Altruism, Narcissism, Comity

Nathaniel Pallone

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351321105
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicología
• Subtopic: Historia y teoría en psicología

How does the sense of basic fairness--or selflessness versus selfishness--arise? How is it exhibited behaviorally? How is it maintained? Few topics hold more contemporary significance or have proved more elusive to specification in precise scientific terms. Current research perspectives on altruism, narcissism, and comity by distinguished behavioral scientists from around the world were brought together in a special issue of Current Psychology (Summer 1998) and are offered here in a useful compendium.

Chapters and contributors include: "Equity, Justice, and Altruism" by Graham F. Wagstaff; "Reactions to the Fate of One's Brainchild After Its Disclosure" by Sidney Rosen and Shannon Wheatman; "Need Norm, Demographic Influence, Social Role, and Justice Judgment" by Helen E. Linkey and Sheldon Alexander; "Adaptive and Maladaptive Narcissism" by Robert W. Hill and Greg Yousey; "Perceptions of Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented Help-Providers" by Mark A. Barnett, Guy D. Vitaglione, Jeffrey S. Bartel, Birgit S. Valdez, Lee Ann Steadman, and Kimberly K. G. Harper; and "Pathological Narcissism and Serial Homicide" by Louis B. Schlesinger. Altruism, Narcissism, Comity will benefit students, researchers, and practitioners in the psychological sciences, sociology, political science, philosophy, law, and other disciplines concerned with the nature of selflessness, heroism, justice, and their variants.

1

Equity, Justice, and Altruism

Graham F. Wagstaff

Is altruism a justice norm? Is justice based on selfishness? And if justice is based on selfishness, can altruism be morally right, yet unjust? I doubt whether many modern psychologists would be prepared to offer an answer to either of these questions with any degree of conviction. A few decades ago, however, things might have seemed rather different.

The Decline of Equity

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the psychological study of justice was dominated by the theory of psychological equity. Indeed, some psychologists saw the equity principle as the basic principle of justice; a principle which governs not only economic relationships between people, but also social relationships (Adams, 1963; 1965; Austin and Walster, 1974; Walster, Berscheid, and Walster, 1973; Walster and Walster, 1975; Walster, Walster, and Berscheid, 1978; Walster, Walster, and Traupman, 1978; Hatfield, Utne, and Traupman, 1979). In its basic form, the equity principle states that a relationship between two people is just or fair when individuals who have made large contributions receive large outcomes, and those who have made small contributions receive small outcomes. The contributions or inputs can be either assets which entitle one to rewards, or liabilities which incur penalties. So, for example, if you work harder than someone else you should receive more than them, and if you commit a crime, the more serious the crime, the more you should be punished.

Importantly, however, when describing equity theory, Hatfield (previously Walster) and her colleagues start from the fundamental assumption that man is selfish (see Walster et al., 1973, p.151; Walster et al., 1978, p.7). The central idea is that individuals will try to maximize their outcomes (outcomes equal rewards minus costs), and they can do this best by evolving accepted systems, or social contracts, for equitably apportioning resources among members. This basis for justice contrasts considerably with the popular notion of altruism which, according to Sabini (1995), “is doing something for someone else. . . . with no benefit to oneself, often with the possibility of risk to oneself” (p. 290). The idea of altruism as self-sacrifice seems to be clearly at odds with an equity principle motivated by self-interest. Moreover, if it is considered morally right to be benevolent or altruistic towards people regardless of their actions, or inputs, then, according to equity theory, one can indeed be altruistic, morally right, yet unjust.

However, during the 1970s an increasing number of critics expressed discontentment with the notion that equity is the most important psychological principle of justice; in particular, there was a growing adherence to multiprinciple perspectives on justice; researchers argued that when individuals are placed in a position of distributing rewards or resources, there are other allocation principles they can, and sometimes do use, particularly those of equality and need (Lerner, 1974, 1975, 1977; Deutsch, 1975, 1983, 1985; Leventhal, Karuza and Fry, 1980; Mikula, 1980; Schwinger, 1980; Sampson, 1975; Schwartz, 1975). Also, although equity as formulated by Walster et al. (1978) also makes promising predictions regarding retributive justice (such as punishment must fit the crime), there was a tendency to ignore or downgrade its predictive explanatory value in this respect (Hogan and Emler, 1981; Miller and Vidmar, 1981).

The multiprinciple perspective has since flourished, and with it the number of different rules of justice posited. For example, Reis (1984) has described seventeen so-called rules of justice, and Desmarais and Lerner (1994) no fewer than eighteen rules, ranging from heroics and self-sacrifice, which would seem to imply altruistic intent, to formal contest and justified self-interest, which would obviously not. However, as a result of these developments, the distinction between rules of justice and any social rule or convention now seems to have been blurred. The problems are compounded by the fact that there are other concepts, such as attributions of responsibility, that are clearly related to justice concerns, but cannot readily be accommodated by any of the other perspectives (Cohen, 1982; Shaver, 1985; Utne and Kidd, 1980).

Justice, Selfishness, Altruism, and Morality

Particularly troublesome for modern perspectives on justice is that there tends to be little consensus as to the nature of the relationship between the concepts of justice, selfishness, altruism, and morality. For example, according to Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1977, 1980; Miller, 1977), the motive for justice (even the norm of justified self-interest) is not based on selfishness; instead people are motivated to restore justice because injustice threatens the whole stability of their social environment (what Lerner terms their “personal contracts” to interact with others in certain defined ways). However, arguably, if the main motive to seek justice for others is to defend oneself against threats against the stability of one’s environment, then this does not seem to constitute any altruistic intent. Indeed, Hogan and Emler (1981) have actually categorised Lerner’s theory with equity theory and argued that both approaches adopt self-interest as the prime motive for maintaining justice.

There would, however, seem to be more obvious connections between the idea of human altruism and the idea of an ethic of care, or a desire for the welfare of others; that is, something akin the idea of justice as need. Schwartz (1975), for example, suggests that there is a justice of need that is motivated solely by humanitarian norms or the norms of social responsibility. As such, he says, “Need-based norms differ in that they do not prescribe a relative balance of inputs and outcomes between claimants. . . . Further, these norms are unique in that the person called on to forgo resources has performed no act justifying either a reduction in his own claims or an increase in others claims” (p. 112). In other words, when humanitarian need norms are invoked, the acts and attributes of the person in need, and those of the benefactor, are presumed to be irrelevant.

One difficulty with this view, however, is that some theorists and researchers argue that, within the context of justice, the characteristics of the recipient are an important determinant of whether a needy person should be benefitted. Thus, Lerner (1977) argues that “Undeserved suffering elicits compassion and help; but people react with indifference or satisfaction to deserved suffering, depending upon whether the suffering was caused by the victim’s blameworthy act or was the ‘deserved’ fate meted out to a villain by the agents of goodness and truth” (p. 1). Empirical data from numerous studies on both adults and children support this general proposal (see, for example, Brabant and Lerner, 1975; Berkowitz, 1969; Lerner, 1977; Utne and Kidd, 1980; Schmidt and Weiner, 1988; Wagstaff, 1994; Weiner, 1980, 1985; Meyer and Mulherin, 1980).

Perhaps more fundamentally, however, Gilligan (1982) has argued that the ethic of care is a moral principle that is to be differentiated from the concept of justice; thus, justice involves using rules and making judgments of fairness, whereas the ethic of care is not rule bound in this way. However, according to those who argue that need is a rule of justice, if caring is seen as a humanitarian norm, then caring, too, is a part, or a requirement, of justice. Thus, for example, referring to a need orientated justice scheme, Furby (1986) notes, “There is also a certain similarity between Gilligan’s ‘ethic of care’ and the humanitarian standard of justice outlined here” (p. 187).

This all reflects a general difficulty that theorists have in differentiating between rules of justice and other principles of moral conduct. Thus, whilst Gilligan differentiates between rules of justice and other moral principles, often discussions about justice seem indistinguishable from discussions of morality in general (see, for example, Bayley, 1981; Sher, 1981; Furby, 1986; Karniol and Miller, 1981; Montada, 1980). Indeed, according to Furby (1986), “Justice involves an evaluative judgment about the moral rightness of a person’s fate” (p. 153), and Kohlberg (1971, 1976) argues that all sets of moral principles used by children and adults are justice structures. Kohlberg says, “The core of the specifically moral component of moral judgment is a sense of justice” (1976, p. 50). Adding to the confusion is the idea proposed by some psychologists that justice also encompasses the famous moral principle of utility (Baron, 1993); a principle that, in theory, prescribes that it is morally right to ignore or even murder those in need of care if, as a result, it would provide greater net benefits for a well-off, selfish majority (Posner, 1981).

Given these considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that many theorists have commented on the rather chaotic state of the psychological literature on justice; thus, Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram (1995) have recently commented that, “New principles of justice seem to spout like weeds in a garden”; they also refer to Greenberg’s survey of the justice literature which notes “a burgeoning terminological and conceptual confusion” in the area (p. 261) (see also Deutsch, 1983; Tornblom, 1992; Wagstaff, 1994).

According to Wagstaff (1994), however, it may be possible to unify some of the disparate and fragmented psychological literature on justice by reference to the core principle of Equity as Desert; this is a principle that combines the idea of equal ratio equity with the ancient philosophical tradition of desert. In the rest of this article, it will be argued that this principle can perhaps usefully be extended to clarify some of the relationships between the concepts of justice, altruism, selfishness, and morality.

Equity as Desert (EAD)

The popular view of the equity principle, as promulgated by many modern theorists, is that it is essentially only one of a number of principles of distributive justice that operate in certain defined circumstances. So, for example, it is popularly asserted that equity, or the contributions rule, operates when there is little or no intimacy or affection (these are neutral) and, although the relationship possesses a degree of cooperation, it is impersonal, and there is a sense of conflict and competition; also, the goal of the interaction is to maximize economic productivity. On the other hand, where there is more intimacy, and slightly less potential for conflict; an affective bond and attraction are present; the relationship is cooperative, and the group goal is one of group solidarity, harmony, and enjoyable social relations, then an equality rule will be preferred. And in situations in which there is intimacy, affection, empathy, attraction, an absence of conflict, and welfare is the shared goal, a need rule will be adopted. (See, for example, Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Mikula, 1980; Schwinger, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza and Fry, 1980; Folger, Sheppard, and Buttram, 1995.) Moreover, within this multiprinciple context, psychologists have tended to see psychological equity as ideologically conservative or right wing in nature (Tornblom, 1992) and its influence on modern thought as a feature of “the marketplace economic system of Western capitalism” (Sampson, 1975, p. 51).

However, historically, equity seems to have been more ubiquitous than is often implied. For example, in the ancient cultures of Sumeria, Egypt, and Greece, the terms we now connect with the concept of justice were more associated with a grand state of cosmic order or equilibrium (see Russell, 1979; MacIntyre, 1982). An essential feature of this scheme was that those who contributed services to others through the roles they adopt should be rewarded in proportion to value of their services; and those who harmed the good of others should be punished, again in strict proportion (the term deserve itself derives from the Latin deservio, to serve zealously). The Greeks called this the principle of geometrical equality; that is, a principle which, according to Plato (1960), “assigns more to the greater than to the lesser” and “deals proportionately with either party, ever awarding a greater share to those of greater worth.” Moreover, Plato asserts that this principle of proportionality is more than simply “true and real equality,” it is, he says, “The very award of Zeus; it is ‘sheer justice’ or ‘absolute and perfect justice’ “ (p. 757). The same principle is described in mathematical form by Aristotle (1984), whose formula for justice, as geometrical proportion, is essentially the same as Adams’s (1965) equity formula; that is, one that awards outcomes (rewards) in equal proportion to inputs (contributions or worth). Aristotle further allows this distribution to be “corrected” whenever it is disturbed by some obtaining unjustified gains, such that, essentially “punishment should fit the crime.”¹

Although the best way to formulate equity mathematically has been the source of considerable controversy (Harris, 1983, 1993), recently Wagstaff and Perfect (1992) have proposed that the ancient justice principle of reward for good and punishment for bad is probably best represented by a single formula: O_i = aI_i, in which, O represents the value of outcomes, I represents the value of the inputs, and “a” is a constant number greater than zero (that is, a > 0) for all participants, who are denoted by the term “i,” in a relationship; this is, in fact, Harris’s (1983) linear formula, with an intercept of zero. This formula is essentially a revision of Adams’s (1965) equity rule, and Aristotle’s principle of geometrical proportion, but with some mathematical constraints. Thus, the main assumptions for perfect equity can be summarized as follows (for mathematical details see Wagstaff and Perfect, 1992):

1. Outcomes should be distributed in equal proportion to inputs, such that the more one inputs or contributes, the more one should receive. For example, if A contributes twice as much as B, A should receive twice as much as B.
2. Positive inputs must always be returned with positive outcomes, and negative inputs with negative outcomes. So, from a starting point in which equity exists, it is always unjust to reward someone for a harmful act or disservice to others, or punish them for a positive contribution to the good of others. (As the nineteenth-century philosopher J.S. Mill says, “The precept of returning good for evil has never been regarded as a case of the fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are waived, in obedience to other considerations,” [1993, p. 46].)
3. Zero inputs must always be returned with zero outcomes. If one does nothing positive or negative, one should receive nothing positive or negative. It also follows that when all inputs are zero, the most equitable, or least inequitable distribution is one that distributes outcomes equally amongst the participants. It is unjust to reward or punish people who have done nothing at all to deserve such treatment; however, in cases in which there are rewards or punishments to be distributed amongst people who have done nothing good or bad to others to deserve them, the least unjust or inequitable distribution is an equal distribution (mathematically, this minimizes the deviations from equity). However, to make psychological sense of any equity formula we must add another condition.
4. When perfect equity exists, the outcomes that individuals receive should be commensurate with their inputs. When the outcomes exceed those commensurate with the inputs the least inequitable solution is one that distributes the commensurate outcomes between participants in equal proportion to their inputs, and the incommensurate excess equally between them. For example, suppose that a group of workers consensually agree that £20 is an appropriate or commensurate reward fo...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Editor’s Foreword
• 1 Equity, Justice, and Altruism
• 2 Reactions to the Fate of One’s Brain-Child after Its Disclosure
• 3 Perfectionism in Relation to Attributions for Success or Failure
• 4 Need Norm, Demographic Influence, Social Role, and Justice Judgment
• 5 Adaptive and Maladaptive Narcissism among University Faculty, Clergy, Politicians, and Librarians
• 6 Perceptions of Self-Oriented and Other-Oriented Help-Providers
• 7 The Linkage between Spurned Help and Burnout among Practicing Nurses
• 8 Doctrinal Orthodoxy, Religious Orientation, and Anthropocentrism
• 9 Intrinsic Religious Motivation and Attitudes toward Death among the Elderly
• 10 Counterfeit Courage: Toward a Process Psychology Paradigm for the “Heroic Rescue Fantasy”
• 11 Pathological Narcissism and Serial Homicide: Review and Case Study
• Contributors
• Index