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CITY ON A HILL?
American Exceptionalism Past and Present1
The idea of American exceptionalism, or the notion that the United States is not only qualitatively different from other states but it is morally superior, has long animated the speeches of U.S. politicians. Recently, a number of challenges both domestic and international has put this unlikely theory to the test, and the notion of American exceptionalism has clearly come up short.
Domestically, economists lament the shrinking of the middle class while sociologists document the costs of oneâs race in America. Upward mobility is now greater in some European states. Embarrassingly, U.S. incarceration rates are compared to some of the most undemocratic states in the world.
Internationally, its exceptional statusâas champion of liberal democracy and human rightsâis similarly eroding when the record is closely examined. True, the U.S. eventually intervened in Libya to help overthrow Muammar Gaddafiâs dictatorship in 2011, but it did so reluctantly and only with the prodding of its allies. But it failed to follow up as tribalism engulfed the area. We know well that American intervention in Iraq (2003) led to a bungled occupation that went terribly awry. Now the Middle East faces the prospect of prolonged instability and even sometimes genocide. At the same time, a repressive Iran has been strengthened. And at least until this point, the United States has not acted decisively as President Assad in Syria has presided over more than five years of violence and an estimated death toll of over 250,000. Objectively speaking then, the end of American exceptionalism is already upon usâespecially with regard to defense of human rights and humanitarian law. Particularly concerning autocracy and atrocities in the Middle East, the Obama administration reflects more fatalism than a determination that American policy can make things better.2
We will back up our bold claimâthat the United States and its citizenry act largely as would any other countryâwith facts from U.S. foreign policy and throw in some domestic affairs to drive the point home. To be clear and as we stated in the previous chapter, we do not contend that U.S. foreign policy comprises an unrelenting string of negatives, but we do assert that U.S. foreign policy on human rights and humanitarian affairsâwhich is our main preoccupationâis mostly a matter of lofty cosmopolitan rhetoric that is then matched much of the time by parochial nationalistic behavior. Occasionally, American policy features acts of what can be considered cosmopolitanism, centered on the broader benefit for others, but its behavior, we contend, is better understood as globalism, because like many other liberal states it acts on behalf of others only when international and domestic conditions are ripe and when American power is not questioned.
On balance, the good may outweigh the bad, but our main point is that American attitudes and behavior of late are not that unusual and the United States has never been that exceptionalâin the past or the present. Most other states and great powers in particular tend to see themselves in a positive light on the question of doing âgoodâ for others while objective facts point to a more modest evaluation. Case in point, Russiaâs President Putin maintains that his countryâs involvement in Ukraine is noble, providing much needed humanitarian aid to Ukrainians and saving the country from a series of pro-Western but highly corrupt regimes. Most others in the world see Russiaâs behavior differently, as predatory and self-interested, based above all on a quest for domination of states in its ânear abroad.â
This chapter explains the origins of the myth of American exceptionalism and the reality. We then use public opinion to see if continuing claims to American exceptionalism actually resonate with public and elite opinion when confronting international questions today. We conclude by examining how appeals to American greatness shape contemporary foreign policy debates. In light of ongoing debates about Americaâs declining position in the world, it is imperative that we examine the historical record for evidence of the inconsistencyâif not complete fallacyâof the notion of American exceptionalism.
The Making of the Myth and its Critique
American exceptionalism has a long history in political rhetoric that predates the U.S. position as a world power. Indeed, this idea has had a central place in Americaâs identity and understanding of itself since the countryâs founding. Sometimes called Manifest Destiny or Providential Nationalism, it is the basic notion that America is special, morally superior to others, and chosen by God to fulfill a progressive role on earth. It has taken on particular names in particular times. If one starts with Governor John Winthrop in Massachusetts and his Puritanical sermons in the 1630s, it was America as a âcity on a hill,â a beacon to others everywhereâand useful to sustain morale during harsh times, which included taking Indian land necessary for economic pursuits and killing many of them. For Thomas Jefferson, it was America as an âEmpire of Libertyâ and the âAlmost Chosen,â which was useful to rationalize the Louisiana Purchase via Executive action and westward expansion at the expense of still other Indians. For several later presidents, it was America as leader of the âFree World,â and this idea was used to rationalize competition with the Soviet Union. All the while, the United States aligned itself with various dictators such as Salazar, Tito, Somoza, Mobutu, Mao, Ceausescu, etc. Only some of these American allies were communist, but all of them presided over decidedly unfree societies.
Recent trendsâsuch as those during the Cold Warâwere summarized concisely by the historian Walter A. McDougall:
Most of all, the idea of an America set apart by Providence and endowed with a special mission to reform (not to say redeem) the whole human race dovetailed perfectly with the political rhetoric needed to rally Americans to lead the Free World in what amounted to a holy war against âgodless Communism.â3
Never mind that some of our dictatorial de facto partners like Tito (Yugoslavia) and Ceausescu (Romania) were communist.
Most realists, including most American realists, have never believed ...