Politics in Russia

Thomas Remington

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317345404
• Edition: 7
• Topic: Jura
• Subtopic: Völkerrecht

Highly regarded for its comprehensive coverage, up-to-date scholarship, and comparative framework, Politics in Russia is an authoritative overview of Russia's contemporary political system and its recent evolution.Area specialist Thomas Remington focuses on four areas of change in this text state structure, regime change, economic transformation, and identity to offer a dynamic context for analyzing the post-Soviet era. With a consistent emphasis on the intersection of politics and economics and the tension between authoritarian and democratic trends, no other text guides students through the complexities and ambiguities of Russian politics today like Politics in Russia.

	CHAPTER
	1

State and Regime in Russia

THE DUAL EXECUTIVE

On May 7, 2008, Dmitrii Anatol’evich Medvedev took the oath of office as president of the Russian Federation. The solemnity of the occasion, which was attended by his predecessor, Vladimir Putin, the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Russia, Alexii II, and other dignitaries, signaled that the leadership was united around the choice of the new president. Elsewhere in the countries of the former Soviet Union, the succession from one president to another has sometimes triggered a struggle for power among contending political forces, leading to popular uprisings with unpredictable outcomes.¹ The Russian authorities were determined not to allow a similar rupture in the transfer of power from one president to the next.

The succession was smooth but it was hardly democratic. Formally, the presidential election itself took place on March 2, but every aspect of the election process was closely controlled so that no impediment to Medvedev’s victory could arise. Once Putin had decided that Medvedev would succeed him—a choice he announced the previous December—the Kremlin took no chances on the outcome. The state-controlled mass media, regional governors, big business, and the election commission all fell into line. The manipulated election process demonstrated to the world and to any would-be opponents that the entire Russian political elite was united in supporting Medvedev.

Adding to the display of unity and continuity was the fact that Vladimir Putin himself stayed on in power as prime minister. Medvedev’s first act as newly inaugurated president was to name Putin as prime minister. This neat exchange of offices—Putin made Medvedev his successor, Medvedev kept Putin in power—solved several problems at once. Putin’s exceptional popularity among the public, and the authorities’ fear of a destabilizing split among the ruling elite, made it desirable to find a post-presidency role for Putin that would ensure continuity and legitimate the new president. At the same time, the authorities deemed it important to observe the niceties of constitutional law, which requires that a president serve no more than two consecutive terms. Putin’s move therefore allowed him to comply with the constitution while holding on to the main levers of power.

The new “tandem” leadership arrangement created some uncertainty in elite circles about who was really in charge. With time, Medvedev has expanded the sphere of his influence by announcing major new policy initiatives and replacing senior government officials, but he has not altered any of the basic policies or institutional arrangements established when Putin was president. Most Russians believe that Medvedev is basically continuing Putin’s policies.² However, as the next presidential election—scheduled for 2012—draws closer, it is possible that competition between Medvedev and Putin will grow, particularly if Medvedev chooses to run again for president. (See Close-Up 1.1: The Putin–Medvedev Tandem.)

▲ CLOSE-UP 1.1

The Putin–Medvedev Tandem

The team leadership of Vladimir Putin as prime minister and Dmitrii Medvedev as president—known as the “tandem”— invites constant speculation inside and outside Russia about the nature of the relationship of the two men. Is Putin still running Russia, with Medvedev a mere decorative appendage? Do the two share power, with Medvedev exercising policy-making power in some issue areas? Is Medvedev personally ambitious enough to want to move Putin out of the way now that he is president? Observers watch keenly for any indication of policy differences between them that might lead to an all-out power struggle. Such a contest could have destabilizing consequences for the country as the political elites divide into opposing factions. Power struggles of this kind invite popular protests and a breakdown in public order, as has happened in other postcommunist states.* So far, however, little tension between them has been evident.

Although the tandem arrangement itself is anomalous, it is based on the well-established pattern of a patron–client relationship. Since Medvedev first started working for Putin in 1990, Putin has kept him close. As Putin moved up in the hierarchy, he brought Medvedev with him. Medvedev has served Putin faithfully, advancing his policy goals and gaining experience but never breaking away to establish an independent political career. Putin has held a number of top executive posts (e.g., running the Federal Security Service, the presidential administration, and the government, before becoming president in his own right). In contrast, Medvedev’s career has largely been in staff jobs, providing legal support or heading advisory commissions. Even when he served as first deputy prime minister, he did not have responsibility for setting overall government policy. It is likely, therefore, that even as president, he continues to defer to Putin. In such a patron–client relationship, the patron is superior in power and gives his client opportunities for power and career advancement in return for personal loyalty.This has clearly been the case with Putin and Medvedev and probably continues even while Medvedev holds the most powerful position in the state.

Putin is Medvedev’s senior by 13 years, Putin having been born in 1952, Medvedev in 1965.Their association began in 1990, when Putin became head of the external affairs department of the mayor’s office of the city of St. Petersburg and made Medvedev his legal advisor. Putin had returned to St. Petersburg after serving for 15 years in the KGB (the Soviet Committee on State Security), five of which he served in East Germany. Medvedev had just completed a graduate degree in law at St. Petersburg State University. In 1996 Putin moved to Moscow to take a job in Yeltsin’s presidential administration. Here his career took off. In July 1998, Yeltsin named Putin head of the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), and in March 1999, secretary of the Security Council as well. In August 1999, President Yeltsin appointed him prime minister. Thanks in part to his decisive handling of the federal military operation in Chechnia, Putin’s popularity ratings rose quickly. On December 31, 1999,Yeltsin resigned, automatically making Putin acting president. Putin went on to run for the presidency and, on March 26, 2000, he won with an outright majority of the votes in the first round. He was reelected president in March 2004 by a wide margin.

In 1999 Putin brought Medvedev to Moscow. Medvedev ran Putin’s successful presidential election campaign, and after Putin was inaugurated as president, Putin made him deputy chief of staff in the presidential administration. He also named him deputy chairman of the board of the giant state gas company, Gazprom, where he presumably served as Putin’s eyes and ears. Putin named Medvedev to several high-profile advisory commissions, including one on reforming Gazprom and another on civil service reform. In 2002 Putin made Medvedev chairman of the board of Gazprom and in 2003 he made him head of the presidential administration.

In 2005, probably with a view to grooming him as a successor, Putin named Medvedev first deputy prime minister.This position gave Medvedev visibility and allowed him to widen his support in the federal government and the regions (aided by the fact that Putin put him in charge of the “national projects,” a set of popular spending programs in education, public health, agriculture, and housing). Consistent with his career pattern of serving in support positions rather than chief executive posts, Medvedev did not have overall responsibility for setting government fiscal policy or basic policy priorities. In addition to overseeing the “national projects,” he also supervised social, demographic, migration, and youth policy. None of these was an area from which he could cultivate an independent political base.

Medvedev is identified with a faction in the Putin entourage associated with the ideas of market reform and the rule of law. Putin balanced this faction against another that was based in the security agencies. It included several people Putin had served with during his days in the KGB. This latter faction—generally called the “siloviki” because the security agencies are nicknamed the “silovye struktury” or force structures—has a generally conservative, nationalist, statist tendency.Throughout his tenure as president, Putin took pains to surround himself both with representatives of the “liberal” faction, such as Medvedev, and with “siloviki.” For example, at the same time he named Medvedev first deputy prime minister, he also named defense minister Sergei Ivanov to be deputy prime minister and secretary of the Security Council. Observers agreed that Putin was effectively giving the two a chance to compete to prove themselves as potential successors to Putin.Then in late 2007, Putin declared that Medvedev was his choice for president but that he intended to stay on in some position of responsibility. Observers expected that Medvedev would name him prime minister, as indeed Medvedev did immediately upon being inaugurated as president. All the resources of the Kremlin and the United Russia party were deployed to ensure Medvedev’s election.

Putin and Medvedev project quite different public personas, although these do not necessarily translate into different policies. Putin cultivates an image of a tough, decisive, down-to-earth leader. Generally unemotional and mild-mannered, he occasionally allows himself to indulge in sarcastic or profane language to make a point. At other times, he projects an affable, relaxed demeanor. He is often shown in active, outdoor settings. Putin is self-possessed and guarded in dealing with others. Although he appears uncomfortable with the give and take of public politics, he is adept at handling live call-in programs where ordinary citizens can pose their questions and complaints. He is skillful at explaining complex issues in clear and plain language. Foreign business and political leaders who have met with him come away impressed at his master of policy detail.

Medvedev, in contrast, projects a cultivated, scholarly demeanor. His public statements are much more unequivocal than Putin about the need for Russia to embrace liberal democratic and market-oriented values, to respect the rule of law, and to reform its economic and political institutions. He has been more willing than Putin was to make concessions to the United States and other Western countries on issues such as arms control, membership in the World Trade Organization, and international sanctions against Iran. Probably on these issues he has not crossed Putin but has won Putin’s consent to move Russia slightly more in a pro-Western direction. Putin has supported him in his drive for economic and political modernization, but since this strategy has not—so far—upset any major existing interests, it probably costs Putin nothing to let Medvedev stake out his own policy agenda at the level of rhetoric. If any of Medvedev’s announced initiatives, such as the call for a serious anticorruption campaign or for dismantling the large state corporations that Putin helped to create, were to be given more than lip service, it would probably lead to a rift between the two. A still more irreparable breach in the tandem arrangement would certainly arise if Medvedev and Putin ran against each other for president in 2012.

So far, though, the two have maintained a remarkably harmonious relationship as president and prime minister based on their 20 years of association and the clear rules defining such patron–client relations. As President Medvedev noted in an interview with a French newspaper, he and Putin have an effective “working alliance.”What’s more, he added, they recently discovered that they have the same blood type, “in the medical sense.” *

_______________

* Henry E. Hale,“Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia,” World Politics 58 (2005): 133–165.

* Polit.ru, February 25, 2010.

The peculiarity of the situation arises from the gap between the formal constitutional rules and the informal understandings that guide the exercise of power. Formally, Russia’s constitution provides both for a directly elected president and a prime minister who is chosen by the president but must enjoy the confidence of parliament. France under the constitution of the Fifth Republic has demonstrated that a president of one party can coexist reasonably well with a prime minister of an opposing party so long as they agree on how to divide responsibilities and do not fight too openly. But Russia has never had successful experience with the sharing of power between two leaders. As Boris Yeltsin once put it, “in Russia, only one person can be number one.” For most of the period since Russia’s present-day constitution has been in force, the president has been the clearly dominant political figure, while the prime minister has mainly been responsible for managing the economy and carrying out the president’s commands. However, Putin accumulated a great deal of power during his tenure as president, using such classic power-consolidation tactics as rewarding supporters with lucrative posts in ministries and state corporations, eliminating opposition centers of power, and launching new policy initiatives. He maintained impressively high public support, in large part thanks to the economy’s robust performance until 2008. He retained his power and popularity when he moved to head the government and continued to dominate the decision-making process in most spheres of policy regardless of the formal lines of authority. Still, as president, Dmitrii Medvedev has considerable institutional prerogatives and has sought to use them to consolidate his own base of power. As a result, under the “tandem” arrangement of Medvedev and Putin, it is often unclear which of them has the predominant po...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Brief Contents
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Chapter 1 State and Regime in Russia
• Chapter 2 The Soviet System and Its Demise
• Chapter 3 Russia’s Constitutional Order
• Chapter 4 Political Participation and Recruitment
• Chapter 5 Political Culture and Public Opinion
• Chapter 6 Interest Groups and Political Parties
• Chapter 7 Between State and Market
• Chapter 8 Politics and the Law
• Chapter 9 Russia and the International Community
• Index