Criminal Justice Theory

Explaining the Nature and Behavior of Criminal Justice

Edward Maguire, David Duffee, Edward R. Maguire, David E. Duffee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781134706181
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

Criminal Justice Theory, Second Edition is the first and only text, edited by U.S. criminal justice educators, on the theoretical foundations of criminal justice, not criminological theory. This new edition includes entirely new chapters as well as revisions to all others, with an eye to accessibility and coherence for upper division undergraduate and beginning graduate students in the field.

Part I The Idea of Criminal Justice Theory

The three chapters in Part I introduce the idea of criminal justice theory. Taken together, they help readers decide what is, and what is not, criminal justice theory; they explore its breadth and its boundaries; and they explore its relevance to issues like reducing crime and disorder and enhancing justice and equity. More importantly, they help readers think about why the idea of criminal justice theory is important and worth pursuing.

In Chapter 1, Duffee asks why criminal justice theory is important, providing a personal account of his own efforts to get people to think theoretically about criminal justice. He describes an intellectual journey that is sometimes humorous and sometimes maddening. Duffee articulates the unfortunate tendency in academic criminology and criminal justice to view “theory” as synonymous with criminological theory. The problems with this approach are not simply academic. He provides clear examples to illustrate an important theme: knowing which policies and practices are most effective in reducing crime is of little use if we don’t know how to get agencies to adopt and implement them. Understanding how criminal justice systems work at multiple levels—people, groups, agencies, and networks of agencies—is not only vital, it is worthy of study in its own right.

Chapter 2 furthers the discussion on criminal justice theory by defining scientific theory in more detail and distinguishing scientific theory from both non-theory and non-scientific theory. In this chapter, Snipes and Maguire observe that much of the literature that is labeled “theoretical” in criminal justice is not scientific theory because it cannot be empirically investigated. The most typical example of this is the concept of “punishment theory.” Writings about punishment theory are generally philosophical tracts concerning why punishment ought to be done in certain ways and not others. As Snipes and Maguire point out, these tracts are certainly important in criminal justice policy, but they do not constitute scientific theory. Following their clarification of scientific theory, Snipes and Maguire review different approaches to scientific criminal justice theory. They articulate seven dimensions on which theory differs. They also describe the phases of scientific knowledge-building, from theory development to theory revision, and preview the types of theories and phases of knowledge-building covered in later chapters.

In Chapter 3, Hagan begins with a bold but unfortunately accurate assertion: that “criminal justice research lacks theoretical initiative.” He asks why there is so little criminal justice theory. His answer focuses on the idea that criminal justice operations behave in a seemingly random way. Hagan develops a structural-contextual theory that is built on the premise that criminal justice systems are “loosely coupled.” Put differently, the various components of criminal justice systems (such as police, courts, and corrections agencies) tend not to operate in a tightly coordinated fashion like the gears inside a motor. While this loose coupling provides certain benefits that are valuable in a democracy, it also results in a system that behaves in a chaotic and seemingly random fashion. Hagan outlines a provisional theory of criminal justice that focuses on the influence of the political environments in which criminal justice systems are embedded. A key aspect of the theory worth paying attention to is how changes in one part of the system are likely to influence other parts, often in unexpected and perhaps unwanted ways.

All three of the chapters in Part I probe the boundaries of criminal justice theory, in some cases arguing that those boundaries are too loose (such as when theories of crime are mistakenly identified as criminal justice theories), and in other cases arguing that they do not extend far enough. Readers should come away from Part I with their own ideas about what criminal justice theory is, what it ought to be, and where it is going.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Two important concepts in theorizing and theory testing are “units of analysis” and “dependent variables.” Units of analysis are what or who is being studied, while dependent variables are something that varies across those units that the theory is meant to “explain.” Criminal justice theories are meant to explain variation in attitudes, behaviors, or other phenomena at multiple levels, including individuals (such as police officers), working groups, agencies, neighborhoods, cities, states, and nations. Each of these levels represents a potential unit of analysis for theorizing or theory testing. Select any three units of analysis and describe some dependent variable on which those units might vary. For instance, you might select U.S. states as a unit of analysis. One way that states might vary from one another is in the rate with which people are executed.
2. In answering Question 1, you practiced selecting a unit of analysis and specific dependent variables. Now select any one of the units of analysis that you listed in your response. Propose your own theory about the factors that influence the dependent variable. What forces might make that variable fluctuate? These factors that influence variation in the dependent variable are called independent variables. This term connotes that we are interested in the effects or consequences of these variables rather than their causes. Following up on the example in Question 1, one might argue that the rate of executions in a state is a function of four factors: state laws regarding capital punishment, local legal culture, the proportion of voters who are politically conservative, and the amount of violent crime within the state. Remember that in selecting independent variables, it is important not only to identify factors that occur prior in time to the dependent variable, but also that the proposed causal connection be plausible and measurable.
3. If you answered the first two questions, you have selected a unit of analysis and one characteristic or aspect of that unit, which is the dependent variable, and one or more independent variables. You are on your way to constructing a theory! Now, does your theory meet the definition of criminal justice theory as outlined by Snipes and Maguire in Chapter 2? Why or why not? If not, can you change the theory so that it does?
4. In Chapter 1, Duffee criticizes some criminologists for their naive assumption that scientific evidence on how to reduce crime will be embraced with vigor by criminal justice agencies. Suppose a new study comes out that suggests police agencies should adopt a certain style of policing—say problem-oriented policing in “hot spots” of crime. Why might some agencies not alter their operations immediately in response to the new study?

Please take a moment and observe that in answering this question about why criminal justice agencies behave as they do, you engaged in a bit of criminal justice theorizing.

5. In Chapter 3, Hagan notes that the political environment can have a big impact on how the criminal justice system operates. How might politics influence the behavior of criminal justice agencies or those working within them?

Once again, if your answer is responsive to the question, then you engaged in another bit of criminal justice theorizing.

1 WHY IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE THEORY IMPORTANT?

David E. Duffee

DOI: 10.4324/9781315882024-1

This new first chapter to the second edition of Criminal Justice Theory is a personal rather than a scholarly statement about criminal justice theory, which is poorly understood and often ignored by scholars and students alike in both the fields of criminology and, oddly enough, criminal justice. I also intend this chapter to be an invitation both to persons interested in research and to those interested in practice to make at least part of their contribution to the field through a systematic, theory-driven understanding of criminal justice in addition to an understanding of crime.

Why do I distinguish the understanding of criminal justice from the understanding of crime? When he was trying to start the new discipline of criminology, Sutherland (1947) defined criminology as the study of crime and responses to crime. Defined in this way, criminology would seem broad enough to include the study of the causes of, the nature of, and the consequences of crime, as well as the study of the causes of, the nature of, and the consequences of criminal justice, provided that criminal justice is defined as a “response to crime.” The problem with Sutherland’s definition is that it has not worked, at least for promoting the study of criminal justice. In Chapter 2, Snipes and Maguire will provide more detailed, systematic definitions of criminal justice and criminal justice theory. What I wish to do here, instead, is (1) provide several examples of how the study of “crime and responses to crime” has played out for criminal justice study and (2) make a case for the importance of criminal justice theory and the research it guides.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AS THE OFFICIAL “RESPONSE TO CRIME”

Many scholars and students jump to the conclusion that crime is more basic, primal, or fundamental than the response to crime. If crime did not occur, they argue, then there would be no responses, and, therefore, no field of criminal justice. This view assumes that crime—a harmful event—occurs prior in time to the response and therefore is more “basic” or fundamental in some sense than criminal justice. The problem with this view is apparent in the cursory examination of any common definition of crime—for example: “A reasonable definition of delinquency and crime is the commission of behaviors that violate criminal law and that place the individual at some risk of arrest if the behavior were known to the police” (Thornberry & Krohn, 2000, 50). In other words, crimes can be defined only through some criminal justice action, such as the prohibition of a behavior or the enforcement of the prohibition. In agreement with Thornberry and Krohn’s definition, but written ten years earlier, Wilkins (1991, 13) concluded: “We may therefore consider ‘punishability’ [not crime] as the central factor. It is the use of punishment which must be studied in its own right: it is not explained away by reference to ‘crime.’” If societies did not designate some events as blameworthy or punishable, those events would not be considered crimes. Indeed, there are societies that do not rely on punishment and do not conceive of some deviant behaviors as crimes. Such societies are free of criminal justice and therefore also free of crime. Societal processes that lead to criminal justice controls, as opposed to other formal or informal controls on difficult and harmful events, would therefore appear to be a basic topic for social research. Looking for the causes of criminal justice actions is a scientific undertaking that examines behavior fundamental to the human condition. Why do some societies punish while others do not? Why does a society select punishment rather than treatment or social approbation or forgiveness as the appropriate approach to some behavior but not to other harmful behaviors? Why do some societies punish more severely than others?

Whether it was intended or not, Sutherland’s definition of criminology has led to an interest in the causes of crime but has retarded an interest in the causes of criminal justice. In 1968, in the first Criminal Justice Administration Proseminar at the new University at Albany School of Criminal Justice, Donald J. Newman lamented that there were no theories of criminal justice, only of crime; consequently, there were no coherent plans for analyzing criminal justice phenomena. There were no frameworks for explanation or theory. Research was ad hoc and scattered. I am glad to say that the state of criminal justice theory has improved since Newman’s observation. There are now a large number of theory building and theory testing papers about criminal justice or some aspect of it. Nevertheless, when compared to theorizing about crime, theorizing about criminal justice is still disorganized, infrequent, and, at times, disdained or dismissed as unnecessary. For example, in my pre-retirement semester, in a faculty meeting discussion of faculty recruitment needs, I tried to make a case for more interest in criminal justice theory among the faculty and was immediately rebuked sharply by one senior colleague, who said that advocating for criminal justice theory “was not collegial.” Shortly before, we had concluded a discussion about the value of recruiting a noted crime theory scholar to the faculty. The same faculty member did not object to that discussion as “not collegial.”

This swiftnegative reaction to the importance of criminal justice theory rather mystified me until I recalled an earlier, private conversation with another senior faculty member about the same issue. On the way to lunch one day, I observed that the school was getting quite thin in criminal justice expertise because of retirements. I observed that when the school had started, there had only been one or two criminologists on the faculty while all others were interested in studying criminal justice. Now, the situation had flipped. I expressed hope that we would manage to keep a balance, since the school had become known for being strong in both areas. I pointed out that we had only one person studying corrections, one studying courts, and two studying police, and t...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Part I THE IDEA OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE THEORY
• Part II THEORIES OF POLICING
• Part III THEORIES OF THE COURTS
• Part IV THEORIES OF CORRECTIONS
• PART V CONCLUSION
• About the Contributors
• Name Index
• Subject Index