Afghanistan Post-2014

Power configurations and evolving trajectories

Rajen Harshé, Dhananjay Tripathi

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781317352211
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Owing to its geo-strategic location and mineral wealth, Afghanistan has acquired significance in the inter-state politics of Asia as well as world politics during the past decades. This book outlines Afghanistan's efforts to build a stable and peaceful democratic polity, with external military support from the United States and its NATO allies. It also analyses the nation's development initiatives with major powers such as India, the United States, Russia and Germany. The volume:

• brings to the fore ongoing tensions within the Afghan polity and its continued impact on Asian/world politics;

• discusses topical themes such as withdrawal of US troops and non-traditional security; and

• presents perspectives from scholars and experts from around the world, including Afghans.

This work will be useful to scholars and researchers in political science, international relations, sociology, area studies, and the interested general reader.

Part I
Locating Afghanistan in a globalising world and testing theories of international relations

Chapter 1
Situating Afghanistan in a globalising world

Rajen Harshé

Introduction

Afghanistan, a geostrategically significant landlocked state that essentially links Asia’s major regions – such as South, Central and West Asia – through its territory, has inevitably been a focal site of struggles between diverse contending world powers and forces. Since the past two centuries, some of the major imperialist powers such as Great Britain, the former Soviet Union and the United States of America (USA), during different phases of history, have ventured to consolidate their hold over Afghanistan with a long-term strategy to shape the politics and political economy of Asia.

Admittedly, Afghanistan also functioned as a buffer state between the British imperialism in India and the Czarist imperialism in Central Asia in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. Besides, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 triggered the phase of the new Cold War between the USA and the then Soviet Union. This period also threw up several new actors, including the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Mujahedin, which were committed to oust the atheist communists from Afghanistan. In the process, the seeds of terror emanating from the radicalisation of Islam were sown in south-west Asia. The rise of terrorism, in turn, was linked with the production of drugs, poppy cultivation and the sale of arms. Unsurprisingly, in their bid to oust the Soviet troops, as will be argued later, the ground was prepared for factional as well as intra- and inter-state violence in south-west Asia.

Such violence eventually reached its intolerable limits, as far as the USA was concerned, when the twin towers were brought down on 11 Sep tember 2001 (9/11) in the city of New York. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban regime – apart from striking cordial ties with a multinational terrorist outfit such as the Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden – had become notorious for the violation of human rights and gender discrimination. It was the rise of radical Islam through the advent of the Taliban that sent out alarming signals. Thus, the devastating impact of the terrorist violence was brought into sharp focus under the Bush administration (2001–08) as the USA declared a global war on terror after 2001 and intervened militarily, along with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in Afghanistan to combat terrorism and restore peace, order and democracy.

This article sheds light on the developments in Afghanistan within the broader context of globalisation that witnessed alliances and counter-alliances between the forces that were, at once, transnational as also local. By examining the interconnections between national, regional and global dimensions of the Afghan problem since the 1970s, the article demonstrates how, through speedy and unusual transition from trans-national to global, Afghanistan has become an important nerve centre of world politics under globalisation. Afghanistan has already reached crossroads, where the withdrawal of the NATO troops has commenced gradually after 2014. The emerging issues, such as the withdrawal of the NATO troops, are, in turn, linked to the internationalisation of the Afghanistan problem, which by now has become part of the globalising world. Before tracing the evolution of developments in Afghanistan, it would be worth reflecting on the processes that characterise globalisation.

Substance of globalisation and its relevance to Afghanistan

The term ‘globalisation’ essentially denotes multiple economic, political, social, and cultural processes that are simultaneously at work between states and societies across the world. In fact, globalisation, especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, has opened up new forms of cooperation through networks of regional organisations as well as conflicts, including those between the state and non-state actors. Ostensibly, globalisation has been facilitating the free movement of goods, capital, services, technology, knowledge, finance, terror, diseases, information, and people, leading to the compression of time and space where, ideally, the notion of a global village could be perceived. However, such a description of globalisation may not be accurate as it hides underlying forces that are stimulating such varied movements, leading to definite shrinkage in time and space. To put it tersely, globalisation has inextricable links with diverse forms of capitalism. Capitalism signifies the organisation of production where means of production are owned privately or by corporate bodies with shareholders. As a mode of production and a world system, it has constantly destroyed and recreated itself according to circumstances by accumulating capital through surplus accrued owing to profits, rents and dividends on the world scale. Admittedly, apart from the conventional capitalist countries of North America and West Europe, countries such as Japan, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Africa, and others are in the process of evolving their own variety of capitalist state, society and culture. At the same time, the phase of globalisation need not be reduced to only capitalism. There are movements of resistance locally and transnationally that are constantly agitating against capitalism at different levels, allowing capitalism to be reformed. Even diehard capitalists have offered a sharp critique of the unbridled exploitation that capitalism had brought in its wake after the Cold War to ensure that capitalism functions smoothly by observing the minimum standards of justice (Soros 1997).

Unprecedented movement of capital and dynamism in currency mobilisation has made the current phase of globalisation unique by spreading new forms of inequalities, migrations and unemployment in different parts of the world. For instance, in the erstwhile Third World, one comes across exclusive localities in urban centres where people lead lives like those in the First World. In contrast, thanks to migrations or innate socio-economic inequalities, there are localities in the urban centres of the First World where people lead an impoverished life like those in poorer countries. Besides, imperialism as a phenomenon signifying asymmetric forms of interdependence between materially advanced and backward societies is alive under globalisation as a by-product of capitalism (Harshé 1997). One can also construe imperialism in its multilateral forms by analysing the dominance of the global north in the world political economy.

What is more, as Negri and Hardt have argued, is that as against imperialism there is the rise of Empire, under globalisation, which is the decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that incorporates the entire global realm within its expanding frontiers (Negri and Hardt 2001: XII). They have elaborated at length flexible hierarchies, hybrid identities and a variety of actors as also networks that constitute Empire. This Empire, which is a product of the free flow of factors of production such as money, technology, goods, and people across the frontiers, is in search of theorisation.

It needs to be underscored that terrorism as a phenomenon, which happens to be relevant in the Afghan context, has acquired global dimensions through multinational terrorist outfits such as Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab. Apparently, the world under globalisation is becoming borderless with the gradual erosion of the primacy of nation states. However, this could be a fairly superficial assertion. For, even though the phase of globalisation has witnessed the rise of transnational regimes such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or supranational organ-isations from the European Union (EU), regional organisations such as South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the state is the primary and indispensable unit in their making. Similarly, the so-called borderless world could also be a myth. Indeed, new borders are being drawn all over the world. The rise of the Central Asian Republics after the fall of the Soviet Union or the resurgence of ethno nationalism in East Europe abundantly demonstrates how the transition is taking place in different parts of the world from empire to nation. Moreover, the functioning of a developed regional organisation such as the EU is characterised by Germany’s capacity to assert German pre-eminence in the realm of finance. Such assertion is accompanied by protest from weaker states such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, which aspire to get appropriately accommodated within the EU in spite of their worsening economic conditions due to the global financial crisis.

Indeed, Afghanistan has to be located in the complex context mentioned above. Evidently, the issues related to ethnicity, nationality, tribalism, war lordism, and borders are alive in the context of most of the developing countries of the erstwhile Third World, or for that matter, even in any other part of the world, despite globalisation. Such issues are influenced by globalisation, on one hand, and they are also shaping the processes of globalisation, on the other. Afghanistan is a case in point (Jalalzai and Jefferess 2011). Afghanistan and its predicament need to be placed in a context where porous borders, coupled with ethnic-tribal strife, has been co-existing along with umpteen modes of transnational realities that include the manoeuvrings of imperialist powers such as the former Soviet Union as well as the USA, the presence of international troops mustered through transnational coalition of forces, the flow of arms and drugs and general global interest in registering presence in Afghanistan of the major powers. In essence, even under globalisation, any discussion regarding borders – ethnic or national – is legitimate. Among the borders in Afghanistan, the significance of the Durand line could be placed in perspective as follows.

Durand line

Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multilingual country. Among the ethnic groups, the Pashtuns are roughly 42 per cent, followed by other groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbecks, Aimaks, Turkmen, and Baloch. Moreover, Pashto and Dari are both official languages of Afghanistan. Considering Afghanistan’s geopolitical location, its ethno-cultural diversities and porous borders, the geographical space of Afghanistan has been vulnerable to invasions for a long time. For instance, in the 5th century BC, Cyrus the Great, who was the founder of the Persian Empire, had invaded the present-day Afghanistan on his way to Hindu Kush. Likewise, over the last 2,500 years, Alexander the Great, the Scythians, Parthians, White Hans, Arabs, Turks, and Mongols also invaded Afghanistan from the north-west. During the whole of the 19th century, the rivalry between Britain and Russia to control Central Asia/Afghanistan was vividly described as the Great Game. The British, in their own ways, chose to draw a map of Afghanistan with an idea of developing Afghanistan as a buffer zone between the British Empire in India and the Czarist Empire in Central Asia. In the process, Mortimer Durand, the then British Secretary based in British India, drew the border between Afghanistan and India (currently Pakistan) that is known as the Durand line.

After two Anglo-Afghan wars (in 1838 and 1878), the Durand line came into existence as the result of an agreement between Amir Abdur Rehaman Khan of Afghanistan and British India in 1893. It is 2,640 km long. By signing the agreement with Britain, Afghanistan relinquished a few districts, including Swat, Chitral and Chagel, and had gained elsewhere in Nuristan or Asmar in north-eastern Afghanistan – areas which it had not controlled traditionally. The Durand line cuts across Pashtun tribal areas further south of Baluchistan. It politically divides Pashtuns, Baluch and other ethnic groups. It also demarcates Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Areas, Baluchistan, and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir/Gilgit Baltistan of northern and western Pakistan from the north-eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. Geopolitically, it is considered among the most dangerous borders in contemporary international relations (Rahi 2014). Subsequently, the Rawalpindi treaty of 1919 only slightly modified the earlier agreement of 1893 that had drawn Durand line. Thus, even though globalisation, theoretically, is supposed to eliminate symbolic borders, the notion of borders continues to be a burning issue. In fact, the Durand line is not recognised by the Pashtuns on either side of the divide. Nevertheless, the Nadir Shah regime in Afghanistan (1930–33) had recognised the Durand line as an international border (Saikal 2004: 102). Ironically, Pakistan, in the eastern part, has had to deal with India so far as the Kashmir issue is concerned, and in the western part, with Afghanistan as far as the Durand line as also the aspirations of the Pakistani Pashtuns are concerned. As Pakistan, during the Cold War phase (1945–90), chose to seek US military assistance and aid since 1953, Afghanistan turned to the then Soviet Union. From 1953 to 1973, the Soviets supported regimes in Kabul with aid and military assistance, trained civilian and military personnel from Afghanistan in the Soviet Russia. However, the current situation in Afghanistan can be placed in a proper perspective after analysing a few significant developments that commenced Afghanistan’s prolonged search for political stability.

Afghanistan in search of political stability

Afghanistan witnessed speedy political transition with the ouster of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who was replaced by Mohammad Daoud in July 1973. Daoud chose to establish a more progressive regime by proclaiming Afghanistan as a republic. He also wanted to modernise Afghanistan and reduce corruption and inefficiency under his regime. Since the primary source of aid to Afghanistan was the Soviet Union, Daoud allowed the quasi Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to develop and play a significant role in politics at the risk of being targeted by it in future (Lowther 2007: 127). The Daoud regime was overthrown on 28 April 1978 after a bloody military coup, aided by PDPA. Nur Mahammad Taraki emerged as the President of the Revolutionary Council and the Prime Minister of the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) after the coup. Taraki’s manner of functioning, especially his brutal course of reforms, fuelled insurgency in Nuristan. Subsequently, a former prime minister as also defence minister, namely Hafizullah Amin, replaced Taraki through a palace coup. In a word, by the time Red Army paratroopers began landing in Kabul on 24 December 1979, the political conditions in Afghanistan were chaotic and almost unmanageable.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the new Cold War

There are a few developments which had a lasting impact after the Soviet intervention that warrant closer scrutiny. First, the decade long (1979–89) Soviet military presence in Afghanistan led to realignment of forces in the politics of south-west and west Asia due to the USA’s interest in repealing the Soviet advances in the region. The USA, especially after the Islamic revolution and the fall of the Shah Regime in Iran in 1979, had already waged the New Cold War against the ‘evil empire’ of the Soviet Union. In every other part of the globe, the Reagan administration in the early 1980s was containing the possible advances of the Soviet Union and its allies. It went to the extent of supporting dictatorial regimes, for instance, of Pinochet (Chile), Mobutu (Zaire), Zia ul–Haq (Pakistan), Marcos (Philippines), and so on as also apartheid regimes in South Africa and the Zionist state of Israel to achieve this objective. In south-west and west Asia, the USA aimed at withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In its bid to contest and eventually eliminate Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, the USA used Pakistan as a frontline state and poured and funnelled arms to combat the Soviet forces through Pakistan. In fact, the Zia regime (1978–86) in Pakistan could perceive the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as an opportunity to exploit the USA and its economic and military support. Pakistan took full advantage of its location and offered a ready base to forces that were going to fight for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

The USA went as far as to seek support from the holy warriors or diverse Mujahedin groups who were prepared to declare Jihad against the communist presence in Afghanistan. Obviously, all such groups landed on Pakistani soil. They were financed by Saudi Arabia and armed by the USA through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. The alignment of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the USA, and Mujahedin groups represented a queer coalition that eventually proved potent enough to put sufficient pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. In any case, in view of the overall rising military expenditure due to external military commitme...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• PART I Locating Afghanistan in a globalising world and testing theories of international relations
• PART II The USA, NATO and Afghanistan
• PART III Afghanistan and major powers
• PART IV Regional perspectives on Afghanistan
• Index