Conservatism and Foreign Policy During the Lloyd George Coalition 1918-1922

Inbal Rose

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317958017
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

Rose analyses the Conservative response to the foreign policy strategies in the post-war coalition, highlighting the complex nature and development of Conservative foreign policy thinking.

1

Demobilization and the General Election: The Challenge of Adjustment

On 11 November 1918, in a small railway carriage at Fontainebleau, the representatives of the Allies and Germany signed the armistice agreement. When the news, awaited for four and a half long and gruelling years, that the war was finally over reached Britain, the sense of exhilaration and relief was tremendous. In a spontaneous display of jubilation, crowds poured into the streets, cheering, dancing, and waving flags.¹ Eventually, slowly but noisily, people began to gravitate towards 10 Downing Street and besieged the Prime Minister’s residence. Their enthusiasm was rewarded. Shortly before half past 11 Lloyd George appeared at the first floor window. Greeted with overwhelming applause, he brought the cheering thousands to an absolute silence. ‘The people of this country’, he declared, ‘and the people of the Dominions and of our Allies have won a victory for freedom as the world has never seen. You have all had a share in it, sons and daughters of the people have done it, and this is the hour for rejoicing.’²

Lloyd George had, once again, captured the public mood. The riotous celebrations of peace, the revelry, the merry-making, were not, however, only a sign of joy. They were also a reflection of the profound exhaustion, war-weariness and relief that permeated society. The price of peace, both physically and emotionally, had been enormous. Drained of its material and spiritual resources, tired and spent, Britain now yearned for calm, for an opportunity to recover from the terrible experience of the past four years.

This longing for a quiet life found an echo in the conservative mind. Conservative politicians had suffered twice-over from the corroding effects of the conflict. Like the general public they too had experienced the carnage of war and the anguish of personal loss.³ In 1917 Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservative Party, had within the short space of four months lost his two eldest sons, a devastating blow from which he never recovered. Yet at the same time Bonar Law and his colleagues had been burdened with the awesome responsibility of governing the nation at war – and leading it to victory. Hence they also wished for a period of repose, for time to recuperate personally and to concentrate upon rebuilding Britain.

Europe, devastated by war and in revolutionary turmoil, stood in almost absolute contrast to the wish for tranquillity, thus inducing among Britons an inclination to distance themselves from Continental affairs. It was a trend to which Conservatives naturally responded. The war, however just and necessary, was generally perceived as a result of the claims Europe had made upon Britain. Withdrawal would free Britain from the dangers of further and costly European entanglements. Moreover, by discarding its European fetters Britain would regain its traditional independence in foreign policy. Disengagement would allow a congenial return to the traditional conservative interpretation of isolation.⁴

These notions, however attractive, contained some significant drawbacks. In a memorandum to the Cabinet Churchill emphasized the dangers of disengagement. In sympathy with the longing for calm and repose, he argued against Britain turning inwards. ‘The reward of victory’, he emphasized, ‘is responsibility.’ The British could ‘no more divest themselves of this responsibility than they could in the first instance have stood out of the war … The British Empire … cannot leave [Europe] in a welter of anarchy. To do so would be to sacrifice at a stroke all the fruits which have been gained by an infinity of sufferings and achievements … Not for the first time in British history should we have won the war to lose the peace … all for the sake of rest and repose … but we should get no repose for our indulgence. We might abandon Europe but Europe will not abandon us. Our unfinished task will follow us home.’⁵

This was a succinct description of the quandary facing Britain. It could ignore but could not escape the effects of an unsettled Europe. Hence on Armistice Day, amidst the general euphoria, Sir Edward Carson sounded a note of caution. ‘Do not let people run away with the idea that they can at once run away with the fruits of peace’, he warned. ‘After all the problems of peace are no less fateful than the problems of war.’⁶ The Conservatives would have to begin balancing between the contradictory pulls of traditional policy values and the demands and responsibilities of a post-war settlement as early as 11 November 1918.

The fighting was over. The diplomatic battle, however, was only just beginning. Conservatives were determined to translate the military triumph into a diplomatic victory. Their goal was a political settlement that would justify the cost of the war, and above all the ultimate sacrifice made by the soldiers. Carson had continued his speech in this vein: ‘Our duty is to see that what these men have gained in war is utilized to the fullest extent in peace.’⁷ A ‘soldiers’ peace’ meant, and Conservative politicians indeed advocated, intensive participation in the European peace settlement.

A sense of obligation towards Britain’s soldiers extended beyond a mere recognition of the debt to be paid. There was also a deep sense of empathy. The end of hostilities saw within the ranks of the conscripted soldiers a general expectation of a quick demobilization. When this was not forthcoming, dissatisfaction was rife, and several mutinies, albeit on a local level, took place. Conservative politicians, many of them with their own war service in mind, were particularly responsive and sympathetic to the soldiers’ plight. Moreover, the fact that most had been officers evoked among them a strong sense of personal responsibility.⁸ Demobilization, and the re-integration of the conscripts into the economic and social life of the nation, was one way of providing for their men’s welfare.

The need to rebuild and secure Britain’s economy served to reinforce the arguments in favour of swift demobilization. Britain, though in debt, had emerged from the war in a relatively favourable economic state. Nonetheless, as Bonar Law pointed out, ‘The whole life of this country – its social and economic life – I will not say it has been thrown out of gear, for it is running very well, but it is on an unnatural and artificial basis. That has got to be changed.’⁹

In 1918 Britain faced the dual problem of consolidating gains made during the war while transferring from a war-time to a peace-time economy.¹⁰ Hence Churchill was not alone in concluding that ‘victory will be very barren if we will not be able to bring our soldiers quickly home to active conditions of industry and employment’.¹¹ Conservatives equate economic strength with national security and great power status.¹² Following the war, the search for security was naturally of overriding interest. Conservatives thus attached great significance to the task of industrial and economic reconstruction.¹³ Believing it to be a pre-requisite of Britain’s security, Conservatives supported a policy of rapid demobilization designed to meet the demands of industry.¹⁴

Demobilization was also consistent with orthodox military thinking. Dismantling the war-time army was regarded as a necessary stage towards restoring the traditional structure and functions of the army. Before 1914 Britain had relied on a strong navy and a small professional army. Conservatives, with their belief in continuity and the value of existent structures, were in strong sympathy with the idea of reverting back to the established system of military organization. It would, however, be a system geared to the demands of Empire rather than to intervention in Europe. Conservatives did not deny this. On the contrary, demobilization, by implying a concentration upon the affairs of Empire rather then Europe, complemented the Conservatives’ inclination to distance themselves from the Continent. ‘The first thing to do’, charged Colonel Repington, the Morning Post’s military expert, ‘is to re-establish the old regular general service army to police the Empire. This’, he urged, ‘cannot wait.’¹⁵

Repington, however, was equally aware that to demobilize before a measure of stability had been attained in Europe ‘would be an inadmissible imprudence’. Demobilization and a small professional army inferred non-intervention, a policy justified only if political conditions in Europe were sufficiently quiescent. As this was far from the case, Britain could not yet disengage militarily from Europe, a fact acknowledged by more than one Conservative. Indeed, recognition of this fact led to some very resolute Conservative arguments against the dismantling of Britain’s European army.

Lord Milner, the Conservative Minister for War, was particularly alert to the dangers of too rapid a demobilization. Only two days after the armistice, he warned Lloyd George that, ‘unless some provision is made for … keeping men, you run the risk of finding yourself with no army at all in six months … with the disturbed state of Europe and the revolutionary tendency, greater or less in all countries, it is as dangerous to have no Army as to have too big a one’.¹⁶ Nor was revolution the only danger. There was also the fear that hostilities might resume at any moment. Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, urged Lloyd George to ‘make it clear to the country that the war is not over and that we are demobilizing fast enough’.¹⁷

The army was deemed equally essential to secure the peace. ‘Germany’, argued the Morning Post, ‘filled with the Mommsen theory that no moral obligation constrains it to keep a dishonourable peace … still retains in being a highly trained and disciplined force … If the military power of the Allies were reduced too rapidly and sweepingly, what security would there be for the acceptance by the enemy of the peace terms?’¹⁸ The ‘peace won by hard fighting’, must leave no room open to German aggression. It required an army and thus for ‘one last burden to be laid on our fighting men’.

The Morning Post’s concern was shared by Conservative politicians. Walter Long pointed out that ‘until peace is signed we must maintain our armies in the front’.¹⁹ Though not necessarily believing in the inherent iniquity of the Germans, they were uncertain of Germany’s willingness to submit to a prescribed peace. A political arrangement to Britain’s liking meant that a Continental army was still necessary. Bonar Law was wholly representa...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: The End of the War
• 1 Demobilization and the General Election: The Challenge of Adjustment
• 2 The Paris Conference: The Need for Containment
• 3 Preserving the Peace I: The League of Nations
• 4 Preserving the Peace II: The Anglo-American Guarantee
• 5 Myth and Tradition in Conservative Foreign Policy
• 6 Atlanticism: The American Option
• 7 The Era of Conferences I: Conference Co-operation and Unity
• 8 Thinking Imperially: A Question of Empire
• 9 The Era of Conferences II: The French Connection
• 10 The Genoa Conference: A Dangerous Conspiracy
• 11 The Chanak Crisis: The Most Troublesome of All Questions
• Conclusions: Conservatives, Coalition and Foreign Policy
• Appendix A: Coalition Government: Conservative Ministers, 10 January 1919–19 October 1922
• Appendix B: Conservative Party Leaders and Officials, 10 January 19194–10 October 1922
• Appendix C: Pro-Coalition Conservative MPs, 1922
• Appendix D: Anti-Coalition Conservative MPs, 1919–22
• Bibliography
• Index