies the descriptive analysis, although Pridham has drawn briefly upon a model of transition to democracy suggested by Dankwart Rust...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Chapter 1. Southern European Transitions in Comparative Perspective
• Chapter 2. Bourgeois State and the Rise of Social Democracy in Spain
• Chapter 3. Classes, Hegemony, and Portuguese Democratization
• Chapter 4. Democratization and the Greek State
• Chapter 5. The Theory and Practice of Transitions: Struggle for a New Politics in Southern Europe
• Index
• About the Authors