The Nature of Shame
There are a variety of perspectives from which one could deal with the issue of shame. It could be considered from a psychological, sociological, philosophical, or theological perspective. Significant literary works have been written from all of these varying perspectives. The understanding of the nature of shame is obviously shaped by the particular perspective or discipline represented.
DIALECTICAL NATURE OF SHAME
Etymologically and conceptually, shame provides its own kind of dialectic. Carl Schneider in his masterful work, Shame, Exposure and Privacy,1 has made a very helpful distinction between what he terms “disgrace” shame and “discretionary” shame. He contends that preeminence has been given to disgrace shame and that discretion shame has been virtually ignored. His thesis is that,
The contemporary rejection of shame is rooted in a faith commitment to reason, science and self-realization. This commitment, in turn is a late incarnation of the Enlightenment ideals of reason and individual autonomy. … The practical consequences of this ideal was a determination to remove shame from human experience in order to prove the point that reason could triumph over custom, tradition and shame and lead to human liberation.2
Schneider is speaking about discretionary shame when he writes about its contemporary rejection. It is his thesis that discretionary and disgrace shame must be kept in dialectical tension giving credence to both as an integral part of human experience. The preoccupation with disgrace shame has left the issue of discretionary shame forgotten in the shadows. An explication of the meaning of both faces of shame will illustrate the necessity of considering them within a dialectical framework.
DISCRETIONARY SHAME
Nineteenth-century writers such as Thomas H. Burgess, Darwin, Tolstoy, Dostoyevski, and especially Nietzsche gave credence to discretionary shame and its positive value in human interaction. Discretionary shame has the positive function of insuring a modicum of modesty, privacy, propriety, and prudence. Its function is to establish appropriate boundaries in order to guard against invasive or intrusive actions which can violate the dignity and integrity of another human being. Nathanson states it succinctly, “… shame guards the boundaries of the self.”3 Schneider's concern is that existence devoid of discretionary shame may preclude the establishment of a true sense of integrity and personhood.
Discretionary shame is an integral and necessary part of a healthy person's existence. Schneider sees discretionary shame as being linked primarily to modesty, which has an ethical component to it. He writes,
The close parallel between shame and modesty, on the other hand, suggests an ethical element in shame, inasmuch as modesty is normally treated as a virtue. … The connection between shame and virtue is even more closely established when we note that culture regularly gives shamelessness a negative connotation. The concept of shamelessness suggests that the lack of a proper sense of shame is a moral deficiency and that the possession of shame is a moral obligation.4
As intimated earlier, Schneider relies heavily upon literary figures from the nineteenth century, particularly the writings of Nietzsche, to make his case for the importance of discretionary shame. Nietzsche invokes harsh invectives against Christianity as it comes to expression in the mysticism of St. Paul and criticizes its perfidiousness in the shameless adaptation of pagan practices. He accuses Christianity of shameless intellectual dishonesty as well as immodesty in its penchant for “helping others.”5 The predisposi-tion of Christians to always “be of help” and to express sympathy to others elicited from Nietzsche an indictment of invasiveness. Nietzsche's principal concern was for the protection of the individual and the right of every person to the establishment of self-determined parameters which were not to be violated. Schneider hastens to add that Nietzsche's accusations were not only levied against Christianity, but against socialism and education as well.
Whereas modern society under the influence particularly of psychoanalytical thought has railed against the phoniness and superficiality of the masks which each of us wears, Nietzsche contended that out of a sense of discretionary shame, “‘Every profound spirit needs a mask’ to protect his vulnerability.”6 The indiscriminate invasion into another's world of thoughts and feelings is not an inherent right of any human being. Schneider mounts a convincing argument for the importance of maintaining the dynamic of discretionary shame. He says, “Each of us needs some time offstage, a private space, before we are ready to go public. Rehearsal is a process which becomes more sophisticated and differentiated as we mature, but throughout life it is a human need.”7 Bradshaw uses the term “healthy” shame to encompass the same concern.8 David Augsburger has also picked up on this same theme and explicates it in a cross-cultural context.9 The concern registered in this discussion is for respecting the boundaries or the parameters which humans erect for their own sense of protection. To utilize another phrase often cited in the language of human rights, every person has a “right to privacy.”
Perhaps some contemporary examples will serve to illustrate the importance of discretionary shame and the resultant damage when boundaries are not observed. Activities associated with sex, bodily elimination, death, and some dimensions of religious expression, as well as certain experiences of tragedy and trauma, are considered as private matters.
Our social sense of discretion precludes people from engaging in sexual activity in the public arena. Such behavior is a violation of the law and those who are caught are subject to arrest. It is not that the behavior in and of itself is unlawful, rather it is the indiscriminate exposure which is an offense to the public sense of propriety. Such “shameless” behavior constitutes a moral and legal infraction.
Discretionary shame stipulates that “indecent exposure” of any kind is a violation of the social and moral contract that prevails in our society. Exhibitionism is indicative of severe emotional problems, but it is also a violation of the law. Shame has to do with issues of “exposure” and in the eyes of the law, such behavior is considered “indecent.” Sexual expression is a private, not a public, matter and those who fail to observe these parameters of propriety are considered to be “shameless” in their behavior and in violation of the law.
Conversely, since the sex act is deemed a personal and private matter between partners, it is not for public scrutiny. Voyeurism like exhibitionism may be indicative of an emotional disorder, but it is a violation of the law. It represents an invasion of privacy and the crossing of a social boundary. While most people would seek to preserve their personal privacy in matters relating to their sexual activity, prurient interests seem to prevail that constitute a kind of public voyeurism. For example, the voluminous sale of tabloids that exploit private lives, particularly of well-known public figures, is indicative of the human proclivity for violating the boundaries of discretionary shame. The lure utilized to entice the sale of such material is that inquiring minds want to know, whether or not they have a right to know.
The issues surrounding sexual harassment are primarily matters related to power as it comes to expression in sexism. On another level, sexual harassment involves a violation of personal boundaries whether it is related to touch, gestures, suggestive language, or the verbal exploitation of the sexuality of another person. Victims of sexual harassment often state that they have felt invaded and thus violated. An unwelcome intrusion upon physical and/or emotionally private space has been experienced to the detriment of the victim.
Another example of discretionary shame is the need for privacy when attending to issues involving bodily elimination. It is considered an invasion of privacy to walk into an occupied bathroom when the door is closed. A violation of the same may bring an angered response regarding this intrusion. People who are physically incapable of attending to their own needs relative to body elimination sacrifice a great deal of their personal sense of privacy because necessity dictates reliance upon others to meet these needs. The parameters of propriety are culturally conditioned, so it is imperative to be sensitive to the operative norms in any given setting.
The death experience is also considered to be a private matter. Intimate loved ones may be in attendance, but it is not an event that invites the curious onlooker. Carl Schneider states that “The sense of shame, therefore, protects the dying from the violation that would cause embarrassment, disgrace-shame, or humiliation.”10 We make a relatively private entrance into the world at birth and likewise feel most comfortable making a relatively private exit from the world at death. The ignominy of public executions is a prime example of the public exposure of the private experience of death. The alleged benefit of such a practice in some societies is that it serves as a deterrent to crime. In part, the rationale employed appears to be an appeal to would-be offenders that they not commit the crime because the consequences involve the horror of dying exposed to the public eye.
The human experience of devastating trauma and tragedy is likewise to be protected from exploitation by a healthy sense of discretionary shame. It is appalling to me how often those who have experienced traumatic devastation have a microphone thrust into their face and a TV camera trained on them in the midst of shock, grief, horror, and pain. The importance of the story seemingly takes precedence over any personal needs that victims may have for privacy. The cost to human dignity, integrity, and privacy is incalculable.
The religious expression of discretionary shame takes the form of “awe” and “wonder” in the presence of the holy. It is an acknowledgement of the gap and the gulf between the human and the divine. Isaiah experiences this phenomenon in his call (Isaiah 6:1–8) and Peter makes a similar confession in his experience with Jesus in Luke 5:8, wherein the acknowledged presence of the divine Peter says, “Depart from me for I am a sinful man.” Human beings cannot tolerate the glory or the revealing light of God, even when it is reflected in someone else's face (Exodus 34:30, II Corinthians 3:7–18). The boundaries are established between the holy and the human even with regard to place and space (e.g., Exodus 3:5, Exodus 19:12–13, II Samuel 6:6–11). It is the kind of awe and reverence which Rudolf Otto calls the “mysterium tremendum.”11 A more contemporary expression of dealing with the issue of the mystery of God has been written by Eberhard Jungel. He asserts that the problem centers about the difficulty of the “speakability of God.”12 The only way in which human beings can speak about God is in metaphorical terms because that is the only language accessible to us. Even utilizing images and metaphors, we do not want to confuse the creature and the Creator in the process. God is God and human beings are human beings. While we may use metaphors to speak of that which is beyond human comprehension and even employ anthropomorphic language in order to provide images that are accessible, the fundamental temptation is still the desire to be like God. The conceptual medium dares not supplant or become confused with the reality that it represents. The issue is how to speak meaningfully about God without violating the boundaries. The demarcation between the divine and human has been established and is to be maintained. Discretion is to be employed when dealing with that which is holy.
Discretionary shame is a dynamic which also operates in ...