Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe

Into the Mainstream?

Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah de Lange, Matthijs Rooduijn, Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange, Matthijs Rooduijn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781317419778
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Radical right-wing populist parties, such as Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom, Marine Le Pen's National Front or Nigel Farage's UKIP, are becoming increasingly influential in Western European democracies. Their electoral support is growing, their impact on policy-making is substantial, and in recent years several radical right-wing populist parties have assumed office or supported minority governments.

Are these developments the cause and/or consequence of the mainstreaming of radical right-wing populist parties? Have radical right-wing populist parties expanded their issue profiles, moderated their policy positions, toned down their anti-establishment rhetoric and shed their extreme right reputations to attract more voters and/or become coalition partners? This timely book answers these questions on the basis of both comparative research and a wide range of case studies, covering Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Analysing the extent to which radical right-wing populist parties have become part of mainstream politics, as well as the factors and conditions which facilitate this trend, this book is essential reading for students and scholars working in European politics, in addition to anyone interested in party politics and current affairs more generally.

Inclusion and mainstreaming? Radical right-wing populist parties in the new millennium

Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn

DOI: 10.4324/9781315687988-1

Introduction

The West European radical right-wing populist party family has gone through various transitions during the past three decades. In the 1990s, the adoption of anti-immigration and populist master-frames opened up an escape route from the margins for many radical right-wing populist parties. As a result, they gained increasing support from voters, with parties like the French National Front (Front National; FN), the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; FPÖ), the Norwegian Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet; FrP), and the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei; SVP) supported by more than 10 per cent of the electorate (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Average percentage of radical right-wing populist parties' vote share in national elections in Western Europe

Country	Party	1990–1999	2000–2009	2010–2015
Austria	BZÖ		7.4	3.5
	FPÖ	22.0	12.8	20.5
Belgium	FNb	1.6	2.0
	VB	8.1	11.8	5.8
Denmark	DF	7.4	13.2	16.7
	FrP	5.1	0.6
Finland	PS	2.4	2.9	18.3
France	FN	13.7	7.8	13.6
	MNR*		1.1
Germany	REP^*	1.9	0.6
Greece	LAOS		3.9	1.8
Italy	LN	9.1	5.6	4.1
Netherlands	CD	1.6
	LPF		11.4
	PVV		5.9	12.8
Norway	FRP	10.8	19.9	16.3
Sweden	NyD	4.0
	SD		3.3	12.9
Switzerland	SVP	16.4	27.8	28.9
United Kingdom	BNP^*		1.9
	UKIP^*		1.9	7.9
Average		8.0	7.5	12.5
*Note: Party only elected to the European Parliament. Source: data from www.parlgov.org.

After the turn of the millennium, the upward trend continued for most radical right-wing populist parties, with the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti; DF) and the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Blok/Belang; VB) also crossing the 10 per cent mark. Moreover, a number of new, electorally successful radical right-wing populist parties emerged on the scene, such as the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich; BZÖ), the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós; LAOS), the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn; LPF), the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid; PVV), the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna; SD) and the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset; PS). As Table 1.1 shows, the average radical right-wing populist party vote share in national elections has increased from 8.0 per cent in the 1990s to 12.5 per cent in recent years (see also Mudde 2013; Zaslove 2011).

As a consequence of increased support, various radical right-wing populist parties have entered governments, either as cabinet members or as support parties of minority governments (Akkerman and De Lange 2012; De Lange 2012a, 2012b). In Austria, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, radical right-wing populist parties took up the responsibilities that come with holding office, while in Denmark and the Netherlands, the DF and the PVV agreed to support minority governments without formally joining them (see Table 1.2). Many of these parties participated in multiple coalitions, leading to the formation of 17 governments including, or being supported by, radical right-wing populist parties between 1990 and 2015.

Table 1.2 Radical right-wing populist parties in office

Country	Party	Cabinet	Composition	Period
Austria	FPÖ	Schüssel I	ÖVP-FPÖ	2000–2005
	BZÖ	Schüssel I	ÖVP-BZÖ	2005–2006
Denmark	DF	A.F.Rasmussen I	V-KF-(DF)	2001–2005
	DF	A.F.Rasmussen II	V-KF-(DF)	2005–2007
	DF	A.F.Rasmussen III	V-KF-(DF)	2007–2009
	DF	L.L.Rasmussen I	V-KF-(DF)	2009–2011
	DF	L.L.Rasmussen II	V-(DF)	2015–
Finland	PS	Sipila II	KESK-KOK-PS	2015–
Italy	LN	Berlusconi I	FI-AN-LN-CCD-UCD	1994–1994
	LN	Berlusconi II/III	FI-AN-LN	2001–2006
	LN	Berlusconi IV	PdL-LN-MpA	2008–2011
Netherlands	LPF	Balkenende I	CDA-LPF-VVD	2003–2003
	PVV	Rutte I	VVD-CDA-(PVV)	2010–2012
Norway	FrP	Solberg I	H-FrP	2013–
Switzerland	SVP	–	–	2003–2007
	SVP	–	–	2007–2011
	SVP	–	–	2011–

At the same time, the strength of the party family should not be overstated. Radical right-wing populist parties have also experienced electoral decline during the past decade (e.g., the VB) and some have disappeared from the political stage altogether (e.g., the LPF and the Swedish New Democracy [Ny Demokrati; NyD]). Not all Western European countries have electorally successful radical right-wing populist parties. Moreover, participation in national government is not always an option for successful parties. In Belgium, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom, radical right-wing populist parties have not had any opportunity yet to enter national office (Mudde 2013). Nevertheless, for most parties the trend seems to be upward. The electoral growth of the radical right-wing populist party family, as well as its recent participation in government coalitions, provide important clues that the parties belonging to this family have become a force to be reckoned with.

This book aims to assess whether the described developments have induced radical right-wing populist parties to move into the mainstream. The starting point for this assumption is the inclusion-moderation thesis, which holds that participation in democratic institutions and procedures will amend the radical nature and ideology of political parties. According to Berman (2008), there are two explanations for the moderating effects of inclusion. First, inclusion into the electoral game will have a moderating effect according to the Downsian logic of the median-voter theorem. Downs (1957) argues that parties will appeal to the median voter in order to attract a majority of votes, provided these are normally distributed along the dimension on which they compete. Over time, this vote-seeking logic will force parties to abandon the narrow or sectarian profiles on the basis of which they were first founded. If West European voters were to be normally distributed and if radical right-wing populist parties strive to obtain an electoral majority, the Downsian logic should also apply to these parties. It is questionable, however, whether radical right-wing populist parties in West European democracies have adopted this as their main objective (see below). A second explanation focuses on inclusion into office. Assuming office is supposed to have a moderating effect, because in West European democracies it requires the formation of coalitions. In coalition governments, policy and ideological distances that exist between coalition partners have to be bridged. For radical right-wing populist parties this implies that they have to adjust their agendas and positions to those of mainstream right-wing parties, because cooperation with these parties is their most likely ticket into office. Moreover, parties that enter office must be able to convince voters that they can deliver the goods; when they are busy filling potholes and fixing sewage systems they cannot devote their energy to ideological radicalism (Berman 2008: 6; MacMillan 2006).

The inclusion-moderation thesis is mainly focused on (orthodox) religious parties, (e.g., Brocker and Künkler 2013; Elman 2014; Gurses 2014; Kalyvas and Van Kersbergen 2010; Somer 2014; Schwedler 2011, 2013; Tepe 2012; see also Karakaya and Yildrim 2013 on communist parties; Przeworski and Sprague 1986 on socialist parties). Research on the radical right-wing populist party family that systematically tests the inclusion-moderation thesis is scarce. On the basis of case studies it has been claimed that entrance into office need not imply that radical right parties de-radicalise (Albertazzi 2009; Minkenberg 2013). Moreover, a few case studies have indicated that some radical right parties manage quite well to uphold a radical profile while in office (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Frölich-Steffen and Rensmann 2007). Thus, it might be the case that inclusion into office is not sufficient to pressure radical right-wing populist parties to moderate.

The inclusion-moderation thesis is mirrored by the exclusion-radicalisation thesis, which stipulates that parties that are excluded from the party and political system will radicalise their stances. The exclusion of political parties often occurs through legal bans (Downs 2001, 2002). Such bans are, however, exceptional in Western Europe, and the number of radical right-wing populist parties affected by bans is minimal (Bale 2007). Legal prosecution of radical right-wing populist politicians for breaching discrimination or hate speech legislation is more common. In addition to legal measures, radical right-wing populist parties sometimes suffer political exclusion in the form of a refusal of other parties to cooperate with them (e.g., by means of a cordon sanitaire) (Downs 2001, 2002). Some studies have indicated that the exclusion of radical right-wing populist parties by means of a cordon sanitaire indeed results in political rigidity or radicalisation (D...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Frontmatter Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Inclusion and mainstreaming? Radical right-wing populist parties in the new millennium—Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah L. de Lange and Matthijs Rooduijn
• PART I Comparative analyses
• PART II Case studies
• Appendix
• Index