Neutrality in Austria

Anton Pelinka

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351308823
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

After Stalin's death, during a respite in Cold War tensions in 1955, Austria managed to rid itself of a quadripartite occupation regime and become a neutral state. As the Cold War continued, Austria's policy of neutrality helped make this small country into an important mediator of East-West differences, and neutrality became a crucial part of Austria's postwar identity. In the post-Cold War era Austrian neutrality seems to demand redefinition. The work addresses such issues as what neutrality means when Austria's neighbors are joining NATO? What is the difference between Austrian neutrality in 1955 and 2000? In remaining apart from NATO, do Austrian elites risk their nation's national security? Is Austria a "free rider, " too stingy to contribute to Western defense? Has the neutralist mentalit become such a crucial part of Austrian postwar identity that its abandonment will threaten civil society? These questions are addressed in this latest in the prestigious Contemporary Austrian Studies series.

The volume emerged from the Wittgenstein Research Center project on "Discourse, Politics, and Identity, " an interdisciplinary investigation of the meaning of Austrian neutrality. The first two chapters analyze the current meaning of Austrian neutrality. Karin Liebhart records narrative interviews with former presidents Rudolf Kirchschlger and Kurt Waldheim, both central political actors present at the creation and implementation of Austria's postwar neutrality. Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak provide in-depth analysis of a debate on Austrian National Television on "NATO and Neutrality, " a microcosm of Austrian popular opinion that exposed all positions and ideological preferences on neutrality. The historian Oliver Rathkolb surveys international perceptions of Austrian neutrality over the past half-century. For comparative contrast David Irwin and John Wilson apply Foucault's theoretical framework to the history and debates on neutrality in Ireland. Political scientists Heinz Grtner and Paul Luif provide examples of how Austrian neutrality has been handled in the past and today. Michael Gehler analyzes Austria's response to the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and Klaus Eisterer reviews the Austrian legation's handling of the 1968 Czechoslovak crisis.

Gnter Bischof is professor of history and executive director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans. Anton Pelinka is professor of political science at the University of Innsbruck and director of the Institute of Conflict Research in Vienna. Ruth Wodak is professor in the linguistics department at the University of Vienna and director of the research center "Discourse, Politics, Identity" at the Austrian Academy of Science.

TOPICAL ESSAYS

Austrian Neutrality

Introduction

This special issue is the result of many debates about neutrality and the relevance of neutrality in Austria as well as in other neutral states, now belonging to the European Union.

Neutrality in Austria has a long and complex history: First, it was seen as something which was accommodated to please the Allied Forces. Slowly, neutrality became integrated into Austria’s official identity. And nowadays, it is very positively connotated for many, emotionally laden for all, although very few know what it actually means and entails. The recent debates in the media and the discussion about European Security Policies as well as the meaning neutrality acquired for the main political parties in Austria, were the reason for a research project, undertaken in the Wittgenstein Research Center “Discourse, Politics, and Identity,” in the years 1997 – 1999. The project is interdisciplinary in nature, and the team consisted of political scientists, sociologists, historians, and linguists (see Liebhart and Benke/Wodak in this volume). The project on “Discourses on Neutrality” is the continuation of another study on the “Discursive Construction of National Identity” (Wodak et al. 1999), which showed that the issue of neutrality was functionalized for many political goals at different times during the past forty-five years, the Second Austrian Republic.

Our study used the discourse-historical approach: on the one hand, debates in the media and political speeches were studied (on Austria’s National Day, 26 October), on the other hand, interviews and focusgroups were installed to investigate private and semi-private beliefs and opinions. The confrontation of these different and distinct public spaces made it possible to study the recontextuliazation of the meanings of “neutrality” and the ideologies involved. Specifically, it was also possible to interview two former Austrian presidents, who had both been involved with the creation and implementation of neutrality in 1955: Rudolf Kirchschläger and Kurt Waldheim. Their speeches were also analyzed, and thus self- and other assessment could be contrasted and analyzed: the reporting about the speeches, and the speeches themselves. The linguistic analysis makes hidden and coded meanings and connotations visible and demonstrates the different usage of neutrality throughout the years and in different phases of Austrian Foreign Policies.

Recently, neutrality has gained new prominence—and has produced a new paradoxon. In 1999, the war in Kosovo and former Yugoslavia has created a popular wave in favor of neutrality. More Austrians said “yes” to neutrality in public opinion polls than during the years before. The war in Austria’s neighbourhood made clear what it would mean to belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to have to send soldiers into battle. During the electoral campaign in summer 1999 the (old) coalition partners gained profile through different positions regarding Austria’s neutrality: The SPÖ wanted to preserve it as a symbol of Austrian identity as well as an instrument of a foreign policy focusing on peace without membership in a military alliance. The ÖVP opted for a policy which should lead Austria into NATO. During the negotiations between SPÖ and ÖVP to reestablish their coalition in December 1999 and January 2000, the principal differences between the old partners regarding neutrality were visible, but not unbridgeable. A compromise which would have kept the future of neutrality open was already reached, when the negotiations broke down in spite of the agreement.

The coalition created on 4 February, 2000 is the alliance of two parties which aim openly at NATO-membership. This could have had an immediate impact on Austria’s neutrality: The consensus between FPÖ and ÖVP to officially end Austrian neutrality by joining NATO is obvious. Paradoxically, an Austrian NATO-membership seems to be unintentionally prevented by this coalition, due to its composition. The ‘sanctions’, the EU-14 have started immediately as a response to the integration of the FPÖ into the government, are a rehearsal for the (un)willingness of the leading Western powers to accept an Austria run by the Freedom Party. It would not be plausible for NATO-countries like Germany, France, Britain, Italy, or Spain (not to speak of non-EU members of NATO, like Canada, which have joined the EU-14 in freezing diplomatic relations with Austria), to boycott this Austrian government diplomatically—but accepting it at the very same time as a member of NATO.

The future of Austrian neutrality is open—the government which wants to exchange the neutrality status for NATO-membership has significant problems to be accepted by NATO. And the opposition, defending what has been left of neutrality, is on much better footing with the governments within the EU and NATO, which would have to decide about an Austrian application to NATO-membership. The domestic divide, which is the result of the coalition between FPÖ and ÖVP, could have a rather paradoxical impact on neutrality.

But neutrality is not only a phenomenon to be seen from an exclusive Austrian perspective. It is interesting that none of the postcommunist countries has demonstrated any interest in declaring its international position as ‘neutral’. The countries west of the former U.S.S.R. (plus the Baltic republics) are overanxious to join NATO. Unlike 1956, when the Hungarian government declared its neutrality according to the Austrian model—only to be crushed by Soviet tanks—none of the new democracies seems to perceive neutrality as a pattern worth following. The post-cold war era does not produce any incentives for becoming neutral.

In the years when the conflict between two blocs dominated international politics, neutrality was a credible solution for smaller states in specific geopolitical positions. To maximize national security, countries like Finland and Austria developed the combination of liberal democracy and non-alignment. The East-West-conflict is history, and neutrality has lost most of its attractivity—at least within Europe. A pattern so typical for smaller European democracies between the 1950s and the 1980s such as neutrality is not a value in itself anymore. The perception of Swiss neutrality is a good example for the purely instrumental character of neutrality. Immediately after 1945, Swiss (and Swedish and Irish) neutrality vis-à-vis Nazi-Germany was seen differently from Swiss neutrality during the cold war or from present Swiss neutrality. Before World War I, Belgium was considered a model for neutrality—like Switzerland. But the Belgian neutrality fell victim to German aggressions twice, and neutral Belgium became one of the founding nations of NATO.

Neutrality is not neutrality. Austria’s neutrality of 1955 is not identical with Austria’s neutrality today. As in instrument, neutrality changes its functions—as a consequence of general political change. Neutrality cannot be the same, when Austria is almost completely surrounded by NATO-members—compared with 1955, when Soviet forces stood sixty kilometers east of Vienna and U.S.-forces at the limits of the city of Salzburg.

This is neither an argument in favor nor against the future of Austrian neutrality. This perspective just underlines the political character of neutrality: It is not a political creed like “liberté, égalité, fraternité.” It is not a value system like democracy. But it can be helpful, even decisive, to stabilize democracy; or to preserve freedom—under specific circumstances. Which values neutrality can help to maximize in the future—this debate will determine the survival or the end of Austrian neutrality.

Neutrality has different meanings. Austrian neutrality must or at least can be seen as a concept of International Politics; as s set of rules in International Law; as an instrument to strengthen Austrian identity; as a possibility to avoid victimization; as a doctrine permitting pacifists to be pacifists without declaring their pacifism; as a ‘double standard’ which allowed the country to be Western and non-Western at the same time; as an illusion to live on an island; as a possibility to mediate credibly international conflicts; as the politics of egotistical national cynicism. This and much more—this is, or this can be neutrality.

Therefore, it cannot be just one academic discipline which would be able to answer the complexity of questions. To deal with neutrality in all its aspects, a multidisciplinary viewpoint must be established. Neutrality is important for historians, as well as for political scientists; for economists, as well as for socio-linguists; for legal experts, as well as for philosophers. The complexity of neutrality makes it necessary to take a most complex approach.

Our study illustrates the manifold meanings neutrality has taken: the focus groups, using the methodology of semantic networks, manifest the complex meanings and narratives in which neutrality has become involved: the distinction from Germany after the war; a positive sense fighting unemployment; a guarantee of richness and social welfare; and many more domains which are touched upon in this volume. The generations differ, as well as gender and social class and political affiliation.

The question remains: what will substitute ‘neutrality’ if it is given up? What will retain its place? This is open for speculation.

The volume comprises papers from very different disciplines and also transcends disciplinary boundaries. This manifests our intention of the above mentioned project: we believe that complex issues, like neutrality, can not be studied from one perspective alone; issues of politics, sociology, history, cultural studies, and discourse analysis have to be combined, not in an additive way, but in an innovative and qualitatively different manner.

Two papers stem from the project “Discourses about Neutrality” of the Research Center “Discourse, Politics and Identity.” The paper by Karin Liebhart analyzes two life histories which were recorded in narrative interviews, with two very significant figures of official life in Austria’s Second republic: Rudolf Kirchschläger and Kurt Waldheim. Both were presidents of Austria, and both were present in 1955 when neutrality was implemented. Especially Kurt Waldheim got large international attention during the “Waldheim Affair”, in 1986/87 when his former Wehrmacht past was disclosed (see Mitten 1992, Wodak et al. 1990). These data are unique because both men are already very old and probably the last witnesses of the beginning of Austria’s new Second Republic. The second paper, by Gertraud Benke and Ruth Wodak, studies a TV debate in Austrian television (ORF) where the topic of “Nato and Neutrality” was discussed. This debate serves as a microcosm, as a possibility to view the differing positions and ideologies towards the significance of neutrality. Proponents of all positions are present, all political parties are invited to this discussion. The methodology was newly elaborated for the analysis.

Oliver Rathkolb, a historian, investigates international perceptions of Austrian neutrality in the course of fifty years. He very clearly states that the political changes throughout the past have influenced the significance of the concept of neutrality, specifically the cold war. He also states that Austrian neutrality cannot be perceived independently from major political power games.

David Irwin and John Wilson present a very different approach: a combination of Foucault’s genealogy and an application of this theoretical framework to the history and debates on neutrality in Ireland. This paper is of particular importance to our volume because it serves as comparison to the Austrian history of neutrality.

Finally, we have included two papers by political scientists, Heinz Gärtner and Paul Luif, who both address specific of around the Austrian case. Heinz Gärtner presents a very interesting concept of change and proposes a “new neutrality,” whereas Paul Luif narrates the history of Austrian neutrality from a constructionist point of view.

The essays by Michael Gehler and Klaus Eisterer provide two case studies by historians of Austria’s active neutrality policy during the Hungarian crisis of 1956 and the Czech crisis of 1968.

In sum, all these papers together allow an understanding of the complex issue of neutrality: neutrality as part of the positive self-identification of Austrians, as something obsolete after the end of the cold war, and as an instrument of independence.

Anton Pelinka (University of Innsbruck)
Ruth Wodak (University of Vienna)

Transformation and Semantic Change of Austrian Neutrality

Its Origins, Development and Demise

Karin Liebhart

1. Preliminary Remarks on the Methodology

In his book Das kulturelle Gedächtnis the egyptologist Jan Assmann rephrases Maurice Halbwachs’ theses about the social frame of collective memory (1985) and observes that the communicative memory within a social grouping is related to the recent past and tied to recalls of a “generational memory” (1992, p. 48).

With regard to establishing neutrality as a pillar of identity of the Second Republic in the collective memory of Austrians, Assmann’s model assumes—far more than four decades after the mystified declaration of everlasting neutrality—special interest to current scholarship. A “sustainable memory referring to origins”—not merely though “in a modus of biographical memories” reminiscent of the frame of one’s own experiences or the “recent past” (ibid., p. 52)—Austrian neutrality and its meaning have been transformed from the communicative into the cultural memory. This memory is directed towards “fixed points in the past” and “changes factual history into remembrances,” into “a story being told in order to illuminate the presence by recalling the origins” (ibid.). The focus on Austrian neutrality as contributing to both cultural and communicative memory can be taken as an example of how the two forms of memory are often overlapping (ibid., p. 55): Everlasting neutrality—originally a (rather unpopular) idea of the political elite but a vehicle that eventuall...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Topical Essays
• Nontopical Essays
• Historiography Roundtable
• Review Essay
• Book Reviews
• Annual Review
• List of Authors