Hope

Stan van Hooft

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317548065
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

From the now iconic Barack Obama 'Hope' poster of the 2008 presidential campaign to the pit-head 'Camp Hope' of the families of the trapped Chilean miners, the language of hope can be hugely powerful as it draws on resources that are uniquely human and universal. We are beings who hope. But what does that say about us? What is hope and what role does it play in our lives? In his fascinating and thought-provoking investigation into the meaning of hope, Stan van Hooft shows that hope is a fundamental structure of the way we live our lives. For Aristotle being hopeful was part of a well-lived life, a virtue. For Aquinas it was a fundamentally theological virtue and for Kant a basic moral motivation. It shapes how we view ourselves and the world in which we live. Whether we hope for a life after death or for good weather tomorrow - whether our hopes are grand or humble - hoping is part of our outlook on life. What we hope for defines who we are. Drawing on everyday examples as well as more detailed discussion of hope in the arenas of medicine, politics and religion, van Hooft shows how hopefulness in not the same as hope and offers a convincing and powerful defense of the need for realism. There are few contemporary philosophical discussions of hope and Stan van Hooft's book offers an accessible and insightful discussion of the topic that shows the relevance of philosophical thinking and distinctions to this important aspect of human life.

1. Defining hope

What do we mean by “hope”? Hope seems to be a psychological state that we experience as part of our inner, subjective lives. However, not all usages of the word designate a state of mind in this way. We sometimes say of someone that “he does not have a hope”. Suppose a goal kicker of average ability is taking a penalty kick against a team and a goalkeeper who are very skilled at football. As he is about to take his kick we might say of him that he has no hope of scoring the goal. We do not mean by this that he does not hope to score the goal. Indeed, we assume that he does hope to. But we are not referring to his psychological condition or to any mental states he might be in. We are referring to the objective fact that he has but a very slim chance of scoring a goal: so slim, in fact, that we think there is no likelihood at all that he will score a goal. We express this by saying that he has no hope of doing so. This statement is a description of the physical or factual likelihood of the outcome taking place. It is an assessment of the objective circumstances rather than of the internal psychological state of the footballer.

But the meaning that we are more interested in is when the word is being used to refer to the way someone feels or thinks about a situation. Let us explore this thoroughly.

An example

John has to go out to attend a lecture at his university and he doesn’t have an umbrella. Moreover, he is moving house and so most of his clothes are in boxes and relatively inaccessible. The weather forecast says there is a chance of rain and John does not want to get wet. Not only would getting wet be uncomfortable, but if his clothes get wet he will have nothing to wear the next day. As he is about to leave his house the sky is clear, but he can see dark clouds forming in the distance. John hopes that it will not rain.

What conditions have to obtain for it to make sense for John to hope that it will not rain? What are the thoughts and feelings that John needs to have for it to be appropriate for us to use the word “hope” in describing his state of mind?

The first thing that seems to be necessary is that he has a relevant desire. Indeed, he has a number of relevant desires. He desires to get to his university and he desires to do so at a certain time (with the consequence that he cannot wait for the weather to clear up). These desires flow from his commitment to his university studies. But his most relevant desire is the desire not to get wet. He would not enjoy walking to his destination in the rain. Indeed, in this case it is an unusually urgent desire since he does not have a change of clothes readily available to him. Accordingly, getting his clothes wet would not only be uncomfortable but would also be a serious inconvenience. John desires not to suffer this inconvenience. Moreover, not only does he need to have a desire that it not rain, but he has to be worried about the effect that the rain would have on him if it should come. He has to give thought to the unfortunate consequences to him of getting wet. Unlike Gene Kelly in the famous scene from the film Singin’ in the Rain, John is anxious not to get wet. It is a matter of concern to him that his clothes stay dry so that he can wear them again the next day. The weather forecast, along with his seeing the dark clouds in the distance, only increases his anxiety about the possibility of getting wet.

A second condition is a consequence of the first. This is that John must consider it to be a good thing for him if it does not rain. It might not be good for farmers or gardeners who need rain, but given John’s needs and concerns, he will judge it to be a good thing if it does not rain.

A third condition that needs to obtain for it to make sense for John to hope that it will not rain is that he has to consider it to be possible that it will rain. If John were convinced that it would not rain, there would be no point in his hoping that it would not. This condition is fulfilled in the example because he has heard a weather forecast that predicts that it will rain and because he has seen the dark clouds gathering in the distance. Notice that this is a psychological matter. It is not the objective possibility that it will rain that is important but the fact that he considers it possible. There are meteorological conditions that make it more or less likely that it will rain, and a certain set of meteorological conditions obtains on that day. According to the weather report those actual conditions are such as to make it likely that it will rain. On other days they might have been such as to make it very unlikely, if not impossible, that it would rain. These are objective conditions that are as they are irrespective of what John or anyone else thinks about them. What we are considering in the example, however, is what John considers possible or likely. One could imagine that if John were going out on a day when rain was extremely unlikely, he might still hope that it does not rain. But if he does have such a hope it will be because he thinks that rain is possible. If he were convinced that it was impossible that it would rain, then it would make no sense for him to hope that it would not. He would then not need to have such a hope because he already knows that it will not. But in this example he is envisaging an unwelcome possibility, that it will rain, and hoping that it will not eventuate. For him to hope that it will not happen he must consider it to be possible that it will.

A fourth condition for its making sense for John to hope that it will not rain is that it is possible that it will not rain. What this means is that if John knew that the meteorological conditions were such that rain was inevitable, then it would make no sense to describe John as hoping that it would not rain. If he hopes that it does not rain he must consider it possible that it does not rain. It follows that he must not think that rain is inevitable. If the conditions and indications were such as to induce in John the belief that rain was inevitable, it would make no sense for him to hope that it does not rain. This would be especially clear if we imagine John leaving the house when it is already raining. It certainly would not make sense for him then to hope that it does not rain. The technical term to describe the third and fourth conditions together – that the hoped-for event is possible but not inevitable – is the word “contingent”. An occurrence is contingent if it might or might not have happened: that is, if it was not necessary, inevitable or impossible that it should happen. An occurrence is contingent if luck – in the form of unknown or unexpected causal influences – can intervene to make it happen or to stop it from happening.

The role of time in these conditions leads me to propose a fifth. As we have just noted, if John were to step outside and feel the rain on his skin it would make no sense for him to say “I hope it does not rain”. It would be even stranger for him to say “I hope it is not raining”. If it manifestly is raining, to say such a thing would be to misuse the word “hope”. He might say “I wish it were not raining”, but he could not say “I hope it were not raining”. John’s thought “I hope it does not rain” refers to the future. It might be more accurate to convey its content by saying “I hope it will not rain” and in this way make the future reference of the hope more explicit. But it is interesting to reflect that, from John’s own point of view, anything is possible in the future. Even if the meteorological conditions were such that rain was completely inevitable, the fact that the rain is not yet actual gives John the psychological possibility of thinking that it might not come and hence of hoping that it will not. On the other hand, if time has passed so that that envisaged future is already settled, what was in John’s future has become the present or the past. Accordingly, it will no longer be considered possible for things to turn out differently from the way they have. If the rain has started, it is no longer possible that it not be raining. It follows that it would make no sense for John to hope that it will not rain. If it ever does make sense to say “I hope it is not raining” when it actually is raining, we could imagine it doing so when John does not know whether it is raining as he is about to leave the house. In this case his hope is future oriented in his thinking if not in fact. What is objectively the case in the present is indeed the case. It is either raining or it is not. But John does not know whether it is. He will find out as soon as he steps outside. His stepping outside is still in the future, however, and so it makes sense for him to hope that it is not raining. In this case, he is hoping that what he finds out about the weather when he steps outside is that it is not raining.

What we have learnt from this example is that hopes are oriented toward the future. Suppose it had rained yesterday and that John had been out in the rain and his clothes had become wet. This had been a discomfort and inconvenience to him. Would it make sense for him now to hope that it had not rained yesterday? No, it would not. If it happened yesterday then he cannot now hope that the circumstances had been different. We saw above that it only makes sense to speak of hope if what is hoped for is possible. But yesterday’s weather cannot be different now from what it was. It has happened in the past and cannot now be changed. That it did not rain yesterday is therefore impossible now. And if it is impossible, John cannot be said to hope for it.

This is not to say, however, that John cannot have some kind of feeling towards yesterday’s weather that is, perhaps, similar to hope. He can wish that it had not rained yesterday, just as he can wish that it were not raining now when it actually is. The conditions for making sense of this are similar to the conditions that make sense of hope. He has a desire that it does not rain and that he does not get his clothes wet. And, in light of the science of meteorology, it is objectively possible that it might not have rained yesterday, even though, in fact, it did. But it is not now possible that it will not have rained yesterday because, in fact, it did. The feeling that John can have today that is similar to hope but different from it, is that he can wish that it had not rained yesterday.

A wish is a psychological state that is similar to a hope in interesting ways. Both are expressions of what John wants and of what he is anxious about. John wants to walk outside without getting wet and is anxious about ruining his clothes. He expresses this by feeling and articulating various wishes and hopes. With reference to the future he hopes that it will not rain, while with reference to the past he wishes that it had not rained. Hope refers to the future while, in this case, John’s wish refers to the past. As I noted above, he could also wish that it were not raining in the present. If it is actually raining now, he could wish that it were not. But he cannot be said to hope that it not raining when it actually is raining since that would be hoping for something that, given present meteorological conditions, is never going to happen. Hopes can only refer to what is possible in the future.

Of course, wishes can refer to the future also. Let us imagine that when John steps outside and sees the dark clouds gathering he becomes convinced that rain is inevitable. He now considers it impossible that it will not rain. Accordingly, the fourth condition for its making sense for him to hope that it will not rain is not met. If he is completely convinced that it will rain, he cannot hope that it will not. Nevertheless, it would make sense to say of him that he wishes it would not rain. Even if he were to feel the first drops of rain on his clothes, he could go on wishing that it would not rain. His wishes can extend into the future and embrace any scenario. His hopes, however, are limited to what is possible, and if it is actually raining then it is no longer possible that it is not raining now. Accordingly, he cannot hope that it does not rain.

We can describe this difference between hopes and wishes in more general terms. We could say that wishes do not need to be realistic while hopes do. Just how realistic hopes should be is a matter we shall explore later. For the moment it is important to see that wishes need not be realistic at all. Not only can John wish that it not rain even when it manifestly is raining, but he can also wish that it had not rained yesterday when it clearly did. More generally, John can wish that the tooth fairy will stop it from raining or that the Easter bunny will bring him good luck. He can wish that global warming was not a reality or that dire poverty in the developing world was not the cause of millions of avoidable deaths every year. He can wish that he was rich or a champion footballer. In short, he can wish for the realization of any of his fantasies, the alleviation of all his anxieties, the satisfaction of all his desires and the fulfilment of all his ideals. But he can only hope for what he considers possible.

A sixth condition is implicit in what we have seen already. Given that it might or might not rain and that John does not know whether it will, we could say that he is uncertain about whether it will rain. Whether it will rain or not is an objective matter. Given the meteorological conditions and the laws of nature, it will either rain or it will not. The occurrence of rain is objectively contingent. But corresponding to this objective state of affairs there is the subjective state of John’s not knowing whether it will rain or not. He is uncertain about the weather. It is this uncertainty, together with his anxiety about not getting wet, that leads him to hope that it will not rain.

There is also a seventh condition. Suppose John had an umbrella. We have already noted that he wants to keep dry when he goes outside and that he is anxious about getting his clothes wet. Let us qualify this a little by saying that he wants to keep relatively dry, or as dry as using an umbrella would make him. If this were what he wanted and if he had an umbrella, then it would be within his power to secure what he wants and allay his concerns when he goes outside in the rain. He just needs to put up his umbrella. In this circumstance, does it make sense for him to hope that it will not rain? Perhaps this question will gain more focus if we reformulate it as: would he hope that he will not get wet? (It was, after all, because he did not want to get wet that he hoped it would not rain in the original scenario.) I think it would not make very much sense for him to hope that he would not get wet because he has it within his power to ensure that he does not get wet. He only has to put up his umbrella. If he can control his circumstances in such a way as to avoid an unpleasant outcome or to secure a pleasant outcome, then it makes little sense for John to merely hope for that outcome. Rather, his mental state should be that of intending to secure that outcome. He could just go ahead and do what was necessary. To say that he hopes for that outcome implies that he cannot control all the parameters of the situation so as to secure the outcome he wants. To say that John hopes that he will not get wet implies that he cannot control whether or not he gets wet. If he can control it by using his umbrella, then it would be redundant for him to also hope not to get wet. (Once again, however, he could still wish that he not get wet, even as he is putting up his umbrella. The notion of a wish seems much more accommodating.)

To return to the original example in which John did not have an umbrella, we can apply this point by suggesting that a further condition for its making sense for John to hope that it would not rain is that he has no control over whether it rains or not. This point is easily missed in this example because no one has any significant control over meteorological conditions. The forces of nature that are involved here are too great and amorphous to admit of human control (although climate scientists do hope that there are things human beings can do to reduce the effects of global climate change). It is certainly true that no one can control whether it will rain today, least of all John himself. It is because he knows that he cannot control whether it rains or not that it makes sense for him to hope that it will not rain. If he were to be able to control the weather he would not need to hope for that outcome: he could just do what was necessary to secure it.

Let us summarize, then, the conditions that make it appropriate for John to hope that it does not rain in the circumstances I have described.

1. John has to be concerned about the effect of rain on him. This applies because he has a desire not to get wet.

2. John has to consider that it would be a good thing for him if it did not rain. (This follows from the first condition.)

3. He has to consider that it is possible that it will rain.

4. He has to consider that it is possible that it will not rain: that is, that rain is not inevitable.

5. The hope is directed towards weather conditions that lie in John’s future.

6. John is uncertain about whether it will rain.

7. John is not able to control the meteorological forces that would stop it from raining.

Do these conditions allow us to offer a definition of what hope is? They certainly give us some clues as to what clauses should appear in such a definition.

Hopes and wishes

While discussing our example we had occasion to contrast hopes and wishes. Let us therefore begin our task of defining hope by specifying what features hopes have that wishes do not have. What we discovered earlier is that a hope is a wish that differs from other wishes in that its object needs to be considered to be in the future of the person who is hoping for it, that the person who is hoping for it cannot bring it about entirely by her own efforts and that it is possible that what is hoped for could occur or could not occur. While some of these features apply to wishes as well, not all of them do. Most notably, a wish can be for something that is not possible, either because it is in the past or because the laws of nature will not allow it to happen. I would suggest that this is a definitive difference between hopes and wishes. A hope should be for something that is possible.

What other differences might there be between wishes and hopes? It is sometimes suggested in popular films for children that if you wish for something hard enough it will come to you. This point suggests that wishes admit of degrees: that you can wish in a more or less intense manner. Does hope admit of degrees in this way? If it did then hope would share this property with other emotions. You can be more or less angry and you can be more or less sad. While it might be naive to say that if you just hope hard enough what you hope for will happen, it does seem to make sense to speak of hoping more or less intensely. One way in which this would make sense is that one can desire what one hopes for more or less intensely. John’s desire that his clothes not get wet is fairly intense because getting them wet would be seriously inconvenient for him. He is worried about getting his clothes wet. However, it is not a life or death matter. His hope is intense to the degree that his desire and his concern not to get wet are intense. Moreover, it seems we could say that the intensity of hope is inversely proportional to the likelihood of the hoped-for event occurring. If John thinks that it is very unlikely that it will rain, then he does not have to hope so intensely that it will not. His hope will be tempered by his expectation. In contrast, if he notes the dark clouds and the weather report and thus thinks that rain is very probable, his hope that it will not rain will possibly be more intense.

However, before we accept the idea that hope admits of degrees, we should notice that it is not easy to imagine what a more intense hope would feel like in contrast to a less intense hope. There do not seem to be qualitative, experiential features in hopes that allows us to measure their intensity in the way that there is with anger or sadness. One can feel more or less angry, but can one feel hope more or less intensely? It would seem not. Perhaps this shows that hope is not an emotion in any simple sense. If we do speak of John hoping more or less intensely, we might be speaking obliquely about his desire that it will not rain and his anxiety about the consequences of the rain for him and suggesting that they can be more or less intense. The desire, the anxiety and the hope are inextricable from each other and so the intensity of the former rubs off on the latter.

There might also be further ways in which hopes differ from wishes. We might, for example, suggest that hopes differ from wishes in that they are more serious. The wish that Santa Claus brings me a Christmas present might be thought to lack seriousness in this sense. Not only is this a wish for something impossible in that it refers to a person who does not exist, but it also seems somewhat childish or frivolous, rather than reflecting a serious engagement with life and its challenges. It might help to use a more serious example to make this point. One of my students – let us call her Fatima – is a mother who has had the heart-wrenching ex...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: mapping the terrain
• 1. Defining hope
• 2. Being hopeful
• 3. Hope in the clinic
• 4. Hope and politics
• 5. Hope and religion
• Epilogue: the virtue of hope
• Further reading
• Bibliography
• Index