Theories of Mood and Cognition

A User's Guidebook

Leonard L. Martin, Gerald L. Clore

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2013
• ISBN:
  9781135682231
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Approaching the topic from a social psychological viewpoint, this book provides a forum for some currently active theorists to provide concise descriptions of their models in a way that addresses four of the most central issues in the field: How does affect influence memory, judgment, information processing, and creativity? Each presentation includes a concise description of the theory's underlying assumptions, an application of these assumptions to the four central issues, and some answers to questions posed by the other theorists. Thus, in one volume, the reader is presented with a single authoritative source for current theories of affect and information processing and is given a chance to "listen in" on a conversation among the theorists in the form of questions and answers related to each theory. Students and researchers alike will benefit from the clarity and brevity of this volume.

Chapter 1

Mood and the Use of General Knowledge Structures

Herbert Bless
University of Heidelberg

Research into the interplay of affect and cognition documents that minor differences in affective states may have a pronounced impact on cognitive processes (for overviews, see Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Fiedler, 1991; Forgas, 1992; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Among the various effects of affect on information processing, researchers have been particularly interested in how different affective states are linked to different styles of information processing. In general, the empirical evidence suggests that information processing in positive affective states is strongly influenced by heuristics, stereotypes, or scripts. In contrast, individuals in negative affective states seem more likely to be affected by the implications of specific information provided in the situation.

Various models that have been proposed to account for these findings emphasize the impact of affective states on the amount of processing. Specifically, it has been suggested that positive but not negative affective states decrease individuals’ processing motivation (e.g., Schwarz, 1990) or capacity (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989) and that these motivational or capacity deficits in turn mediate the increased reliance on heuristics under positive affective states. In contrast, the present mood-and-general-knowledge model accounts for the available evidence without entailing assumptions about affect influencing individuals’ processing motivation or capacity.

THE MOOD-AND-GENERAL-KNOWLEDGE ASSUMPTION

The present model can be separated into two parts: (a) Building on previous theorizing (Frijda, 1988; Schwarz, 1990), it is assumed that individuals’ affective states inform the individual about the psychological nature of the current situation; and (b) departing from previous theorizing, it is assumed that, based on affect influencing their interpretation of the current situation as benign or problematic, individuals in positive affective states are more likely to rely on activated general knowledge structures, whereas individuals in negative affective states are more likely to focus on the data at hand.

Affective States Provide Information About the Current Situation. The notion that affective states provide a useful source of information has been incorporated in rather divergent theoretical approaches. In this respect, individuals’ affective states have been conceptualized, for example, as “barometers of the ego” (Jacobsen, 1957), as a “source of information” (Nowlis & Nowlis, 1956), or as “monitors” (Pribram, 1970). The present approach builds primarily on the theorizing offered by Schwarz (1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). It is assumed that individuals usually feel good in situations that are characterized by positive outcomes, in situations that do not threaten their current goals, or both. In contrast, individuals usually feel bad in situations that threaten their current goals either because of the presence of negative outcomes or because of the lack of positive outcomes. If different situations result in different affective states, individuals may consult their affect as a usually valid and quick indicator of the nature of the current psychological situation. Specifically, positive affective states may inform the individual that the current situation poses no problem, whereas negative affective states may signal that the current situation is problematic. (For a more detailed discussion see Schwarz, 1990.)

The Nature of a Situation and the Use of General Knowledge Structures. The general notion that affective states inform the individual about the nature of the current situation has implicitly or explicitly been entailed in various approaches. The present position departs from previous theorizing, however, with respect to what follows from the information provided by the individual’s affective state. Presumably, rather different implications may potentially result from interpreting the current situation as problematic or benign. Evidence for the diversity of the possible implications has been reported by Martin and colleagues (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993). Their findings suggest that although individuals rely on their affective states as a source of information, this reliance may imply either less or more processing, depending on the nature of the inference task activated in a specific situation.

Accepting the diversity of possible implications, research needs to address (a) the relation between specific situational aspects and different implications for individuals’ information processing, and (b) what implications would be functional and adaptive for the individual in general. Pursuing the latter aspect, I have proposed that in general it would be highly adaptive for individuals to differentially rely on their general knowledge structures as a function of the current psychological situation (Bless, Clore, et al., 1999).

Specifically, individuals in benign situations may rely on their general knowledge structures, which usually serve them well. In contrast, in problematic situations reliance on general knowledge structures is risky. This reflects the fact that successfully dealing with problematic situations usually requires considerable attention to the specific details. If so, individuals’ current affective states may influence the interpretation of the current situation, and this may in turn influence the degree to which individuals rely on their general knowledge structures. Specifically, individuals in positive affective states may feel more confident about relying on activated general knowledge structures that are potentially applicable to the situation. In contrast, individuals in negative affective states may feel less confident about relying on general knowledge structures and about focusing on the data at hand.

In sum, the proposed account shares the general notion of previous theorizing that affective states inform the individual about the current situation. It departs, however, from previous theorizing in what follows from this information. Most important, the approach neither implies a mood-dependent motivation to engage in more or less processing nor requires the assumption that different procedural knowledge is activated as a function of mood.

In the remainder of this chapter I address a number of aspects that arise from this mood-and-general-knowledge assumption: (a) the potential advantages for happy individuals relying on general knowledge structures, (b) reduced processing as an antecedent versus a consequence of relying on general knowledge structures, (c) specific hypotheses that can be derived from the current approach, (d) limitations, overriding effects, and the impact of specific affective states, and (e) how the proposed model can account for available evidence on mood and processing style.

WHY SHOULD HAPPY INDIVIDUALS RELY ON GENERAL KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES?

For a number of reasons it would be highly adaptive for individuals to rely on general knowledge structures in benign situations, that is, when they are in a positive affective state, and to focus on the data at hand in problematic situations, that is, when they are in a negative affective state. As discussed previously, the two different processing perspectives direct individuals’ attention toward the information that is presumably most useful in the current situation. Problematic situations are usually deviations from normal, routine situations. If so, individuals would be poorly advised to rely on the knowledge they usually apply. Rather, successfully dealing with problematic situations requires one to focus on the specifics of the current situation. In contrast, situations that are not problematic require less attention to the specifics. In this case it would be highly adaptive to save processing resources allocated to the specifics of the situation and to direct the spared resources toward other tasks. Such a mechanism would be particularly beneficial if it allowed one to redirect processing attention when certain aspects of the situation require additional attention. Finally, individuals would be well advised to generate and test new, creative inferences beyond the information given in safe rather than problematic situations. The reliance on general structures may support individuals with these requirements.

1. General knowledge structures serve as energy-saving devices (e.g., Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; cf. Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Thus they enable the individual to reduce the attention allocated to those aspects of the situation that match the general knowledge structure. The present approach holds that the spared resources are allocated to other aspects of the situation or to other tasks. This “transfer” of resources would be a highly adaptive mechanism, as it directs the attention to those aspects for which additional processing is potentially more beneficial and effective. Note that according to this assumption individuals in positive versus negative affective states are not differentially decreasing their amount of processing but differentially allocating their processing attention.

2. General knowledge structures enable a parsimonious processing of information that is consistent with the knowledge structure. However, inconsistent information will not go unnoticed. To the contrary, given sufficient processing motivation and capacity, inconsistent information receives additional processing attention (Fiske & Taylor, 1991): Because of the attempt to apply general knowledge structures, more resources are allocated to schema-inconsistent information. Thus the reliance on general knowledge structures has a built-in mechanism; that is, the same process that allows one to allocate resources to other tasks will quasi-automatically redirect attention to the data at hand if necessary. Note that this reallocation requires that happy individuals are willing and able to engage in additional processing.

The advantage of this redirection of attention rests on the assumption that the important and adaptive additional attention is not a function of mood. Once happy individuals rely on a general knowledge structure, the additional processing is a function of the match between the knowledge structure and the information at hand, with the inconsistent information itself triggering the additional processing. Therefore, this mechanism allows for a flexibility in attention to the specifics of a situation without a previous change of individuals’ affective states. As a consequence, individuals in not only negative but also positive affective states may elaborate on the data at hand if the specific information does not match the general knowledge structure.

3. General knowledge structures can serve to enrich the stimulus information at hand and provide a basis for making inferences beyond the information given (Bruner, 1957). This going beyond the information given may sometimes lead individuals to new, creative inferences. Given the risky nature of new solutions, it seems highly adaptive to rely on general knowledge structures as a basis for inferences, particularly if the situation is safe rather than already problematic (see also Schwartz, 1990).

The general assumption that individuals in problematic situations more strongly attend to the data at hand whereas individuals in less problematic situations more strongly rely on preexisting knowledge is shared by other theorists. Although coming from a different starting point, Gray (1971) has made analogous suggestions with respect to the role of positive and negative affect. According to his position, positive affect leads organisms to behave on the basis of habits, and negative affect leads them to engage in learning. In a related vein, Piaget (1955) differentiated between processes of assimilation, that is, applying general structures to the current situation, and accommodation, that is, adapting general knowledge structures to fit the data at hand. Interestingly, Piaget assumed that accommodation results from unsuccessful assimilation attempts that are often associated with negative affect. In other words, individuals in negative affective states are less likely to rely on general knowledge structures. The notion that negative situations are associated with more specific representations is also part of action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1986), which assumes that successful actions are represented on a more general level, whereas unsuccessful actions are represented on more specific levels. Finally, Fiedler’s “dual-force” model (1991; see also Fiedler, chapter 4, this volume) incorporates similar assumptions, holding that positive moods encourage individuals not to stick to the external data but to rely more on top-down processes, whereas the reverse is assumed for negative moods.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RELYING ON GENERAL KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES AND REDUCED PROCESSING MOTIVATION

Because general knowledge structures often allow efficient and parsimonious processing, my approach may at first glance seem equivalent to the assumption that happy mood reduces processing motivation (Schwarz, 1990) or processing capacity (Mackie & Worth, 1989). In other words, happy individuals rely on general knowledge structures due to their reduced capacity or motivation. A closer look, however, reveals that my perspective does not share this assumption. My approach explicitly refrains from assumptions about a mood-dependent amount of processing. From this perspective, reliance on general knowledge structure is considered an antecedent, not a consequence, of simplified processing. For example, it has been observed that happy individuals are more likely to rely on their stereotypes than are emotionally neutral (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) or sad (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996) individuals. From a reduced-capacity or a reduced-motivation perspective it is argued that happy individuals’ reliance on stereotypes is a consequence of their need or their motivation to simplify processing. According to the proposed mood-and-general-knowledge assumption, the increased impact of stereotypes under happy mood does not reflect different processing motivation or capacity but the different reliance on general knowledge structures. As a result of this reliance, happy individuals’ processing is parsimonious. This parsimony is, however, not caused by processing deficits. I will return to different empirical implications of the two perspectives in the discussion of the available evidence.

LIMITATIONS AND OVERRIDING EFFECTS

A number of limitations should be mentioned:

1. The proposed model focuses on mood and processing style, but it does not directly address the issues of mood-congruent recall (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1992) and mood-congruent judgment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).

2. The approach discussed here is restricted to situations in which a potentially applicable general knowledge structure has been activated or is otherwise easily accessible. Thus the mood-and-general-knowledge assumption does not entail any direct implications for tasks in which this antecedent is not given. What, however, are the consequences if a general knowledge structure is applied? The answer is obviously not included in the proposed model itself but must rest on other theories and models addressing how different forms of general knowledge structures influence processing, social judgment, and behavior. The exact consequences are of course not just mood dependent but result from an interaction of mood and the nature of the task. For example, in most cases general knowledge structures may structure the social situation and are very useful. In these cases, happy mood facilitates better performance. Under some conditions, however, due to the nature of the situation, applying a seemingly applicable general knowledge structure may perhaps result in poorer performance. Given that this issue presumably applies to several models, such as those discussed in this volume, it seems particularly important to investigate the impact of mood on tasks that are well conceptualized within existing theories.

3. A related limitation is that at the current stage the proposed model itself does not provide an exact definition of general knowledge structures. According to the model, general knowledge structures may comprise different forms, such as scripts, stereotypes, schemas, or other forms of generic knowledge. Different situations and tasks require the application of these knowledge structures to a different degree (for a discussion of this issue, see Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Fiedler, chap. 4, this volume). For example, the dual process models in person perception (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and persuasion (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) differentiate situations characterized by a strong emphasis on prior knowledge, for example, in the form of stereotypes or in form of knowledge related to peripheral cues, from situations characterized by a focus on externally provided information. Note that in contrast ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Mood and the Use of General Knowledge Structures
• 2. Affective Feelings as Feedback: Some Cognitive Consequences
• 3. Mood and Processing: A View From a Self-Regulation Perspective
• 4. Affective States Trigger Processes of Assimilation and Accommodation
• 5. The Affect Infusion Model (AIM): An Integrative Theory of Mood Effects on Cognition and Judgments
• 6. Mood as Input: A Configurai View of Mood Effects
• 7. Feelings as Information: Implications for Affective Influences on Information Processing
• 8. Understanding Effects of Mood Through the Elaboration Likelihood and Flexible Correction Models
• Author Index
• Subject Index