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But Why This Man?
Challenging hegemonic masculinity in an age of repression
Walter S. DeKeseredy
Introduction1
Despite numerous progressive changes spawned by the feminist movement that have occurred over the past several decades, and even with 2016 US presidential candidate Hillary Rodham Clinton embracing parts of conservative policies, yet again, a man was elected President of the United States. But why Donald Trump? Why not another man? One answer is that âthe desire for a strong, virile man in the White House runs deep in the American DNAâ (Katz, 2016, p. ix). Related to this point is that there remains a strong anti-feminist backlash, one fueled in part by âthe desire to return to aspects of an idealized past in which structured inequality was normalizedâ (Dragiewicz, 2018, p. 336). Unfortunately, many on the Left did not foresee the possibility of a Trump victory and were blind to the fact that thousands of men across the United States are feeling what Kimmel (2013) identified three years prior to the presidential election. He uncovered a ânew breed of angry white menâ who are experiencing aggrieved entitlement:
It is that sense that those benefits to which you believed yourself entitled have been snatched away from you by unseen forces larger and more powerful. You feel yourself to be heir to a great promise, the American Dream, which has turned into an impossible fantasy for the very people who were supposed to inherit it.
(p. 18, emphasis in original)
Many angry white men (and angry white women) live in rural communities and were ignored by Democratic presidential candidates because of âthe assumption ⌠that rural white voters are racist and illiberal and intolerantâ (Pruitt, cited in Kaori Gurley, 2015, p. 1). Another major error was to blatantly insult angry white men. For instance, Hillary Clinton told supporters at a September 2016 New York Fundraiser that âhalfâ of Trump supporters fit into a âbasket of deplorables.â Similar words are used today in many progressive circles, and the left continues to be out of sync with those whom Hochschild (2016) refers to as âstrangers in their own land.â
Still, there are progressives who now contend that âWe need to not close ourselves off to how the other side thinksâ (a letter writer cited in Pitts, 2018, p. 6A). Will understanding anti-feminist, racist men makes things better compared to ignoring and insulting them? Certainly, we need to know the causes of social problems otherwise we will be âpoorly equipped to talk about remediesâ (Currie, 2016, p. 26). What much, if not most, of the Left failed to do, however, was understand the gendered nature of the 2016 presidential election and that Trump embodies hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995), which is the dominant form of masculinity in the United States and elsewhere (Katz, 2016). The basic components of such a masculinity are: (a) avoid all things feminine; (b) restrict emotions severely; (c) show toughness and aggression; (d) exhibit self-reliance; (e) strive for achievement and status; (f) exhibit nonrelational attitudes toward sexuality; and (g) actively engage in homophobia (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; DeKeseredy, 2017; Levant, 1994; Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 1997). Masculinities studies show that men are encouraged to live up to these ideals and are sanctioned for not doing so (West & Zimmerman, 1987), and as Katz (2016) correctly points out, âthe qualities considered âpresidentialâ â with the notable exception of Barak Obamaâs blackness â track closely with those associated with hegemonic masculinityâ (p. 28).
Having a gendered understanding of Trumpâs style of governance, his supporters, and the antifeminist backlash is essential for creating effective strategies for social justice in an age of repression (Dragiewicz, 2018). Gender should not be confused with sex, even though both terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably (DeKeseredy, 2015). Within communities of feminist and masculinities scholars, gender is commonly referred to as âthe socially defined expectations, characteristics, attributes, roles, responsibilities, activities and practices that constitute masculinity, femininity, gender identity, and gender expressionsâ (Flavin & Artz, 2013, p. 11). Sex, on the other hand, refers to the biologically based categories of âfemaleâ and âmaleâ that are stable across history and cultures (Dragiewicz, 2009).
The 2016 presidential election demonstrates that angry white men striving to meet the standards of hegemonic masculinity can be more dangerous than is often realized, and they are not completely disingenuous. They truly feel hurt and slighted, as amazing as that sounds. In the words of Kimmel (2017), it is difficult to tell these men:
that their feelings are wrong. Their feelings are real. They cannot be dismissed with a casual wave of the hand. But at the same time, their feelings may not be true â they may not provide an accurate assessment of their situation âŚ. With angry white men, we need to ⌠offer an alternative way to understand their situation.
(pp. xâxi, emphasis in original)
There are alternatives to hegemonic masculinity, and there are what Messerschmidt (2018) sees as âpromising prospects for gendered social changeâ (p. 134). Though there are a wide variety of suggestions in the literature on how to challenge hegemonic masculinity, many of them conflict with each other. As the journalist H. L. Mencken is reputed to have written many years ago, âFor every problem, there is a solution which is simple, neat, and wrongâ (cited in Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 1997, p. 137). It is impossible to describe the vast array of progressive policy proposals advanced by academics, activists, community groups, practitioners, and others in one chapter. Instead, I will concentrate primarily on a few recommendations that are informed by contemporary left realist ways of knowing and the work of some masculinities scholars. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe left realism in its entirety,2 but it is a critical criminological perspective3 that pays constant attention to the short-term, anti-crime policies aimed at alleviating much pain and suffering (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2018). The study of masculinities is the gendered study of men (Messerschmidt, 2018; Morgan, 1992).
Economic policies
We may be approaching a new decade, but some things donât change, including the popular view that the best way to stimulate economic growth and create new jobs is to give more to the rich, which the Trump administration quickly did with its large tax cuts for the wealthy. Often referred to as the âtrickle-downâ theory, advocates of this neoliberal approach call for cutting business taxes, keeping wages low, cutting social programs, reducing benefits like welfare, and eliminating public sector jobs. Contemporary governments seem obsessed with trickle-down strategies because they assume, as Galbraith (1992) notes, âIf one feeds the horse enough oats, some will pass through the road for the sparrowsâ (p. 108). However, trickle-down economics will not improve the lives of angry white men or anyone else at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. In fact, a wealth of poverty and unemployment data show that the âtrickle down has fizzled outâ (Hurtig, 1999, p. 103). Not surprisingly, however, the wealthy continue to benefit greatly from low wages, government cutbacks, and the rapid growth of the âprecariatâ4 (Wacquant, 2011).
Male privilege is âpersistent but precariousâ (Sernau, 2006, p. 69). Due to the above and other destructive economic transformations, 20 years ago Susan Faludi (1999) observed that many US men âlost a useful role in public life, a way of earning a decent and reliable livingâ (p. 40). They experienced what Young (2007) coined the âvertigo of late modernity,â and were suffering from a âsense of insecurity, insubstantiality, uncertainty, and fear of fallingâ (p. 35). Today, more US men feel humiliated and emasculated than ever before because, in the words of Marxist scholar Vegh Weis (2017), âit is the first time in which the American Dream has entirely fallen apart: it is not enough for parents to work hard to provide their children with a better lifeâ (pp. 194â195).
Again, we know that numerous rural males are angry white men who voted for Trump and feel âstiffedâ (Faludi, 1999). Kimmel (2017) reminds us that their anger is directed at the wrong people, but they have every right to be angry because:
Economic restructuring has hit rural men particularly hard, resulting in high levels of unemployment, chronic underemployment, and declining wages âŚ. The loss of stable male employment has also tested the fortitude of the masculine ideal (i.e., the notion that menâs identity and success is linked to their ability to provide economically for their family).
(Smith, 2017, p. 120)
There is a major decline in the number of family-owned farms because many people cannot make a reasonable living from them. Moreover, numerous rural US towns that had to rely on a small number of industries for employment have been economically devastated by the closing of sawmills, coalmines, and other key sources of income (Nelson, 2011; Sherman, 2011; Stoll, 2017). Note, too, that an increasing number of rural women are seeking employment or getting jobs due to the loss of stable male employment (Smith, 2017). Transitions like these often generate marital instability because many economically displaced men cannot meet what they see as the responsibilities of âbeing the man of the household,â and thus must cope with their perceived failed masculinity (DeKeseredy et al., 2007; Sherman, 2011; Smith, 2017). Further, a sizeable portion of unemployed rural men who strongly adhere to the ideology of familial patriarchy compensate for their lack of economic power by exerting more control over their wives (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2009) â a problem that can influence these women to consider leaving or actually exiting their relationships (Sherman, 2011). This ideology is a discourse that supports male domination over women in domestic settings. Relevant themes of this ideology are an insistence on womenâs obedience, respect, loyalty, dependency, sexual access, and sexual fidelity (Barrett & McIntosh, 1982; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Smith, 1990; Schwartz & DeKeseredy, 1997).
There are plenty of other major social and economic transformations that have spawned the âcrisis in the rural gender orderâ and that have helped create the aforementioned new breed of angry rural white men (Hogg & Carrington, 2006, p. 181). These changes include womenâs rights to own property and inherit wealth, an increase in the number of rural womenâs associations, the âdelegitimationâ of some forms of rural hegemonic masculinity (e.g., harsher drinking and driving laws), and the rise in rural womenâs employment that coincided with the rise of the service sector (DeKeseredy et al., 2007; Smith, 2017). Of course, there are also unemployed rural men who have âmanaged to remake masculinityâ in ways that do not involve becoming angry and engaging in patriarchal practices. For instance, Shermanâs (2011) study of families harmed by the closure of sawmills in a rural California community reveals that some unemployed men became active, progressive fathers and enjoyed spending much time with their children while their wives worked. Too many other unemployed men, however, deal with the above âmasculinity challengesâ in negative ways, such as drinking with men in similar situations, abusing female intimate partners (DeKeseredy & Schwartz, 2009), and joining far right groups (Kimmel, 2017).
What is to be done? There are no easy answers to this question in this current era. Meaningful job growth appears to be a pipe dream thanks to the devastating effects of Trump imposing heavy trade tariffs on imported goods such as steel and aluminum from Canada, Mexico, and the European Union (EU). For example, in late June 2018, iconic US motorcycle producer Harley-Davidson announced that it is moving some production overseas because, in response to Trumpâs actions, the EU increased US motorcycle tariffs from 6% to 31%, which adds roughly US$2,200 to the cost of the average motorcycle (Kessler, 2018). This, perhaps, is just the tip of the iceberg, since the Trump tariffs could result in job losses for hundreds of thousands of US workers (Tuttle, 2018). And just when one thinks that things could not get worse, factor in the effects of robots and artificial intelligence. A Pew Research Center study (see Smith & Anderson, 2014) asked 1,896 experts about the consequences of these new technologies and found that:
Half of these experts (48%) envision a future in which robots and digital agents [will] have displaced significant numbers of both blue- and white-collar workers â with many expressing concern that this will lead to vast increases in income inequality, masses of people who are effectively unemployable, and breakdowns in the soci...