Cognitive Models of Psychological Time

Richard A. Block

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317784906
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This volume critically reviews cognitive models of psychological time in order to clarify and enrich what is known about the temporal aspects of cognitive processes. Concentrating on how adult humans experience, remember, and construct time, chapters survey recent work on such topics as mental representations of time, timing in movement sequences, time and timing in music, and the processing of temporal information. Also included are chapters with a broader perspective, such as the impacts of methodological choices, chronobiology and temporal experience, a comparative approach to time and order, and normal and abnormal temporal perspectives. The book makes current research and theories on the psychology of time more accessible to researchers in cognitive psychology.

1
Models of Psychological Time

Richard A.Block
Montana State University

Psychological time consists of three major aspects: succession, duration, and temporal perspective. Succession refers to the sequential occurrence of events (i.e., changes), from which an organism may perceive successiveness and temporal order. Duration refers to several different characteristics of events. Every event persists for a certain duration, which an individual may encode and remember. Events are separated by time periods, or intervals, that may contain other events, and the length of intervals plays a role in various aspects of psychological time. A relatively unified series of events forms an episode that continues for a certain duration, which an individual may encode and remember. Temporal perspective, the third aspect of psychological time discussed here, refers to an individual's experiences and conceptions concerning past, present, and future time.

This chapter reviews models and evidence concerning each of these three aspects of psychological time. It also focuses on problems with, or weaknesses of, the various models. No existing model can handle the variety of experimental evidence on psychological time.

Models of Psychological Time as Succession

In the literature on psychological time, researchers have been somewhat less concerned with time as succession than with time as duration (Michon, chapter 2, this volume). Nevertheless, considerable research has investigated judgments of simultaneity, successiveness, and temporal order of rapidly occurring, very brief-duration events. This work has been grounded primarily in models of biopsychological and sensory-perceptual processes. Researchers studying memory have done considerable recent work on issues and models concerning how people encode and remember the temporal order of events occurring over longer periods of time.

Simultaneity and Successiveness

Some classic studies on psychological time investigated the temporal resolution of perceptual systems. Various phenomena occur if brief stimuli are presented in such a way that the stimulus-onset asynchrony (i.e., the interval between the onset times of two stimuli) is less than several milliseconds. The perceptual systems differ somewhat in this regard, especially audition and vision, the two that researchers have studied most. An added complication is that certain kinds of phenomena occur when stimuli strike the same sensory-receptor areas (e.g., the same position on the cochlea of an ear or on the retina of an eye), whereas somewhat different phenomena occur when stimuli strike different receptor areas.

The monaural or binaural presentation of two brief auditory stimuli separated by less than a few milliseconds produces an experience of simultaneity—subjects fail to discriminate the two stimuli from a single stimulus. However, the auditory system is still extremely sensitive to relatively small temporal differences. Under optimal conditions, Exner reported successiveness if the stimulus-onset asynchrony of two binaurally presented stimuli was as short as about 2 ms (see Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961). If two auditory stimuli are presented dichotically (i.e., one stimulus to each ear) with a stimulus-onset asynchrony less than about .5 ms, people experience them as a single stimulus. Under these conditions, the perceptual phenomenon is spatial, rather than temporal: A sound source located away from the median plane normally produces such slight differences in asynchrony, and these differences are a cue that enable a person to localize the sound source. If the stimulus-onset asynchrony of two dichotically presented stimuli is greater than several milliseconds, however, people experience successiveness, with one stimulus located to the left and one to the right of the median plane.

Exner also reported that if two binocularly presented stimuli occur with a stimulus-onset asynchrony less than about 44 ms, they seem to be a single, unchanging stimulus. If stimuli repeatedly strike the same retinal areas with slightly longer interstimulus intervals, people experience flicker—temporal discontinuity of the stimuli. Other phenomena occur under conditions in which stimuli strike different retinal areas. Westheimer and McKee (1977) found that if two 100-ms visual stimuli strike spatially adjacent positions on a retinal surface, people report apparent movement of a single stimulus, even if the stimulus-onset asynchrony is very short (e.g., 3-10 ms). (Perhaps concomitantly, under these conditions they can also judge temporal order fairly reliably. As I mention later, however, people cannot always judge temporal order reliably under conditions in which they can discriminate successiveness reliably.) As the stimulus-onset asynchrony of two stimuli increases (e.g., 120 ms for two 100-ms stimuli, or an interstimulus interval of 20 ms), apparent movement becomes optimum, but it nevertheless depends on stimulus parameters (Kahneman & Wolman, 1970). At still longer intervals, people experience successive stimuli, but no apparent movement.

Psychological Moment

A number of studies have investigated several slightly different central (i.e., cortical) intermittency models of what Stroud (1955) originally called the moment, or "the least timewise element of psychological experience" (p. 180). These models, which have mostly fallen from whatever favor they originally had, are usually collectively called psychological-moment, or perceptual-moment, models. They originated with observations that people experience apparent simultaneity if a very short interval separates two or more brief visual stimuli. Although these models propose a central pacemaker immune to specific sensory-perceptual influence, virtually all of the studies investigating psychological-moment models have used visual stimuli (see Patterson, chapter 4, this volume).

Stroud's (1955, 1967) original proposal, which is usually called a discrete-moment model, claims that all incoming information is processed in nonoverlapping (i.e, temporally discrete) samples or scans and that the temporal order of stimuli within a scan is not preserved. Allport (1968) proposed a major alternative, a so-called travelling-moment model, which asserts that information is processed as if it is perceived through a continuously moving, fixed-duration window, rather than as if it is perceived in discrete, nonoverlapping samples. Regardless of model (discrete moment or travelling moment), early speculation linked the moment with a hypothetical scanning reflected in the alpha rhythm, which is 8-12 cycles/s, or about 100 ms/cycle. Different investigators have obtained varying evidence on the duration of this hypothetical time span of integration. For example, researchers have estimated the moment at about 90 ms (Hylan, 1903), 50-200 ms (Stroud, 1955), 140-170 ms (White, 1963), and 70-100 ms (Allport, 1968).

Although psychological-moment models such as Stroud's propose a central, neural pacemaker that is uninfluenced by external events, stimulus parameters such as duration and intensity heavily influence estimates of the moment. Efron (1970) found that the minimum duration of a visual or auditory perception is about 130 ms, and he suggested that this finding is interpretable in terms of persistence of vision. Efron and Lee (1971) compared predictions of moment and persistence explanations. Their results, which are consistent with a persistence model, reject any psychological-moment model in which a central pacemaker or internal clock dictates a fixed sampling period that is uninfluenced by stimulus parameters. Prior research on the psychological moment may have involved dynamic properties of sensory systems rather than any central temporal pacemaker. Breitmeyer (1984) reviewed evidence showing that "the existence of a psychological moment can be as easily explained by persistence" at peripheral levels of the visual system, and so "the notion of the psychological moment is conceptually superfluous" (p. 94). In addition, failures to link internal-clock models with the alpha rhythm of about 10 cycles/s (e.g., Treisman, 1984) weaken the frequently proposed neurophysiological basis for a fixed-duration moment of about 100 ms.

Patterson (see chapter 4, this volume) discusses relationships between psychological-moment models and recent research, which suggests that several kinds of neural persistence accompany the visual analysis of information. He concludes that although research has not adequately tested psychological-moment models, no available evidence supports the notion of a central, fixed-duration intermittency with a period of about 100 ms.

Some other research seems to reveal the operation of briefer kinds of intermittences in time-related estimates and productions, and this has led to models that hypothesize a smallest unit of psychological time, or a so-called time quantum. Geissler (1987), for example, reviewed analyses of various kinds of time-related response measures that suggest a time quantum with a duration of approximately 4.5 ms. Kristofferson (1980) identified a step function underlying duration discrimination in well-practiced human subjects. Based on this step function, Kristofferson concluded that the time quantum does not have a fixed periodicity; instead, it may double and halve, assuming values of about 13, 25, 50, and 100 ms. The origins of these values of the hypothetical time quantum remain obscure. At present, no research unambiguously reveals the existence of a central, neural pacemaker that may underlie the concept of a psychological moment or time quantum; there probably is none.

Psychological Present

If an event or a sequence of events lasts for more than a few seconds, people experience what most theorists call the psychological present or conscious present. James (1890), who called it the specious present, suggested the metaphor of "a saddle-back ... on which we sit perched, and from which we look into two directions into time" (p. 609).

Controversy about the upper limit of the psychological present continues, especially concerning what this implies about the attention and memory systems that may underlie the phenomenon. Boring (1933/1963) said that the "conscious present can certainly include a rhythmic grouping that occupies a second or a second and a half, and that with somewhat less 'immediacy' . . . may extend to include a rhythm of a quarter or perhaps even half a minute" (p. 135). More recent evidence reveals that the upper limit of the psychological present is much shorter than this. Poppel (1972) reported evidence suggesting a process with a period between 4 and 7 s, which he said is roughly equivalent to the time span of the conscious present. Michon (1978) concluded that the width of the psychological present is highly variable, but that the upper limit is about 7 or 8 s. Fraisse (1984) said that the psychological present averages about 2 to 3 s, with an upper limit of about 5 s. As examples of content that are part of the psychological present, Fraisse cited the perception of a telephone number, a simple sentence, or a unified rhythmic pattern. These are typical examples of content that is maintained in an activated state, or in a hypothetical short-term memory store. Block (1979) agreed that the psychological present is limited to about 5 s and suggested that this limit is related to the dynamic functioning of the short-term store.

No single temporal-judgment paradigm or method allows us precisely to measure the duration of the psychological present. To my knowledge, little or no evidence reveals any discontinuity in the experiencing of durations or intervals over the range from about 1 s through tens of seconds. The lack of any discontinuity is probably a reflection of the continuous transitions between dynamically different information-processing components, at least as far as the experiencing of a psychological present is concerned. Stated somewhat differently, the psychological present "is a highly flexible tuning process that is dynamically fitting the temporal width of the field of attention ... to the sequential structure of the pattern of events" (Michon, 1978, p. 89).

The perception and production of rhythm, as in a piece of music or in a series of coordinated movements, depends on structural and dynamic properties of the information-processing systems underlying the psychological present (see Jones, chapter 9, this volume). If a musical or other rhythmic tempo is very slow, the limits of the psychological present may be exceeded, and a person may need to effortfully strive to synthesize what seems like a relatively nonunified piece. Thus, the experiencing of rhythm (or the lack of it) apparently involves an awareness of durations of events and of intervals between events maintained in information-processing systems involved in the construction of a psychological present (cf. Woodrow, 1951).

Memory for Temporal Order

Perhaps in interaction with human cognitive processes, information relating to the ordering of events from earlier to later gives rise to the common idea that the progression of time may be represented as a line or an arrow. The continuously integrated functioning of perceiving, remembering, and anticipating processes apparently produces a relatively automatic awareness of the successive ordering of events. This is a fundamental aspect of all temporal experiences beyond those that merely produce an experience of successiveness without the ability to discriminate temporal order. The primary psychological basis for the encoding of order relationships between events relates to the dynamic characteristics of information processing: In the process of encoding an event, a person remembers related events which preceded it, anticipates future events, or both (cf. Hintzman, Summers, & Block, 1975; Tzeng & Cotton, 1980).

Under conditions in which the same sensory-receptor areas are stimulated, trained observers can discriminate reliably (i.e., at 75% accuracy) the temporal order of two events (rather than merely discriminate two stimuli from one stimulus) o...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Contributors
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Models of Psychological Time
• 2. Implicit and Explicit Representations of Time
• 3. The Evasive Art of Subjective Time Measurement: Some Methodological Dilemmas
• 4. Perceptual Moment Models Revisited
• 5. Circadian Rhythms and Human Temporal Experience
• 6. Time and Order: A Comparative Perspective
• 7. A Cognitive Approach to Temporal Information Processing
• 8. Timing in Human Movement Sequences
• 9. Musical Events and Models of Musical Time
• 10. Time Reversal in Human Cognition: Search for a Temporal Theory of Insanity
• 11. Identity and Temporal Perspective
• Author Index
• Subject Index